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Foreword 
on occasion in Newport and at other venues where scholars of naval and maritime af-
fairs congregate, old-timers lament the relative shortage of scholars, especially younger 
ones, interested in the U.s. Navy. aside from a handful of naval officers who manage to 
earn their doctorates while on active duty or who return to the university upon retire-
ment to finish their terminal degrees, there are relatively few scholars of the younger 
generations deeply interested in the U.s. Navy. Many of us read the bloggers and op-ed 
writers who write passionately about the latest development regarding the littoral 
combat ship or the impact of so-called strategic-pivot naval deployments. a few of us 
know faculty at the Naval War College or one of the other professional military educa-
tion institutions who, after cutting their intellectual teeth on other topics, ranging from 
nuclear deterrence to asian regional security, turn their attention to the U.s. Navy or 
the Marines for professional reasons. and, of course, they have written some very fine 
analyses. But scholars who begin their careers researching Navy issues are few and far 
between. (No, I have not named names in this paragraph, but I could. The risk would 
be to leave out worthy scholars or to mischaracterize someone and thus draw attention 
away from the larger point.)
Further, those who are interested in the Navy—whether serving or retired officers or 
scholars dabbling in naval affairs later in their careers—are often historians studying 
past battles, the evolution of technology, or long-lost doctrinal debates. Few use quanti-
tative methods, concern themselves with testing hypotheses, or address long-standing 
arguments within the disciplines of political science, international relations, or even 
strategic studies.
Many maritime hands might argue, so what? Why is it important for scholars from 
other disciplines to study the Navy? Why not leave the business of studying what the 
Navy does and has done to specialists and members of the community? The answers to 
these questions would require more argumentation than is appropriate here, but two 
points are suggestive. First, skeptics aside, methodologically sound studies can offer 
insights that would be difficult to replicate from traditional historical or case-based 
research. second, I would also argue that the Navy’s intellectual capital occasionally 
needs replenishment from outside the proverbial lifelines. after all, some of the most 
influential postwar studies of the U.s. Navy, its role in the world, and its contribution to 
U.s. national security have come from scholars not closely associated with the service; 
xvi  the newport papers
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Bernard Brodie and the sprouts, Harold and Margaret, are some of the earliest and most 
famous examples.
It is thus a welcome development to find a young civilian scholar with few ties to the 
Navy who seeks to study that service using the techniques of modern social science. It is 
even more welcome for the young scholar to be a woman, a non-american, and a native 
of a small, landlocked country. But that is exactly what we have here, with the author of 
this Newport Paper—Dr. larissa Forster.
Dr. Forster came to our attention through a roundabout but classic fashion: hers was 
a story of scholars talking to scholars about who is studying what, why, and where. 
eventually, she found her way, as a predissertation doctoral student at the University of 
Zurich, to the strategic research Department of the Naval War College’s Center for Na-
val Warfare studies, where she was a visiting research fellow. With the encouragement 
of many, ranging from Provost Mary ann Peters to Dean robert C. “Barney” rubel, she 
conceived of a dissertation that became, with many revisions and rewrites, the mono-
graph that follows.
I would encourage readers to consider Dr. Forster’s arguments carefully both because 
of her substantive conclusions and, perhaps even more importantly, because of her ef-
forts to build on the work of analysts like adam siegel, who in his days at the Center for 
Naval analyses worked long and hard to build a usable database of naval activities. like 
adam and a handful of others, Dr. Forster has labored to increase our analytic capacity 
by collecting data that will be available to analysts and scholars in the future.
In terms of substance, this study explores the political use of naval forces during foreign 
policy crises short of full-scale warfare. Dr. Forster uses a statistical model to analyze 
naval crisis data in ways useful to policy makers and strategists. she outlines the unique 
characteristics, advantages, and disadvantages of naval forces; summarizes theoretical 
literature on naval diplomacy and coercion; reviews earlier quantitative research; and 
explains the variables used in her analysis. In the end, the monograph presents an em-
pirical analysis in terms of crisis characteristics, actors, U.s. involvement, and outcomes.
peter dombrowski
Chairman, Strategic Research Department 
Naval War College
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Introduction: Military Interventions and the Deployment of Naval Forces
As long as the United States chooses to continue as the leader of the free 
world, sea power is the absolutely vital basis for United States policy, in 
peace or war, anywhere in the world. 
J. C. Wylie 
Mit der Navy sichern die USA im Frieden und im Krieg ihren einfluss 
und ihre Macht. (The U.S. Navy secures U.S. influence and power in both 
wartime and peacetime.)
Albert A. StAhel 
the use of military force is not restricted to fighting; it can also be employed to shape 
and influence events.1 During the October Arab-israeli War of 1973, neither superpower 
was directly engaged in the fighting, but both heavily supported their “client” states. 
the deployment of naval forces sent a strong signal, not only to the direct crisis partici-
pants but also to the other superpower. the Soviet navy initiated movements of assets 
into proximity of the crisis a couple of days before hostilities erupted. in direct reaction 
to the outbreak of the conflict on 5 October, the United States reinforced its Sixth Fleet 
and also moved vessels closer to the crisis location. 
At the onset of the war, the U.S. Navy (USN) had two aircraft carriers in the Mediter-
ranean and was thus ready to react on the same day. the aircraft carrier USS Indepen-
dence (CV 62) and three destroyers were ordered almost immediately to proceed to 
Crete and to stand by there. the other carrier, USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV 42), began 
to move east a couple of days later, and a third aircraft carrier was sent to the Mediterra-
nean as a backup. Over the next few weeks, the United States stretched a chain of ships, 
elements of the Sixth Fleet, across the Mediterranean to support U.S. transport aircraft 
and replacement fighter-bombers on their way to israel. the ships were placed to pro-
vide navigational, refueling, and rescue services and if necessary to prevent interdiction 
attempts from North Africa. 
increased readiness was relaxed on 17 November. the third, backup, aircraft carrier de-
parted the Mediterranean, and the Sixth Fleet resumed its normal operations. While the 
U.S. naval vessels had played no direct role in the fighting, they had contributed greatly 
to the U.S. diplomatic efforts. During the conflict the naval forces never entered the 
2  the newport papers
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combat zone and faced no direct challenge, but by containing the conflict they helped 
achieve diplomatic success. the presence of a strong force, strategically distributed, 
sent clear signals to both the Soviet Union and the crisis participants and underscored 
U.S. resolve.2 this example shows how naval forces can be used as a political tool to add 
weight to the diplomatic efforts without resorting to full-scale force. 
Military intervention always has been and always will be an important part of foreign 
policy, a tool to further national interests and influence world events.3 Many scholars 
have tried to explain the intervention behavior of states in crises, conflicts, and wars. 
When and why do states intervene, and what are reasons for nonintervention? What 
conflicts and crises are more likely to call for intervention, and why? When is interven-
tion successful? the explanations are manifold and include political, military, econom-
ic, social, environmental, domestic, and humanitarian factors.4 the theoretical literature 
covers a gamut of realist intentions, ranging from security, power, and national inter-
ests, as guides to state action;5 to emphasis on international trade and economics;6 and 
to domestic politics.7 Some argue for explanations based on idealistic aspirations, such 
as democracy and human rights.8 Many studies focus on a mix of different reasons.9 As 
Ken booth observes, a combination of motivations is the most common.10 An approach 
mostly neglected in the political science research is to ask why states choose different 
intervention strategies.11 Assuming capacity and will to intervene, policy makers must 
also determine how to pursue their goals.12
From this vast field i have selected international crises involving any form of U.S. activ-
ity in the years 1946–2006. Within these U.S. activities, i distinguish between crisis 
response with and without naval forces, as this study intends to advance the knowledge 
of the use of U.S. naval forces as a response to international crises and to contribute to 
a better understanding of when and how the U.S. Navy is deployed. there are various 
studies analyzing why the United States becomes involved in international conflicts, 
crises, or wars.13 One factor nearly absent in the research of this broad topic is in-depth 
analysis of what form and type of force is employed and why. Military interventions 
are responses to a variety of situations, exercised by many states, and carried out by 
different types of military services. As James Meernik and Chelsea brown observe, 
“While there has been a tremendous amount of research regarding the domestic and 
international factors that influence the decision to use force, far less work has been done 
to analyze the types of operations authorized and their relationship to duration, policy 
success, security, and stability in the affected areas, as well as a host of other concerns. 
Further research is needed in several areas.”14 
Full-scale wars have become rare, and the majority of confrontations occur at lower 
intensity levels. Crisis response is an activity short of full-scale war. Some identify it as a 
peacetime activity, and others locate it between peace and war. Most international crises 
influence without boots on the ground  3
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have occurred without an escalation to war, and many have been resolved without even 
resorting to the use of force. Crisis response covers a range of activities, from strictly po-
litical uses of force, such as the backing up of diplomacy with the threat of force, to open 
military engagement. While war preparedness is their ultimate raison d’être, armed 
forces are involved in many other international situations short of actual war, a fact that 
allows a broad analysis of naval activities. As a superpower, the United States is in an 
exceptional position to influence global events. the questions of when, where, and why 
the country should employ military force are among the national issues most frequently 
and passionately debated.15
Naval forces possess certain advantages over other military services. “Navies are not 
something you think about,” says robert Kaplan.16 “they are out there over the horizon. 
but if you look throughout history, navies are often a good indicator of where power is 
going. Navies are able to do things that armies can’t.” the U.S. Navy supports foreign 
policy objectives through a variety of missions, ranging from “showing the flag” to re-
taliatory attacks against hostile nations. An important asset in crises is the Navy’s abil-
ity to act as a persuasive deterrent to war by demonstrating an ability to destroy.17 the 
vast presence of the U.S. Navy around the world at all times allows for fast reaction. Sea 
power can influence nearly every country; very few places have no access to the sea or 
are beyond the reach of the power-projection capabilities of aircraft carriers. the ability 
to be present almost anywhere around the world and exert influence without “boots on 
the ground” is the quality that sets navies apart from armies and air forces in deploy-
ments short of war and highlights their unique capabilities for political missions during 
peacetime and crises.18 before World War ii, the engagement of the United States in 
world affairs was sporadic. but by the end of the war, it had established its preeminence 
in world politics, finance, and security. today, the nation’s armed forces, especially the 
U.S. Navy, face no equal competitor.
to date, naval forces as crisis-response tools have not been analyzed sufficiently. Al-
though there are studies researching the involvement of naval power in a particular cri-
sis or war, there is a dearth of empirical analysis and theory on their systemic role. the 
nation’s continuing reliance on the use of military force to influence events throughout 
the world justifies an in-depth inquiry into these events.19
the impetus of this project is to gain a fuller grasp of the U.S. Navy not simply as a 
military fighting force but as a political instrument. in the twentieth century, the Navy 
climbed up into the top ranks of the world’s fleets and became a powerful actor on the 
global stage. harold and Margaret Sprout identify the end of World War i as the begin-
ning of the U.S. Navy’s worldwide power status and of its evolution from an important 
instrument of national policy into an important element of the foreign policy of the 
United States.20 U.S. naval forces played a prominent role during World War ii, from 
4  the newport papers
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battles like those of Midway and leyte Gulf to Japan’s official surrender on the deck of 
USS Missouri (bb 63). the end of World War ii and the changed international structure 
and politics that emerged favored the use of naval forces as political instruments over 
other types of forces. Not only did the political situation and the general U.S. use of 
force change significantly after World War ii, but the U.S. Navy itself was transformed 
dramatically. it was by then the world’s largest and able to exert significant influence, 
with the help of its powerful aircraft carriers. 
Since World War ii the Navy has functioned simultaneously as what Charles Pirtle calls 
the “Sword of the State” and the “Shield of the republic.”21 the Navy’s crisis-response 
capabilities (assisted by those of the Marine Corps) guaranteed its important position 
as a tool in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. in the following Cold War, the Navy 
served as a nuclear deterrent and crisis-response force, while preparing for a possible 
global war with the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, the USN was always ready for 
this eventuality. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Navy’s power has been unchal-
lenged. Peacetime presence and focus on regional conflicts have been emphasized.22 the 
USN has regularly responded to international incidents, but it has done so even more 
frequently since the demise of the Soviet Union.23 
the specific goals of this study are twofold. First, a new data set will be generated. 
Most popular crisis data sets do not distinguish between the involvements of different 
military service types within an intervention. the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) 
published studies with basic data about the reactions of naval forces to international 
situations but not in a larger context.24 this exploratory study combines both extensive 
crisis data with naval involvement information by introducing new variables to an es-
tablished data set. thus, the first step is the generation of data that will allow examining 
naval crisis response more broadly than is possible with case studies. On the basis of the 
available data and information, different empirical methods will be employed to ana-
lyze hypotheses derived from assumed advantages and disadvantages of naval forces. 
Second, the basic empirical results will help to begin answering the many questions 
pertaining to the overarching question that follows. 
What Is the Role of U.S. Naval Forces in Crisis Response?
in order to structure the analysis, the study focuses on four different areas critical for 
understanding crisis response. the first set of questions focuses on the dimensions, 
context, and attributes of the crisis, followed by actor characteristics. the next category 
poses questions in regard to the U.S. involvement, both as third party and direct actor; 
the last part is concerned with the crisis termination. these four categories encompass 
most significant events.
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1. Crisis Characteristics
•	 1.1. in what type of crises are U.S. naval forces mostly deployed?
•	 1.2. to which crisis locations do U.S. naval forces mostly deploy?
2. Crisis Actors
•	 2.1. how do other actors influence U.S. naval involvement?
•	 2.2. What crisis-actor characteristics trigger the deployment of U.S. naval forces?
•	 2.3. how is the U.S. naval involvement perceived by the other crisis actors?
3. U.S. involvement
•	 3.1. in what type of activity are U.S. naval forces most likely deployed?
•	 3.2. how do U.S. naval forces deploy with other military services? 
•	 3.3. how effective is the U.S. naval involvement?
4. Crisis Outcomes
•	 4.1. how do U.S. naval forces influence outcomes?
Defining the Concepts
Military forces can be deployed as reactions to a variety of incidents, such as full-scale 
wars, small wars, civil wars, domestic crises, international crises or conflicts, ethnic 
conflicts, intrastate conflicts, or disasters, to name a few. 
Crises, Conflicts, and Wars
richard lebow presents the following justification for focusing on international crises 
in studying the use of force short of war: “Short of war, crises are the most salient and 
visible points of conflict between states.”25 Crisis and conflict, although often conflated, 
are different phenomena. in most cases, a crisis concerns a single event—for example, 
a threat to a political regime—whereas “conflict” emphasizes the time factor. Conflicts 
can stretch over a long period of time and may erupt on multiple occasions with differ-
ent degrees of intensity. international crises often occur within conflicts or even within 
wars—“intrawar crises.” Crises can also lead to long-lasting conflicts or to the outbreak 
of wars. Michael brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld classify war as a subset of crisis.26 
Furthermore, all wars are preceded by crises, but not all crises conclude in a war.27
there are many definitions of international crisis. According to lebow, most classi-
fications have in common certain elements, such as “perception of threat, heightened 
anxieties on the part of the decision-makers, the expectation of possible violence, the 
belief that important far-reaching decisions are required and must be made on the basis 
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of incomplete information in a stressful environment.”28 international crises often rep-
resent turning points in international politics and change the perceptions of the crisis 
participants, not only between those involved but also their perceptions of other states. 
“We regard crisis as an occasion for decision. that is, crisis is a situation or an event that 
confronts decision makers with an opportunity for response, either action or inaction.”29
this analysis considers, in accordance with the international Crisis behavior Project, 
that an international crisis is present when the following conditions are met:30
1. A change in type/or increase of disruptive—that is hostile verbal or physical—interactions 
between two or more states, with a heightened possibility of military hostilities, that, in turn:
2. destabilizes their relationship and challenges the structure of an international system—global, 
dominant, or subsystem.
An international crisis erupts with a “break-point,” posing a threat to the values of 
states, coupled with time restraint and “a heightened probability of involvement in 
military hostilities.”
international crises are heavily influenced by external parties. Much depends on when, 
how, and why these parties become involved. the involvement of a major power can 
profoundly impact and shape the outcome.
Political Use of Force and (Military) Intervention
Many authors, such as barry blechman, point to the great value of military power as 
a political use of force short of actual deployment in war.31 Generally, the political use 
of force means the use of armed forces short of war. in their extensive study on the use 
of armed forces blechman and Kaplan define the political use of force as follows: “A 
political use of the armed forces occurs when physical actions are taken by one or more 
components of the uniformed military services as part of a deliberate attempt by the 
national authorities to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of 
individuals in another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.”32
the ultimate goal should be a show of military strength that allows a nation to accom-
plish goals without having to resort to violence. As Clausewitz remarked, “So, too, the 
armed forces—by their very existence as well as by their general character, deployment, 
and day-to-day activities—can be used as an instrument of policy in time of peace. in 
peace, as in war, a prudent statesman will turn to the military not as a replacement or 
substitute for other tools of policy but as an integral part of an admixture . . . of means.”33
Any decision to intervene in an international crisis is risky and challenging. it is often 
difficult to categorize the involvement clearly. Generally war imposes the will of one 
state on another, whereas the political use of force involves a lesser degree of violence (if 
any) and is employed to influence the behavior of foreign actors. Despite this distinction, 
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it is not always clear where to draw the line. Meernik describes the intervention in 
Panama in 1989 as an example.34 that invasion can be viewed as an effort either to 
impose U.S. will on Panama or merely to influence events. the existence of perma-
nent military bases abroad and routine operations, he believes, do not fall under the 
category of political uses of force. While i agree with Meernik on this point, i disagree 
with his statement that covert or paramilitary operations cannot be part of the political 
use of force. this deployment of armed forces too aims at altering and influencing the 
behavior and actions of adversaries and therefore can be said to be political rather than 
specifically military and violent in nature, not synonymous with imposing will and 
employing full-scale force.
by becoming involved in an international crisis, the actors essentially intervene in the 
affairs of a third party, or several parties. For the statistical analyses in this study, no 
classification of intervention is needed. however, the following explanations help in 
understanding the broader picture of involvement in international crises. intervention 
can be a very extensive concept. James rosenau points to the difficulty of agreeing on a 
clear definition.35 For Adrian Guelke, intervention can include any event between states, 
while for bryan hehir, “intervention means the use of force to address problems within 
boundaries of a sovereign state.”36 Karen Feste describes intervention, in its broadest 
form, as a 
process of overt or covert involvement by an outsider in the internal economic, social, or political 
processes of another society with the aim of determining the direction of trends in the target coun-
try’s policies, institutions, or policies. Strategies used to exercise leverage in these situations include 
a range of assistance through military instruments (supplying combat troops or peacekeeping 
observers, weaponry, advisors), economic support or sanctions (financial aid, embargo), and politi-
cal and diplomatic initiatives (mediation offices, nonrecognition, refugee policies). the intervention 
approach may be passive, providing little beyond words of support or condemnation to the parties 
in the conflict; or active, with physical movement of troops and supplies.37
Some scholars, like hehir, already include the use of force in their definitions of in-
tervention.38 elizabeth Saunders provides a detailed account of military interventions, 
adding the “military component” to interventions: 
i thus define military intervention as an overt, short-term deployment of at least 1,000 combat-
ready ground troops across international boundaries to influence an outcome in another state or an 
interstate dispute; it may or may not interfere in another state’s domestic institutions. “Short-term” 
may encompass a wide range of time frames, but it excludes conquest or colonialism. interventions 
into both interstate and intrastate conflicts or crises are included in the universe of cases; both can 
vary in the degree of internal interference.39 
these definitions demonstrate how variously the concept of intervention can be 
interpreted. thus a deployment of naval forces to reach a foreign-policy objective can 
be classified, depending on goals and forms of deployment, as either an intervention 
or a military intervention. For a detailed analysis of the deployment of the U.S. armed 
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services, it is important to maintain the distinctions between forms of intervention, in-
cluding between covert/semi-military and direct military, and types of mission. Feste’s 
detailed explanation and very inclusive description of the different characteristics help 
to demonstrate the various aspects the term can encompass.40 the identification of both 
overt and covert activities and of both military and nonmilitary aspects captures impor-
tant elements of interventions.
Naval Crisis Response: Peacetime or Wartime Activity
the focus on crisis response invites the question where to locate this activity along the 
spectrum of naval operations. the broadest classification of naval functions divides it 
into two categories: the use of force and action short of the use of force. Another pos-
sibility is categorization into wartime and peacetime functions. Crisis response, often 
referred to as a peacetime function, can include not only threatened but also actual use 
of force. therefore, arguably, crisis response should be a separate category, between 
peacetime and wartime. to employ the first distinction—that between the use of force 
and action short of force—crisis response would be situated between these two. While 
the mere demonstration of power without actual employment of force is desirable, it 
might be necessary to resort at least to a limited amount of force to resolve a crisis. 
the second categorization—wartime and peacetime—allows a more nuanced expla-
nation of crisis response. Scholars differ in their interpretations of “peacetime.” For 
Alberto Coll, “peacetime engagement refers to those activities carried out before a crisis 
exists, or at least before it has crossed the threshold into armed violence.” 41 Dr. Coll 
refers to operations between war and peace, such as humanitarian interventions or 
peace enforcement, as “chaos management,” accompanied by a heightened possibility 
of force. Other scholars define peacetime more broadly. During the Cold War, bradford 
Dismukes suggested the following comprehensive definition: “[peacetime] is meant to 
encompass all situations short of major war with the USSr. Operations in peacetime 
can range from routine forward deployments, to crisis augmentations of forces, to ac-
tions against a nation other than the USSr, and can even include a local conventional 
exchange between U.S. and Soviet forces in connection with a third World crisis.” 42
At around the same time, Charles Allen distinguished two peacetime deployments for 
naval forces: routine posture, and operations/reactions to increased tensions or crisis.43 
robert Mahoney and Adam Siegel (writing separately) also define crisis response as a 
peacetime activity but offer more general classifications independent of the Cold War.44 
the absence of war, defined by the threshold of U.S. casualties lower than one thousand, 
defines the term “peacetime activity.” the U.S. General Accounting Office (as today’s 
Government Accountability Office was then known) and linton brooks provided in the 
mid-1990s more detailed characterizations.45 According to the former, “the peacetime 
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role of forward-deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious task forces covers the 
spectrum of military involvement—from single-ship port visits, maritime interdiction 
and blockades, humanitarian relief missions, and emergency evacuation of U.S. nation-
als, to major amphibious operations.” Similarly, brooks defines crisis as part of “military 
operations other than war” (MOOtW). in his view, all military peacetime operations 
support one of the three following tasks: 
•	 Preparing for war. training, operating in areas of potential conflict to get accustomed to 
them, working with allies.
•	 Responding to crises with action. Protecting American citizens, respond to natural disasters, 
solutions for local conflicts, prevent conflicts from spreading, punishing aggression.
•	 Advancing U.S. interests without the use of force. Deterring adversaries, reassuring allies and 
friends, sending signals of U.S. interests, fostering goodwill.46
More recently, in 2007, in “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,” the 
heads of the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard highlighted the presence of 
naval forces in the event of crisis. the Navy possesses, it declared, the capability to 
respond even “should peacetime operations transition to war.” 47 it is debatable when 
exactly this “transition” occurs, when an operation is considered a wartime, and no 
longer a peacetime, undertaking. international crises per se are confrontations short 
of actual full-scale wars, and therefore i will follow the earlier definition of Mahoney 
and Siegel, considering all responses involving fewer than a thousand U.S. casualties 
“peacetime operations.” 48
Plan of the Study
this study is very exploratory in nature. First, a new data set had to be created combin-
ing crisis and naval-response information. Second, four subsets of crisis are chosen in 
an attempt to provide a comprehensive account of the influence of seaborne forces. the 
idea of the political use of force, short of full-scale warfare, guides the entire analysis. 
Chapter 1 sets the stage by explaining the advantages and disadvantages of naval forces 
and providing a detailed account of naval functions. the chapter concludes with the 
most recent developments, as of this writing; an understanding of the unique capabili-
ties of naval forces is important as a basis for theories and hypotheses. the theoretical 
explanations in chapter 2 connect naval capabilities with literature on naval diplomacy 
and coercion, so as to inform the hypotheses. Chapter 3 explains the groundwork of 
my empirical analyses, discussing earlier quantitative research and identifying naval 
variables for international crises, thereby generating a new data set. the various empiri-
cal methods will be explained, followed by the presentation of “simple frequencies.” 
the purpose in doing so will be not to develop a complex statistical model but rather 
to find and present naval crisis data. Chapters 4 (crisis characteristics and actors) and 5 
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(U.S. involvement and outcomes) present the results of the empirical analyses. Where 
possible, specific international crises will be briefly summarized to support or ques-
tion the findings. After each of these two chapters, the results of the models will be 
explained. the last chapter reviews the most important findings, discusses limitations, 
points to future research, and argues that these results are of importance for policy and 
decision makers.
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Navies are able to Do Things That armies Can’t
The Difference between the U.s. Navy and other U.s. 
armed Forces
We can do all that because our equipment is flexible and fungible, 
because our forces have a zero land based footprint, and we can 
maneuver because our forces and their equipment are together. When 
we are ordered by the President to meet some challenge on behalf of our 
Nation, we don’t have to negotiate or wait for permission to use someone 
else’s soil. We move on the seas that we control.
raY MaBUs, seCreTarY oF THe NavY, 2009
The U.s. Navy enjoys a unique position among the military services. armies, navies, 
and air forces are not of the same kind.1 The most obvious difference is in the environ-
ments within which they operate—land, sea, and air. The Navy is the only armed force 
that operates on, above, and under the surface of the sea.2
Advantages of Naval Forces
as regulated by international law and convention, naval forces are free to maneuver on 
the world’s oceans as close to any coastline as twelve miles.3 The vast presence of the 
U.s. Navy around the world at all times enables fast reactions. This ability to be pres-
ent almost anywhere is the quality that sets navies apart from armies and air forces. 
The U.s. Navy can be employed “overtly or covertly, directly or indirectly, actively or 
passively, but almost always effectively, in whatever may at any moment be the national 
interest.” J. C. Wylie further describes “maritime presence” as subtle, benign, and ubiq-
uitous in quality and as the great asset of sea power in times of peace and war.4 Fleets are 
not only highly effective combat tools; they can also be employed as mediums of diplo-
macy, advancing U.s. interests without the use of force.5 Ubiquity, flexibility, mobility, 
limited intrusiveness (“leaving no footprints”), readiness, and independence represent 
the great advantages of navies.6
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Ubiquity, Flexibility, Mobility, and Limited Intrusiveness
The fact that naval forces operate in the neutral medium of the world’s oceans permits 
nations to engage relatively subtly and nonintrusively. Naval forces can be sent to points 
on the sea near crises and there wait for developments. They can be visible without 
invading foreign sovereign territory, but they can also wait close by and yet stay out of 
sight. such actions will most likely be perceived as less invasive than the movement of 
land forces, and the risks, as well as the political costs, will likely be more acceptable. 
James Cable points out that the U.s. air Force and army cannot be deployed without 
evoking the threat of high levels of violence and anxiety.7 Navies, even if they enter 
foreign territorial waters, are portrayed as “a lesser involvement than a platoon that has 
crossed the frontier or an aircraft that has dropped a bomb.”
The traditional combination of the military and diplomatic roles of naval forces means 
that while potential adversaries view the use of naval forces as representing significant 
national interest and willingness to act on the part of the United states, it also implies 
a lesser threat than do airpower or armies of destruction and war.8 as adm. sergei 
gorshkov, for many years commander in chief of the soviet navy, once wrote, navies 
can “demonstrate graphically the real fighting power of one’s state. Demonstrations by 
the navy in many cases have made it possible to achieve political ends without resorting 
to armed struggle, merely by putting on pressure with one’s own potential might and 
threatening to start military operations. Thus, the navy has always been an instrument 
of the policy of states, an important aid to diplomacy in peacetime.”9 The great mobil-
ity and flexibility of naval power allow for the calibration of action to circumstances.10 
should political initiatives and shows of force fail, naval forces can resort to coercion 
and war fighting.11 at any time of the day and under almost any weather conditions, and 
at times and locations of their choosing, naval forces can project offensive power.12
The Navy can hardly be studied without taking account of the U.s. Marine Corps 
(UsMC), the “sea portable” ground force. This sea mobility is the Marines’ advantage.13 
With the help of the Marine Corps, power can be projected ashore through amphibious 
operations, in addition to naval gunfire, carrier airpower, or cruise missiles. Marines 
embark on UsN vessels and are able to change quickly from sea to land combat, often 
with support of naval forces. With amphibious landings, Marines can be deployed to 
the crisis location with little political constraint.14 In most naval crisis responses, UsMC 
forces deploy with the UsN. ever since the american revolution, the two services have 
regularly deployed jointly.15 sean Cate describes the “Navy–Marine Corps team,” with 
its mobility, sustainability, and power-projection capability, as a “go anywhere, do any-
thing [force].”16
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Independence and Readiness
The Navy and Marine Corps are inherently crisis- and contingency-oriented forces and 
have conducted peacetime operations in littoral areas since their respective creations. 
Both forces are designed so that the naval services collectively can maintain forward 
presence and rapidly respond to crises, in addition to their war-fighting requirements.17 
other military forces are more constrained by their needs and by the environment they 
operate in and so cannot deploy as freely. They depend on approval of third parties 
and are restricted by legal, logistical, and political factors. Navies, unlike armies and 
air forces, are not dependent on access to foreign bases or military facilities, permis-
sion to use foreign airspace, or rights to refuel in other countries. Their strength lies in 
their freedom of action, their ability to function on their own without depending on 
the goodwill and support of others. according to Dakota Wood, the Navy can stay on 
crisis location and sustain itself for months.18 P. K. ghosh writes, “a single naval unit is 
self-sufficient on its own. a naval task force is a stand-alone unit that incorporates the 
elements of land, air and sea power into it.”19 Its ability to “wait and see” allows the gov-
ernment to gain time—for reflection, for other preparations, for diplomacy, or for nego-
tiation.20 Naval forces promise a more rapid deployment compared to land-based units 
and are less costly to move.21 arthur Barber acknowledges the high costs of maintaining 
strong naval forces but argues that “cheapness is relative: the most expensive force for a 
given mission is the one that does not have the flexibility or availability to be used when 
force is needed.”22 once naval forces arrive at the crisis location, their ships are im-
mediately ready for action—what Pirtle calls “readiness on arrival.”23 Furthermore, the 
withdrawal of navies is less difficult than the withdrawal of land forces.24
Finally, the deployment of naval forces also provokes less criticism or debate within the 
United states. Kaplan observes,
If we want to deploy an extra 30,000 troops somewhere, there is a big national debate about it. But 
you can double the number of warships in the Persian gulf and nobody in Congress breathes a word 
about it or cares. You can go from one to two to three carrier strike groups in the Persian gulf—a 
carrier strike group is an aircraft carrier with 5,000 seamen onboard, with two cruisers, two de-
stroyers, a frigate, two submarines; you are dealing with 10,000 or so sailors—you can just send one 
a few miles off the coast of Iran, and there is nary a word of protest.25
Disadvantages of Naval Forces
Notwithstanding the many valuable characteristics of naval forces, there are also 
disadvantages and limitations. according to Joseph Bouchard, the “irony of naval crisis 
response is that the characteristics of naval forces that make them the preferred type of 
force for use as a political instrument in crisis also tend to make them relatively more 
susceptible to crisis stability problems than other types of forces.”26 Weaknesses include 
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misinterpretation of signals, limitations on endurance, vulnerability, and indecisive 
outcomes.
Misperception, Endurance, and Vulnerability
signaling by naval forces is prone to misperception. observing events and showing pres-
ence from a distance may have a positive influence on a crisis, but they may also worsen 
the situation. The signal perceived in naval presence can lead to very different interpre-
tations about reasons and intentions. In a crisis situation, potential enemies might fear 
an intervention because of ships’ presence; this perception can lead either to reluctance 
to continue the fighting or resolution to escalate an already tense situation. another 
problem is the duration of the deployments. even a carrier group, despite its ability to 
replenish, refuel, and rearm at sea, can sustain itself for only a certain period before it 
needs access to a base, at least for the replenishment ships supporting it; also, replace-
ments on station are required periodically to allow opportunities for major repairs and 
crew rest. While not a problem for short-term crises and conflicts, this becomes an issue 
if the crisis and tensions persist. Naval vessels, particularly aircraft carriers, are also 
very vulnerable to attack. This vulnerability, especially to missiles, is one of the aircraft 
carrier’s main weaknesses.27
Decisiveness
“Maritime power is such a flexible instrument that it is inevitably the tool of choice, 
whenever circumstances permit, for the government intending the threat or use of lim-
ited force. on the other hand, its value in total war has declined.”28 This quotation from 
Cable dates back many years, but the use of exclusively naval forces in full-scale wars 
has decreased even more since the demise of the soviet Union. Because the UsN faces 
no equal competitor, its role has changed mostly to supporting wars on land. richard 
Betts even says, “The one unique thing naval combat forces can do is fight other blue-
water navies. . . . With the exception of war at sea, naval combat power overlaps with 
the capabilities of the other services and fills few gaps that are completely uncovered.”29 
He further claims that naval airpower is too expensive and limited in its effects and is 
therefore justifiable only in situations when there is no access to land airfields.
Many scholars agree that in military confrontations, U.s. naval forces rarely achieve 
decisive results on their own.30 However, Don Inbody argues that neither does airpower, 
when it comes to winning a war.31 While sea power and airpower (as well as space pow-
er) will play enabling roles, ground forces are necessary to achieve a decisive victory on 
land. But according to Colin gray, this naval help is very important and may well “pro-
vide a decisive edge in war overall.”32 Most importantly, Norman Friedman argues that 
“in the post–Cold War age . . . we are not fighting for our lives; we rarely seek decisive 
influence without boots on the ground  17
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:03 NP_39 Chapter1.indd  January 29, 2013 1:05 PM
ends. almost always we seek some limited outcome, which reduces dangers to ourselves. 
We cannot afford unlimited investment in each conflict to achieve the most favorable 
decisive resolution. agile, mobile, seapower is well suited to such a world. We can gain 
a satisfactory outcome, and then leave when we want or when we must.”33 Thus while 
naval forces might need support to achieve decisive victories, this is hardly a reason to 
dismiss their importance or ignore their other advantages. ground troops, for their 
part, rely on naval and air forces to bring them to the operation theater. Thus today, no 
full-scale war is fought by one armed service alone—rather, they deploy jointly.
Era of Jointness
The end of the Cold War marked a growing importance for joint operations. The 
goldwater-Nichols act of 1986 represented a major change in the organization of de-
fense and promoted joint forces. Brooks states that “a major goal of peacetime operation 
should be to work with other services to foster inter-operability between U.s. forces, 
especially the Navy, and the air forces, and to a lesser extent, the ground forces, of 
potential coalition partners.”34 The Navy is equipped to transport other military forces 
to desired destinations and to support land operations. Because naval forces are often 
the first to arrive at a crisis location, they possess the military capabilities to secure the 
environment and prepare for the arrival of other forces.35 once other military services 
have reached the theater, naval forces can switch to a supporting function.36 While this 
latter role is important, the U.s. Marine Corps and army are to a certain extent capable 
of sustaining their own land operations and can receive support from the air Force 
instead of the UsN.37 Today important Navy missions such as worldwide presence and 
deployments to support foreign policy are no longer solely naval in character. The army 
and air Force have also served as political U.s. foreign-policy tools; despite all their 
advantages, navies are not the only military forces employed in MooTW.38 exercis-
ing with foreign armed forces, deploying mobile-training or humanitarian-assistance 
teams, and sending logistical aircraft and attachés are only a few of the examples. espe-
cially the air Force has been more frequently deployed for humanitarian responses, at 
about ten times the rate of the other services.39 While the Navy and the army are clearly 
distinct services, the air Force has certain characteristics and capabilities in common 
with naval forces.
Sea and Air
The Navy and the air Force, ever since the establishment of the latter as a separate ser-
vice, have been in constant competition. roy Walker and larry ridolfi find that “we no 
longer always need to wait for the power of the U.s. Navy to steam to the area to defend 
our interests in littoral areas which coincidentally place the fleet within range of enemy 
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mines or shore-to-ship weapons. land based airpower can be anywhere in the world 
in a matter of hours. The historic notion that only ships are needed to extend maritime 
influence has ended.”40 These authors claim the air Force can perform equally well in 
maritime operations. They list functions ranging from projecting power ashore and 
controlling sea lines of communication to bottling up enemy shipping, attacking and 
sinking enemy ships, and conducting maritime interdiction operations. They come to 
the radical conclusion that the advantages of airpower render the Navy obsolete:
The revolution in Military affairs has placed the ship as a weapon of war in the same position 
as a Knight from the Middle ages. Knights were well trained and armed; expensive to maintain. 
along came cheap longbow technology[,] which pierced a Knight’s defenses. european battlefields 
were quickly covered with expensive casualties. The era of Knights came to an end. Navies are well 
armed and expensively manned. Today, we have the potential for a new innovative use of high tech 
airpower and missiles. should the next battleground be covered with sacrificial ships?41 
Not many critics go as far. Inbody locates the main advantages of the air Force in accu-
racy, speed, and range.42 surged from the United states, air forces travel much faster than 
sea forces.43 But they require highly technical support and need prepared airfields, which 
are highly vulnerable to attack. The safety of the sea in comparison to bases ashore; 
independence from the need for access rights by host countries; mobility and endurance; 
and the ability to deliver accurate air strikes, conduct blockades and port-denial attacks, 
interdict commerce, move large numbers of personnel and volumes of matériel, and in-
sert and aid ground forces are the main advantages of naval forces, according to Inbody. 
He identifies the biggest disadvantages of sea power as the challenge of protecting supply 
lines and vulnerability to long-range aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and cruise 
missiles. However, control of the sea and air can minimize these threats. Inbody consid-
ers it very important to understand the advantages and disadvantages of both the Navy 
and the air Force and to employ the two services accordingly. Both can be successful 
in limited wars and interventions, but as mentioned previously, in a full-scale war they 
need the support of ground troops. overall, Inbody argues that naval forces offer more 
advantages than air forces and in particular are better suited for coercion but that the 
air Force is more useful for achieving strategic effects. He concludes “that, applied cor-
rectly with its full range of capabilities (which includes air, sea, and land components), 
sea power can bring an enemy to its knees while air power cannot.”
It is important to note that despite the competition between these two services, they 
operate jointly and support each other. good examples are joint pilot training and aerial 
refueling of Navy aircraft by the air Force.44 This integration of the Navy and air Force 
in aerial strike warfare is a fairly recent phenomenon in american military experience. 
For more than two centuries the Navy operated independently on the high seas and so 
became accustomed to functioning independently and self-reliantly. The nation’s sea 
service was forward deployed from the beginning of its existence, and throughout most 
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of the Cold War it was, Benjamin lambeth writes, the only service that was “‘out there,’ 
in and above the maritime commons and ready for action.” 45
But the gulf War in 1991 demonstrated to the Navy that its environment had changed—
the capacity to fight open-ocean battles was no longer relevant. In that conflict the UsN 
faced no surface forces or aerial threat.46 lacking a significant precision-strike capabil-
ity, naval strike aviation was denied certain targets during operation Desert storm, 
targets that were assigned to the air Force instead. over the next years, however, the 
several Iraq operations brought the two services closer together. land-based and sea-
based fighters jointly enforced the no-fly zones, in what lambeth calls an “aerial strike 
policing function.” 47 after 9/11, the lack of access to land bases in southwest asia led to 
the creation of sea bases, with deep-strike capability to project power. The fact is that
for the first time in the history of joint warfare, operation enduring Freedom showed real syner-
gies in air Force and Navy conduct of integrated strike operations. Navy fighters escorted air 
Force bombers into afghan airspace until allied air supremacy was established. For its part, the 
air Force (along with the [United Kingdom’s] raF [royal air Force]) provided roughly 80 percent 
of the tanker support . . . that allowed Navy carrier-based fighters to reach central and northern 
afghanistan. That support, in turn, enabled sea-based strikes far beyond littoral limits, as well as a 
sustained carrier-based strike-fighter presence over remote target areas for hours if needed for on-
call strikes on [time-sensitive targets].48
as can be seen, naval forces show both similarities to and differences from other 
military forces. In order to analyze the role naval forces play in crisis response, it is 
also fundamental to understand general naval functions as defined by national policy. 
shedding light on the unique capabilities they can offer in the context of crisis manage-
ment will be important for the theoretical background of seaborne crisis response. We 
have defined naval crisis response as a peacetime activity. The remainder of this chapter 
presents a more general introduction into the functions of naval forces, highlighting 
their important role in activities short of wars and placing them in a historical context.
Functions of the U.S. Navy
There are many ways to categorize and describe naval responsibilities. Booth offers 
a good introductory example, characterizing the functions of navies as the sides of a 
triangle: a diplomatic role (negotiation, manipulation, and prestige), a military role (bal-
ance of power and projection of force), and a policing role (coast-guard responsibilities 
and nation building).49
General Naval Functions
The Navy’s diplomatic responsibilities are concerned with most aspects of foreign policy 
short of the use of force. Bargaining, such as occurs in negotiations, aims to persuade a 
target state to act in the desired manner. The military capabilities of countries affect and 
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shape the thinking and choices of their political leaders and policy makers. Manipu-
lation attempts to change the political calculations of the target state by granting or 
withholding rewards. Booth describes military aid as one of the most important tools 
used to influence foreign governments. Prestige is mostly a useful by-product of naval 
activities—for example, port visits, aid, and events hosted on board ship in foreign 
harbors. Balance-of-power functions comprise the peacetime activities of the military 
role. Deterrence (conventional and nuclear), defense, and maintenance of good order at 
sea fall into this category.50
The other aspect of the military role is the use of force. Booth divides the use of force 
at sea into four categories: “general Wars,” “Conventional Wars,” “limited Wars,” and 
“guerilla Wars.” The first two categories have not involved naval forces since the end 
of World War II. The U.s. Navy has mostly been concerned with small-scale interven-
tions and limited wars. The deployment of forces to protect interests in conflicts and 
crises has been widely employed. But most Western navies have left the policing role to 
their nations’ coast guards. Policing functions are mainly concerned with extending 
sovereignty as far out as the nation’s maritime frontiers.51 In Ty Waterman’s words, “In 
modeling naval functions as a combination of diplomatic, military, and policing roles, 
generic coast guard functions fall under the policing role.”52
on the basis of these considerations about limited policing and direct war fighting, the 
following sections describe the functions carried out by U.s. naval forces in some detail.
Specific Functions of the U.S. Navy
The U.s. Navy has always had wartime and peacetime functions, but the relative em-
phasis has varied over time. although wartime combat missions are the main rationale 
for equipping naval forces, the Navy’s strength and uniqueness lie in employment short 
of full-scale wars.53 as Cable has said, “anyone who denies the peacetime relevance of 
navies will find himself rather short of recent examples of the traditional wartime battle 
between rival fleets.”54 U.s. naval forces have always engaged in MooTW and small con-
tingencies, in various environments and with changing technologies.55 over the years a 
succession of documents have been released discussing the missions of the U.s. Navy. In 
them, not only is the term “strategy” widely debated, but there is also no common agree-
ment as to whether to call “missions” by that name or, instead, “functions,” or “capabili-
ties.” The terms have been used interchangeably.56 But if naval and maritime visions, 
concepts, and strategies have shifted over time, core missions have remained constant.
There are many different characterizations of the purposes and contents of the docu-
ments. In 2009, Peter swartz developed a comprehensive report discussing all major 
naval documents released since 1970. Figure 1 shows the capstone documents since  
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1970. Figure 2 lists the most important of these documents and the core capabilities 
defined in them.57
The more than twenty-five “capstone” documents that have been published since 1970 
have made it clear that the global environment and the challenges facing the United 
states have changed and that different functions have gained priority and others are 
no longer regarded as vital. What has remained consistent are what stansfield Turner 
listed in 1974 as the four missions of the U.s. Navy.58 The “classic four” have proved to 
FIGure 1
Major Capstone Documents since 1970 (adapted from Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone 
Strategy Policy, Vision and Concept Documents, p. 745)
Name mIssIoNs
Project Sixty (1970) 4 categories of USN capabilities (“classic 4”)
Missions of the USN (1974) 4 missions (“classic 4”)
NWP 1 (Rev. A) (1978) 2 functions (sea control, power projection); 3 roles (including strategic  
nuclear deterrence); presence a side benefit
Sea Plan 2000 (1978)
Future of U.S. Sea Power (1979)
The Maritime Strategy (1986) 3 primary missions (sea control, power projection, sealift)
The Way Ahead (1991)
The Navy Policy Book (1992) 20 characteristics of naval operations, including “classic 4,” sealift
. . . From the Sea (1992) 6 capabilities (“classic 4,” crises, sealift)
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (1994) 10 characteristics of “what we do,” including “classic 4”
Forward . . . From the Sea (1994) 5 fundamental and enduring roles (“classic 4” + sealift)
Navy Operational Concept (1997)
Anytime, Anywhere (1997) 4 broad missions (sea control the prerequisite)
NSPG II (1999–2000) 10-part multilevel model, including “classic 4” missions
SP 21 & Global CONOPS (2002) 5 enduring missions (“classic 4” + strategic sealift)
Naval Power 21 (2002)
NOCJO (2003)
Fleet Response Plan (2003)
NSP ISO POM 08 (2006)
NOP 2006 (2006) 13 naval missions, including “classic 4”; no sealift
NSP ISO POM 10 (2007)
Cooperative Strategy (2007) 6 expanded core capabilities (“classic 4” + MSO, HA/DR); no sealift
NSG ISO PR 11 (2007)
NSP ISO POM 10 (Change 1) (2008)
NDP 1: Naval Warfare (2010)
NSP ISO POM 12 
NOP 2010
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be enduring and are still relevant today, although new functions have been added. The 
following discussion of U.s. naval missions is based on Turner’s categorization.59
•	 sea control
•	 Projection of power ashore
•	 Naval presence
•	 strategic deterrence. 
FIGure 2
Major Documents and Core Missions (adapted from Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone 
Strategy Policy, Vision and Concept Documents, pp. 745–47)
ProJeCT sIXTY (1970) mIssIoNs oF THe us NaVY (1974)
4 CaPaBIlITIes 4 mIssIoNs/mIssIoN areas
l Assured second strike l Strategic deterrence
o Control of sea lines & areas/sea control o Sea control
n Projection of power ashore n Projection of power (ashore)
u Overseas presence in peacetime u Naval presence
NWP 1 (reV a) (1978) THe marITIme sTraTeGY (1986)
2 FuNCTIoNs 3 PrImarY mIssIoNs
o Sea control o Sea control
n Power projection n Power projection
v Sealift
. . . From THe sea (1992) ForWarD . . . From THe sea (1994)
6 CaPaBIlITIes 5 FuNDameNTal & eNDurING roles
u Forward deployment/presence n Projection of power from sea to land
l Strategic deterrence o Sea control and maritime supremacy
o Control of the seas l Strategic deterrence
w Crisis response v Strategic sealift
n Project precise power u Forward naval presence
v Sealift
aNYTIme, aNYWHere (1997) sea PoWer 21 (2002)
4 BroaD mIssIoNs 5 eNDurING mIssIoNs
o Sea and area control o Sea control
n Power projection n Power projection
u Presence l Strategic deterrence
l Deterrence v Strategic sealift
u Forward presence
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The newest (at this writing) documents—such as A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower (Cs21), and the Naval Operations Concept—enlarge on the original four core 
missions, notably with the additions of security operations, humanitarian assistance, 
and disaster relief, as well as cyber and space capabilities.60 I will discuss these recent 
developments after analyzing the four core missions. The following models show 
FIGure 2
Major Documents and Core Missions (adapted from Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone 
Strategy Policy, Vision and Concept Documents, pp. 745–47), continued
NaVal oPeraTIoNs CoNCePT (2006) CooPeraTIVe sTraTeGY For 21sT CeNTurY  seaPoWer (2007)
13 NaVal mIssIoNs 6 eXPaNDeD Core CaPaBIlITIes
u Forward naval presence u Forward presence
w Crisis response l Deterrence
n Expeditionary power projection o Sea Control
t Maritime security operations n Power projection
o Sea control t Maritime security
l Deterrence  Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
 Security cooperation
 Civil-military operations
 Counterinsurgency
 Counterterrorism
 Counterproliferation
 Air and missile defense
 Information operation
NaVal sTraTeGIC GuIDaNCe Iso Pr 11 
(2007)
6 Core CaPaBIlITIes: 6 aDDITIoNal CaPaBIlITIes
Enabling capabilities  Warfare capabilities
l Deterrence l Deterrence
 Humanitarian assistance &  
 disaster relief
o Sea control
u Forward presence n Power projection
 Sea basing t Maritime security
 Cyber superiority  Maritime BMD
 Global awareness  Cyber superiority
 Space superiority  Space superiority
 Naval expeditionary 
 logistics
n	Power projection o Sea control l Deterrence u Forward presence v Sealift 
t	Maritime security w Crisis response
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alternative permutations of crisis response within the different possibilities, in order to 
situate crisis response and the Navy’s core capabilities. generally, sea control and power 
projection are categorized as war-fighting capabilities and forward presence and deter-
rence as peacetime functions. The relationships between the missions themselves are 
not part of the models.
Crisis is located between war and peace, though realistically the three are not com-
pletely separate. In a crisis, all four naval functions are important tools. although most 
important in the categories of war and crisis, sea control facilitates the Navy’s routine 
activities in peace as well. Presence is not necessary in war, but reaction times are 
shorter if ships are already close by at the outbreak. also, familiarity with the environ-
ment greatly helps in any operation. Deterrence pertains only to crisis and peace. If war 
breaks out, deterrence has failed, although it could be argued that further escalation 
might be deterred. Power projection might become necessary in a crisis, but only in a 
limited form. Model 1 (see figure 3) situates crisis in between war and peace but overlap-
ping with both, while Model 2 (again, see figure 3) depicts crisis response as part of 
peacetime and distinct from war. as Bouchard states, “national objectives are achieved 
through political impact, and, if necessary, the direct military impact, of war-fighting 
capabilities brought to bear at the scene of a crisis.” 61 although crisis response includes 
tasks such as power projection, not otherwise employed in peacetime, the two categories 
differ in degree—it is possible to describe the power projection in crisis as a “mild” form 
Power
Projection Presence
Presence
Deterrence
Power
Projection
DeterrenceSea Control Sea Control
War WarPeace PeaceCrisis Crisis
FIGure 3
Crisis Model 1 and 2: Crisis Part of War and Peace and Crisis Part of Peace
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of power projection and therefore clearly distinct from wartime. although it is often 
difficult to draw a clear line between nonwar and war, I argue that the level of intensity 
is lower in crisis response and thus it should be seen as separate from war.
Sea Control. Sea control has been the central mission for naval forces for a long time. In 
1977 the Chief of Naval operations, adm. James l. Holloway III, defined sea control as 
“the fundamental function of the U.s. Navy, . . . [connoting] control of designated air, 
surface, and subsurface areas.”62 It secures free usage of the sea while denying—or, more 
realistically, limiting—the adversary’s use of the sea.63 “sea control” replaced the expres-
sions “command of the sea” and “control of the sea.” The difference between “control of 
the sea” and “sea control” would seem minor but the change, according to Turner, was a 
deliberate one, meant to reflect the impact of technological innovations on previous no-
tions of control, notably in air and submarine warfare.64 sea control no longer connotes 
absolute control everywhere and at all times but rather in limited areas and for particu-
lar periods of time. “Nowadays force can be used on, over or under the sea to protect 
or to deny a particular use of the sea.”65 But even alfred Thayer Mahan was not writing 
about absolute but rather working command—absolute command in a certain area at a 
certain time.66
Sea denial, another term closely related to sea control, focuses mostly on denying the 
enemy the use of the sea; it is often the strategy chosen by weaker navies. For Mahan 
and other influential naval strategists, gaining control of the sea was a necessary first 
step in exploiting an advantage.67 The views of these theorists varied as to what forms 
gaining control of the sea might take—for example, commerce protection, interdic-
tion of the sea lines of communication, for guerre de course, or for power projection 
at sea or ashore. In Mahan’s view, control of the sea in war meant the destruction of 
the enemy’s f leet. This, he argued, should be the exclusive focus of the Navy. gained 
control of the sea would bring economic rewards, maintaining free access to the 
resources of the world while at the same time denying access to the enemy, thereby 
strangling his economy.68
although navies operate on water, their actions are mostly reactions to events on land. 
The earliest navies only had one mission—command of the sea. It was because of rome’s 
control over the western Mediterranean during the second Punic War (218–202 bc) that 
Carthage was unable to reinforce the army under Hannibal that was ravaging the Italian 
Peninsula. subsequently, control of the sea became vital as well for commerce protection 
and for military expeditions. It was crucial not only to secure free usage of the seas but 
also to deny it to the enemy, for both commercial and military reasons.
according to Turner, there has been a redefinition of traditional U.s. naval roles and 
missions since the 1970s.69 since World War II, there have been no major battles at sea.70 
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This has affected the role of the UsN. Its primary missions today focus much more 
on influence from the sea than at sea, a perspective emphasizing power projection 
ashore.71 Nevertheless, as James ellis says, “Maritime supremacy will provide the ability 
to use the oceans as a bridge to its friends, a barrier to its enemies, a source of bounti-
ful resources, and a bastion from which to wield power.”72 geoffrey Till calls the sea a 
“strategic highroad.”73 around three-quarters of the earth is covered by seawater, and 
about the same percentage of the world’s population lives in littoral areas, within two 
hundred miles of the shore. eighty percent of the world’s capital cities, as well as the 
most important trading centers and states that are military powers, are located within 
this area.74 around 90 percent of world trade travels by sea. It is therefore not surprising 
that control over the seas always has been afforded a very high value.
Whosoever commands the sea, commands the trade. Whosoever commands the trade of the world 
commands the riches of the World, and consequently the world itself.75
Control of the sea by maritime commerce and naval supremacy means predominant influence in 
the world . . . [and] is the chief among the merely material elements on the power and prosperity of 
nations.76
although these quotes date back to the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, respec-
tively, they are still valid today.
The following incident highlights the benefits of sea control in a crisis. In May 1958, 
lebanon experienced a crisis in which riots among political and religious factions 
threatened the government. The lebanese president requested U.s. help to control the 
situation. Washington was at first hesitant, but a revolt in Iraq in July 1958, triggered 
by an army coup against the Hashemite government in Baghdad, led President Dwight 
D. eisenhower to approve operation Blue Bat in lebanon. all branches of the U.s. 
armed forces were involved. Marines landed on lebanese shores to restore order in 
Beirut, stabilize the country, and protect american citizens. Deployed U.s. naval forces 
comprised seventy vessels, including the three aircraft carriers Uss Saratoga (Cv 60), 
Wasp (Cv 18), and Essex (Cv 9), as well as heavy cruiser Uss Des Moines (Ca 134), the 
guided-missile heavy cruiser Boston (Cag 9), and twenty-eight destroyers. The entire 
sixth Fleet supported the operation, especially through the landing of the Marines. Its 
tasks included patrol, reconnaissance, and transportation by carrier aviation of Marines 
who needed to be evacuated.
This incident clearly demonstrated the sixth Fleet’s dominance in the Mediterranean. 
soviet naval forces in the proximity were capable of challenging neither U.s. influence 
in this crisis nor the sixth Fleet’s control over the Mediterranean. The Navy’s readiness 
played an important role; in contrast, U.s. air Force and army units were unable to 
react promptly. The Navy was ready off the coast of lebanon thirteen hours after the 
order was received, whereas it took the air Force five days to advance from its base in 
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Turkey.77 This example also shows how closely power projection and sea control are 
connected.78 Naturally, most crisis examples “fit” more than just one mission, as they 
are all interlinked.
Projection of Power Ashore. Projection of power ashore is the use of naval forces against 
land forces and targets. In the words of Till “maritime power projection involves the 
use of seaborne military forces directly to influence events on land. Whereas the area 
of sea control is on, under and over the sea, power projection ashore manifests itself 
in the naval influence on events ashore. For Corbett this is the ultimate justification for 
having navies.”79
Turner divides power projection ashore into three categories, Friedman into four,  
as shown in the figure.80 Through his three categories, Turner sees navies attempting to 
achieve the following four objectives: “to secure territory from which a land campaign 
can be launched and supported[;] . . . [t]o secure land area from which an air operation 
can be launched and supported[;] . . . [t]o secure selected territory or facilities to prevent 
enemy use of them[;] . . . [t]o destroy enemy facilities, interrupt his communications, 
divert his effort, et cetera, by means of amphibious raids with planned withdrawal.”81 
Tactical air and naval bombardment are employed to influence happenings ashore 
directly. These bombardments can be delivered in support of troops operating near 
the coast or for interdiction and pursuit close to the shore. Tactical air projection aims 
at destroying the enemy’s war-making potential and hinders his movement, while 
facilitating the movement of one’s own troops. Power projection is most efficient when 
the targets are close to the shore or within the radius of carrier-launched aircraft.82 Till 
identifies eight specific goals of maritime power projection:83
TurNer (1974) FrIeDmaN (2001)
1. Amphibious assault 1. Traditional (control of offshore shipping,   e.g., embargo)
2. Naval bombardment 2. Discrete strikes (e.g., air raid on Tripoli,   1986)
3. Tactical air (strikes by carrier-based tactical  
 aircraft or sea-launched cruise missiles).
3. Sustained air attacks (usually in support of  
 other operations, e.g., Kosovo)
4. Landing Marines.
(1) Determining the outcome of a 
conflict
(2) opening new operational fronts
(3) Direct support of the land forces
(4) Force displacement
(5) economic warfare
(6) seizing or attacking naval bases and 
ports
(7) Forcing an inferior adversary to fight
(8) Political coercion.
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In the post–Cold War era, power projection has become more difficult. The increasing 
need to move into the littorals to influence events on land or to support the operations 
of other services ashore poses a great risk of enemy attack on naval forces.84 But admiral 
gary roughead, when Chief of Naval operations (2007–2011), praised the UsN’s force-
projection capabilities in times of war and peace. as his statement shows, even power 
projection is not confined to the use of force:
We project power in a variety of ways. We can do it from our aircraft carriers of which they are 
always deployed. We can do it in the form of missiles that come off of our cruisers and destroyers 
or submarines, but we in the Navy have also another unique relationship in that we project power 
with the United states Marine Corps with our amphibious ships and the Marines that launch either 
on the sea or in the air for whatever operations they need to take part. and that power projection 
doesn’t always mean that it’s a forceful power. Consider for example, in the last couple of weeks a 
Navy and Marine Corps task group, amphibious ready group happened to be operating in the West-
ern Pacific. The range hit the Philippines, the earthquake hit Indonesia, and a tsunami hit samoa. 
That amphibious ready group was there; they were global, they were forward, they were ready; they 
projected their power in a humanitarian way; and split themselves apart. some went to the Philip-
pines, some went to Indonesia and then some operated in and around samoa to render humanitar-
ian assistance.85
american retaliatory strikes in 1998 in response to attacks on U.s. embassies in east 
africa constitute an exemplary use of forceful power projection ashore. on 7 august 
1998, the embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es salaam, Tanzania, were the targets 
of terrorist attacks. The almost simultaneous bombings killed 224 people and wounded 
more than five thousand. shortly thereafter, the United states identified al-Qa'ida as 
the primary suspect and accused the Taliban in afghanistan of allowing osama Bin 
laden and al-Qa'ida to operate freely. although the United states received international 
support in condemning the embassy attacks, the Taliban refused to comply with its 
request to hand over Bin laden. on 20 august, U.s. forces executed retaliatory air and 
cruise-missile strikes in operation Infinite reach against terrorist training grounds 
in afghanistan and a factory in sudan. allegedly this pharmaceutical factory, in sudan’s 
capital, Khartoum, was capable of producing chemical weapons and was collaborating 
with al-Qa'ida. The U.s. retaliation took place without warning and involved a number 
of naval vessels in the red and arabian seas.86 The surface combatants and nuclear-
powered attack submarine (ssN) that fired the cruise missiles, Tomahawks, had been in 
the Indian ocean prior to the attacks. Infinite reach highlights the limited use of 
force to achieve an objective and supports Booth’s observation that killing and fighting 
are not the Navy’s foremost functions: “Military strategy is not the science of military 
victory but the diplomacy of violence.”87
The next two naval functions to be discussed—naval presence and deterrence—are 
primarily political uses of naval forces in which actual force plays only a secondary role. 
as les aspin, when secretary of Defense (1993–94), said, “our naval forces should be 
sized and shaped not only for armed conflict, but also for the many other important 
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tasks we call upon them to do. Forward presence is certainly a key ingredient of this 
mix, along with such missions as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, deterrence 
and crisis control.”88
Naval Presence. The term “naval presence,” as a mission, was first defined by Turner 
in 1974—the use of naval forces, short of war, to achieve political objectives. Naval 
presence had been exercised before, but its characterization as a separate mission was 
new. In the Maritime strategy of 1986, the mission of “forward presence” encompassed 
earlier concepts of naval forces as instruments of foreign policy and of “naval presence.” 
Today the Navy states on its website, “The U.s. Navy is engaged. and engaged means 
being there.”89 Forward presence comprises forward-stationed and rotationally deployed 
forces. The former are dependent on the goodwill and permission of friends and allies. 
The latter are homeported on U.s. territory and are deployed as necessary to guarantee 
a continuous presence. Both forms of presence can symbolize U.s. interest or concern 
and demonstrate to friends and enemies alike where U.s. global interests lie. Forward 
presence by U.s. Navy aircraft carrier battle groups (CvBgs), expeditionary strike 
groups (esgs), and amphibious ready groups (args) helps secure national interests 
overseas. as William Cohen, former secretary of defense (1997–2001), once declared, 
“If you don’t have that forward deployed presence, you have less of a voice, less of an 
influence.”90
Till stresses the difference between presence and “existence”—that is, the simple pos-
session of a fleet. Presence, he argues, can take various forms, from routine operations 
to demonstrate interest or periodic deployments, but in any case deploys forces actively 
around the globe, whereas “existence” does not necessarily imply “forward.”91 similarly, 
Bud Jones defines the objective of military presence as exerting influence and thus as 
requiring more than “just being present.”92 according to Frank Uhlig, Jr., through naval 
presence a force can pose a threat of the following:
•	 amphibious assault
•	 air attack, bombardment
•	 Blockade and exposure through reconnaissance.93
Commander James McNulty identifies seven specific roles for naval forces during a 
presence mission:
1. supporting U.s. international military commitments, such as the NaTo alliance, 
with forward-deployed forces;
2. Confirming on a routine basis U.s. political commitments to other nations, by show-
ing the flag in port visits and holding joint exercises with other navies;
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3. Demonstrating the capability of U.s. naval forces to act in support of national 
interests;
4. asserting continuing U.s. interest in important areas of the world, such as the Per-
sian gulf;
5. Demonstrating war-fighting capabilities in a tension area to deter potential oppo-
nents and serving as an instrument of crisis management, such as by signaling U.s. 
intentions;
6. Providing humanitarian aid; and
7. Coercing an opponent to comply with a preferred course of action.94
as this list shows, the presence mission has been defined as covering the full range of 
naval missions short of wartime actions.95 such capabilities as showing the flag, signal-
ing, and coercion lie on a continuum from peace to war. as James Miskel states, “naval 
presence is as much a diplomatic as it is a military function.”96 Naval forces have to be 
forward deployed to influence events and to be able to react immediately. robert Work 
underlines the importance of forward-deployed and -stationed forces to support U.s. 
foreign policy and calls for the establishment of seven “global fleet stations,” in the 
Caribbean/east coast of south america, the west coast of africa, the east coast of africa, 
southwest/south asia, southeast asia, east asia, and the western Pacific/oceania.97 The 
deployment of naval forces overseas is an important part of the U.s. national strategy, 
demonstrating presence year-round, not only during times of hostilities. The presence 
of naval forces of any size can signal concern. Turner emphasized the importance of 
sending the right force at the right time: “Naval Presence can be enormously useful in 
complementing diplomatic actions to achieve political objectives. applied deftly but 
firmly, in precisely the proper force, Naval Presence can be a persuasive deterrent to 
war.”98 This function of presence provides the link to deterrence. The 2010 Naval Opera-
tions Concept (known as NoP 2010) describes the changes of forward presence: “origi-
nally conducted to protect U.s. merchant shipping, promote overseas trade, and support 
diplomacy, over time the basis of our forward presence operations has evolved and 
expanded to include crisis response as well as conventional and nuclear deterrence.” 99
an illustration of the benefits of presence (and deterrence) is the crisis in lebanon of 
1982. Israel attacked the Palestine liberation organization (Plo) in southern leba-
non and invaded lebanese territory on 5 June 1982. The rapid progress of the invasion 
deepened the crisis for syria. Israel and syria agreed on a cease-fire with the help of 
U.s. mediation, but fighting erupted again on 11 June. The Mediterranean amphibious 
ready group (Marg) was ordered to deploy to the eastern Mediterranean in June, and 
the aircraft carrier Uss John F. Kennedy (Cv 67) was sent to the region to stand by for 
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possible evacuation of american and other foreign nationals from Beirut. Kennedy was 
relieved on 17 June by Uss Dwight D. Eisenhower (Cv 69). The U.s. embassy, advising 
all american citizens to leave lebanon, closed on 24 June. U.s. nationals were evacu-
ated and transported to ships of the sixth Fleet, which took them to Cyprus. In July 
the United states halted military aid to Israel to demonstrate its disapproval of Israel’s 
activities. In august the situation worsened, and the Marg stood ready for deploy-
ment as part of a peacekeeping force and to support the evacuation of Plo forces from 
Beirut. By september, with the help of U.s. mediation, the crisis between syria and Israel 
was resolved. on 22 september the Marg was ordered to lebanon, together with two 
aircraft carriers, to support U.s. Marines ashore. on 2 January 1983 Uss America (Cv 
66) arrived off the coast of lebanon, where it was relieved by Uss Nimitz (Cv 68) on 
the 20th. In February the U.s. alert level was lowered, but the United states remained 
actively involved and ready to deploy military forces to lebanon if necessary. Direct 
talks between the governments of Israel and lebanon under american auspices led to a 
peace agreement in May 1983.
The presence of U.s. (and other nations’) naval forces had helped limit the conflict by 
preventing a threatened Israeli attack on Beirut itself. The presence of naval forces also 
supported the diplomatic efforts of the United states, not least by providing helicopter 
transportation for the mediators during their shuttle diplomacy.100
Yet not everybody supports forward presence. Brooks points to the possible negative 
effects of constant U.s. naval presence. The permanent stationing of the U.s. Navy in 
a particular region signals the importance of that region to the United states, but the 
demonstrated resolve may become taken for granted and thus exert only limited influ-
ence. Moreover, it may even have a reverse effect—if forces are withdrawn temporarily, 
their absence may be more visible than their extended presence and create the impres-
sion that the United states is losing interest.101 Daniel gouré criticizes the shaping func-
tion of forward presence as not well defined and empirically unprovable.102 He even calls 
naval forward presence a “tyranny” overstretching naval capabilities, since the UsN 
does not dispose of a sufficient number of ships to meet all the demands.
Deterrence. sea control, projection of power ashore by amphibious means, and naval 
presence were the missions of navies through the end of World War II.103 after the war 
two new missions—tactical airpower in support of land campaigns (as an addition to 
projection of power ashore) and strategic deterrence—were added. Deterrence threatens 
the use of force by conditioning forceful actions on the part of the opponent. as robert 
art has said, “its purpose is to prevent something undesirable from happening.”104 Naval 
forces are used to persuade the adversary not to do something by demonstrating that 
the likely costs may well outweigh the expected benefits. according to Turner, strategic 
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deterrence missions are employed “to deter all-out attack on the United states or its 
allies; to face any potential aggressor contemplating less than all-out attack with unac-
ceptable risks; and to maintain a stable political environment within which the threat 
of aggression or coercion against the United states or its allies is minimized.”105 Till 
names two forms of deterrence: “The mere existence in an area of a capable naval force 
loitering with intent in international waters near an area of concern may be all that is re-
quired. or naval forces may be ostentatiously surged into the area to bring the prospec-
tive adversary to realize the error of his way. Here the naval advantage most of value for 
purposes of deterrence is their speed and strategic mobility.” 106
It is important to note that deterrence is based on the potential rather than the actual 
use of force and is highly dependent on the enemy’s reaction. Because deterrence is es-
sentially psychological, the naval forces involved need to have the necessary capabilities 
to convince the adversary. The more powerful the ships (in general), the more success-
fully deterrence works. Thus the deterrence function is linked with the scale of military 
power, and the deployment of strong naval forces underlines the willingness to use these 
forces if necessary.107 The ability to deter by the implicit or explicit threat of nuclear 
weapons at sea is the most extreme case (nuclear deterrence). since the collapse of the 
soviet Union, conventional deterrence has supplanted the Cold War focus on nuclear 
deterrence. Michael gerson distinguishes between deterrence by punishment (mostly 
precision strikes) and the more common form, deterrence by denial.108 The latter frus-
trates the adversary’s hostile objectives by signaling: “Deterrence is best served when the 
attacker believes that his only alternative is a protracted war: The threat of a war of attri-
tion is the bedrock of conventional deterrence.”109 gerson emphasizes the importance of 
both strategies:
some adversaries are more likely to be deterred by the threat of punishment and others by the threat 
of denial. For example, some leaders may believe that they can simply withstand or “ride out” what-
ever punishment the opponent’s conventional forces can inflict. For these regimes, threats to deny 
success may be a more potent deterrent than threats of punishment. on the other hand, some ag-
gressors may convince themselves that Us conventional forces will not be able to successfully deny 
their objectives. These leaders may believe that they can achieve their aims in spite of the opposing 
conventional power because they have greater resolve and are willing to fight longer and harder, and 
accept greater casualties. often, they base this resolve on the belief that they can achieve their goals 
before substantial Us conventional power arrives, a fait accompli.110
“Compellence” is closely related to deterrence. Compellence is the use of threats to 
make a target stop an action it has already undertaken or take an action that the coercer 
wants. Coercion, then, depends on two factors: credibility (whether the target be-
lieves that the coercer will execute its threats) and persuasiveness (whether the threats 
will have a great impact on the target).111 In general, deterrence aims at preventing an 
unwanted action from taking place by showing the costs of those actions, whereas com-
pellence is specific and active, intended to oblige an adversary to act according to the 
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wishes of the “compelling” party, usually to reverse an action already begun.112 Despite 
this distinction, some argue that there are no major differences between the two strate-
gies. according to edward luttwak, both belong to the realm of “coercive suasion,” a 
term that underscores the use of the direct threat and suggests an affinity with coercive 
diplomacy.113 “It boils down to the assertion that it is more difficult to compel than it is 
to deter since (1) moves are more difficult to reverse than prevent in that the moves to 
be stopped or reversed may have acquired their own ‘tactical’ and political momentum 
and (2) public compliance with others’ demands would entail additional losses in the 
way of prestige. The underlying working principles and requirement of both strategies 
are the same.”114 However, deterrence is passive and preventive, whereas compellence is 
active and offensive, usually involving the threatened or actual use of force. Compel-
lence offers an alternative crisis response to unforeseen crises that, by definition, cannot 
be deterred.115
It is very difficult to measure the direct impact of deterrence. In the Iraq/Kuwait crisis 
of 1994 the presence of naval forces is said to have exerted a deterrent effect. The crisis 
had its origin in an Iraqi troop deployment toward the Kuwaiti border on 7 october. 
The United states responded within a day, deploying the aircraft carrier Eisenhower, 
accompanied by an aegis cruiser carrying Tomahawk missiles, to demonstrate re-
solve and deter Iraq from crossing the border. air Force and Navy units already in the 
area as part of operation southern Watch were now assigned to a new operation, 
vigilant Warrior. additional vessels supporting vigilant Warrior included 
the Uss George Washington (CvN 73) battle group, Uss Tripoli (lPH 10), an amphibi-
ous ready group, the 15th Marine expeditionary Unit (special operations Capable) (or 
MeU[soC]), and Military sealift Command ships.116 The U.s. commitment to saudi 
arabia was reaffirmed, and Iraqi troops began to retreat on 11 october. The crisis ended 
on 10 November, when saddam Hussein signed a declaration of “Iraq’s recognition of 
the sovereignty of the state of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and political indepen-
dence.” The United states increased its military strength in the region so as to respond 
quickly to future threats.
as this introduction into the core naval functions demonstrates, all four functions play 
important roles in naval crisis response. The recent past, however, has brought about 
significant changes in the strategic environment. In order to understand the future of 
naval crisis response, it is important to take new realities into account.
Recent Transformations and Challenges
We have gone from a blue-water Navy, which is clearly where we were 
before the [Berlin] Wall came down, to a Navy that has vastly expanded 
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its mission sets in a world that’s much more uncertain, much more 
unpredictable, and in a world that I believe the Navy and the Marine 
Corps have the ability and the maneuverability to be out and about.
aDMIral MICHael MUlleN, 2006, THeN CHIeF oF Naval oPeraTIoNs
as at the end of the Cold War, the events on 9/11 caused a shift in the strategic environ-
ment, leading to a new emphasis on counterterrorism (CT) and asymmetric opera-
tions.117 The global war on terror (gWoT) and the emergence of new security threats 
have influenced naval responsibilities.
The Twenty-First-Century Navy
In 2007 the National research Council released a document identifying three roles for 
naval forces to support the gWoT efforts: “forward presence, maritime operations, 
and homeland defense.” These roles require three critical naval capabilities: maritime 
domain awareness (or MDa, which includes increased maritime intelligence), com-
mand and control, and naval force protection. In a 2009 report for Congress, ronald 
o’rourke presented a more detailed list of actual UsN operations in CT missions.118 He 
highlighted the importance of joint operations of the three U.s. sea forces, emphasizing 
homeland defense. other important points he raised include Tomahawk cruise-missile 
attacks, seal operations, and surveillance by naval forces, as well as MDa and protec-
tion of forward-deployed naval vessels. The Navy, he argued, is less concerned with 
preventing terrorists from carrying out attacks at sea than with denying them the use of 
the seas. Terrorists resort to the oceans and waterways to move people, resources, and 
money in relative anonymity. as Joshua lasky says, “attacks at sea have little chance of 
attracting maximum public attention, achieving significant loss of life, and are signifi-
cantly complicated by reasonably good security measures, thus hold little value. The 
challenge for the U.s. Navy and all U.s. Navy naval forces is to detect, monitor, and 
interdict or facilitate the interdiction of terrorists, or prevent terrorism related use of the 
vast maritime domain.”119 low-intensity, irregular warfare (IW), and counterterrorism 
are important challenges for the Navy, generally trained as it is in conventional warfare. 
Further, the Navy has responded with sea basing, global partnerships, intensified in-
terservice collaboration, and expansion of expeditionary missions. The service has also 
taken into account new technologies and weapons, and the need to replace ships, as well 
as new challenges—for example, maritime security and the emergence of new maritime 
powers—especially China.
In early 2006, in reaction to the increased demand for expeditionary missions and to 
support the six core missions later put forward in Cs21, the Navy expeditionary Com-
bat Command (NeCC) was established. NeCC “provides a full spectrum of operations, 
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including effective waterborne and ashore antiterrorism force protection; theater securi-
ty cooperation and engagement; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.”120 The 
grouping of forces known as the expeditionary strike group, comprising amphibious 
ships, cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, was developed. The nature of expeditionary 
missions allows fast reactions aimed at shaping the world order. The forces employed are 
sea based; they “come from the sea and return to the sea [and are] sustained from the 
sea.”121 Most expeditionary operations are executed in a littoral environment, not on the 
high seas. expeditionary forces need high-grade equipment and skills that are specific 
to their particular tasks and operational area. The development of littoral combat ships 
(lCss) and advances in riverine warfare demonstrate that the U.s. Navy is preparing for 
the new challenges, where in the past the Navy was predominantly focused on blue-
water operations.122 The esg broadens the response capabilities of seaborne forces. They 
are capable of operating independently in low-to-medium-threat environments, thereby 
increasing the fleet’s responsiveness and strategic impact, especially when aircraft carri-
ers are scarce. NoP 2010 highlighted the value of naval expeditionary capabilities in en-
abling and supporting joint force efforts to combat conventional and irregular threats. 
In 2008 the Navy Irregular Warfare office was established, to “institutionalize current 
ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and the sup-
porting missions of information operations, intelligence operations, foreign internal 
defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to [CT] and [counterinsurgency].”123
since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the UsN has been heavily engaged in the Persian gulf 
and arabian sea in support of the army and Marine Corps in Iraq and afghanistan. 
Navy personnel are also involved ashore in the two theaters. robert C. rubel high-
lights operation enduring Freedom in afghanistan as a good example of the use 
of sea basing, as the initial phase of this operation was almost entirely supported by a 
naval task force.124 But the lack of suitable bases had already become apparent in earlier 
conflicts, such as the first Persian gulf War (1990), Bosnia, and Kosovo.125 securing ac-
cess to foreign land bases or permission to maintain naval bases in foreign countries is 
becoming steadily more difficult—most countries do not allow the United states to base 
military personnel on their soil. additionally, land bases are increasingly vulnerable to 
attack.126
The Navy has responded by shifting to the role “of an offshore weapons platform.”127 sea 
basing lessens dependence on the support of other countries. The Navy’s “sea Power 21” 
initiative brought forward three new concepts: “sea strike,” the projection of offensive 
power; “sea shield,” the projection of defensive power; and “sea Basing,” the projec-
tion of sovereignty.128 The concept of sea basing centers on the use of the ocean to as-
semble, move, project, support, and sustain forces. In some respects the sea offers many 
advantages over the land. Forces there are less vulnerable to enemy attack, sovereignty 
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concerns and need for access rights can be avoided, and personnel and equipment can 
be transported and withdrawn quickly.129 The need to build logistic stockpiles ashore 
is reduced, sealift is minimized, and joint forces can be positioned forward without 
depending on the goodwill of host nations. Henry Cook highlights too such benefits as 
accelerated deployment times and seaborne positioning.130 Douglas King and John Berry 
point out that sea basing not only functions as a platform but also supports the projec-
tion of sea power ashore to influence events.131 Till praises sea-based strategic missiles 
attacks: “Today a fleet operating against the shore is able not only to solve the tasks con-
nected with territorial changes, but directly to influence the course and even outcome 
of a war.”132 swartz, however, does not view this as a new concept; he points out that the 
Continental Navy landed Marines in the Bahamas, and shore bombardment was used 
against the Barbary states.133 similarly Peter Dombrowski and andrew ross see sea 
Power 21 as largely repackaging already existing capabilities.134
While the new terms will advance the technology, then, the underlying ideas are not 
revolutionary. The 9/11 attacks suggested the need to be equipped for long-term opera-
tions. The difficulty of executing operations in failed or failing states and the reluctance 
of neutrals or allied countries to allow U.s. military access or overflight rights point 
to the future value of sea basing. The idea of sea basing posits a nonhostile sea envi-
ronment, and today the UsN enjoys broad sea control. Where land-based air support 
is either unavailable (the Falklands, sierra leone) or insufficient (Desert storm, 
Yugoslavia, afghanistan), fleets can provide fire support (sea-launched cruise missiles, 
carrier-based aviation, and naval gunfire).135 The response to the 2010 earthquake in 
Haiti illustrated this strength. although the aircraft carrier deployed to Haiti surged 
from the continental United states, it served on arrival as the sea base for an aerial 
rescue mission, most of the infrastructure ashore having been destroyed or badly dam-
aged. Within three days, the carrier was on the scene and ready to act. However, as 
Work says, while sea basing does offer more independence, it is not replacing land bases. 
There are also voices that find the value of sea basing overrated.136 one of the often-
praised benefits is the reduced dependence on host nations, but gouré claims that if 
the United states needs land bases, it will find them, and if it meets resistance will 
seize and occupy them.137
The concept of sea basing led to the development of the global Fleet station (gFs). In 
october 2007 the africa Partnership station (aPs) was established in the gulf of guin-
ea, where it served as a platform for humanitarian and disaster-relief (Ha and Dr) op-
erations in the area. The pilot aPs mission, which ended in May 2008, laid a foundation 
for conflict prevention. Future deployments were facilitated through the relationships 
the UsN built with and between the peoples of the gulf of guinea region and by the 
goodwill it created through its Ha and Dr activities.138 In November 2008 the southern 
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Partnership station (sPs) mission was established; until april 2009 the UsN deployed 
various forces throughout the Caribbean and Central and south america. sPs strength-
ened regional partnerships and maritime security; UsN forces conducted training and 
cooperative activities with navies, coast guards, and civilian services.139 Kathi sohn sees 
this development of sea basing as a broad concept “and its promise and flexibility arise 
from . . . its minimal military footprint ashore and the wide cross-section of professional 
resources that it hosts.”140
generally, Till notes an increase in coalition operations and a rising concern about the 
maintenance of international security.141 Collaboration between navies is important 
and is much more frequent than land military cooperation. Kaplan attributes that 
to the “brotherhood of the sea.”142 In 2006 adm. Michael Mullen had announced the 
“Thousand-ship Navy,” now known as the global Maritime Partnership (gMP), to 
enhance cooperation between the UsN and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime 
police forces in identifying common threats and jointly providing security against them, 
as well as in maintaining global maritime security.143 The sPs and aPs can be viewed as 
specific measures for promoting global maritime partnership, for supporting U.s. Navy 
engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of security part-
nership building, and for increasing the capabilities of those countries for maritime-
security operations.
These developments can be traced back to Cs21.144 This strategy provided the first 
unified maritime strategy for the U.s. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast guard, stress-
ing their partnership. To the UsN responsibilities for global presence, deterrence, sea 
control, and power projection ashore, this maritime strategy added maritime security, 
humanitarian assistance, and disaster response. another important change is the equal 
priority afforded preventing wars and winning them. according to Wang Baofu, the 
pursuit of absolute military superiority, assuring the defeat of any opponent, has always 
been the core of U.s. military strategy.145 The objective of using military force to prevent 
war has been embodied to some extent in U.s. military strategic deterrence theory but 
has very rarely been placed at the same level as winning wars in important strategic doc-
uments. Nonetheless, Till does not see a major change, since most of the Cold War era 
was spent preventing wars.146 He rather emphasizes the enlarged function of deterrence: 
“The coercive approach of demonstrating denial capabilities against, or promising 
punishment for, prospective wrongdoers has been absorbed into a much wider con-
cept of working against the social, environmental, and economic conditions that make 
wrongdoing more likely.” He also highlights the new profile of Ha and Dr as a new 
development: “Instead of being something of bonus when the need arises and assets are 
available because there is no decent war to fight elsewhere, the task is accepted as part of 
one of the six strategic imperatives, and the ability to do it has apparently been elevated 
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to equal standing with more traditional core capabilities like forward presence and sea 
control.” Thus the new maritime strategy explicitly emphasizes maritime cooperation 
and naval soft power—a new development, and one viewed very favorably by other na-
tions and navies.
Increased international cooperation is also encouraged by recent operations to protect 
shipping. These maritime security operations aim at securing global commerce and sea-
lanes. Maritime security is now defined as “the creation and maintenance of security 
at sea, which is essential to mitigating threats short of war, including piracy, terrorism, 
weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit activities.”147 In the realm of 
maritime security, counterpiracy efforts have become a central focus. In the recent past, 
piracy has seen a stark increase, leading to the launching of multinational antipiracy 
operations in 2008 off the coast of somalia and in the gulf of aden.148 In an impressive 
display of international cooperation, navies from many nations are collaborating to 
protect commercial and other ships from pirate attacks. The european Union, NaTo, 
australia, China, India, Iran, Pakistan, and russia are among the participants. This col-
laboration is even more impressive in that some of the involved countries are otherwise 
politically alienated from the United states. Furthering the cooperation with China and 
russia in the counterpiracy efforts, especially information sharing, is emphasized in the 
“CNo [Chief of Naval operations] guidance” for 2010.149
New strategic documents, such as the National security strategy or the Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDr) for 2010 have defined the larger Indian ocean region as an area 
of interest to the United states. Tim sullivan states that “as home to a number of the 
world’s most dynamic economies, two rising powers, and six nuclear states, asia is a 
region of enormous strategic importance to the United states. For over six decades, 
america has functioned as the preeminent power in asia, playing a vital role in provid-
ing security and ensuring a stable balance of power that has allowed the region’s states 
to flourish politically and economically.”150 Within the Indo-Pacific commons, the two 
rising powers, China and India, are of particular U.s. interest. James Holmes and Toshi 
Yoshihara speak of a strategic triangle in the region, consisting of the United states, 
China, and India.151
The rise of the Chinese People’s liberation army Navy (Pla Navy, or PlaN) is a topic 
of highest priority in Washington. some believe China’s preoccupation with Taiwan 
is the main reason behind the PlaN buildup, while others emphasize the Chinese 
desire to control sea-lanes, to make manifest its status as a major world power, to secure 
regional interests (such as in disputes over the south China sea and, in particular, the 
resource-rich spratly and Paracel Islands), or generally to oppose U.s. regional mili-
tary influence.152 China is building defenses (antiaccess forces) against hostile naval 
intervention with the aim of delaying its arrival or reducing its effectiveness. o’rourke 
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compares the strategy to soviet sea denial during the Cold War.153 also, according to 
Kaplan, China is producing or acquiring submarines at five times the rate of the United 
states.154 What makes China’s strategy more dangerous is its possession of antiship bal-
listic missiles (asBMs), capable of hitting moving targets at sea. Furthermore the Pla 
Navy has been buying naval mines and technology to block global Positioning system 
(gPs) signals. The PlaN is also striving for a fifth generation of stealth fighters, new 
submarine models, aircraft carriers, and advances in space.155 In august 2011 China 
began sea trials with its first aircraft carrier—an old, retrofitted soviet vessel formerly 
known as Varyag.156 at some point in the next decade the PlaN will surpass the UsN 
in number of warships overall. according to Work, “China is now the largest builder 
of merchant ships in the world, and it has embarked on an impressive buildup of naval 
warfighting capabilities—many of them directly targeting the U.s. Navy fleet.”157 These 
modernization efforts have implications for the UsN and affect deliberations about 
forward homeporting, forward basing and shipbuilding, and the advancement of other 
naval capabilities such as improved antisubmarine-warfare systems and antimissile 
defenses to protect ships. More generally, they impact strategic planning for the Pacific 
and Indian oceans and the south China sea, as well as future relations with allies and 
non-allies in the region.
In order to become more familiar with the PlaN, cooperation mechanisms should be 
explored. The UsN and PlaN have engaged in joint search-and-rescue exercise, but 
to foster mutual understanding, more cooperation is needed. Nontraditional security 
issues like international terrorism offer a good starting point.158 For the United states, 
the establishment of military-to-military relations with China is difficult, in particular 
because of the Taiwan question. The accidental NaTo bombing of the Chinese embassy 
in Belgrade in 1999, the collision of a U.s. intelligence aircraft with a Chinese fighter jet 
near Hainan Island in 2001, and the 1995–96 Taiwan strait crisis had serious implica-
tions for U.s.–Chinese military relations. Nonetheless, nontraditional security issues 
such as counterpiracy, joint search and rescue, and humanitarian missions offer ways to 
increase interactions and create an environment to foster a relationship. Promoting mu-
tual trust and building consensus are essential preconditions for future sino-U.s. naval 
security cooperation. a report by the Heritage Foundation argues that misperception 
and misunderstanding are only part of the problem and different goals and incentives 
further explain the difficulties of U.s. Navy–Chinese military relations.159 In May 2011, 
the Chinese counterpart of the U.s. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of staff (then admiral 
Mullen) visited Washington, D.C., for talks that both sides described as a positive step 
toward a stronger relationship.160
But above all, the developments themselves must be closely observed and analyzed. The 
United states is striving for a force distribution of sixty–forty between the Pacific and 
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atlantic.161 already six out of the eleven aircraft carriers (Cvs) are located in the Pacific 
ocean. In the recent past, incidents between the PlaN and the UsN in the western 
Pacific have increased. PlaN vessels have shadowed or even blocked U.s. ships in the 
region.162 The Chinese maritime ambitions are matters of concern not only for U.s. strat-
egy but for that of many regional countries. India, the other major growing power in the 
region, with close ties to the United states, has shown great concern about the rise of the 
Chinese navy, especially in the Indian ocean, in close proximity to India. That country 
is determined to defend its influence in the surrounding waters, and a stronger PlaN 
presence is likely to trigger Indian maritime countermeasures. Holmes and Yoshihara 
see possibilities in a more rapid buildup of naval forces or an expansion of Indian naval 
presence toward both the south China sea and Horn of africa.163
Moreover, innovative technologies and the changing global security environment 
pose serious challenges and greatly affect U.s. defensive and offensive considerations. 
o’rourke, for example, sees a need to replace the fourteen Ohio-class ballistic-missile 
nuclear-powered submarines (ssBNs) with twelve next-generation ssBNs and to develop 
lCss and longer-range carrier aircraft.164 In December 2010, after much negotiation, 
Congress approved the building of twenty lCss through 2015. To meet the growing 
demand for ballistic-missile defense, the Navy also calls for a large number of aegis-
equipped cruisers and destroyers. The former CNo, admiral roughead, had promised 
to make ballistic-missile defense a core mission and in april 2009 established the Navy 
air and Missile Defense Command. a breakthrough in 2011 was the beginning of the 
technology-development phase of the Ohio replacement program—an important step 
toward a shipbuilding contract.165
according to Navy officials, the UsN will require a larger fleet to meet its growing 
responsibilities, including sustained forward presence and maritime security, partner-
ship capacity building, and humanitarian relief. as admiral roughead commented in 
2008, “even the [planned] 313-ship Navy will not be enough for the missions that we’re 
going to be tasked with in the coming years.”166 The Navy is striving to add fifty new 
battle-force ships by fiscal year (FY) 2015. While the 313-ship Navy could be realized 
in theory, this prospect seems less plausible in light of the current budget crisis. In early 
May 2010, former secretary of Defense robert gates warned that “our current plan 
is to have eleven carrier strike groups through 2040 and it’s in the budget. and to be 
sure, the need to project power across the oceans will never go away. But, consider the 
massive overmatch the United states already enjoys. Consider, too, the growing antiship 
capabilities of adversaries. Do we really need eleven carrier strike groups for another 30 
years when no other country has more than one?”167
While he did not doubt the need for new ships, gates pointed to the considerable 
increase in costs. Today, submarines and amphibious ships have tripled their building 
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costs compared to the 1980s, while the overall budget has shrunk by 20 percent. But 
gates also spoke of possibilities offered and challenges presented by new technologies: 
“at the higher end of the access-denial spectrum, the virtual monopoly the U.s. has 
enjoyed with precision guided weapons is eroding—especially with long-range, ac-
curate antiship cruise and ballistic missiles that can potentially strike from over the 
horizon.” 168 Work, for his part, argues that it is crucial to focus on the capabilities when 
talking about ship numbers.169 With (at this writing) the aircraft carriers Uss Roosevelt 
and Lincoln undergoing repair and maintenance and Enterprise scheduled to retire after 
its next deployment in spring 2012 (inactivation ceremony December 2012), the number 
of active CvBgs could temporarily drop to nine.170 Roosevelt should be ready to deploy 
again in December 2012;171 Lincoln is likely to return to active service only in 2015. The 
newest Cv, Uss Gerald R. Ford (CvN 78), is scheduled to be ready for deployment in 
2015, but raymond Pritchett suggests 2017 as more likely.172
The revolution in technology does not affect shipbuilding and weapon requirements 
alone. as Thomas Mahnken said in 2001, the U.s. Navy must “define its roles in space 
and cyberspace.”173 The importance of intelligence and communication was recognized 
by reestablishing the Tenth Fleet (it had been a specialized antisubmarine force in World 
War II), reactivated in January 2010 as the cyber fleet, without ships or aircraft but 
fitted for joint information and intelligence tasks.174 The fleet’s mission is to combine 
intelligence and communication to support information warfare. richard Burgess calls 
this an important step compared to the Cold War, when there was a “wall of separation 
between intelligence collection and fleet operations that once was a given—for security 
reasons.”175 In May 2009, admiral roughead, as CNo, argued that while within the 
military, cyberspace is often depicted as “a little lightning bolt going up to the satellites 
and running around down to earth[,] [t]hat’s not cyber space. Cyber space is on the bot-
tom of the ocean because 95 percent of what moves in cyber space moves on cables that 
rest on the bottom of the ocean. That’s the maritime domain. That’s the domain of the 
United states Navy.” Therefore the UsN has to play a lead role in securing, protecting, 
and defending cyberspace.176
In addition to the cyberspace domain, naval use of space is the subject of an important 
debate today. In the 1990s gulf War U.s. space-based assets delivered valuable operational 
information.177 since then other states have been striving to advance in space. space-
based systems can perform essential functions facilitating military activities on land, 
in the air, and on and under the sea. Because of the diverse nature of space, U.s. space 
operations have implications influencing all elements of national power—diplomatic, 
military, economic, technological, and information.178 according to Frank lacroix and 
Irving Blickstein, this development could influence the naval presence mission and 
maybe one day even replace it.179
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Two aspects of the space discussion are important: command of space and space com-
munication. space command is the control of space communications for civil, commer-
cial, intelligence, and military purposes. Command of space allows the close study of 
the adversary and the tailoring of capabilities to fight that enemy.180 Command of space 
does not mean that one’s adversary cannot act in space, only that he cannot seriously 
interfere in one’s actions thereby. space has great value for communications; therefore, 
space warfare must aim at either securing command of space or preventing the enemy 
from securing it. space communications are used for the movement of trade, matériel, 
supplies, and information.181 Network-centric warfare (NCW) heavily relies on space 
assets.182 NCW focuses on the combination of actions by a fleet, even if not physically 
concentrated. With the help of sensors, valuable information about the adversary’s 
forces is collected and distributed in real time.183 rear admiral Kenneth W. Deutsch, 
speaking before the strategic Forces subcommittee of the senate armed services Com-
mittee, described space systems as providing “essential communication capabilities, 
position, navigation and timing support, missile warning, meteorological data, and 
over-the-horizon surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities on a worldwide basis.”184 
Most space-related issues have been moved to the air Force, but the Navy has important 
interests in space and must be involved in that realm. according to steven Whiting, 
space assets offer unique diplomatic advantages: “From peacetime through war, the 
United states can use the varied components of space assets’ diplomatic power directly 
to improve its diplomatic, economic, and military position.”185
The Navy, then, has gone through a number of transformations and now faces many 
challenges. Before turning to the next chapter, the study will discuss developments of 
the peacetime missions—forward presence and deterrence—and also the “enabler” of 
the two, sea control.
Development of Naval Functions
Cs21 marked a milestone for cooperation activities and emphasized naval missions that 
are essentially peacetime functions—exercising soft power, nation building, coopera-
tion building, and the “Thousand-ship Navy,” to name a few. However, traditional naval 
roles have remained relevant.186 The newest strategic document, NoP 2010, lists sea 
control, power projection, deterrence, forward presence, maritime security, and Ha/Dr 
as core capabilities. It builds on Cs21 and essentially provides the basis for assessing the 
forces required to implement that document.
a study in 2009 by the Institute for Defense analysis proposes five core capabilities for 
the UsN (adding one new mission to Turner’s list), ranking them as follows: strategic 
deterrence, maritime security/irregular warfare (new), power projection, sea con-
trol, and forward deterrence (presence, renamed).187 Its authors see a change since the 
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outbreak of the gWoT, in that adversaries have become less visible and more difficult 
to influence. Because forward presence aims at deterring conventional and irregular 
threats to (regional) stability, and forward forces are immediately ready to deploy in case 
conventional deterrence fails, the study’s authors argue for renaming forward presence 
“forward deterrence/assurance.” They write, “strategic” deterrence “is defined as the 
prevention of nuclear war and aggression or coercion, threatening the vital interests of 
the United states, and/or our national survival.”188
The study also discusses Ha and Dr, added to core capabilities in 2007. Its authors 
conclude that those two missions, while very important, are by-products of traditional 
naval capabilities and therefore do not need to be categorized as separate core capabili-
ties. However, I believe that this elevation of them is appropriate, as it recognizes the 
important contributions military forces can offer in this arena. since the relief efforts 
after the Indian ocean tsunami in 2004, the military role in Ha and Dr missions has 
gained prominence and the U.s. armed forces have conducted several such operations. 
examples include the responses to the earthquake in Haiti in 2010 and the tsunami in 
Japan 2011. also, annual deployments offer humanitarian, medical, dental, and engi-
neering assistance to south and latin america (under Continuing Promise—the 
hospital ship UsNs Comfort or an amphibious vessel, in alternate years) and to asia (as 
part of the Pacific Partnership program—the hospital ship UsNs Mercy or an amphibi-
ous ship in alternate years). overall, the UsN has a long tradition of providing medical 
aid and disaster relief.
since World War II, the UsN has enjoyed sea control, though during the Cold War its 
ability to retain it should conflict break out was sometimes challenged. With the demise 
of the soviet Union, the mission lost its highest priority, but it is still nevertheless im-
portant for security and prosperity.189 sustaining sea control is vital to allow the UsN to 
move freely in peacetime and react to crises. The rise of the Chinese navy has the poten-
tial to pose a threat to U.s. sea control in the future. James Kraska hypothesizes that by 
2015 american command of the global commons will no longer be taken for granted.190 
While the oceans and the airspace above them have been the exclusive domain of the 
U.s. Navy since World War II, this situation could be challenged by then. although 
China is not an enemy of the United states it is becoming a legitimate peer competitor. 
But not only China is augmenting its naval forces; russia and India are also attempting 
to strengthen their navies. Kaplan surmises that India will soon possess the third-largest 
navy.191 Forces engaged in expeditionary operations depend especially on safe passage 
in both open ocean and coastal waters. as Till observes, “This kind of assured theater 
access, in turn, depends on naval forces securing the degree of sea control necessary 
for them to operate effectively and for the shipping they protect to arrive safely at its 
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destination and operate there according to requirements.”192 Therefore sea control has to 
remain a core function and priority for the UsN.
In the first decades after World War II, the Navy emphasized two missions, projection 
of force and nuclear deterrence.193 Both were direct reactions to the environment of the 
Cold War and the possibility of confrontation with the soviet Union. Deterrence works 
best when there are constants and certainty in the international system.194 But it has not 
lost its value with the end of the Cold War; deterrence without the soviet Union has, 
according to Brooks, become even more convincing.195 The focus has largely shifted to 
conventional deterrence. although it is impossible to measure how much direct rel-
evance the Navy has in deterring any specific adversary, naval operations can help dis-
play national power and signal national will, both essential components of deterrence. 
The Navy has to adapt deterrence strategies to the party it wishes to deter; different 
enemies require different types of deterring forces. Today, gerson argues, “with two on-
going wars already straining the military, concerns about a recalcitrant and militarized 
russia, Iran’s continued uranium enrichment activities, North Korea’s nascent nuclear 
arsenal, and top-to-bottom military modernization in China, adversary-specific deter-
rence strategies will likely become a prominent component of national and international 
security in an increasingly multipolar world.”196
But not only naval forces contribute to deterrence. The army and air Force argue that 
they are better suited for this task and that forward presence is not a necessary capa-
bility. The army reasons that because deterrence is mostly related to perception, land 
power is more influential and effective. The air Force, for its part, views deterrence as a 
task that can be fulfilled from a distance. In this view, new technology trumps forward 
presence and will help to stabilize the post–Cold War world order.197 a study by gerson 
and Daniel Whiteneck lays out in graphic form the functions of the different U.s. armed 
forces in deterrence missions.198
gerson and Whiteneck cite North Korea as an instance where “U.s. presence on the 
Korean peninsula has apparently deterred North Korean aggression against south 
Korea for over five decades (although . . . we cannot definitively prove that North Korea 
has wanted to attack the south at any time since the Korean War).”199 While land-based 
presence is assumed to be a more effective deterrent, stationing troops on foreign soil 
becomes, as we have noted, increasingly more difficult. Forward naval forces and sea 
basing offer alternatives. Conventional deterrence is closely linked with forward deploy-
ment, intended to act as a deterrent or for immediate reaction if deterrence fails, in what 
Jerome Burke and his coauthors rename “forward deterrence.”200
Beginning with a traditional status as a by-product of other naval missions, the presence 
mission has grown to the Navy’s most important contribution to peacetime operations. 
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During the Cold War the Navy identified its principal duties as containing soviet 
expansion, destroying the soviet navy in case of war, securing command of the sea, and 
contributing to nuclear deterrence with the help of forward forces. as part of this strat-
egy, the Navy recognized the diplomatic leverage its forces could produce when forward 
deployed. With the end of the Cold War in 1989, it began searching for a new strategy, 
and a resulting white paper, From the Sea, stated that the Navy–Marine Corps team was 
reorienting toward a littoral strategy intended to focus on influencing events ashore.201 
as part of this strategy, the Navy stated, the highest peacetime priority was achieving 
diplomatic benefits by the forward presence of naval vessels. Forward presence had 
evolved to a core function of the UsN. Today the gWoT relies on and calls for forward 
presence in critical regions. NoP 2010 even states that “forward presence facilitates all 
other naval missions, most importantly sea control, which is a necessary condition for 
the deployment and sustained employment of any joint or multinational force.”
But the concept and the amount of forward presence are intensely debated. some argue 
it puts an unnecessary strain on forces and diverts combat power from other areas. 
• Regime removal
• Prompt denial/defeat
• Active/passive 
defenses
• Forcible entry
• Rapid response/ 
reinforcement 
from CONUS
• Project and sustain 
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FIGure 4
Deterrence Capabilities by U.S. Armed Forces (adapted from Gerson and 
Whiteneck, Deterrence and Influence, p. 61)
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others argue that forward presence makes the Navy capable of reacting immediately, 
influencing events, or nipping crises in the bud before they can seriously break out or 
escalate. In any case, the justification goes both ways: the Navy needs to be there to 
respond rapidly, and because the Navy is there, it is the first force to arrive on a scene. 
Presence is not risk-free, as, for example, the bombing in 2000 of the guided-missile de-
stroyer Uss Cole (DDg 67) in Yemen painfully demonstrated. Conversely, events such 
as the tsunami in Indonesia in 2004 clearly underscored the value of forward presence. 
The UsN was the first military force to arrive and provide crucial help. as admiral 
Mullen said,
We must be able to continue to react quickly in times of humanitarian crises and with resolve in 
times of conflict. We must deter and dissuade potential adversaries in peacetime through persistent 
forward presence, and respond instantaneously in war by amassing overwhelming and lethal 
combat power. as we learned in Indonesia, and as we are seeing in the international relief efforts in 
earthquake-stricken Pakistan today [a Pakistani zone of Kashmir was, when the admiral wrote in 
2006, recovering with substantial U.s. military assistance from an earthquake that had occurred in 
october 2005], virtual presence is not the answer. You need to be there to make a difference.202
although acknowledging the great influence of the Navy–Marine Corps teams, exerted 
without leaving footprints, Kaplan argues that the “United states was able to lead the 
relief effort off the coast of Indonesia only because the carrier strike group Uss Abra-
ham Lincoln happened to be in the vicinity and not in the Korean Peninsula, where it 
was headed.”203 However, even a deployment from the Korean Peninsula would have 
shortened the reaction time dramatically compared to a surge from the continental 
United states. Kaplan further points out that while this was a humanitarian mission, the 
necessary skills resembled a war situation, with the need for rapid assembly of ships and 
aircraft. During the crisis sea basing proved highly valuable. all land routes had been 
damaged, and supplies could be delivered only by air, but the United states could per-
form its services independently of land access. Furthermore the geographic conditions 
(an impassable mountain range in the northwest of the affected province, aceh) favored 
access from the sea.204
Forward presence clearly helps the United states respond rapidly, and it supports not 
only deterrence and power projection but also Ha and Dr, maritime security, and dip-
lomatic initiatives. additionally, concepts like sea basing demonstrate the importance 
of forward naval forces for other military services. The capabilities of “being there” and 
influencing without leaving footprints are unique and make naval forces important. 
No other service can replace these advantages. “For example, a U.s. military base in 
okinawa, Japan, simultaneously provides a forward base to deter North Korea, prevents 
Japan from increasing defense spending and becoming a potential military rival to the 
United states, and provides U.s. Marines an important training area.”205 Notwithstand-
ing the current debate over which types of forces best provide presence, the real question 
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is: Which forces will work successfully across the widest possible spectrum of events to 
influence future international situations?206 giving up global presence would surrender 
the initiative to adversaries, unless naval forces were deployed preemptively from the 
continental United states. But any preemptive deployment or attack would involve great 
costs, both domestically and internationally. any policy/decision maker would take 
preemptive action only after much deliberation and with great care.
Dismukes describes forward forces as “immune to this problem.”207 augmenting already 
deployed forward forces has smaller political costs and “express[es] unambiguous U.s. 
commitment in the most compelling form of political communication: the language 
of action.” Forward forces have the capability to demonstrate american intentions and 
are likely to be more credible than words alone. Further, Dismukes points to the lack of 
experience of forces that have remained in the continental United states with poten-
tial crisis locations. Through forward presence they become familiar with conditions, 
environments, and possible partners. Forward-deployed forces frequently engage in 
exercises with foreign navies, enhancing their interoperability with potential allies. 
Cultural awareness is crucial to fostering trust and building relationships. only frequent 
interaction can create such an environment. Furthermore, cooperation with foreign 
forces is necessary to learn their procedures and prepare for combined military opera-
tions. Hans Binnendijk emphasizes as well the benefits of close cooperation for diplo-
matic initiatives:
Bosnia has illustrated the correlation between force presence and influence in the contact group. 
Cooperation can benefit civil-military relations in transitional societies as the Partnership for Peace 
has demonstrated. . . . Forward deployment is crucial to forging patterns of cooperation without 
which american influence would rapidly decline. Forward deployed forces are fundamental to 
america’s ability to react to crises around the world which affect vital interests or humanitarian 
concerns.208
additionally, the backing-up of diplomacy with force is more effective when forces are 
in proximity and immediately ready to react; an example would be a suddenly necessary 
evacuation of an embassy. Forces based at home require time and would deploy only 
after a warning of a possible or actual crisis. In 2002 a Center for strategic studies study 
researched warning times in crises, distinguishing between “out of the blue” cases (no 
warning time), “peaks in messes” (situations of concern that have slowly arisen until 
a certain event led the United states to deploy forces), “slowly gathering cases” (“no 
particular incidents of such a magnitude as to trigger a U.s. response. The responses 
became a matter of when the United states found the situation so intolerable that it 
decided to act”), and “those where it was the U.s.’s choice of the time to initiate some 
action” (“that is, warning time was not the problem since a situation existed beforehand 
and there was no precipitating attack or incident that the U.s. was responding to”). The 
study’s author found that even when there is sufficient warning time, sometimes years, 
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the forces actually used are most often already overseas, and thus forward presence 
greatly helps the United states to respond to crises. The most important value of for-
ward forces lies in small-scale crises and when action is required immediately, but even 
for larger interventions familiarity with the environment and closer proximity favor 
them over forces that have remained at home.209
all this argues that as long as the United states continues to have globally distributed 
national interests, those interests will need to be defended, and forward presence helps 
secure them and demonstrate the will and capacity to do so. But as mentioned above, 
budget restrictions threaten the status quo. In a recent CNa study, Whiteneck and 
coauthors concluded that the existing forward strategies based on combat-credible for-
ward presence are unsustainable.210 It is a fact that while the demand remains constant, 
resources are stagnating or even shrinking. In addition, great costs are associated with 
modernization, people, and infrastructure. The Navy’s battle forces have decreased by 
20 percent, while the number of deployments has remained more or less the same. The 
CNa coauthors suggest a “two hub” approach (credible combat power in east asia and 
arabian sea/Indian ocean, with reduction of global forward presence) or one “hub” 
(credible combat power only in east asia, with global forward presence less than cur-
rently but still robust) to preserve sufficient forward presence to reassure allies and deter 
adversaries but not overstrain naval forces. The two-hub option would result in fewer 
resources for lower-end missions, such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, en-
gagement, shaping, and maritime policing. The one-hub scenario means an unbalanced 
fleet, with consequent loss of flexibility, but more resources for small-scale activities.
alternatives such as reducing combat credibility overall while maintaining the global 
presence or significantly reducing forward presence while focusing more on surging 
naval forces are less attractive. But if the current forward posture is not reconsidered, 
the UsN is at risk of losing influence and credibility. In this realm the importance of 
esgs arises—less costly than carrier strike groups, this type of force presents a viable 
alternative for lower-intensity crises. The emphasis on combat-credible forward forces 
requires those forces to be strong, so that, while rarely engaged in combat alone, they 
might influence by virtue of their combat credibility. The CNa study’s suggestion to 
concentrate on east asia while keeping smaller forces globally dispersed would leave 
much of the globe with limited combat-credible forward presence.
It is not yet clear whether, for example, deterrence would have the same effect with 
smaller forces. The focus on east asia, however, is in line with the steadily rising im-
portance of the Indo-Pacific commons. NoP 2010 recognizes the difficulties posed by 
forward presence but nonetheless continues to emphasize its importance: “The chal-
lenge is to employ globally distributed, mission-tailored forces across a wide range of 
missions that promote stability, prevent crises and combat terrorism; while maintaining 
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the capability to regionally concentrate credible combat power to protect vital american 
interests, assure friends, and deter and dissuade potential adversaries. Forward forces 
and forces surged from the United states, along with those of allies and partners, must 
be sufficiently ready and interoperable to respond effectively across a broad spectrum 
of crises.”211 It remains to be seen how this will affect the Navy and its functions in the 
coming years.
Summary
The goal of chapter 1 was twofold. First, it intended to show the importance of seaborne 
crisis response and the need of an approach focusing on the military services separately, 
rather than treating armed forces as a unity. second, it provided an introduction into 
the different naval core missions, with emphasis on peacetime activities, linking them 
to recent developments. Which military service is best for what purpose is widely de-
bated, and as this study develops it will link naval advantages, disadvantages, and crisis 
response in more detail. Because of the differences between the military services, it is 
important to appreciate the impact of the uniqueness of each part of the armed forces. a 
better understanding of why, how, and when naval forces are sent to respond to a crisis 
can enhance crisis-response effectiveness. The influence of latent use of force and the 
frequent employment of the UsN as an instrument of foreign policy in times of peace 
point to the importance of a more in-depth inquiry of the influence of uniquely naval 
attributes. The next chapter provides the theoretical background and relevant literature 
for hypotheses explaining naval crisis response.
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Just enough Force?
a Theoretical Framework for seaborne Crisis response
In having a peacetime political function in addition to their combat 
capabilities, naval forces are like all other forms of military power, only 
more so.
eDWarD lUTTWaK
There is no single theory directly linking the involvement of the United states in inter-
national crises with the use of naval forces.1 However, there are many theories explain-
ing the motivations of the use of force and assumptions about the advantages as well as 
disadvantages of naval power. The first part of this chapter will briefly summarize the 
history of the american use of force, followed by the three dominant schools of thought 
for justifying intervention decisions: realist, idealist, and diversionary theories. These 
theories will serve as an introduction into the U.s. use of force, but not all directly influ-
ence the hypotheses drawn later.
There are a variety of different approaches states can employ in reacting to international 
conflicts and crises. Political leaders can publicly voice disapproval, announce political 
or economic sanctions, engage in negotiations, support mediation attempts, undertake 
diplomatic efforts, or employ violence. This diversity of possible responses suggests the 
many tools at the disposal of the decision makers. as Meernik says, “the United states 
has utilized a vast arsenal of foreign policy carrots and sticks to induce, compel, and 
deter changes in other nations’ foreign policies.”2 often, especially since the end of the 
Cold War, the United states has relied on military forces to respond to crises.3 Ideally, 
military force is used as only a last resort, but frequently it not only serves as a backup 
for other forms of engagement but substitutes for them. However, military power can be 
employed in many different ways and forms; it is not confined to war fighting.
The second part of this chapter focuses on the use of naval power and crisis-response 
capabilities. Because naval forces share a number of attributes with ground and land-
based air forces, I will attempt to identify any significant circumstances where naval 
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capabilities are of unique value, especially for operations short of full-scale war.4 To-
gether with the advantages/disadvantages of seaborne forces, these considerations will 
inform the building of measurable hypotheses. rather than establishing a single theory 
of naval deployments, I pursue here a general inquiry that encompasses as many factors 
as possible in order to answer four main questions—pertaining to the relations between 
the use of naval forces and crisis characteristics, actors, U.s. activity, and outcomes—to 
determine where future research will be useful.
Explaining the U.S. Use of Force
Up until the twentieth century, as gerald astor describes, americans used force as a 
means of protecting national security or self-defense.5 The war against the Barbary 
states, the War of 1812, and the Civil War are cited as examples. The war with Mexico 
(1846–48) was fought for territorial gains, and the spanish-american War (1898) can 
be seen as a demonstration of american power in the tradition of the Monroe Doctrine. 
Within the United states, the sioux wars (between 1854 and 1890) exemplify a fight for 
territory between U.s. and Indian forces.6
Motives behind Intervention Decisions
since the founding of the republic, the United states has deployed forces overseas for 
many purposes short of war. Prior to World War II, these included protecting commerce 
and trade routes, deterring and punishing piracy, enhancing prestige, cultivating rela-
tions with foreign governments, restoring order, guaranteeing the collection of debts, 
and defending american citizens and interests during regional upheavals.7 strictly 
speaking, the United states was never truly isolationist. For example, U.s. military 
forces have been committed in east asia since 1898 and have frequently intervened in 
the Western Hemisphere.8
By the twentieth century, however, the United states had troops almost constantly 
deployed around the world.9 Feste identifies four moments in american history that 
have shaped intervention policy: World War II, the middle of the vietnam War, the 
end of the Cold War, and one decade post–Cold War.10 Before World War II, american 
military capabilities were limited; real global intervention activism and commitment 
began only after the war.11 The United states was resolved to remain actively involved in 
world affairs and to prevent a unilateral buildup of hostile might. Munich was engraved 
in the minds of american presidents. No longer were the main reasons for using force 
threats to U.s. influence in the Western Hemisphere, its citizens, or—however rarely—
the homeland.
During the Cold War, the use of force centered on the standoff between the two 
superpowers. Protection of the free world, maintenance of the balance of power, and 
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prevention of soviet gain of territory or the spread of communism dominated U.s. for-
eign policy. The United states tried to keep the Western Hemisphere, and as many other 
Third World nations as possible, under american control.12 In vietnam, the United 
states suffered a major defeat and for a while became more reluctant to use force (open-
ly) abroad. But Jeffrey record interprets the lesson from vietnam not as an example to 
discredit U.s. use of force but rather as evidence of the mismatch between conventional 
military power and revolutionary forces.13 The two paradigms, Munich and vietnam, 
influence most presidents in their attitudes toward intervention.
In the wake of the Cold War, the United states no longer faced an equal adversary, 
and its military supremacy became unchallenged.14 escalations with the soviet Union, 
triggered by involvement in countries located in the soviet sphere of interest, did not 
influence U.s. intervention decisions any more.15 The danger of a war between the 
superpowers had been eliminated, but conflicts and crises persisted, and military power 
remains essential, rendering the “responsibility of global leadership greater than ever.”16 
as many crises and conflicts have occurred since the collapse of the Berlin Wall and 
the demise of the soviet Union as prior to those momentous events. as richard Neal 
says, “While the Cold War superpower contest is over, the world may be a more peaceful 
place, but it is not a world at peace.”17 according to art, military power continues to be 
important because the relations between states remain anarchic.18 Thus military force 
and foreign policy stay closely linked.19
some even see a rising importance of intervention since the end of the Cold War.20 
Humanitarian interventions, for example, have emerged as a new post–Cold War phe-
nomenon.21 Human suffering, brought to the american homes on television, has led to 
interventions mainly undertaken to halt human-rights abuses.22 In general, military op-
erations other than war gained momentum in the post–Cold War era.23 The increase of 
overt intervention after the end of the Cold War, according to Feste, can be attributed to 
a combination of diminished concern about soviet involvement, the rising importance 
of economic criteria, and reemphasis on idealistic considerations, such as human rights 
and democracy.24 While american intervention policy continues to be strongly oriented 
to national interests, humanitarian concerns—and, since 9/11, antiterrorism—seem to 
have replaced communist containment. The year 2001 brought the global war on terror 
and opened a new chapter in the justification of U.s. use of force—preemptive strikes, 
democratization, and a new (or renewed) moralization of warfare. The communist 
threat from the Cold War had shifted to the terrorist threat, no longer confined to states 
but instead found among individuals and transnational and international organizations. 
But in Paul atwood’s words the war on terror “is in keeping with the long history of 
american foreign policy.”25 some even argue that military supremacy has become part 
of the national identity.26
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Thomas Barnett highlights the changes in the U.s. intervention pattern.27 Key targets 
are countries located in what Barnett calls the “gap,” that part of the world excluded 
from the benefits of globalization and therefore outside the “core”: “simply put, . . . [if a] 
country was losing out to globalization or rejecting much of its cultural content flows, 
there was a far greater chance that the United states would end up sending troops there 
at some point across the 1990s.” The 9/11 attacks triggered another change. Barnett 
speaks of a time of chaos and uncertainty and of the necessity to “defend all against 
all.”28 since the demise of the soviet Union, no coherent strategy for when force should 
be used had been established. “Today, america and the world stand at a crossroad simi-
lar to the one we faced following World War II. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 have pro-
vided us all a glimpse of the new form of international crisis that will define our age.”29 
The attacks of 2001 represented a milestone in the international security system. states 
were no longer the exclusive actors but gave way to substate and transstate systems.30 
During the 1990s, Washington mainly concentrated on individual enemies, whereas the 
Cold War had focused on a hostile order. rogue states and their leaders, failing states, 
extremists, and terrorists became new targets.31 The war on terrorism focuses mostly on 
individuals or groups and on countries providing them with support and safe havens. 
During the Cold War the West faced a known threat from the soviet Union and, to a 
lesser extent, China, which had well-known intentions and goals. Today the motives and 
moves are less predictable. In the words of the former american secretary of defense, 
Donald H. rumsfeld, new military thinking is now required to arm Western societies 
“against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen, and the unexpected.”32
Soft Power?
Feste observes that “the United states is widely perceived as emphasizing military power 
as a tool of foreign policy, at the expense of the complexities of diplomacy and other 
forms of soft power.”33 Joseph Nye has frequently warned that the United states has 
lost “soft power”—its ability to attract others by the legitimacy of U.s. policies and the 
values that underlie them.34 The United states both undervalues this form of power and 
underestimates its importance. The Cold War was won with a strategy of containment 
that employed soft power along with hard power. after 9/11 the United states pursued a 
unilateralist foreign policy and relied excessively on military means to resolve all secu-
rity problems, not only damaging its hard power but also seriously setting back its soft 
power. Damage to hard power can be made good in a relatively short period, whereas 
losses in soft power are long lasting and require fundamental policy changes to address.
The preemption doctrine has removed “the distinction between imminent (immediate) 
and potential future threats. It assumes that grave threats are now always imminent.” 
This thought process leads to the devaluation of diplomacy and negotiation and shifts 
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the emphasis to the use of force as an immediate resource, thereby failing to distinguish 
between short- and long-term threats and different adversaries. The result is a more 
complex security scenario and greater instability.35 The soft-power dilemma has trig-
gered persistent discussions in the U.s. academic community. The Center for strategic 
and International studies (CsIs), an american think tank in Washington, D.C., held in 
2007 special seminars involving such former government officials and expert as Zbig-
niew Brzezinski, richard armitage, and Joseph Nye.36 The consensus view was the need 
for a new balance on the part of the United states if it was to prolong its hegemony. The 
participants “proposed to use hard and soft power in coordination as ‘rational strength’ 
in order to realize strategic national security goals.”37 Nye had previously defined this 
“combination of the hard power of coercion and payment with the soft power of persua-
sion and attraction” as smart power.
Two years later, in 2009, secretary of Defense robert gates proposed the following 
approach:
What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide irregular campaign—a 
struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force 
will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists and other extremists. But over 
the long term, the United states cannot kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the 
military calls kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures aimed at promoting bet-
ter governance, economic programs that spur development, and efforts to address the grievances 
among the discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of 
quiet successes over a long time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideologies.38
This statement supports the smart-power commission’s call for a soft-power approach 
linked with military force.39
a policy shift became visible with the release of a National security strategy (Nss) in 
2010 and the 2010 QDr. Both strategic documents recognized the importance of soft 
power and emphasized the american interest in focusing on it. If necessary, however, 
soft power can be backed up by hard power, which suggests a combination of the two. 
Naval forces are a uniquely appropriate smart-power tool, because of their global pres-
ence, frequent interactions, diplomatic potential, and low intrusiveness. This point is 
reflected in the newest maritime strategy, “a Cooperative strategy for 21st Century 
seapower,” and NoP 10.40 The latter explains how naval forces “will blend soft and hard 
power in support of the approach, objectives and enduring national interests articulated 
in the National Defense strategy (NDs).” according to Bruce elleman, “during the 
nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries, the very thought that sea powers might 
regularly use naval platforms to deliver humanitarian aid, as opposed to cutting off and 
starving an enemy’s supply lines, would have seemed alien. In the twenty-first century, 
however, national power and prestige are more and more characterized by ‘soft power.’ 
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Unified assistance [after the tsunami in southeast asia] showed that ‘hard power’ 
assets like aircraft carriers can also be the best providers of ‘soft power.’ ” 41
Realism, Idealism, and Diversionary Theory
Policy and decision makers face the challenge of deciding whether, when, and how to 
use force.42 a large body of literature, with the help of various theoretical approaches, 
has studied how the use of military force has helped to promote U.s. foreign-policy 
goals.43 Three schools of thought—realism, idealism, and diversionary theory—capture 
the main paradigms. realism remains the most important for studying the use of force 
and international relations.44 In classical realism, sovereign states are the dominant 
actors in the international system, which is characterized by anarchy. Nation-states 
are in a constant state of competition as they seek power, maximization of security, 
and material wealth.45 This struggle shapes the conduct of foreign policy and interna-
tional relations. Political, military, and economic assets can be used to support power 
and security. In its exercise of foreign policy, the state depends on public support and 
economic resources. However, domestic politics are (for the most part) secondary in the 
formulation of foreign policy in the realist paradigm.46 Hans Morgenthau and e. H. Carr 
are among the main proponents of classical realism, the roots of which go as far back as 
Thucydides, Hobbes, and Machiavelli.47
Unlike classical realism, the reformulated neorealism, or structural realism, downplays 
the importance of the individual and human nature in explaining why states seek power 
and sees the pursuit of power as a derivate of international structure.48 even without an 
imminent threat, states, treated in the aggregate, as “black boxes,” are considered well 
advised to pursue power sufficient for self-defense. Different forms and interpretations, 
such as defensive and offensive, have emerged.49 Defensive realists argue against the 
maximization of power, because they believe the system will punish states that attempt 
to gain too much power, whereas offensive realists would maximize power to the point 
of hegemony: “The argument is not that conquest or domination is good in itself, but 
instead that having overwhelming power is the best way to ensure one’s own survival. 
For classical realists, power is an end in itself; for structural realists, power is a means 
to an end and the ultimate end is survival.”50 National interests are closely linked to 
realist thinking, as they are essential for power and security: “The dominant paradigm 
in world politics—realism—would suggest that interventions take place only when clear 
national interests are at stake.”51
John Ikenberry describes the mainstream of american foreign policy since World War 
II as influenced by either realist or liberalist considerations.52 These two strategies have 
guided american presidents in their foreign-policy orientations. liberal institutional-
ism, like idealism, acknowledges the importance of multilateralism, international law, 
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international institutions, and democracy. U.s. power can help to create a more peaceful 
and cooperative world, the vision of Woodrow Wilson. Following this ideal, foreign 
policy should prefer a “carrot” rather than a “stick” approach and downplay the role 
of military force. David skidmore, analyzing american presidents from Nixon to g. 
W. Bush, identifies Nixon’s foreign policy as most “realist,” whereas he believes Jimmy 
Carter and William Clinton favored a liberal institutionalist approach; Carter was a 
strong advocate of human rights, and Clinton promoted “assertive multilateralism.”53 
But both presidents began shifting their policies toward realism as a result of interna-
tional events and domestic pressure. He describes ronald reagan and (after the 9/11 at-
tacks) Bush as followers of neoconservatism. While the reagan administration engaged 
in covert operations to topple socialist and communist regimes, the “Bush doctrine” and 
the gWoT endorsed overt regime change in Iraq and afghanistan. Ikenberry argues 
that the Bush doctrine sets a new precedent of unilateralism, involving less reliance 
on allies and global institutions in the battle against terrorism and rogue states.54 He 
criticizes the U.s. use of military force to refashion the global order and favors more at-
tention to the international community and world stability. Francis Fukuyama cautions 
that “neoconservatism, whatever its complex roots, has become indelibly associated with 
concepts like coercive regime change, unilateralism and american hegemony. What is 
needed now are new ideas, neither neoconservative nor realist, for how america is to 
relate to the rest of the world—ideas that retain the neoconservative belief in the univer-
sality of human rights, but without illusions about the efficacy of american power and 
hegemony to bring these ends about.”55
generally, realists tend to appreciate the use of power but are skeptical of the impor-
tance of institutions, while liberals value the importance of institutions but are skepti-
cal of the use of power to restructure them. But steven Brooks and William Wohlforth 
argue that the benefits of international institutions are grounded in realism—that it will 
be more challenging for the United states to advance its national interests if it does not 
invest in those institutions.56 a discussion sparked in april 2010 after remarks by the 
former White House chief of staff rahm emanuel highlighted the difficulties of label-
ing a president’s orientation in regard to idealism and realism. rahm told the New York 
Times, “If you had to put him [Barack obama] in a category, he’s probably more realpo-
litik, like Bush 41 [that is, g. H. W. Bush]. . . . He knows that personal relationships are 
important, but you’ve got to be cold-blooded about the self-interests of your nation.”57 
several scholars reacted in Foreign Policy to the categorization. Whereas robert Kagan 
sees obama’s foreign policy as oriented to idealism, stephen Walt and Charles Kupchan 
see a tilt into a realist direction. Thus a clear categorization is nearly impossible and 
often depends more on the nature of the decision that needs to be made.58 similarly Nye 
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points out that obama should not be categorized as either idealist or realist but rather as 
oriented toward liberal realism.59
To capture this variety, Miskel distinguishes two different types of realists, one with 
a very narrow definition of what constitutes national interests and the other one with 
a more inclusive definition that captures such events as Bosnia and Kosovo.60 He sees 
most american presidents as bracketed between those two. america’s announced condi-
tions for intervention are very broad.61 vital national interest is a reoccurring theme and 
offers the main rationale for intervention decisions. glenn Hastedt draws a complex pic-
ture of individuals and institutions “competing for positions of prominence in setting 
‘values and priorities’ ” leading to a variety of different national interests.62
There exists no agreement on the exact definition of national interests. security and 
power are clearly dominant, whereas humanitarian issues are secondary and normally 
not categorized as vital. For record, only a direct attack on or threat to the american 
territory and its citizens is widely accepted as a prime vital national interest.63 art lists 
six categories of national interests for the United states, ranked from highest to low-
est: prevent an attack on the United states; prevent a war between the major powers in 
eurasia; preserve access to oil reserves; maintain an open international economic order; 
spread democracy, promote upholding human rights, and prevent genocide and mass 
murder in civil wars; and preserve the global environment.64 The first three are the most 
important ones and largely dominate policy making. art argues that military power 
can guarantee the first three vital interests but not the next three: “In general, military 
power cannot be efficiently and effectively employed to force states to lower their barri-
ers to trade, to create democracy in states that have never experienced it, or to force oth-
ers to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases. . . . Military power can be directly used 
to prevent aggression against the Persian gulf oil sheikdoms, or to preserve eurasian 
great-power peace, by deterring would-be adversaries and reassuring america’s great-
power allies.” The fifth in this list is an idealistic goal and by itself largely irrelevant for 
realist intervention decisions. art proposes a strategy of selective engagement, between 
isolationist, unilateralist, and highly global interventionist. This strategy—what he calls 
“realpolitik plus”—follows both realist and liberalist ideals. Beside power and security, 
the promotion of democracy, human rights, free markets, and international openness 
are important goals of U.s. foreign policy. Military power is fundamental to selective 
engagement, as it furthers both military and nonmilitary goals.65 Many different reasons 
for interventions have been given, but the most powerful and enduring motive has been 
security.66 Feste comes to the conclusion that although intervention to protect human 
rights, spread democracy, or support peacekeeping missions has increased after the 
Cold War, these purposes cannot outweigh national interests.67 andrew Bacevich makes 
a similar statement: “I am pretty idealistic, but when it comes to american statecraft, 
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despite all our talk about american idealism, ideals matter only when they coincide 
with U.s. interest.”68 once military operations are under way, the rhetoric shifts to 
idealistic goals rather than realist ones.69 Nevertheless, these commentaries point to the 
overall dominance of national interest for the decision-making process.
Traditionally, “just war” theory is used for moral justification of certain interventions 
and wars by reference to universal values. Unlike pacifism, just war theory does not 
oppose all uses of force but gives clear limitations and offers guidelines as to when it 
is morally legitimate.70 after the vietnam War the theory gained increased recogni-
tion in the United states. Just-war theory comprises two parts: jus ad bellum and jus in 
bello; the former describes the legitimate conditions for intervention, and the latter sets 
rules for the behavior of soldiers and states engaged in a war. only the first category is 
relevant to the intervention decision. The principles trace back to augustine in the early 
fifth century and to the work of Thomas aquinas from 1265 to 1273.71 aquinas defined 
three main criteria for when a war can be just.72
•	 Just cause (e.g., violent attack)
•	 right authority (e.g., United Nations)
•	 right intention (e.g., to end violence).
other definitions, such as that put forward by the Responsibility to Protect report of 
2001, add last resort, proportionality of means, and reasonable prospect to the list.73 
Frequently american presidents have rhetorically employed one or more of the just-
war principles to justify decisions and portray the U.s. role as a moral force, especially 
in promoting democracy and human rights. In the prelude to the 2003 war in Iraq, 
just-war principles were evoked to justify actions within “a broader moral, cultural and 
humanistic framework.”74 Thus, as mentioned above, realist decisions can be linked to 
idealist rhetoric to “sell” intervention to the public.
another school of thought focuses on the importance of domestic politics for foreign 
policy making. The “diversionary” theory assumes a connection between domes-
tic politics and the decision to intervene.75 Factors such as high inflation rates, high 
unemployment, recession or economic stagnation, and low presidential approval rates 
can encourage a diversionary focus on foreign policy. Benjamin Fordham empirically 
supports the assumption that interventions are more likely in times of high unemploy-
ment rates and low presidential-popularity ratings.76 although realists commonly reject 
the impact of domestic politics and considerations on foreign-policy decision making, 
some scholars emphasize it.77 For example, robert gilpin acknowledges the importance 
of domestic factors for explaining uses of force.78 In Paul Huth’s words, “state leaders are 
rational foreign policy decision makers who seek to remain in power, but they are also 
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concerned with promoting the international security of their country and are there-
fore careful to pursue security policies that do not undermine their domestic political 
position. . . . [B]oth domestic political concerns and international power considerations 
determine foreign policy choices.”79
These interpretations illustrate the importance of a combination of theoretical ap-
proaches in explaining intervention decisions. Meernik’s 2004 The Political Use of Mili-
tary Force in US Foreign Policy, already cited, is one of the most comprehensive research 
accounts of why the United states employs military force. His empirical analyses include 
realist, idealist, diversionist, and economic-interest considerations, and his various 
hypotheses integrate different theories in a historical context. His empirical findings 
strongly suggest an orientation to realist goals, such as power and security. The results 
for the realist model are the most convincing and provide the best explanation for deci-
sions to use force.
However, no single model is all-powerful. While the realist model is superior to other 
models, the liberalist, idealist, diversionist, and economic-interest models also help to 
understand when the United states will use force. This finding supports the observation 
that no president is oriented to any single school of thought. as circumstances dictate, 
different reasons justify their decisions. What remains convincing, however, is the 
dominance of national interest; thus for this study I assume that the greater the threat 
to national interests, the stronger and more forceful the U.s. response will be. In this 
connection it is interesting to see how seaborne responses are influenced by national 
interests and how this affects naval deployments with other forces.
How Can Naval Forces Influence International Crises (Behavior)?
american military power serves as an instrument of foreign policy by its very exis-
tence. Without ever having to be used or even referred to, it heightens U.s. prestige 
and lends importance to proposals and expressions of concern. The knowledge that it 
exists influences both how american policy makers approach problems and what posi-
tions other states adopt.80 as laid out in the previous chapter, naval forces are charac-
terized by unique capabilities especially valuable for crisis response and the political 
use of force. The power of the use of force short of war is summarized in the following 
words by g. F. Hudson:
In traditional international politics the use of force has not been confined to actual war, but has 
won its greatest success when governments have been intimidated into compliance with the will 
of a stronger (or more determined) power without any clash of arms taking place. War can even be 
regarded as a failure in the application of force, just as the killing of a cashier by a bank robber usu-
ally implies that the robber has failed to intimidate by pointing a gun and has had to carry out his 
threat in action.81
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Luttwak’s Suasion
luttwak describes the political use of sea power as “armed suasion.” He defines the phe-
nomenon as follows: “armed suasion defines all reactions, political or tactical, elicited 
by all parties—allies, adversaries, or neutrals—to the existence, display, manipulation, 
or symbolic use of any instrument of military power, whether or not such reactions 
reflect any deliberate intent of the deploying party. Naval suasion refers to effects 
evoked by sea-based or sea-related forces.”82 suasion can be active or latent, coercive or 
supportive, deterrent or positive. What all forms have in common is dependence on the 
reactions of others. essentially, armed suasion is about threat perception, not the actual 
use of force. suasion materializes in reactions by other actors taken because of their 
perceptions, not in actions by or intentions of the “suasor.” Yet armed suasion is feasible 
only if resort to force is possible and convincingly plausible.
active suasion includes any deliberate attempt to induce a specific reaction from the 
target, whether an ally, enemy, or neutral. latent suasion, exercised through routine 
or undirected naval operations, works best as a deterrent but can also be supportive, 
reminding allies and clients of the capabilities that can be brought to their aid. Further, 
suasion can manifest itself in signs of support (supportive mode) or can be aimed at 
deterring (deterrence mode) the adversary.83 The coercive aspect of active suasion can 
deter or compel, while the supportive form reassures allies or clients.84 Michael Codner 
illustrates luttwak’s different modes of suasion with the graph given in figure 5.85
one example given by luttwak of unintended effects brought about by latent suasion 
involves U.s. naval activity in the Mediterranean in the years following World War II.86 
Negative
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FIGure 5
Armed Suasion (adapted from Codner, “Defining Deterrence,” p. 2)
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While the U.s. sixth Fleet was consciously deterring russian and arab moves against 
american interests, it may also have been giving unintended encouragement to Israeli 
activism in a manner inimical to the interests of the United states. The active version 
of supportive suasion is exemplified by the visit of the battleship Uss Missouri (BB 63) 
to Istanbul in March 1946, a visit that marked the beginning of the postwar deploy-
ment of american naval power in the Mediterranean. The Missouri episode demon-
strated the political application of naval power—the use of ships as symbols, rather than 
instruments, of power. The offensive power represented by Missouri was secondary in 
importance to gaining the declared commitment to Turkey. according to luttwak this 
“symbolic” role is preventive of, rather than reactive to, a confrontation.87 In my view, 
the symbolic power of warships can be influential at any time in a crisis, be it to con-
vince adversaries to desist from hostilities, to encourage the termination of the crisis, or 
to prevent escalation.
another example is the crisis triggered by tension between Taiwan and China in 1950. 
elements of the U.s. seventh Fleet were deployed between Taiwan and China to dis-
suade, and if necessary to thwart, any attempt to mount an amphibious invasion of Tai-
wan. at the same time, any potential unintended supportive effects for the Nationalists 
were neutralized by a public declaration that the fleet would also intervene to prevent a 
Nationalist landing on the mainland. In this case, the deterrent effect on the communist 
government was actually reinforced by emphasizing the supportive role of the seventh 
Fleet: Bejing’s incentive to invade Taiwan was much reduced when the Nationalist threat 
to the mainland was neutralized. This incident again highlights the advantages of naval 
forces, which are flexible in a sense that has no equivalent on land. overall, since 1945 
the U.s. Navy has exercised different forms of suasion, on many occasions, at all levels 
of intensity, and all around the world. What luttwak labels “suasion” can more gener-
ally be termed “naval diplomacy,” working to influence and persuade minds rather than 
manifesting itself in physical action.88
Naval Diplomacy
During the nineteenth century, “naval diplomacy” was added to the naval vocabulary.89 
over the course of history, naval forces have been used frequently and successfully to 
support political-diplomatic initiatives by influencing behavior and have established 
their role as the predominant military instrument of diplomacy.90
History of Naval Diplomacy. With their capabilities to deploy forward, remain in in-
ternational waters, stay on station indefinitely, interact with friendly countries, monitor 
crisis spots, withdraw when no longer needed, and respond with military power, naval 
forces have exercised diplomatic power to great effect.91 sir Julian Corbett regarded 
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the support or obstruction of diplomatic efforts as the central task of naval fleets.92 as 
Deborah sanders observes, “Naval diplomacy allows states to signal national interests 
in a particular region, and through naval presence, navies can also act as subtle remind-
ers of their states’ military might and commitment.”93 John stuart Mill observed, “our 
diplomacy stands for nothing when we have not a fleet to back it.”94 at the lower end of 
the diplomatic spectrum are such measures as demonstrating presence, visiting ports, 
showing the flag, exercises, and other confidence-building activities. “ship visits can be 
a useful form of diplomatic exchange, help maintain or secure good relations, and win 
popular favour.”95
sailors frequently help communities on land. examples that foster goodwill and reas-
sure american support include volunteer work, such as helping to build hospitals and 
schools, or invitations to foreign nationals to visit U.s. Navy ships.96 Naval vessels also 
operate periodically as hospital ships (in addition to actual Navy-operated hospital 
ships) for poor countries and deploy in humanitarian-assistance and disaster-relief mis-
sions.97 Further traditional diplomatic peacetime activities center on cooperation with 
foreign military forces—military-to-military contacts, exercises with foreign navies, 
officer training, and access agreements—as means of demonstrating and building posi-
tive political relationships.98 as Blechman says, these operations “provide the backbone 
of the strategy of global engagement.”99 at the higher end, armed suasion is the most 
forceful aspect of diplomacy.100 The term “naval diplomacy” has been used so broadly 
that it can be defined as encompassing all events, even including violence, that do not 
lead to war.101
The ability of navies to provide diplomatic leverage has long been recognized by nations. 
Bob Davidson locates the origins of naval diplomacy in the heritage of colonial pow-
ers.102 These powers would dispatch vessels to foreign locations to boost their prestige 
and reputations and also to influence events. For the majority of the nineteenth century, 
the United states benefited from the gunboat diplomacy of the royal Navy, and also to 
some extent of the French navy, in Chinese ports.103 at the same time the UsN con-
ducted direct american diplomacy, and sailors served as ambassadors. Naval diplo-
macy today is a continuation of this tradition, aimed at influencing incidents on land 
by controlling the sea or by threatening to project power ashore if necessary. Max Boot 
compares the original tasks of gunboat diplomacy with the ones of the World Trade 
organization today.104 For rob Mclaughlin, the U.s. Navy is the principal military arm 
of american diplomacy in the post–World War II world.105 Bouchard notes that “observ-
ers of naval diplomacy have concluded that changes in the structure and conduct of in-
ternational politics since the end of World War II have been the primary factors causing 
maritime powers, particularly the United states, to place greater emphasis on the use 
of naval forces as a political instrument relative to land-based air and ground forces.”106 
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likewise, Cable states that “some of the constraints on the use of american military 
power to exert international influence are also such as almost to encourage reliance on 
limited naval force for this purpose.”107 others suggest domestic political constraints as 
the driving force.
Whereas such authors as Booth and Peter Nailor consider gunboat diplomacy a thing 
of the past and the use of naval forces for diplomacy as obsolescent, ghosh expresses 
an opposite viewpoint, that reluctance to become involved in full-scale wars increases 
the need for naval diplomacy, which can be employed to achieve national objectives 
without engaging in open warfare. In the latter’s words, “the focus of armed conflict is 
shifting from traditional regular war to the use of military power on the lines of modern 
gunboat coercive diplomacy.”108 Thomas goodall emphasizes the technological advan-
tages of the United states for conducting gunboat diplomacy.109 He names carrier-based 
aviation, cruise missiles, and amphibious assault as unique capabilities that further its 
effectiveness. since the UsN enjoys unmatched capabilities and worldwide presence, 
coercive diplomacy will remain an important tool for U.s. policy makers.
according to Matthew scarlett, coercive diplomacy can achieve tangible foreign policy 
objectives; however, it requires a fusion of political, diplomatic, and naval skills for 
success.110 “The great utility of coercive naval diplomacy is made apparent through the 
variety of objectives for which it can be applied. Potential objectives range from general 
expression of foreign policy at one extreme, to the outright expulsion of a foreign gov-
ernment at the other extreme. often coercive naval diplomacy is used to persuade an 
adversary to change their behavior. Naval forces are also used to enforce peace between 
two adversaries by a third party.”111 The North Korean shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 
November 2010 triggered the deployment of a well-armed naval task force, involving the 
carrier George Washington, to the Yellow sea. Pritchett calls this “a little bit of gunboat 
diplomacy,” with China and North Korea as target states.112 China had warned the Unit-
ed states in the past not to send carriers to the Yellow sea. With this move the United 
states cautioned North Korea not to escalate the situation and sent a signal to China to 
join the international denunciation of the North Korean aggression. as Pritchett says, 
“gunboat diplomacy is always distinct to time and place, and even in the twenty-first 
century remains a policy of force intended to deter other nations from exercising the 
violent use of military power.”113
The following passage from Cable summarizes thinking on the usefulness of navies for 
diplomacy:
Curiously enough, the expressive use of coercive diplomacy is sometimes better attempted by ac-
tions than by words, by warships rather than by politicians or diplomats. . . . The movement of war-
ships, however, can still convey a sense of menace that is plausible to the victim because it is potent 
yet undefined, but convenient to the aggrieved government, because it is simultaneously impressive 
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to domestic opinion and noncommittal. Warships can always be withdrawn, provided the purpose 
of their movement has been left a little vague: verbal threats become embarrassing if they are nei-
ther productive nor implemented.114
The Concept of Naval Diplomacy. The U.s. Navy underscores the areas of interest to 
the United states by maintaining presence and conducting regular or periodic visits. 
But the mere presence of its ships in home ports sends a signal of military readiness. 
The primary objective of signaling is to influence events by shaping the perceptions and 
attitudes of other nations. “The influence military forces can exert in the international 
arena is related to their presence (or capability to be present), their core capabilities, the 
political will to use those forces, and, most importantly, the perception of those who you 
seek to influence.”115 To be successful in changing the other parties’ behavior, the pres-
ence and movements of the ships have to seize their attention. Maintaining, augment-
ing, and withdrawing forces all attract attention. a periodic deployment or sustained 
presence serves as a symbolic use of force and can attract the attention of foreign lead-
ers. In order to signal heightened concern or interest, the naval force must be augmented 
or increase its readiness. Conversely, forces can also be left uncommitted or even sent 
in the opposite direction to indicate a determination not to get involved. While routine 
and presence functions are very similar to crisis management, they are more preven-
tive, whereas the latter is more reactive. The choice of type of force and operation sends 
additional signals.116
While signaling can take place at any stage in a diplomatic crisis, it is most successful 
before a crisis is even reached.117 a show of interest (mere signaling) expresses the lowest 
level of activity. a show of resolve demonstrates intentions more clearly, and a show of 
force is the highest level. according to allen, the appearance of ships and a public state-
ment of intent are the key variables in the signaling process; the reaction of the target 
country establishes whether the operation is a success or failure.118 He distinguished 
four levels of signaling: routine peacetime presence (e.g., normal port visits); show of 
interest (expressing concern but without committing to any action); show of resolve 
(signal a commitment to a friend or to halt enemy action); and show of force (when the 
use of force in a specific way is threatened to resolve the crisis or influence its resolution 
to our satisfaction). except for the first level, all can be reactions to international crises, 
because they divert naval forces from their regular employment. allen states that if it 
is to be signaled that the United states is ready to intervene, an aircraft carrier or an 
amphibious force is required.119
When lower-level diplomatic activity is unsuccessful, actors frequently prefer a policy 
“combining diplomatic efforts with the threat of force”—coercive diplomacy—to achieve 
their goals in world politics.120 If this attempt fails, the crisis escalates to a limited or gen-
eral war.121 Cable emphasizes that threats are only credible when there is a real readiness 
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to use force.122 This implicit coercion is the “bread and butter of diplomacy.”123 He 
defines this coercive “gunboat” diplomacy as “a resort to specific threats or to injurious 
actions, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, in 
the furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the 
territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.”124 With the help of coercive diplomacy, 
the employing actor aims at achieving an advantage from another state. If force is used 
for other than a specific advantage, it is no longer a diplomatic action. The same is true 
of inflicting damage after the desired objective has been achieved.125 Cable distinguishes 
four types of coercive diplomacy:126
•	 Definitive: creates a fait accompli, leaves the adversary no choice.
•	 Purposeful: induces the adversary to make a decision to do or stop something, such 
as policy change—success depends on victim.
•	 Catalytic: to influence events but is more manifest in a readiness to respond, such as 
through the presence of a naval force.
•	 expressive: to emphasize attitudes and underline statements.
In his study on the effectiveness of gunboat diplomacy, robert Mandel locates the roots 
of gunboat diplomacy in the theories of bargaining, signaling, deterrence, coercion, and 
force.127 like luttwak’s suasion, gunboat diplomacy incorporates many aspects of the 
spectrum of possible reactions. according to Mandel, gunboat diplomacy is the most 
frequently used “show of force” tool.128 Following Blechman and Kaplan, he defines a 
show of force as “when physical actions are undertaken by one or more components of 
the uniformed armed services as part of a deliberate attempt by the national authori-
ties to influence, or to be prepared to influence, specific behavior of individuals in 
another nation without engaging in a continuing contest of violence.”129 Mandel’s 
graph (figure 6) shows the different stages from the most general classification of 
gunboat diplomacy, presented by the widest circle, through the very specific, separate 
categorization. 
often “gunboat diplomacy” and “coercive diplomacy” are used interchangeably. Mandel 
observes that coercion “does seem to be at the core of gunboat diplomacy incidents.”130 
Christian le Mière calls gunboat diplomacy a muscular negotiation that “attempts to 
achieve its goals, which will be either coercive or deterrent, through intimidation. It is, 
therefore, reliant upon a mismatch, or at least a perceived mismatch, between two states’ 
naval capabilities. a weaker navy will struggle to engage in gunboat diplomacy directed 
at a stronger adversary for the simple reason that its bluff may be called.”131 generally it 
can be argued that gunboat diplomacy is more aggressive, overt, and offensive.132
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Coercion
Diplomacy is closely linked to coercion. Thomas schelling was the first scholar to 
explore the power of coercion in depth. In his 1966 Arms and Influence he described war 
as “brute force” aimed at destroying the adversary’s capabilities. More promising are the 
coercion and intimidation of the enemy, as the power to hurt is more successful when it 
is latent. schelling concludes that “the power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it 
is diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy. It is the threat of damage, or of more 
damage to come, that can make someone yield or comply. It is latent violence that can 
influence someone’s choice—violence that can still be withheld or inflicted or that a 
victim believes can be withheld or inflicted. Unhappily, the power to hurt is often com-
municated by some performance of it.”133 His work clearly links diplomacy and violence. 
Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman more generally define coercion as “getting the 
adversary to act a certain way via anything short of brute force.”134
once distinguished from brute force, coercion is typically broken down into two subcat-
egories, compellence and deterrence. stephen Cimbala calls armed coercion “military 
persuasion,” a “psychological strategy intended to influence the decision of other state or 
nonstate actors, without necessarily having to destroy their armed forces or society.”135 
as these different definitions show, the term can be broadly interpreted, especially in 
regard to the use of force. Bratton criticizes the lack of agreement on definitions and 
success of coercion.136 often the terms “coercion,” “compellence,” “coercive diplomacy,” 
Bargaining, signaling, and force
Coercive diplomacy, deterrence
Shows of force
Gunboat
diplomacy
FIGure 6
Conceptualization of the Theoretical Context of Gunboat Diplomacy (adapted 
from Mandel, “The Effectiveness of Gunboat Diplomacy,” p. 61)
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“military coercion,” “coercive military strategy,” and “strategic coercion” are used 
interchangeably. Bratton urges analysis of the effectiveness of coercion in “terms of 
positive and negative outcomes rather than successes or failures.”137 His study provides a 
structured analysis of the most important research on coercion and groups scholars ac-
cording to their different definitions of coercion characteristics. The figure presents the 
different types of threat involved in coercion.138
a major disagreement revolves around the question whether force can be merely 
threatened or must actually be used. Whereas the deterrence literature does not focus 
on force—because deterrence has failed once force has to be employed—the coercion 
literature has three divisions: “coercion through diplomacy separate from the use of 
force; coercion exercised almost entirely through the use of force (normally air power); 
and coercion exercised by both diplomacy and force.”139 The first views the use of force 
as similar to deterrence: except for minor displays, force demonstrates the failure of 
coercion. This school underscores the political-diplomatic nature of coercion: “The 
goal of coercive diplomacy is to persuade the opponent to halt what he is doing, not to 
strike him until his capabilities are so reduced that further resistance is futile. ‘Coercive 
diplomacy, then, calls for using just enough force of an appropriate kind—if force is 
used at all—to demonstrate one’s resolve to protect well-defined interests as well as the 
credibility of one’s determination to use more force if necessary.’ ”140 The second divi-
sion includes “sticks,” such as sanctions or force and threats of coercion, as an addition. 
Coercion occurs simultaneously with the use of force. However, the objective is not the 
destruction of the enemy’s military forces or territorial occupation but the compliance 
of the opposing state. Critics complain that this school of thought often makes fine 
distinctions between coercion and brute force. The third group does not distinguish 
between coercion with force and coercion without force. Coercion involves diplomatic 
and military means, including the use of force. “What distinguishes coercion from brute 
force in this school is that force is used in a measured and controlled way to ‘signal’ to 
the target the threat of further punishment unless it complies. . . . ‘Coercion depends 
more on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage already done.’”141 Table 2-1 
presents advocates for the three different schools. 
Only compellent threats (i.e., coercion is 
different from deterrence)
Alexander George, Janice Gross Stein, Robert 
Pape
Both compellent and deterrent threats 
(deterrence and compellence are both types of 
coercion)
Thomas Schelling, Daniel Ellisberg, Wallace 
Thies, Lawrence Freedman, Daniel Byman, and 
Matthew Waxman
Note: For a detailed account of Robert Pape’s interesting discussion on airpower and coercive diplomacy see Bombing to Win. He 
advocates the denial strategy of coercion and rejects the punishing power of coercive airpower. His denial theory proposes that 
the specific means for coercion is the opponent’s military vulnerability: defeating an opponent’s military strategy denies him the 
probability of achieving benefits and results in coercion.
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Thus, crisis coercion and brute force lie on a common continuum, as many different 
levels of force can be employed to coerce.142 While schelling promotes coercion through 
both diplomacy and force, alexander george urges the use of nonviolent coercion be-
fore force is used.143 He articulates as an alternative to war a detailed coercive-diplomacy 
theory in which he describes the concept of coercive diplomacy as restricted to “efforts 
to persuade an opponent to stop and/or undo an action he is already embarked upon.” 
The offensive version of coercive threats, to persuade the victim aggressively to give up 
something, is referred to as “blackmail strategy.” Deterrence is also different because co-
ercive diplomacy is employed as a response to something already undertaken. Compel-
lence often includes both blackmail and coercive diplomacy. george, however, offers the 
criticism that compellence does not distinguish between defensive and offensive uses of 
coercion and provides less flexibility.144
While coercive diplomacy employs coercive threats, it also includes noncoercive persua-
sion and accommodation. Coercive diplomacy tries to persuade an actor to cease an 
action and introduces the threat of punishment if he does not. This strategy relies on 
the restricted exemplary use of force. The adversary is given the opportunity to halt his 
action before more force is employed. signaling, bargaining, and negotiating are impor-
tant parts of this strategy. The goal is to avoid use of full-scale force and to minimize the 
risk of escalation.145 excessive use of force might have an effect contrary to that intended, 
by hardening the position of the opposing party, and result in a further escalation of 
tension.146 such characteristics of naval forces as limited intrusiveness and flexibility 
favor the role of the UsN for this strategy. However, U.s. Marines, moving by sea, bring 
capabilities for seizing objectives that have proved especially valuable in threatened or 
actual interventions ashore.
george lists the impact of the following eight contexts on coercive diplomacy:147
•	 Type of provocation. Certain provocations are more difficult to halt or even undo. For 
instance, a fait accompli, such as overrunning a neighboring country, is more chal-
lenging to reverse than coercing a state to halt an arms buildup.
•	 Magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests. very important national interests are 
more complicated to manage and to reach a satisfactory solution for.
TaBle 2-1
Coercion before the use of force George, Gross Stein
Coercion only through force Pape
Coercion through diplomacy and force Schelling, Thies
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•	 Image of war. The more the parties want to avert an open war, because of the horrible 
consequences, the more restraint they will show in escalating tensions and the more 
amenable they will be to cooperation attempts (as was the case in, e.g., the Cuban 
missile crisis).
•	 Time pressure to achieve objective. Urgency felt by the parties to resolve the crisis 
(for example, because of fear of losing domestic support, the influence of weather on 
military operations, growing strength of the adversary, etc.).
•	 Unilateral or coalitional coercive diplomacy. The more parties, the more difficult it is 
for them to speak with one voice. This loss of unity might outweigh the benefits of 
higher international pressure and greater resources.
•	 Strong leadership. The success of coercive diplomacy may depend on the pressure of 
strong and effective top-level leadership. such leadership was provided by John F. 
Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis.
•	 The isolation of the adversary. resolution is more difficult if the adversary is not (like 
laos in 1961–62) an isolated state but is supported diplomatically and militarily by 
allies.
•	 The preferred postcrisis relationship with the adversary. Parties who hope to improve 
the relationship after the termination of the crisis are more amenable to attempts to 
reach mutually acceptable outcomes.
Further, coercive diplomacy depends greatly on context. george lists a number of 
conditions that favor coercive diplomacy.148 First is the clarity of the objective of coercive 
diplomacy and what is demanded of the adversary. The second is strength of motivation 
(a necessary but not sufficient condition). The third is asymmetry of motivation— 
coercive diplomacy is more likely to be successful if the side employing it is more highly 
motivated by what is at stake in the crisis than its opponent. It is critical in this respect, 
however, that the adversary believe that the coercing power is more determined. The 
fourth is sense of urgency; the fifth, domestic and international support; and sixth, an 
opponent’s fear of unacceptable escalation. Finally, the seventh is clarity concerning the 
precise terms of the settlement of the crisis.
The effectiveness of coercive diplomacy can be appraised differently in a variety of con-
texts. It succeeded during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 but failed for the gulf War 
in 1990–91.149 Positive incentives or negative, punishing threats can be employed. The 
assurance given to Cuba during the missile crisis was a positive inducement (carrots and 
sticks), while during the early stages of the gulf War punishment was threatened.150
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The Problem of Effectiveness
as previously stated, naval forces can signal intentions, shape attitudes, and employ 
(coercive) diplomacy. This suggests the question of the effectiveness of naval forces in 
exercising these functions. How successful are naval forces at carrying out the dif-
ferent missions? Measuring effectiveness is complicated. Crises outcomes are often 
characterized by a mixture of success and failure.151 Because naval forces normally do 
not encroach on other nations’ sovereign territory and their presence poses less of a 
threat than that of ground or air forces, their involvement is likely to be more readily 
accepted by crisis actors. at the same time, because naval forces are relatively subtle, 
they may lack the desired efficacy and directness in crises of high importance to the 
United states. authors disagree as to whether the flexibility of naval forces increases 
or decreases their effectiveness.152 It is often argued that naval power is unlikely to 
be as influential as ground or air forces and that it is rarely decisive on its own. In 
Brooks’s words, “attempting to use the Navy as the sole—or even the primary—vehicle 
of influence is at best inefficient, and at worst useless. In an era of jointness, the Navy 
should leave the task of influencing other states to the other services.”153 This suggests 
that the biggest disadvantage of naval forces is their lack of decisiveness. likewise, Till 
claims that naval diplomacy is hardly ever decisive when employed alone.154 Deborah 
sanders argues that naval diplomacy lacks cultural and historical awareness and suffers 
from inadequate information exchange.155 she draws on the example of operation sea 
Breeze in 2006 in Ukraine: designed to improve the collaboration between countries, 
the planned exercise “became a hostage to the political crisis in Kiev over the formation 
of a new coalition government.”
edward rhodes and coauthors conclude that our understanding of how shaping opera-
tions during peacetime support desired political outcomes is limited.156 Neither the 
types of military power nor the kinds of successful shaping operations are well known. 
In rhodes’s study on the effectiveness of naval presence and signaling he comes to 
the following conclusion: “Further, and more germane to the issue of naval forward 
presence as a crisis deterrent tool, there is some evidence that because of the general 
insensitivity of potential aggressors to information, efforts to ‘signal’ resolve through 
measures such as reinforcing or redeploying forces have limited effectiveness. If force 
movements are large enough to foreclose particular military options, they may forestall 
aggression. But as a means of indicating resolve and convincing an aggressor of the 
credibility of deterrent commitments, they do not generally appear to have an impact.”157 
But as Brooks says, “Navies, by their very nature, tend to operate on the margins of 
national consciousness. Their influence is likely to be subtle and indirect and not easy to 
discern or to measure.”158 The fact that it is hard to measure influence is an argument for 
better understanding and better methods of measurement. It is not, however, a reason 
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for ignoring the influence of naval forces in seeking to advance U.s. interests.159 I will 
argue that while limited effectiveness poses a problem, the many other advantages of 
naval forces are valuable.
Hypotheses
signaling, shaping, and coercive diplomacy are all possible reactions to international 
crises. of course, many other factors contribute to coercive diplomacy, and the hypothe-
ses based on coercion literature merely borrow the idea of a limited use of force in crises 
to achieve U.s. goals. These theoretical ideas, together with the functions and character-
istics of navies discussed previously, provide the starting point for formulating explor-
atory hypotheses, attempting to answer the present research questions pertaining to the 
types of crises the UsN responds to, and investigating the way in which other involved 
actors shape the UsN involvement, the role naval forces play within U.s. crisis activity, 
and the influence they exert on outcomes. The graph in figure 7 shows the strengths of 
different naval-forces combinations and how they will be analyzed in the hypotheses. 
Table 2-2 summarizes the potential impact of advantages/disadvantages of naval forces 
on the four categories of crises response. as laid out in the previous chapter, ubiquity, 
readiness, mobility, flexibility, independence, and subtleness are the main advantages; 
misperception, limited decisiveness, limited self-sustainment, and vulnerability are the 
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main disadvantages. The last two affect other military services even more than they do 
navies and so will thus not be considered for the generation of hypotheses. 
some of the hypotheses treat the U.s. naval activity as a dependent and others as an 
independent variable, since certain criteria influence the decision to send naval forces 
but once launched, naval forces produce their own cause-and-effect outcomes.
Crisis Characteristics Hypotheses (H1a–H1d)
In the introductory chapter I presented two research questions concerning the crisis 
characteristics:
•	 In what type of crises are U.s. naval forces mostly deployed?
•	 To which crisis locations do U.s. naval forces mostly deploy?
The following theoretical ideas and hypotheses will help to answer these questions. 
Crisis characteristics are manifold and include the type of threats and issues, conflict-
management techniques, levels of intensity, geographic locations, and the importance of 
a crisis, to name a few. The list of advantages and disadvantages of naval forces offers a 
starting point for analyzing the relation between crisis characteristics and seaborne cri-
sis response. advantages such as ubiquity, readiness, mobility, flexibility, and indepen-
dence all enable seaborne forces to react immediately to crises. subtleness and limited 
decisiveness, on the other hand, suggest involvement in “low threat” and “low issue” 
crises and, together with the problem of misperception, render U.s. seaborne activity 
more likely when the threat to american national interests is low. This view is also en-
couraged by a realist point of view. The problem of decisiveness would further suggest a 
more hesitant involvement in violent crises, while conversely ubiquity/flexibility allows 
immediate response in order to halt violence.
Threat, Stakes, and Violence. Crisis characteristics are important in deciding how to 
respond to and manage a crisis, as they influence severity, duration, management tech-
nique, and termination.160 according to Paul Diehl, the issue of a crisis and its salience 
TaBle 2-2
aDVaNTaGes DIsaDVaNTaGes
Crisis Characteristics Observing events, adapting to changes, immediate response, subtle influence Limited influence 
Crisis Actors Subtle influence, less publicity Limited influence, misperception
U.S. Involvement
Support of all types of activities, calibration 
of action to circumstances, subtle influence, 
less publicity
Limited or even 
negative influence
Crisis Outcomes Different levels of coercion, subtle influence Limited or even 
negative influence
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are especially crucial to understanding national behavior and the use of military force.161 
Depending on the issue and its salience, actors may be more willing to suffer high 
costs, and if so, that makes diplomacy more difficult and less likely to succeed. High-
salience issues are prone to be long lasting and often call for coercion as a management 
technique. Not all of george’s contextual variables affecting coercive diplomacy can be 
applied to this study of international crises, but two assumptions—type of provocation 
and magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests—can be transformed into hypoth-
eses.162 as stated above, george argues that certain types of provocations pose a greater 
challenge and are thus more difficult to resolve. He identifies the invasion of foreign 
territory as an example of these greater challenges, whereas a hostile arms buildup is 
more amenable to coercive diplomacy. Thus, I assume, the lower the threat of the crisis, 
the less difficult its resolution. as a result, very limited uses or displays of force should 
be sufficient. Political crises suggest political/diplomatic means as response tools. In 
general, force is graduated to the severity of the incidents, in such terms as importance, 
difficulty, and risk. The more threatening and grave the crisis, the less likely naval 
forces will be employed alone. The same can be assumed about the issues at stake in a 
crisis. This assumption is based on george’s concept of magnitude and depth, viz., that 
military issues present a greater threat to national interests than economic crises, for 
example, and require a more forceful intervention.
Further analyzing the type of provocation, Paul senese finds that territorial disputes 
have a high likelihood of escalation and often show higher levels of severity.163 Huth also 
points to the need to intervene as soon as possible: “given that once territorial disputes 
emerge, domestic political incentives encourage leaders to remain deadlocked in con-
flict, timely diplomatic intervention is necessary to try and avoid protracted disputes.”164 
This suggests that within the category “threat” of a crisis, territorial disputes trigger 
naval responses, because of their capacity to respond immediately.
H1a (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in “low threat” 
international crises. (Based on George’s type of provocation.)
H1b (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in “low issues” 
international crises. (Based on George’s magnitude and depth of the conflict of interests.)
Deterrence theories argue that if violence levels reach full-scale warfare, diplomacy has 
failed, in which case appropriate military force must be called on. violent crises are 
also said to be more difficult to resolve; thus the limited effectiveness of naval forces 
may suggest more forceful responses. graduated force can protect against violence or 
control, contain, or even dominate it and thereby persuade the enemy to halt his actions. 
as loup Francart and Jean-Jacques Patry note, the issue is how much force to apply.165 I 
assume that high levels of violence will typically bring stronger U.s. military responses. 
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alternatively, however, high levels of violence may increase the need for immediate 
response or the capability to calibrate action to circumstances, or even encourage non-
intervention. The so-called vietnam syndrome, reinforced by the events in lebanon in 
1983 and somalia in 1993, suggests an unwillingness to accept high casualties. although 
even a single event can be sufficient, as the overall violence level of the crises increases, 
so does the danger of high casualties. as susan Hannah allen states, “In fact, the lower 
risk of casualties associated with air power is part of its appeal as a coercive instrument 
for the United states, since lower casualties are associated with lower domestic costs in 
democratic societies.”166 It is thus not clear in which direction the hypotheses will go, but 
following a deterrence point of view I assume the following:
H1c (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in international 
crises with low levels of violence.
Geostrategic Importance and Geographical Location. Because of their limited decisive-
ness, naval forces are less likely to be employed in regions and crises of great interest to 
the United states. If the crisis is deemed important and national interests are threat-
ened, the United states will send a more powerful force. according to Meernik and 
Chelsea Brown, “a major military operation will likely signal strong Us interest in a 
crisis and, thus, a willingness to use such forces for longer periods of time to attain Us 
objectives.”167 The commitment of ground troops and the number of troops committed 
signal the level of resolve.168 similarly, art concludes that limited uses of force usually 
provide equally limited incentives for targets to change their behavior and are therefore 
not powerful enough when important U.s. interests are at stake.169
H1d (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely when the threat 
to geostrategic interests posed by the international crisis is low.
Crisis Actors and USN Crisis Response: Crisis Actors Hypotheses (H2a–H2d)
The introductory chapter presented three research questions pertaining to the relation 
between crisis actor characteristics and seaborne crisis response:
•	 How do other actors influence U.s. naval involvement?
•	 What crisis actor characteristics trigger the deployment of U.s. naval forces?
•	 How is the U.s. naval involvement perceived by the other crisis actors?
Four hypotheses will help to answer these questions. The characteristics of the crisis 
actors and other involved third parties play an important role and influence the crisis 
management technique. The more subtle influence and the likelihood of misperception 
of naval forces suggest more power when there are fewer crisis actors. Because naval 
forces normally do not encroach on other countries’ sovereignty, their involvement is 
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likely to be perceived more favorably. additionally, all advantages of naval forces favor 
their deployment in crisis with only limited publicity and global scrutiny.
Number of Actors. some of Mandel’s hypotheses on the effectiveness of gunboat diplo-
macy can be modified and applied to naval involvement in crises. according to glenn 
snyder and Paul Diesing, where there are several participants, accountability is more 
broadly diffused and hostility less pronounced.170 Yet others claim that negotiations are 
likely to be less efficient and settlements more elusive as the number of participants 
grows.171 I share the latter position, viz., that naval forces are less effective when mul-
tiple actors are involved, because it is then more difficult to reach agreements and to 
influence all actors. similarly, art finds that a multiplicity of parties on each side of the 
confrontation renders coercive diplomacy more difficult.172 In this analysis there is only 
one coercer (the United states), not multiple coercers, but I hypothesize that the form 
of military deployment chosen by the United states is influenced by the number of co-
ercion targets. Meernik argues that the importance of a crisis to U.s. national interests 
increases with a growing number of actors.173 Because the potential impact of the crisis 
intensifies with the number of actors, so does the need to respond more visibly and 
decisively because of the received attention.
H2a (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is less likely in international 
crises with multiple actors. (This is a counter-hypothesis to Mandel: that gunboat diplo-
macy is more successful if the action involves multiple assailants or victims rather than a 
single assailant or victim.)
UN Involvement. The involvement of the United Nations lends a certain legitimacy 
to involvement in a crisis. UN involvement can range from a preliminary discussion 
of the crisis without resolution to authorization to use force. While multilateralism is 
desirable, it slows down intervention decisions; the right moment to intervene might be 
lost.174 Because naval forces are relatively nonintrusive and politically acceptable, they 
might be the instrument of choice in crises without UN engagement, so as to attract 
minimal global attention. The unique attribute of naval as compared to other forms of 
military power in the diplomatic context is its oceanic ubiquity and its independence 
from non-U.s. authorities.175 a study by Terrence Chapman and Dan reiter found that 
when “uses of force attract the support of the United Nations (UN) security Council, 
the rally in support of the american president increases significantly.”176 This lends ad-
ditional support for the likelihood of deployment of naval forces when the UN is  
not involved, as such missions also trigger less debate or criticism within the United 
states. Naval forces can be deployed without attracting much attention in the U.s. 
media, giving the U.s. policy makers the option of influencing events without attract-
ing close scrutiny by the american society. generally, strong military power is most 
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commonly endorsed by the public when seen as a last resort, which is unlikely in the 
case of low-level UN activity.177
H2b (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is more 
likely when there is no or low UN involvement.
Lack of Cohesion. Conflict management works best between well-identified enti-
ties. When the government of one of the involved nations faces challenges, such as a 
rebellion or insurgency, it will be more difficult for third parties to support conflict 
resolution. Internal unity is an important source of bargaining strength.178 Disunity 
and lack of cohesion hinder successful conflict management because of the limitations 
they impose on the power and authority of the government.179 Thus, severe political and 
socioeconomic disorder renders coercive diplomacy more difficult and less likely to be 
successful. I hypothesize that stability is related to how receptive the state is to low-level 
influence. In order to exercise more subtle influence it is necessary to have an entity 
to address; thus internal stability is more likely to yield favorable results. additionally, 
unstable states have less incentive to terminate crises, because they have less to lose; 
naval forces are not influential enough to change their behavior. The hypothesis follows 
Mandel, with the United states in the role of the assailant.180
H2c (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely when the actors 
are politically stable. (Gunboat diplomacy is more successful if the assailant possesses 
equal or higher political stability than does the victim.)
Perception of U.S. Involvement. The flexibility, ubiquity, and limited intrusiveness 
of naval forces establish the ground for the next hypothesis. Participants in a crisis are 
more likely to perceive involvement of naval forces as less threatening than that of other 
military forces and therefore to retain a more positive view of U.s. actions. once in the 
crisis area, naval forces are more flexible, less disruptive psychologically, and less offen-
sive diplomatically than equivalent land-based forces.181 additionally, their deployment is 
likely to be viewed with less anxiety and violence. Dov Zakheim and colleagues conduct-
ed a survey among senior opinion leaders in the Mediterranean littoral, the Middle east, 
and east asia.182 The findings were that flexible american presence is perceived as most 
favorable and that maritime presence is the most flexible U.s. military presence. Treating 
naval involvement as an independent variable, I hypothesize the following:
H2d (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is 
perceived as more favorable by the crisis actors than a combination with other military 
services.
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U.S. Involvement and USN Crisis Response
The introductory chapter presented three research questions to analyze the role of sea-
borne forces within U.s. crisis response:
•	 In what type of activity are U.s. naval forces most likely deployed?
•	 How do U.s. naval forces deploy with other military services?
•	 How effective is U.s. naval involvement?
Their ubiquity, readiness, and independence make naval forces an attractive way to 
show concern almost immediately without waiting for a buildup, while their flexibil-
ity allows adaptation of the response as necessary. Their quality of subtleness further 
encourages low-level activity. The concerns regarding limited decisiveness and misper-
ception, on the other hand, suggest that naval deployments have less leverage, a factor 
impacting the effectiveness of the contribution of U.s. activity to crisis termination. 
similarly, when the United states has a larger stake in the crises, naval forces alone 
might not be the response tool of choice.
U.S. Involvement Hypotheses (H3a–H3f)
The level of military force employed signals clearly the U.s. level of commitment to a 
crisis. In turn, the level and choice of force mirror the political, financial, and logistical 
costs the United states is willing to accept.183 Huth explains, “rational deterrence theo-
rists have argued that costly signals are required to communicate credibly a defender’s 
resolve. Costly signals are those actions and statements that clearly increase the risk of 
a military conflict and also increase the costs of backing down from a deterrent threat, 
thereby revealing information about the actual commitment of a state to defend against 
an attack. states that are bluffing will be unwilling to cross a certain threshold of threat 
and military actions in a crisis for fear of committing themselves to armed conflict.”184
The questions and hypotheses involving U.s. activity include naval-force involvement as 
both a dependent and independent variable.
Level of U.S. Involvement. The use of the seaborne forces, in the absence of ground or 
air forces, should be prevalent in international crises with limited U.s. involvement. 
Most forms of coercive diplomacy assume both limited involvement and limited force in 
a first attempt to influence the adversary. The United states will try to halt and reverse 
the progress of an adversary’s action before resorting to the direct use of armed forces. 
alternatively, low-level involvement demonstrates a moderate interest in the crisis and 
reluctance to invest in a strong military deployment. In both cases a lower U.s. involve-
ment is assumed to favor naval involvement.
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H3a (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is more likely in international 
crises with lower forms of U.S. involvement.
U.S. Effectiveness. according to Cable, a limited use of naval force is effective if the 
threat alone achieves the objective.185 However, a survey of the Mediterranean region 
reveals that host nations pay the most attention to the actual use of force in crisis, 
especially combat action. Furthermore, the study finds, U.s. military force is perceived 
as most effective when it takes the form of combat action—for example, the air attack on 
libya in 1986. Before april of that year, Colonel Muammar gaddafi pursued an active 
program of training, supplying, and sponsoring international terrorists. after the U.s. 
bombing, libyan-sponsored terrorism dropped sharply and may have ceased entirely.186 
Meernik proposes the following hypotheses to measure the effectiveness of the different 
force levels: “The greater the force level deployed, the more likely the United states will 
achieve its objectives in the short and long term.”187 The dispatch of larger and stronger 
forces is more likely perceived as a firmer commitment and thus can more likely lead to 
or enforce an abatement of the crisis.
The following three hypotheses treat naval involvement as an independent variable, 
influencing the effectiveness of the U.s. involvement.
H3b (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is less 
effective than the involvement of all forces.
H3c (independent): The U.S. involvement will be most effective if direct military force is 
used.
H3d (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is less effective in contribut-
ing to the termination of the crisis.
United States as a Crisis Actor. If the United states is directly involved as a crisis actor 
and not as a third party, the stakes are higher for, and the outcome is more important 
to, the United states. Thus when the United states is directly involved in the crisis, one 
should expect a correspondingly heavy military commitment.
H3e (dependent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only in international crises is less 
likely if the United States is a direct crisis actor.
Immediate Readiness. Naval forces are forward deployed in and close to regions where 
crises are most likely to develop and U.s. national interests lie. Because U.s. naval forces 
are spread around the world, they are able to react immediately. It is often argued that 
they react to crises because they are “there.” But Carlisle Trost and arthur Barber, writ-
ing separately, underscore the importance of capability as well as availability, qualities 
that are critical in explaining their frequent use.188 Barber stresses that “the political 
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agility and rapid in-theater availability of naval forces, as much as their military capabil-
ity, have influenced decisions to use them so frequently.” Further, Cable argues that 
some disputes require an immediate response to be effective. I assume that naval-forces 
responses occur very shortly after the crisis breaks out. The state of readiness also de-
pends on the overall overseas number of naval personnel.189
H3f (dependent): Only U.S. naval forces are able to react immediately after the interna-
tional crisis breaks out.
Crises Outcomes and USN Crisis Response
The last research category presented in the introductory chapter concerns the relation 
between seaborne crisis response and outcomes. 
•	 How do U.s. naval forces influence outcomes?
Crises Outcomes Hypotheses (H4a–H4d)
The deployment of naval forces is assumed to affect the outcome of a crisis, treating na-
val involvement as the independent variable. although it is impossible to measure how 
much direct relevance the Navy has in deterring a specific adversary, naval operations 
can help to display national power and signal national will—both essential components 
of deterrence.190 according to this view, naval forces can positively influence outcomes 
in an unthreatening fashion, yet flex muscles and subtly support diplomatic efforts.
a part of Blechman and Kaplan’s study analyzed outcomes of the interventions of 
different U.s. armed forces.191 a positive outcome is achieved when the United states 
is satisfied with the behavior of the other participants. Their findings on the effective-
ness of the different armed services in producing positive outcomes are that land-based 
combat aircraft is most positively correlated with successful outcomes, followed by 
land-based ground forces. Positive outcomes were more frequent when land-based 
troops are employed, compared to amphibious ground forces, and they are even more 
frequent when both of them deployed together.192 Blechman and Kaplan show that 
positive outcomes of crises and conflicts are associated primarily with the direct use of 
force, although indirect or latent uses of force can be successful in the short run. When 
the objective is to end the use of force by another actor or to precipitate regime change, 
direct use of armed forces is less successful. When the objective is to deter another actor 
from repeated use of force, outcomes are positive.193 The authors also study the influence 
of the levels of force on outcomes and conclude that “outcomes were less often positive 
when greater levels of force were used, unless nuclear-capable forces were used together 
with one or more major conventional components.”194
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Higher levels of force correlate with more complicated situations, which in turn 
negatively influence the chances of a successful outcome. The same study, however, 
concludes that landing U.s. forces on foreign territory is more likely to result in positive 
outcomes than the mere dispatch of naval forces, thus suggesting that a U.s. land com-
mitment positively influences outcomes.195 While the former finding is concerned with 
the level of force, the latter focuses on the type of force. overall, the findings suggest 
that small land forces (satisfying criteria both for land forces and lower levels of force) 
correlate most strongly with positive outcomes. Further, land-based aircraft rank higher 
than ground troops, and ground troops higher than sea-based Marines; the combina-
tion of the army and Marine troops is optimal. although the two findings seem contra-
dictory, they are focused on different issues—the type of force and the strength of the 
force. Hastedt finds that generally the firmer the commitment, the more often favorable 
outcomes are achieved.196
The mere threat of intervention can prevent or end conflicts by altering the parties’ 
perceptions of a continuation or cessation of hostilities. It can reduce the rewards of war 
and enhance those of peace. While this can increase the bargaining space and facilitate 
agreements, there remains debate over whether or when threats of intervention have this 
effect. Military forces can threaten to intervene if a party continues to fight or does not 
comply. This threat can also encourage weaker parties to fight in hopes that the stronger 
military force will come to their defense.197
Despite the difficulty in assessing the crisis outcome from the vantage of the United 
states as Blechman and Kaplan did, I assume that definite outcomes are overall more 
positive, because they signify a clear-cut end to the crisis.198 Because naval forces are said 
to be less decisive, I assume a negative relation between the involvement of naval forces 
and definite crisis resolution. stronger forces, however, are more likely to enforce a 
solution instead of subtly trying to broker a formal agreement. air and land forces pose 
greater threats than naval forces and raise the odds of compliance. The promotion of an 
agreement can be interpreted as a right intention in the context of just-war theory, while 
an imposed outcome is likely to further the national interests of the imposing party and 
thus implies an ulterior motive.
H4a (independent): International crises with only U.S. naval forces involvement are less 
likely to lead to definite outcomes.
H4b (independent): International crises with only U.S. naval forces involvement are more 
likely to lead to a formal agreement.
according to linton Brooks, the very fact that naval presence can be temporary and 
low-key, rather than dramatic, makes presence potentially useful in easing tension.199 
For example, James Tubbs assumes that excessive use of force actually escalates a 
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confrontation.200 It is debatable, however, whether the presence of naval forces plays a de-
cisive role in ending tension. some aver that it could even heighten it. McNulty identifies 
a possible deterrence effect if naval forces demonstrate their war-fighting capabilities 
in a tense situation.201 This in turn has the potential to exacerbate tension if deterrence 
fails. according to these deliberations the direction of the next hypothesis can go either 
way. For now I assume a positive influence of naval forces on tension.
H4c (independent): The deployment of U.S. naval forces only is likely to reduce tensions in 
international crises.
another important aspect of outcomes is the satisfaction of the crisis actors with results. 
Poor or weak crisis management is likely to influence negatively the overall resolution 
and therefore actor satisfaction. as with arguments made above, the limited power of 
naval forces may not be enough to resolve crises to the satisfaction of the involved par-
ties. This is different from hypothesis 2d, which suggests that these characteristics leave 
the actors with a favorable impression of U.s. intentions, aside from the outcome itself.
H4d (independent): International crises with only U.S. naval forces involvement are less 
likely to lead to a satisfactory outcome.
Summary
Chapter 2 began with a very broad introduction into the U.s. uses of force before 
focusing on the theoretical ideas of naval diplomacy and coercion. By combining these 
concepts with the advantages and disadvantages of naval forces discussed in chapter 1 
and other research on crisis management, I attempted to explain the generation of the 
various hypotheses. Before turning to the statistical analyses, chapter 3 describes the 
efforts to find and combine reliable naval-response data.
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Data on U.s. Naval activity short of War
While there is much research on naval activities, there is a dearth of empirical evidence 
of the influence of naval forces. only very few studies statistically research the deploy-
ment of the U.s. Navy in employments short of war. as laid out so far, naval forces offer 
promising vehicles for crisis response, and by looking at different international crises, 
the hypotheses can be used to underline both advantages and disadvantages. This chap-
ter lays the groundwork for the empirical analyses in this study by explaining the data 
collection and the creation of naval variables. The last part presents some frequencies of 
the newly introduced naval variables and introduces the methodology. Prior to a discus-
sion of the data for this project, the most important empirical studies are summarized.
Empirical Literature Review on U.S. Naval Activity
James Cable’s Gunboat Diplomacy, first published in 1971 and updated in 1981, 
provides a detailed account of different instances when naval gunboat diplomacy was 
employed, independent of the country and the target, between 1919 and 1979. “gunboat 
diplomacy” captures events where naval forces either threatened or used limited force, 
short of war, against state actors on their territories. Cable’s data for each of the more 
than two hundred cases provide the dates, the assailant, the victim, and a very brief 
description. It does not account for every single use of gunboat diplomacy but rather 
illustrates the range.
In 1977, robert Mahoney, Jr., conducted a CNa study on U.s. Navy responses to crises 
over the previous twenty years.1 Based on the assumption that crisis management is 
among the Navy’s principal missions, the report provides a summary of U.s. naval 
(including Marine Corps) responses to international incidents and crises short of war. 
only reactions of UsN and of UsMC forces “immediately prior and during” are in-
cluded, thereby neglecting a number of activities outside this time frame, such as deter-
rence operations before a crisis erupts. The focus on UsN and UsMC activity does not 
account for the possibly important role other service and different policy instruments 
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play. Mahoney urges caution when applying the findings to future research: “The way 
in which the Navy has been employed as an instrument of crisis diplomacy in the past 
has been the result of choices made by the National Command authorities in conjunc-
tion with certain types of foreign events. Different choices may be made in the future in 
response to changing circumstances.” The following criteria were applied to define the 
cases:
•	 any actions taken by the national command authorities involving the U.s. armed 
forces (only the Navy and Marine Corps for immediate purposes)
•	 Carried out in conjunction with events (of any type) occurring outside the United 
states
•	 occurring other than in the course of general or limited war
•	 With the exception of a few categories of responses (to be shown below), such as 
humanitarian relief efforts
•	 reported at a given level in the political-military policy process.
The mere presence of naval forces is not sufficient for an event to be considered a “re-
sponse.” Mahoney defines “peacetime” as the absence of war and therefore locates crisis 
management within the peacetime activities. The peacetime category applies to any in-
stance with fewer than a thousand casualties; once this threshold is crossed the incident 
would amount to at least a limited war. Therefore, within his study’s time frame only 
the vietnam War, beginning with the gulf of Tonkin resolution in 1964 and ending in 
april 1975, is considered a war. additionally, the following categories of responses are 
excluded:
•	 Humanitarian operations (e.g., the provision of medical assistance following natural 
disasters abroad)
•	 Intelligence and other special operations (these are not systematically covered in the 
project’s sources, which do not include compartmentalized intelligence information)
•	 operations that are routinely undertaken to support american diplomacy (e.g., Navy 
units are customarily alerted during presidential visits to Third World nations)
•	 Incidents at sea that are not specifically related to events taking place ashore (e.g., 
hijackings, rammings, overflights of Navy ships by soviet aircraft)
•	 extraregional alerts of Navy forces (during some responses the Navy was placed on 
global alert; while this is noted, where relevant, the principal emphasis in the analysis 
is on forces within the region where the crisis or incident transpired [e.g., the Medi-
terranean basin]).
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The Mahoney analyses reveal the following:
•	 The Navy responded to ninety-nine international incidents and crises.
•	 More than three-quarters of the responses took place in three regions: the Mediterra-
nean, the americas (Central and south america plus the Caribbean), and east asia 
(Korea through southeast asia).
•	 In fifty-nine out of the ninety-nine cases, aircraft carriers were present. From 1955 
to 1960 there were twenty operations with, and seven without, carriers; 1961–65, 
twenty-two with carriers and twenty-eight without; and 1966–75, seventeen with 
and five without. The 1961–65 time frame shows the highest frequency of operations 
both with and without carrier deployment. The 1966–75 period was marked by fewer 
carrier operations, but more than 75 percent of the total responses involved carriers.
•	 amphibious units were deployed in sixty-one out of the ninety-nine naval responses. 
In 1961–65, amphibious forces were used most frequently (twenty-eight operations 
with amphibious forces and twenty-two without them). The earlier and later periods 
were marked by higher percentages of operations involving amphibious forces, but 
overall fewer responses occurred. In 1955–60 occurred eighteen responses with and 
nine without amphibious forces, and in 1966–75, fifteen with and seven without.
Power was projected ashore mostly to influence the following kinds of events:
•	 evacuation of special weapons and associated personnel
•	 rescue of endangered Western nationals
•	 short-term, moderate-scale landing and air-strike operations directed at Third 
World nations
•	 signals of american intentions and concerns sent during the course of a crisis (e.g., 
the movement of two carrier groups toward the syrian coast during the final phase of 
the 1967 June War). 
Carrier aviation is most likely in the last two categories of responses, especially when 
overflight or basing rights are restricted or not granted. Mahoney concludes that the 
Navy “has been used as a flexible instrument of crisis diplomacy” and that “it appears 
that the force packages correspond (in at least a general sense) to certain types of crisis 
situations or sets of similar policy problems.”2
Blechman and Kaplan analyzed in 1978 the political use of different U.s. military ser-
vices and their deployment in responses short of war.3 They concluded that
•	 The Navy was the armed service most often employed for political uses of force in 
the post–World War II period.
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•	 air forces, excluding sea air, were involved in about half of the incidents. Combat 
ground troops were the least involved and rarely without naval forces.
•	 Naval forces participated in events worldwide. The results demonstrate that whoever 
else was involved, wherever the incident took place, or whatever the type of incident, 
the Navy was deployed in roughly nine out of ten cases.
•	 Within the instances of use of naval forces, aircraft carriers were involved in more 
than half the cases. The authors found that aircraft carriers were most often deployed 
when the level of violence was high and the Chinese or soviets either threatened or 
actually used force. The use of amphibious forces does not seem to be influenced by 
the location of the incident, with the exceptions of southeast asia (more frequent) 
and east asia (less frequent). often the deployment of aircraft carrier and amphibi-
ous forces overlapped. 
In regard to the outcome, the following results were presented:4
•	 Most positive outcomes were reached when land-based combat aircraft were 
deployed, followed by ground troops; the deployment of naval forces reduced the 
frequency of positive outcomes.5
•	 Positive outcomes occurred less often when the objective was to reinforce (assure or 
deter) clients rather than to modify (compel or induce) behavior and when greater 
levels of force were used.
•	 Previous U.s. military engagement in the region, withdrawal of forces, and state-
ments issued before the involvement by the president or senior administration 
officials positively influenced outcomes. Both very high and very low levels of presi-
dential popularity were frequently related to positive outcomes.
•	 Involvement of the soviet Union (as actor and as threatening or actually using force) 
negatively influenced outcomes, while the strategic weapons balance between the 
actors exerted no influence.
•	 Finally, direct american involvement increased the frequency of positive outcomes.
In 1986, robert Mandel published a study entitled “The effectiveness of gunboat Diplo-
macy.” Building on Cable’s data, he developed ten hypotheses to examine the effective-
ness of gunboat diplomacy between 1947 and 1978. The hypotheses were divided into 
three groups, relating to the nature of the event, the relationship between the assailant 
and the victim, and the natures of both assailant and victim. He found that militar-
ily prepared and politically stable parties were more successful in gunboat diplomacy. 
Prior uses of force in the same region and a definitive, deterrent display of force further 
supported success. after 1965 actual uses of force became more successful, comparable 
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to the success of displays of force. The success of gunboat diplomacy was independent of 
the regional identity of the participants or the relative strengths of the assailant and vic-
tim. overall, he praises the strategy of gunboat diplomacy as a viable alternative to war if 
meaningful dialogue between the disputing parties is no longer feasible.
In 1991, adam siegel conducted for CNa an empirical study of U.s. Navy and Ma-
rine Corps crisis-management responses to international incidents and crises.6 like 
Mahoney, siegel focused on reactions immediately prior to and during U.s. involve-
ment. Two hundred seven cases involving the U.s. Navy were identified, excluding 
worldwide everyday, routine activities. siegel defined “crisis management” as peacetime 
activity, including all actions short of war. a “war” was defined by the threshold of one 
thousand american casualties; for this reason both the Korean and vietnam Wars were 
excluded—considering the dates of the Korean War as 25 June 1950–27 July 1953 and 
vietnam as 10 august 1964–31 December 1974, in order that “(a) the long wind down 
of heavy U.s. involvement [in vietnam] would not be unduly reflected in the study and 
(b) the evacuations of american personnel from Phnom Penh and saigon would be 
included.” The final stages of the report were written in January 1991, before the begin-
ning of the gulf War of that year. siegel surmised at the time that this conflict would 
be categorized as a war; however, retrospectively applying the one-thousand-and-over-
casualties criterion, it would not.
all instances meeting the following criteria were included in siegel’s study:
•	 actions taken by the national command authorities involving the U.s. armed forces 
(for an action to be included in his study, a Navy surface ship or a Marine Corps unit 
must have been involved)
•	 actions taken in conjunction with events occurring outside the United states
•	 actions taken other than in the course of general war (Korea in 1950–53 or vietnam 
1964–74)
•	 actions that were reported at a given (senior) level in the political-military policy 
process.
a few categories of responses were not included:
•	 activities inside the United states (because the focus lies on international events).
•	 Humanitarian missions, such as disaster relief and hospital-ship port calls.
•	 Intelligence operations, for security reasons (because the document is unclassified, 
all responses had to involve surface ships; “other forces such as submarines, patrol 
aircraft, and seals [were] used without surface ship involvement; however, the 
activities of these forces are not well documented in the unclassified literature”).
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•	 operations that are routinely undertaken to support american diplomacy. (For 
example, as noted above, U.s. Navy units are often alerted during presidential 
visits overseas, such as during President george H. W. Bush’s February 1990 trip to 
Colombia.)
•	 law enforcement operations (for example, the Department of Defense involvement 
in drug-interdiction operations).
•	 Incidents at sea, activities not specifically related to events taking place ashore, such 
as incidents (collisions or harassment) between U.s. Navy and soviet vessels. some 
types of incidents at sea, specifically terrorist hijackings or seizures of U.s.-flag ves-
sels that prompt a U.s. military response, are included. 
every entry lists the name of the crisis, the area of responsibility (aor), the start date 
and duration, and the involvement of UsMC, U.s. air Force, and U.s. army, in addi-
tion to naval forces. Not counting the involvements in Korea and vietnam, the peri-
ods 1951–55 and 1966–75 showed the lowest U.s. military response frequency. siegel 
suggests either that military forces were too engaged in the war activities to make more 
resources available for other purposes, or that other military activities are less docu-
mented during times of war. aircraft carriers were employed in 68 percent of the 207 
cases, amphibious force in 54 percent, and the Marine Corps in 55 percent. addition-
ally, in twenty-one cases UsMC aviation units on board carriers were involved, raising 
the total UsMC involvement to 57 percent of all cases. In 26 percent and 18 percent of 
the crises, respectively, the air Force and army were involved.
In 2005 the Center for Naval analyses released a report by eugene Cobble, Hank  
gaffney, and Dmitry gorenburg, of which the initial goal had been to compare U.s.  
naval forces’ responses with those of other services for the period between 1970 and 
2000.7 However, it became apparent that there were no major differences between the 
services’ responses. This finding did not surprise the study’s coauthors, as they had 
found an increase in the number of joint and coalition operations. This latest CNa 
study is the only one to include responses by other military services without any naval 
involvement. The report divides the type of response into six different categories (a few 
cases are coded differently) and produces the frequencies shown below. 
Combat 22
show of force 65
support of peacekeeping and military supply 64
Contingent positioning and reconnaissance 50
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Protection of noncombatants (including evacuations) 83
Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Ha/Dr) 366
The total cases, including some other categories, numbered 660 responses. For the period 
from November 2000 through June 2003, thirteen more cases (exclusive of Ha/Dr) were 
added. out of the additions only one—an evacuation of noncombatants from the Ivory 
Coast in september 2002—did not involve naval forces. Without accounting for the 
last category (Ha/Dr), naval forces were involved in 54 percent of all responses. While 
Blechman and Kaplan had found a ratio of nine out of ten for political uses of armed 
forces, these numbers suggest a proportion of a little over five out of ten for the five types 
of responses to international incidents.8 More than half of UsN responses included the 
UsMC. very few Marine Corps or army reactions occurred without naval forces. The 
large majority of cases without the UsN were air Force responses. Figure 8 shows the 
different service-combination percentages for cases with and without naval involvement. 
The CNa study’s data include the involved military services, incident name and loca-
tion, response type, start/end dates, and duration. Humanitarian responses are listed 
on a separate data sheet. The best way to measure the size and intensity of an operation 
Not sure if yes
No USMC
USMC
USAF
No USAF
No USARMY
USARMY
USMC & USN USAF & USN USARMY & USN
2.40%
51.50
%
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%
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%
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%
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%
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%
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is to take into account the number of units or their strengths; however, neither the 
force strength nor the length of the individual responses is accounted for. The authors 
observe that the cases do not represent world or conflict history. They suggest the need 
for further research on naval activities and their relation to world conflicts and U.s. 
national security priorities.
The three CNa reports offer collectively the most detailed and systematic account of 
naval responses to incidents besides routine deployments. The reminder of this chapter 
discusses the data collection and my new data set.
Data for the Empirical Analyses
I had two choices as to how to research the U.s. naval involvement in international cri-
ses: generate a data set on my own or work with an existing one. Creating my own data 
set with multiple variables was not feasible, because of access restrictions and logistical 
limitations. Next, I had to decide if I wanted to add “naval” variables to a data set or 
“crisis” variables to UsN data. Because my goal was to include as many crises character-
istics as possible, I chose the latter. By focusing on an existing data set I exclude nonrou-
tine naval reactions not meeting the data-set definition of international crises.
Data-Set Selection: International Crisis Behavior Data Set (ICB)
There are many data sets concerning the use of armed force. “Correlates of War” 
(CoW), “International Crisis Behavior Project” (ICB), “International Military Inter-
ventions” (IMI), “Militarized Interstate Disputes” (MID), “Military Interventions by 
Powerful states” (MIPs), and “Use of armed Forces” are among the most prominent.9 
These various projects differ in many respects, including their time frames and defi-
nitional disagreements relating to the use of force, disputes, conflicts, crises, and wars. 
The CoW offers data on wars and is therefore not suitable for research on political uses 
of force short of war.10 Jeffrey Pickering and emizet Kisangani updated Pearson and 
Baumann’s IMI data for the years 1946–88 for the years from 1988 to 2005.11 The result 
captures all cases where national military personnel were purposefully dispatched into 
other sovereign states and also includes the use of armed forces against nonstate actors. 
Their data set features a variable controlling for the motive of the intervenors, a very 
rare measurement in military-intervention data. The MID is part of the CoW collec-
tion and provides information about interstate disputes; disputes involving nonstate 
actors are excluded. Benjamin Fordham and Christopher sarver come to the conclusion 
that the MID is not well suited for the analysis of the american use of force, because of 
definition disagreements of the use of force; they point out important incidents missing 
in the data set.12 sullivan’s MIPs provides data for the five parties of intervention—the 
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United states, Britain, France, russia/Ussr, and China. The data also include a variable 
measuring the level of force used, ranging from a mere display of force to ground com-
bat operations. like most other databases, the cases cover only instances when military 
interventions were carried out. Blechman and Kaplan’s data originally covered the Cold 
War era but were extended to 1995 by Fordham and sarver. They thus do not include 
post-1995 incidents. The ICB is exceptional in that it includes cases with and without 
military involvement and thus allows research into different forms of intervention.
Therefore the present analysis is based on the well-established ICB data set for interna-
tional crises, compiled by the Center for International Development and Conflict Man-
agement (CIDCM) at the University of Maryland. In addition to the advantages already 
mentioned, the ICB data set is, as Karl Derouen and Christopher sprecher note, “rich 
in contextual information.”13 Because I want to conduct a broad analysis of when and 
how naval forces are employed, the ideal data set should encompass many different cases 
and crisis characteristics. The ICB allows me to research a wide variety of international 
crises and offers many variables, such as controlling for the form of american involve-
ment, the effect of that involvement, and attitudes toward it.
Moreover, the ICB provides both system and individual data, including different char-
acteristics, reactions, and perceptions of the individual crisis actors. although the ICB 
does not include every instance of the american use of force, it presents the best choice 
for the purpose of this project. The ICB was first published in 1975; the newest (ninth) 
version, of January 2009, covers the period 1918 to 2006, with 452 international crises, 
35 protracted conflicts, and 994 crisis actors.14 The ICB defines its goals as
the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge about interstate crises and protracted conflicts; 
the generation and testing of hypotheses about the effects of crisis-induced stress on coping and 
choice by decision makers; the discovery of patterns in key crisis dimensions—onset, actor behavior 
and crisis management, superpower activity, involvement by international organizations, and out-
come; and application of the lessons of history to the advancement of international peace and world 
order. . . . Underlying the project are three assumptions: first, that the destabilizing effects of crises, 
as of conflicts and wars, are dangerous to global security; second, that understanding the causes, 
evolution, actor behavior, outcomes, and consequences of crises is possible by systematic investiga-
tion; and third, that knowledge can facilitate the effective management of crises so as to minimize 
their adverse effects on world order.15
Expansion of the Data Set: CNA Studies
While the ICB data may be sufficient to analyze general involvement of U.s. armed 
forces, it does not provide information about the type of force used. In order to control 
for the naval involvement, new variables had to be added to the data set. My initial at-
tempt, to examine the naval involvement in every crisis with some form of U.s. involve-
ment, proved to be infeasible. Complete information on where all ships of the U.s. Navy 
have been deployed at any given time is very difficult to find, if not unattainable. There 
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is no uniformity in how information and data are collected; deck logs, command his-
tories, historical reports, and fleet histories differ enormously in detail, focus, and infor-
mation. While it might be possible to find material in depth about a certain response, 
one cannot gain knowledge as to the day of response and the location or name of ships 
involved for every incident. Furthermore, even historical data often remain classified. 
In the case of the second Fleet, for example, only five random years between 1946 and 
2006 were available when my research was conducted. Without access to new informa-
tion I had to take a step back and rely on already existing studies, consolidating sources 
and adding new details where possible.16
almost all of the data on naval involvement are adapted from the comprehensive ac-
count of naval activities as documented in the three CNa reports summarized earlier in 
the chapter. They researched UsN responses to international situations in 1946–2003. 
For the years 2004–2006 I collected information about naval interventions from a 
variety of sources.17 except for adam siegel’s study, the CNa reports do not describe 
the incidents themselves in depth but rather provide only their names and the dates of 
the naval responses. Mahoney and siegel’s data include the types of ship involved in the 
response—the number of aircraft carriers and the employment of amphibious forces. 
Cobble, gaffney, and gorenburg give no information about the ships involved but 
control for the involvement of other military forces and categorize the type of response. 
While siegel’s data include the deployment of other armed forces, they do not catego-
rize the type of mission. These responses had to be correlated with the crises in the ICB 
data set; for example, a crisis in ethiopia might trigger a naval response off the coast 
of somalia. since some international crises have led to multiple naval involvements, I 
worked to match the dates and locations of the responses and crises. In order to validate 
my matching and to control for inter-rater reliability, two graduate students verified my 
data. Both Cohen’s kappa values were higher than 0.8. Kimberley Neuendorf speaks of 
0.80 as the benchmark for satisfactory intercoder reliability; according to Joseph Fleiss, 
a value above κ = .80 is excellent.18 Thus the inter-rater reliability meets the statistical 
requirements.
There are several shortcomings in the CNa reports, including their emphasis on 
“responses.” The fact is that “response” encompasses only a fraction of the total range 
of actions that the Navy undertakes in support of national crisis-management efforts. 
siegel remarks that his research excludes fleet actions during precrisis periods, which 
are crucial because the presence and deterrent capabilities of naval forces can then have 
a far-reaching impact. similarly Mahoney states that regular peacetime presence can 
be far from “routine” in its effect on the ways in which events ashore develop. Clearly, 
the optimal solution for many crisis-management problems is to prevent the crisis from 
developing, by taking timely action during the precrisis period to achieve national 
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goals.19 also, siegel observes, the number of cases underestimates naval actions since 
it includes only surface movements. For example, seals, submarines, and transport 
aircraft can operate independently of ships. Mere alerts are also not part of the selected 
cases but are, according to siegel, especially important for the U.s. army: “For the U.s. 
army, especially, alerts are often used as a crisis response action and, depending on the 
circumstances, alerts can be used as a signal similar to that created by the movement of 
a surface ship.”20
Further, siegel surmises (in the source cited) that it would be interesting to compare not 
only the deployment of the different services but also the types of forces employed. Un-
fortunately, none of the three data sets includes these measures. siegel believes that his 
“research does not provide an adequate basis for comparisons of service-specific activ-
ity,” but I have supplemented it with the latest CNa study, and the result is information 
sufficient to research UsN force combinations. Finally, the latest CNa study (by Cobble, 
gaffney, and gorenburg) aims to compare UsN responses with those from the other 
services, but I have preferred to study the comparison between all-forces involvement 
and the UsN plus other individual services.
In most of the overlapping cases for the years 1970–90 the two studies (those of siegel 
and Cobble et al.) agree on the services involved. There were only very few cases where 
the reports differed, either because a response was not listed in all reports for the over-
lapping years or the service combination was coded differently. Where the two cod-
ing values diverge, I followed the results of the most recent study, because its research 
is most up-to-date and the data focus on the activities of all military services. Where 
possible, more information is provided in the case-summary appendix (in the online 
version of this monograph). siegel excluded humanitarian operations, although he ac-
knowledged that they often are connected with responses to crises, because he discounts 
their conflict potential. Whereas Cobble, gaffney, and gorenburg include peace opera-
tions in their main data set, they present a separate listing of humanitarian responses 
since the 1970s (defined as “responses that are not into harm’s way—the U.s. units and 
personnel involved did not face hostile fire”).21 Typically this type of response consists of 
disaster relief (e.g., after an earthquake) or humanitarian assistance (for example, in the 
form of medical aid or refugee relief—not to be confused with “humanitarian interven-
tions”). The air Force is primarily in charge of humanitarian responses—by a factor of 
ten, compared with the UsN. siegel points to ambiguity in dating the onset and end of 
a crisis response. lack of information or uncertainty in the distinction between routine 
activity and contingency response may influence the number of cases.
I tried to address these terminological ambiguities by combining the three research 
papers. None of the documents attempts to answer questions with regard to how these 
deployments influenced the crises (or vice versa), their effectiveness, and why particular 
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services were deployed, to name a few. In contrast, my research aims to advance the 
information provided in the CNa studies. By the strengthening of their data with 
information about the nature of the crisis, the involved actors, the outcomes, and the 
U.s. activity, the UsN involvement can be placed in a larger context, thereby allowing 
analysis in greater depth of the deploy ment of seaborne forces. Before describing the 
new variables in more detail, I shall explain my focus on aircraft carriers and amphibi-
ous forces.
Why Aircraft Carriers?
One of the most significant changes in the composition of the major 
navies of the twentieth century was the battleship’s replacement by the 
aircraft carrier as the capital ship. 
geoFFreY TIll
The aircraft carrier era began with the successful Pacific campaigns of 1944, in World 
War II.22 since World War II, carriers have been deployed in over 80 percent of the times 
when the world was faced with the risk of international violence.23 aircraft carriers form 
the core of a battle group. according to Friedman, carrier battle groups (CvBgs) are the 
most powerful naval formations. They are the dominant element of sea power. Normally 
a CvBg includes a carrier, escorts (generally including a pair of missile cruisers), and a 
station (replenishment) ship fast enough to steam with the group. often CvBgs deploy 
with one or more nuclear submarines in support. aircraft carriers offer both offensive 
and defensive firepower. They have room to embark eighty to one hundred aircraft—
they can be described as “floating airfields.”24 The use of aircraft carriers has changed 
over time. In the words of rebecca grant, they are “no longer main guardian[s] of the 
sea but rather mobile air base[s].”25
During the 1990s, war fighting was replaced by forward presence as the main task of 
carrier forces. For Booth the aircraft carrier is the “pinnacle of operational flexibility.”26 
Freedom of action for policy makers is made possible by the flexibility of the carrier (or 
Cv, in generic terms—a specifically nuclear-powered carrier is referred to as a CvN). 
There is hardly any place in the world where the aircraft carriers cannot respond. Till 
describes their functions as independent strike, amphibious support, and protection 
against attack by land-based aircraft.27 Booth emphasizes air defense, surface ship inter-
diction, submarine pursuit, and on-shore power projection. a raND study highlights 
unparalleled mobility, power advertisement, and sustained military presence, whereas 
Till additionally singles out independence on the open seas.28 Cvs do not have to worry 
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about foreign base access or overflight rights, and they can deploy rapidly, thanks to 
forward basing. according to the UsN website, “the Carrier Mission is (1) To provide 
a credible, sustainable, independent forward presence and conventional deterrence in 
peacetime, (2) To operate as the cornerstone of joint/allied maritime expeditionary 
forces in times of crisis, and (3) To operate and support aircraft attacks on enemies, 
protect friendly forces and engage in sustained independent operations in war.”29
Thus aircraft carriers are useful not only in times of war but also in action short of war. 
They are the most powerful and visible tool the UsN possesses and can influence events 
ashore. aircraft carriers are symbols of strength and resolve, and they can be sent into 
action quickly.30 Today, aircraft carriers are primarily political instruments. They offer 
numerous options, ranging from discreet withdrawal to full-scale warfare.31 as Presi-
dent William Clinton once said, “When word of crisis breaks out in Washington, it’s no 
accident that the first question that comes to everyone’s lips is, where is the nearest car-
rier?”32 Yet the utility of aircraft carriers has frequently been questioned. grant’s critique 
focuses on their inferior offensive potential compared with that of the U.s. air Force.33 
Certainly carriers in combat often need the support of land-based air. But where the fo-
cus is on peacetime missions, combat effectiveness is not the key criterion; what counts 
then is the ability to observe, influence, and react to situations in international waters. 
Cost and vulnerability are also focuses of criticism. aircraft carriers are virtually float-
ing cities housing about five thousand Navy personnel. With their high construction 
and maintenance costs, they are the military’s costliest asset.34 What sets the Navy apart, 
then, is its forward presence mission, its extensive observation potential, and its varied 
means of intervention, ranging from suasion to attack. Importantly, aircraft carriers can 
operate where land-based air forces lack access. 
The nation’s current reliance on aircraft carriers for many naval missions is well 
understood by potential enemies, who are striving to find ways to counter them. For 
instance, antiship ballistic missiles pose a formidable threat to carriers. Because of the 
vulnerability of a big floating platform, rubel suggests more widely distributed missile-
firing platforms that are more difficult to find and hit.35 optimally they would include 
submarines, surface combatants, and guided-missile destroyers. such a mixture of ships 
instead of one “key ship” offers dispersed targets and could prove valuable in crisis as a 
reliable deterrent. He concludes, “This sea change in the Navy indicates the early stages 
of a paradigm shift away from a force centered on big-deck aviation platforms. although 
assault ships (lHDs) and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CvNs) will continue to 
constitute a critical power-projection capability for the United states into the foreseeable 
future, the Navy will increasingly shift to dispersed but integrated surface and subsur-
face operations to constitute the credible combat power required by its new maritime 
strategy.”36
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Despite the voices calling for a different approach involving a focus on different ship 
types, aircraft carriers remain the center of the naval power. “For the future there might 
be lower cost and less vulnerable alternatives, but for now aircraft carriers will likely to 
continue to be an asset of choice.”37 Increasingly, Cvs serve as joint aviation platforms.38 
The important concept of sea basing emphasizes the avoidance of overflight rights and 
basing restrictions and, once again, favors aircraft carriers. recent examples include 
operations enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, as well as the Haiti earth-
quake of 2010.39 However, as Charles allen remarks, a single-carrier group can conduct 
combat operations for only a certain amount of time, for personnel reasons; extended 
combat requires more than one carrier group.40 In practice, the average number of 
deployed Cvs/CvNs steadily decreased between 1975 and 2005.41 The number dropped 
again in 2007 when Uss John F. Kennedy (Cv 67) was decommissioned. o’rourke 
estimated in 2009 that the number of Cvs would drop from eleven to ten in 2012 with 
the decommissioning of Enterprise (CvN 65) and before its replacement by Gerald R. 
Ford (CvN 78), scheduled to be ready in 2015 (though Pritchett suggests 2017 as a more 
likely date).42 With the aircraft carriers Uss Theodore Roosevelt (CvN 71) and Abraham 
Lincoln (CvN 72) undergoing repair and maintenance at this writing, the number of 
active CvBgs could temporarily even drop to nine. Roosevelt should be ready to deploy 
again in February 2013, while Lincoln is likely to return to active service only in 2015.43 
Before taking into account the now-impending budget cuts, the Navy projected that the 
force will increase to twelve carriers in FY 2019, when CvN 79 is commissioned.44
Amphibious Operations
amphibious warfare units, which project combat power ashore from the sea, make 
up one of the naval service’s two principal projection forces.45 like aircraft carriers, 
amphibious forces play a central role in crisis management because of their ability to 
affect events ashore, either by taking direct action or by establishing a naval presence.46 
since World War II, amphibious landings have usually evoked the picture of assaults on 
heavily defended beaches. The most famous U.s. army amphibious landing was the in-
vasion of Normandy, and for the UsMC the successive seizures of the Pacific islands. In 
the decades after the World War II, the Corps further developed its techniques, greatly 
aided by technological advances.47
an amphibious force consists of a Navy element—a group of ships known as an am-
phibious task force (aTF)—and a landing force of U.s. Marines (occasionally army 
troops), in total about five thousand people.48 amphibious operations include amphibi-
ous assaults, withdrawals, demonstrations, raids, and special operations in support of 
assaults. The aim of amphibious assaults is to land on hostile territory. During an as-
sault, supremacy on the sea, on land, and in the air is essential.49 amphibious raids aim 
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to achieve a tactical or operational goal, followed by a planned withdrawal. amphibious 
feints and demonstrations are aimed at tying down the enemy’s forces. surprise and 
speed are essential to minimize the risk to the attacking forces; defending forces have 
a natural advantage over amphibious forces.50 In most cases, the aTF will be deployed 
under the protection of a CvBg, which provides cover for the aTF and combat support 
to operations ashore. The ships of the aTF are capable of embarking and supporting 
other forces when the mission requires, including army, special operations forces (soF), 
or other joint and combined forces. Because they are sea-based and because decisions to 
position and engage amphibious forces are easily reversible, amphibious forces greatly 
expand the range of available response options. They are particularly well suited as 
demonstrations of american commitment to friends and allies, as well as adversaries. 
This type of deployment closely links the Navy and UsMC team.
In the ideal scenario, amphibious forces confuse the enemy and force him to guess 
where along the coastline the landing force might be inserted. This limits the defender’s 
ability to concentrate his forces at a single point and thereby favors a wily attacker. This 
idea is encompassed by the concept of sea basing. as Wood remarks, “the entire concept 
of ‘seabasing’ rests on the principle that the ocean can be used to assemble, move, pro-
ject, support and sustain forces as is done on land.”51
Selecting the Cases and Coding Naval Variables
The cases were selected according to the following criteria:
•	 “Date of Perception of Crisis Breakpoint”: 1946–2006
•	 “Content of U.s. activity”: “low level, covert/semi-military, or direct military”
•	 Low-level U.S. activity: political activity, including statements of approval or dis-
approval by authorized government officials; economic involvement (e.g., finan-
cial aid to, or the withholding of aid from, an actor); and propaganda involvement
•	 U.S. covert or semi-military activity: covert activity (e.g., support for antigovern-
ment forces); military aid or advisers, without participation in actual fighting
•	 U.S. direct military activity: dispatch of troops, aerial bombing of targets, or naval 
assistance to a party in a war.
The first limitation excludes any crises before World War II, because U.s. naval power 
was less able to influence events ashore than it is today. When the Cv replaced the 
battleship as the capital ship, this dramatically changed. earlier cases can therefore not 
be compared to post–World War II cases.52 
The second limitation was chosen because cases without any U.s. involvement are ir-
relevant to my analyses.53 of the 452 international crises, 241 met the criteria for the 
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required time frame and american involvement. Because of my definition of peacetime 
operations and uncertainty in some cases about naval involvement, a small number of 
cases (N = 12) were coded as “missing data.” The international crises taking place in 
connection with the Korean and vietnam (until 1972) Wars were excluded, because both 
involved full-scale war activity on the part of the United states. after 1972, U.s. naval 
forces were no longer engaged in major combat operations. The gulf War of 1991 is in-
cluded, because the crisis resulted in fewer than a thousand american casualties. More-
over, it led to continuing U.s. engagement in Iraq—for example, operation southern 
Watch, aimed to prevent Iraqi aerial activity, which produced close to no coalition 
casualties. The different crises triggered by Iraqi noncompliance with the United Nations 
special Commission and by the no-fly zones are listed as separate crises and are in-
cluded. While operations enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom in their initial 
phases did not exceed the casualty threshold, those two crises are of a different kind. at 
the time of the analyses, operation enduring Freedom had not ended yet, and both 
conflicts have far surpassed the critical value of one thousand casualties. Thus these two 
cases are included as naval involvements but not in the statistical analyses.
Besides the engagements during the Korean and vietnam Wars, I identified three 
international crises for which I was not able to verify naval involvement.54 Because 
these international crises do not meet the selection criteria, they are not included in the 
database. However, because the associated naval activity appears to have had at least 
peripheral relevance to the larger U.s. crisis responses, I have included them in the 
crisis description appendix (available in the online version of this monograph). I also 
excluded several intrawar crises during the Iran-Iraq War. For example, the UsN role in 
protecting international commercial shipping in the Persian gulf (the “tanker war”) was 
a response to secondary events deriving from the war, as distinct from the facet of the 
war itself. Conversely, evacuation operations were direct reactions to the crisis, although 
they had no bearing on its resolution, and are thus included.
“Naval” Variables
In a first step I added a dichotomous variable, “U.s. naval involvement,” simply measur-
ing whether the UsN had been involved in an international crisis or not. Naval forces 
rarely reacted on their own; thus the next ten variables control for the involvement of 
other armed forces.55 In a next step I grouped the different service combinations. Be-
cause the number of “UsN only” cases is very small, I mostly treat the UsN and UsMC 
as one “team,” the “UsN-UsMC Team.” (siegel subtitled his work U.S. Navy and U.S. 
Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity.) I acknowledge the limitation posed by this com-
bination of the U.s. seaborne forces. The addition of the Marine Corps includes the pos-
sible or actual landing of U.s. forces on foreign territory and thus represents a greater 
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intrusion. Conversely, it can be argued that the presence of a UsMC force increases the 
threat perceived by the enemy and increases the likelihood of a favorable outcome. also, 
given the limited number of naval responses, I could not distinguish between shows of 
force and actual force projection, or between the mere presence of Marines and actual 
landings. To research each response in detail, case studies, not just statistical analyses, 
are necessary. For a future project, these distinctions could prove very interesting and 
reveal additional information. In the online appendix listing the crises I present more 
comprehensive accounts and when possible describe the activities of the Navy and 
Marine Corps. Where the analyses allowed a distinction, however, I control for “UsN 
only” cases.
The following table explains how the different services are grouped. There was only one 
case where the UsN, UsMC, and army were involved. In order to qualify for an “all 
forces response” both the army and the air Force had to have been involved, repre-
senting all three types of forces: sea based, air based, and land based. In two cases the 
Marine Corps did not participate, but because the UsN represents the seaborne force 
I counted the two crisis responses as all-forces responses. Because only one case of the 
variable “UsN & other Forces” includes “UsarMY,” this variable is nearly congruent 
to seaborne forces and air Force responses and can be treated as combinations with 
the air Force. The only case including the U.s. Navy, Marine Corps, and army was a 
noncombatant evacuation operation (Neo) in Congo in 1998. Because of the already 
very low number of cases, I decided not to exclude this incident; that it was a Neo 
highlights the noncombat character of the mission. Using the service combination 
numbers, I generated different “naval variables” that will be used as both dependent and 
independent variables.
For each crisis where naval forces were involved, I introduced the following variables:
•	 Cv involvement (yes/no)
•	 Number of Cvs (metric)
FIGure 9
Three Naval Combination Variables
TYPE OF SERVICE 1 
(SERVICETYPE1) (Y1)
0. NO NAVY
1. USN ONLY
2. USN-USMC 
3. USN AND OTHER 
 FORCE
4. ALL FORCES (at least one 
 seaborne force and USAF 
 and USARMY)
TYPE OF SERVICE 2 
(SERVICETYPE2) (Y2)
0. NO NAVY
1. USN-USMC TEAM
2. USN AND OTHER FORCES
3.  ALL FORCES (at least one 
 seaborne force and USAF 
 and USARMY)
USN-USMC-TEAM 
(USNUSMCTEAM) (Y3)
0. NO NAVY
1. USN-USMC TEAM
2. USN AND OTHER FORCES 
 (incl. All Forces)
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•	 Cv strength (no Cv / one Cv / two or more Cvs)
•	 amphibious involvement (yes/no)
•	 Type of mission.
The variable “Cv involvement” accounts for the deployment of an aircraft carrier. 
The number as well as the capabilities of U.s. aircraft carriers has changed over time, 
and it is therefore difficult to compare the quantity of Cvs deployed to crises over the 
years.56 However, Blechman and Kaplan distinguish between minor, standard, and high 
components of force.57 For the Navy, a standard force component is a carrier task group; 
two or more carriers are a major component of force; and the absence of aircraft carrier 
incidents defines minor components of force. To have a complete account of Cv in-
volvement I introduced another variable measuring the actual number of involved Cvs, 
“Number of Cvs.” For the years 1990 onward the CNa data did not provide information 
about the number of Cvs. When the Cv involvement can be confirmed with sufficient 
certainty the variable is included; otherwise it is counted as missing data. The next 
variable measures the involvement of amphibious forces. In all CNa documents this is 
simply measured by a binary variable (yes/no).
The variable “Type of mission” is divided into six categories, following Cobble, gaffney, 
and gorenburg:58
•	 Contingent positioning (naval forces are ordered to an area, diverted away from their 
routine schedule but without clear operational intentions)59
•	 reconnaissance (moving U.s. forces around the world to influence actions of some 
potential adversaries, mostly a naval activity)
•	 Noncombatant evacuation operation
•	 show of force (similar to contingent positioning and reconnaissance but more direct 
and open, e.g., actually putting boots on the ground, moving weapons systems, mov-
ing supplies)
•	 Combat
•	 Peace operations.
since only the latest CNa study provides this information, in earlier cases I coded the 
variable as missing data. Contingent positioning and reconnaissance responses are 
characterized by diverting naval ships from their schedules to position them closer to 
incipient crises. Neos are conducted for the protection of american embassies or the 
evacuation of american and other approved personnel. shows of force are reactions in 
which U.s. naval forces sail into harm’s way, though no shots are fired. In combat ac-
tions, actual combat takes place or weapons are fired. Peace operations comprise three 
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different activities: support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peace building, and preventive 
diplomacy), peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. “Peace operations include traditional 
peacekeeping as well as peace enforcement activities such as protection of humanitarian 
assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee and 
denial of movement, establishment of protected zones, and forcible separation of bel-
ligerents.”60 Disaster-relief missions are responses to natural disasters or other emergen-
cies that are conducted in otherwise benign environments; they are not included in this 
analysis. similarly, humanitarian-assistance missions—while likely to be carried out in 
nonpermissive environments and mostly reactions to man-made events—are likely to 
take place only after the initial U.s. reaction to a crisis.
Naval Involvement Frequencies
as an introduction to the main variables, I present some simple frequencies. according 
to the data set, U.s. naval forces were deployed in ninety-three (including afghanistan 
and Iraq) out of the 229 international crises in which the nation was involved. Twelve 
cases are excluded because they either do not meet the criterion of fewer than a thousand 
american casualties or specifically naval involvement cannot be adequately confirmed. 
afghanistan and Iraq are excluded from the statistical analysis (because they exceed the 
casualty threshold) but are otherwise treated as cases with naval involvement.
as shown in figure 10, naval forces were deployed in more than 40 percent of all U.s. en-
gagements in international crises. of the ninety-three cases under study, in thirty-nine 
the UsN deployed alone or with the UsMC and in fifty-four cases with other forces.
The charts in figure 11 further break down the combinations with other forces in which 
the Navy was deployed. These new variables were introduced to measure the level of 
Missing Data
Naval Involvement
No Naval Involvement
USN & Other
USN-USMC
12
136
93
54
39
USN Involvement USN-USMC Team
FIGure 10
Naval Involvement Binary and USN-USMC Team & USN with Other Forces
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joint deployment. a deployment of all forces is a much more substantial involvement 
than the other two categories and must include sea, air, and ground forces.
Figure 12 presents the strength of the naval force, measured in number of aircraft carri-
ers and amphibious ships. all cases that included the Marine Corps involved amphibi-
ous forces. The stronger the U.s. force, the more likely it was to reach or exceed force 
levels of two Cvs. Because the latest CNa study does not provide information on vessels 
involved, the following charts include only cases up to 1990.
The time lines of figures 13a and 13b graphically demonstrate the variation of the 
frequency of U.s. reactions to international crises, controlling for involvements with 
All Forces
USN, USAF, USARMY
USN, USMC, USAF
USN, USAF
USN-USMC
USN only
All Forces
USN & Other
USN-USMC Team
23
16
614
1
2
31
39
21
33
USN, USMC, USARMY
FIGure 11
USN and Other Forces Combinations
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and without naval forces. Whereas the first figure distinguishes only between “no naval 
involvement” and “naval involvement,” the second analyzes the different service combi-
nations with which the UsN deployed. 
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Figure 13a shows that the peaks and lows of naval responses differed from those of non-
naval ones. Naval responses peaked in 1958 and 1962–63, while declines occurred in the 
early 1950s, late 1980s, early 1990s, and after 2002. a relatively steady response pattern 
is visible between 1966 and 1978 and between 1992 and 1997. In the time frame between 
1977 and 1991, nonnaval american activity peaks occurred on several occasions. The 
second time line, figure 13b, distinguishes among the different service combinations, 
treating maritime forces jointly. The years 1962 to 1964, 1981, and 1984 saw peaks of 
maritime-forces-only responses. after 1986 very few of the military responses occurred 
with only seaborne forces but rather were characterized by joint deployments. This in-
crease in joint operations coincides with the goldwater-Nichols act, which encouraged 
interservice cooperation.
General Observations of U.S. (Naval) Activity in International Crises
Before statistically analyzing the circumstances in which the United states deploys na-
val forces, a historical account of the frequency and location of U.s. activity can provide 
answers to crisis-characteristics questions concerning the locations of UsN responses. 
as shown in figure 14, the late 1940s were dominated by responses in europe. This find-
ing is not surprising, since many eastern european countries were struggling against 
the influence of communism at the end of World War II. In roughly half of the cases, 
naval forces were involved. somewhat more surprising are the responses in the Middle 
east. In the first years after the end of World War II the United states focused mainly 
on other regions, and an increasing interest in the Middle east occurs only in the early 
1950s.61 However, the following decades were marked by a much higher frequency of 
reactions to international crises in that region. Three responses between 1946 and 1949 
occurred in asia. The 1950s were clearly dominated by two regions, asia and the Middle 
east, with slightly more cases without naval involvement. Fewer responses took place in 
europe, mostly without the support of naval forces. The activity in Central america was 
evenly distributed between no naval involvement and naval involvement, whereas crisis 
response in North africa occurred without UsN deployments. In the 1960s naval forces 
dominated american crisis-response activity in Central america and europe, while in 
the other major response areas, the Middle east and in asia, only about half of the cases 
featured UsN forces.
The largest concentration of international crises in the 1970s occurred in africa. During 
this decade many african countries gained independence from former colonial powers. 
Frequently this led to wars between factions or with bordering countries, resulting in 
international crises. Most of the american responses on this continent took place in 
central or southern africa and did not include naval forces. again, the majority of naval 
deployments occurred in the Middle east and asia, with fewer cases in europe and 
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Central america. africa remained tumultuous in the 1980s, but american responses 
also occurred in North and east africa. The various crises with libya are mostly re-
sponsible for the involvement in North africa. In the Middle east, more involvements 
took place without the UsN, and no crisis response in asia included naval forces. of the 
three reactions to incidents in europe, two included naval deployments. In the 1990s the 
United states was less active in africa; however, half of the six responses included naval 
forces.
The Middle east largely dominated the 1990s, but the United states also focused on 
asia, both with and without naval support. The responses in europe are largely attribut-
able to the wars resulting from the breakup of Yugoslavia. Few responses show up in 
Central and south america. The first decade of the twenty-first century was marked by 
a very small number of involvements. This may be a side effect of the gWoT, which tied 
up U.s. military forces and left little room for other deployments. only five cases for 
the time span 2000–2006 led to the dispatch of naval forces, including afghanistan and 
Iraq. No activity occurred in europe or in Central or south america, but the United 
states reacted to three crises in eurasia and five in asia (two Navy, three without). over 
the years the Middle east; asia, predominantly southeast and east asia; and Central 
america were the main foci of U.s. naval forces.
In the next step, the different types of forces are analyzed in more detail. The “Navy 
only” cases are located in Central and south america, the Middle east, asia (especially 
southeast and east asia), and some in africa, especially in the north. This is not much 
different from the findings of naval deployments independent of the force combination. 
UsN-UsMC cases add europe and south asia to the regions but also occur in Central 
america, North and east africa, the Middle east, and southeast and east asia. look-
ing at all crises including the army and air Force explains the crisis responses in other 
regions. The distributions now cover most geographic locations, although the focus 
remains on the Middle east, Central america, and southeast and east asia.
Table 14 also distinguishes between different levels of U.s. activity. The majority of 
american responses occurred at only a low level of activity. For this type of response 
“no naval involvement” was more frequent than the deployment of naval forces. For 
responses of the next category, semi-military involvement, naval forces are frequently 
deployed. The smallest set of responses involved direct military activity, which often in-
cluded naval forces. only in two cases where the U.s. activity was coded as “direct mili-
tary” were no naval forces involved. The two crises in question are the Congo II crisis 
of 1964 and the libyan jets crisis of 1988. During the Congo crisis the United states and 
Belgium dispatched paratroops to support a hostage-rescue mission. The shooting down 
of two libyan Mig-23s by U.s. fighters was coded as direct military involvement in a 
crisis initially triggered by the Pan american airliner crash at lockerbie in late 1988.
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as previously shown, the majority of responses occurred in the Middle east, Central 
america, and south, southeast, and east asia. While in the first region half of the 
responses occurred with naval forces, the other half without, in the latter two regions 
more than 50 percent of the responses involved naval forces. The majority of the various 
responses in east asia included the dispatch of the UsN, while in africa the larger part 
of U.s. activity took place without naval forces (with the exception of North africa) and 
also occurred at a low level. after the end of the Cold War, direct military “all forces” 
responses dominated Middle east crisis response, whereas previously only UsN-UsMC 
forces had been deployed frequently. Central america shows a high level of semi- 
military UsN-UsMC response activity. overall, since the end of the Cold War U.s. 
direct military crisis-response activity has increased.
Methodology
There are important limitations here. The relatively small number of naval involvements 
and the even more limited data on the response time, specific mission, and strength of 
the deployment pose great challenges to statistical analysis. While I would like to create 
complex models accounting for a variety of different effects, especially also interaction 
effects, this goal is not attainable with the current data. Instead of elaboration on the 
hypotheses and taking into account more variations of naval deployments, the follow-
ing empirical analyses will be rather basic in nature. Based on the available information 
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FIGure 14
Geographic Location & Content of U.S. Activity 
(the three crises where USN involvement is uncertain are circled by broken line)
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and restrictions posed by statistical requirements, the analyses are necessarily confined 
to simple regression models, in an attempt to provide more information than simple 
frequencies. However, given the exploratory character of this study, even frequencies 
will be an important first step and ideally will encourage future efforts to report naval 
involvements in more detail as to allow deeper analysis of their impact.
Binary and Multinomial Logistic Regression
regression analyses help to understand the relation between one dependent and one or 
more independent variables. The most common regression, linear regression, requires 
the dependent variable to be metrically scaled. logistic regressions allow us to predict 
dependent variables based on dichotomous, categorical, or continuous independent 
variables. Binary (or binomial) logistic regression is employed when the dependent is a 
dichotomous variable and the independents are of any variable type. Multinomial logis-
tic regression models are applied when the dependent variable has more than two values 
and is categorically scaled. When the dependent variable can be ranked, an ordinal 
logistic regression model is preferred. In all of these three regression types, there can be 
only one dependent variable.
logistic regression applies maximum-likelihood estimation after converting the 
dependent into a logit variable (the natural log of the odds of the dependent occurring 
or not). In this way, logistic regression estimates the odds of a certain event occurring. 
logistic regression has many analogies to the ordinary-least-square (ols) methods in 
linear regressions: logit coefficients correspond to b coefficients in the logistic regres-
sion equation, the standardized logit coefficients correspond to beta weights (b values), 
and a pseudo-R2 statistic is available to summarize the strength of the relationship. But 
these “pseudo-R2 statistics” have to be interpreted with care.62 For ols regressions the 
R2 value provides information on how much of the variance in the dependent variable is 
explained by the independent variable(s). For regressions with dichotomous or categori-
cal dependent variables, however, R2 does not serve as a measurement of the variance of 
the dependent variable but rather has to be interpreted as a measurement of the strength 
of association.
Unlike ols regression, logistic regression does not assume that the relationship be-
tween dependent and independent variables is linear, and the choice is not restricted 
to normally distributed variables. Further, no homoscedasticity (equality of statistical 
variance) is assumed, and generally the requirements are less stringent. goodness-of-fit 
tests are available, such as the likelihood ratio test as an indicator of model suitabil-
ity and the Wald statistic to test the significance of individual independent variables. 
In order to interpret the output, the b values need to be discussed. The b values—
Exp(B)—generate the factor by which the likelihood of the occurrence of “1” values of 
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the dependent variable (0 or 1) increases. all values smaller than 1 signify a negative 
relationship, and no assumption can be made regarding the strength of the negative 
influence. a b value of 1 signifies a neutral indicator, with no influence on the depen-
dent variable.63 Binary logistic regression predicts the “1” value of the dependent, using 
the “0” level as the reference value. Multinomial logistic regression compares each level 
of the dependent with the baseline category for each independent variable. Because 
the hypotheses not only measure the naval involvement as a binary variable but also 
distinguish between the different combinations of the services, both binary logistic and 
multinomial logistic models are appropriate.
For multinomial logistic regression we must select a baseline category for the dependent 
variable. For instance, given the multinomial dependent “naval involvement” with levels 
0 = “No Navy,” 1 = “UsN-UsMC,” 2 = “UsN & other Forces,” and 3 = “all Forces,” four 
choices can be made for the baseline category. If “all Forces” is chosen as baseline, the 
multinomial logistic output will show, first, the comparison of “No Naval Involvement” 
with “all Forces”; second, the comparison of “UsN-UsMC” with “all Forces”; and third, 
the comparison of “UsN & other Forces” with “all Forces.” similarly, for the indepen-
dent variables a reference category has to be defined. The statistical program sPss auto-
matically defaults the highest value. If the researcher desires another reference category, 
the variables have to be recoded accordingly. This brings up three considerations. First, 
because the b coefficients for dummy variables will reflect changes in the dependent 
with respect to the reference group (which is the left-out group), it is best if the reference 
group is clearly defined. Thus leaving out the “other” or “Miscellaneous” category, for 
example, is suboptimal, for the reference comparisons will be unclear. second, the left-
out reference group should have multiple cases if it is to lead to stable reference compari-
sons. Third, some researchers prefer to leave out a “middle” category when transforming 
ordinal categories into dummy variables, arguing that reference comparisons with 
median groups are preferable to comparisons with extremes. In this study the small 
number of cases often posed a problem in this regard, and I tried to choose the reference 
category as carefully as possible.
Structure of the Regression Analyses
In order to measure how much the independent variable influences the dependent 
variable, simple or stepwise regression models are employed. When the data and the 
theoretical considerations allow, I chose stepwise multiple regression models, thereby 
automatically eliminating independent variables with no significant influence. stepwise 
regression assumes that the term would have a coefficient of 0 and adds the term only 
when there is sufficient evidence that the null hypothesis can be rejected. otherwise, 
simple regression analyses were employed to test hypotheses separately and determine 
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which factors change the dependent variable independent of any intercorrelation effects 
between independent variables. In multiple regression models, the influence may be 
altered by intercorrelation effects. Moreover, because the dependent variable varies from 
hypothesis to hypothesis, no general overarching regression model can be calculated. In 
simple regression models the pseudo-R2 values are lower, because usually one variable 
alone is less strongly associated with the dependent variable.64 again, it is important to 
note that R2 values have to be interpreted with care in logistic regression models. While 
most regression analyses were run with “servicetype2” (treating UsN-UsMC as a single 
force team) serving as dependent variable, the basic frequencies are presented with 
“servicetype1” (UsN and UsN-UsMC separate categories). To calculate the frequencies 
for the joint seaborne forces, the categories UsN only and UsN-UsMC need only be 
added. The already low number of cases for the different variables and the additional 
decrease in cases when dividing into the different categories often do not allow a further 
distinction between the seaborne forces, especially on the system level. However, when 
statistically possible and when results reveal interesting differences, the more detailed 
regression outputs are discussed.
In a first step, tables with the frequencies for the different forms of american involve-
ment and the variables categories are depicted. In a second step, the results of the regres-
sion analysis are presented. In order to simplify the statistical outputs, generally only 
two categories are chosen as baseline and reference categories. The values in the tables 
represent the Exp(B) values with the according significance level. after the statistical 
analyses, if possible, historical examples are described to strengthen the validity of the 
argument and support the empirical results.
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We Move on the seas That We Control, Part I
assessing the empirical evidence—Crisis Characteristics 
and actors
To better understand the influence of different crisis characteristics on seaborne crisis 
response, four hypotheses were generated in chapter 2.1 The first three are concerned 
with the type of crisis, while the last one analyzes the influence of the crisis on the 
global system. all variables are measured on the system level.
The following three hypotheses are analyzed in a combined stepwise regression model, 
Crisis Characteristics Model 1 (see sidebar 1). graver threats and higher stakes were as-
sumed to favor “all forces” responses and render the deployment of seaborne responses 
less likely. In regard to higher levels of violence the hypothesis can go either way, either 
increasing or decreasing the likelihood of seaborne responses alone.
SIdEBAR 1
The variables in the hypotheses can be expressed mathematically as follows.
 (1) x1a and x1b = gravity of threat (gravcr, gravcr2, gravcr3).
A low-threat crisis is measured with the variable “gravity of value threat-
ened.” Categories have to be transformed from their original values. The 
variable measures the seriousness of the threat of the crisis for the actors, 
ranging from “low level” fear, such as economic threats, through midrange 
fears, such as threats to “territory” and “influence,” and ultimately to a 
danger to existence (“grave threat”).
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H1a: Threats
H1b: Stakes
H1b: Violence
x1 = gravity of threat
x2 =  issues
x3 = violence
Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response
FIGure 15
Crisis Characteristics Model 1
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 (2) x2 = issues (issue, issue2).
A low-politics crisis is measured by the nature and number of issues at 
stake. If a case includes military-security issues the crisis threatens high 
politics. The variable contains three categories: “1–2 issues non-military-
security,” “military-security issue alone,” and “2 issues including military-
security/3 issues.”
 (3) x3 = violence (viol).
The level of violence is identified with the help of the variable “violence,” 
controlling for the highest level of violence in a crisis. “No violence” is the 
lowest level, followed by “minor clashes,” “major clashes,” and the last 
category, “war.”
 (4) x4 = geographic location (geogloc, geogloc2), and 
 (5) x5 = geostrategic salience (geostr, geostr2).
A crisis of geostrategic interest is measured by its “geostrategic salience” 
and the “geographic location” of the crisis. The variable “geographic loca-
tion” was converted into a new binary variable. Thomas Barnett and H. H. 
Gaffney define Central America and the Caribbean, Europe, Southwest 
Asia (particularly the Persian Gulf region), Japan, Taiwan, and Korea as re-
gions or countries of most importance to the United States.a Blechman and 
Kaplan find frequent U.S. involvement in Europe, Southeast and East Asia, 
Middle East, and Central America.b The Persian Gulf region is a subset of 
the Middle East, but clearly the United States has a great interest in the 
latter.c Japan, Taiwan, and Korea are the key nations in East Asia. Therefore 
the ICB variable “geographic location” was converted into a binary variable 
depending on whether an area was or is of interest to the United States fol-
lowing Blechman and Kaplan’s definition. Geostrategic salience identifies 
the level and number of the international systems affected by the crisis. The 
variable was reexamined as a binary variable measuring whether the crisis 
affected “only subsystem(s)” or the “dominant/global system.”
a. Thomas Barnett and H. H. Gaffney, “100 Top Rules of the New American Way 
of War,” British Army Review—London Ministry of Defence, no. 131 (2003), pp. 
40–44.
b. Blechman and Kaplan, Force without War.
c.. See, for example, Hahn, Crisis and Crossfire.
The second model, Crisis Characteristics Model 2 (see sidebar 1), analyzes the hypoth-
esis assuming a negative relation between the deployment of seaborne forces only and 
crises of high geostrategic importance. 
x4 = geographic location
x5 = geostrategic salience
H1d: Geostrategic
Importance
Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response
FIGure 16
Crisis Characteristics Model 2
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Before turning to the regression analyses, the frequencies of the variables are summa-
rized in figure 17.
Different distributions of the independent variables require adapting the dependent 
variable in order to meet the significance requirements for conducting regression analy-
ses. While the variables “gravity of threat 2” and “issues 2” could be analyzed employing 
“servicetype1”—distinguishing between the seaborne forces—the variable “violence” 
requires the collapse of these categories. Moreover, “gravity of threat 3” calls for “UsN-
UsMC Team” as dependent variable, because of the zero correlations between territorial 
threats and the deployment of all forces.
Regression Analyses Crisis Characteristics 1
The variable “gravity of threat 2” was automatically removed from the regression  
model by the stepwise entry mechanism. The results show that the categories “no navy” 
FIGure 17
Crisis Characteristics Frequencies
CrIsIs CHaraCTerIsTICs No NaVY usN oNlY usN-usmC
usN & 
oTHer 
ForCes
all ForCes
Gravity of threat 2 Low-level threat 54/40.3 9/39.1 9/56.3 5/23.8 10/32.3
Territorial or influence 63/47 9/39.1 3/18.8 7/33.3 12/38.7
Grave threat 17/12.7 5/21.7 4/25 9/42.9 9/29
Gravity of threat 3 Low-level threat 54/40.3 9/39.1 9/56.3 5/23.8 10/32.3
Territorial threat 46/34.3 7/30.4 2/12.5 3/14.3 0/0
Threat to influence 17/12.7 2/8.7 1/6.3 4/19 12/38.7
Grave threat 17/12.7 5/21.7 4/25 9/42.9 9/29
Issues 2 1–2 non-Mil-Sec 23/16.9 3/13.6 3/18.8 2/9.5 9/29
1 Mil-Sec 66/48.5 6/27.3 7/43.8 2/9.5 4/12.9
2 issues incl. Mil-Sec or 3+ 47/34.6 13/59.1 6/37.5 17/81 18/58.1
Violence No violence 33/24.3 6/26.1 5/31.3 4/19 6/19.4
Minor clashes 43/31.6 5/21.7 4/25 4/19 11/35.5
Major clashes 48/35.3 2/8.7 2/12.5 6/28.6 7/22.6
War 12/8.8 10/43.5 5/31.3 7/33.3 7/22.6
Geostrategic salience Subsystem only 118/86.8 17/73.9 11/68.8 14/66.7 9/23.1
Global system 18/13.26 6/26.1 5/31.3 7/33.3 22/71
Geographic location Not important 69/50.7 6/26.1 2/12.5 6/28.6 3/9.7
Important 67/49.3 17/73.9 14/87.5 15/71.4 28/90.3
Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”
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and “UsN-UsMC Team” are dominant in crises concerning one single military-security  
issue.
The Exp(B) value suggests that the highest category of issues correlates with responses 
involving the air Force; however, it fails to meet the significance requirements. No 
clear deployment pattern for “all Forces” response is visible. “No Navy” is dominant 
in the first three categories of violence when “war” serves as reference category and 
“all Forces” as baseline. although not significant, the negative or close-to-1 results 
suggest that all forces are more likely in lower levels of violence than the other service 
combinations. once the baseline and reference category are reversed, all military forces 
combinations are more likely in a setting marked by a war level of violence than by no 
naval deployment. While the Exp(B) values are fairly similar, the combination with 
the air Force shows the strongest correlation. This suggests that high levels of violence 
generally encourage all types of U.s. military interventions and that different military 
intervention strategies are better explained by looking at the issues of the crises. Neither 
the gravity of the threat nor the issue of the crisis seems to influence the deployment of 
“all Forces,” suggesting that other considerations, such as the importance of the crisis to 
the United states, determine the strength of the response.
FIGure 18
Model Crisis Characteristics 1a: Servicetype2, Stepwise Multinomial Regression
CaTeGorY No NaVY usN-usmC Team
usN&oTHer  
ForCes 
all ForCes
1–2 issues 0.802 0.653 0.248 bl
1 Mil-Sec issue 5.577*** 3.446* 0.536 bl
2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+ rf rf rf bl
No violence 3.522* 1.079 0.982 bl
Minor clashes 2.218 0.428 0.462 bl
Major clashes 3.534* 0.272 1.048 bl
War rf rf rf bl
1–2 issues bl rf rf rf
1 Mil-Sec issue bl 0.760 0.311 0.144***
2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+ bl 1.229 3.233 0.803
No violence bl rf rf rf
Minor clashes bl 0.630 0.747 1.588
Major clashes bl 0.251** 1.063 0.996
War bl 3.265** 3.586* 3.522*
N = 224 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R² = 0.233 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category 
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When the independent “issues 2” is analyzed alone, employing a simple multinomial 
regression model, the correlation between the highest category and naval deploy-
ments including the air Force shows a strong and significant value of 4.250. a model 
testing the variable “violence” alone shows very similar results, but the Exp(B) values 
for war change to more pronounced differences between the services, with “UsN & 
other Forces” displaying the strongest correlation, followed by seaborne forces, and 
“all Forces” having the lowest correlation. violence and issues correlate significantly, 
although not very high, at r = 0.227. a simple frequency analysis reveals that a war 
level of violence is dominant in crises involving “2 incl. mil/3+ issues,” while crises 
concerning “one mil-sec issue” concurred eighteen times when no violence was pres-
ent, twenty-six times for minor violence, thirty-one times for major violence, and 
fourteen times for war-level violence. entries of “1–2 issues” rarely coincide in war-
level violence (twice) but rather take place in nonviolent settings (sixteen) and minor 
clashes (thirteen).
In trying to explain the results, I took a closer look at the type of mission (N = 46) 
and the strength of naval deployment (N = 73) where the information was available. 
Because of the small N values, only frequencies can be presented. For the lowest issues 
category, “1–2 issues,” six responses took place in the form of shows of force and two as 
Neos. For “mil-sec issues,” three were contingent positioning/reconnaissances, four 
were Neos, and two were shows of force, while for the highest issue categories, combat 
(five) and show of force (eight) were dominant. In general, a show of force is the most 
frequent type of mission, but given the absence of combat activity in lower-level crises, 
this supports the assumption of a graver threat presented by crises involving multiple 
issues. looking at the strength of the naval deployment, the two variables increase 
simultaneously. For the lowest issues category, deployments with no Cvs are most fre-
quent; conversely, for the highest issue category, deployments with two or more Cvs are 
most likely. Blechman and Kaplan had found a correlation between the use of aircraft 
carriers and the importance of violence.2 examining the “eyeball” correlations (that 
is, those apparent on quick inspection) from the frequencies, aircraft carriers were not 
overwhelmingly more frequent in war levels of violence. The same was observed for the 
involvement of amphibious forces.
While the variable “gravity of threat 2” had been excluded from the previous model, the 
frequency analysis shows that maritime forces are mostly deployed in crises where ter-
ritory is threatened, while “all Forces” deployed only when a threat to influence is pres-
ent. This encourages a distinction between the two categories. surprisingly, territorial 
crises never triggered the deployment of all U.s. military services. Following the separa-
tion of cases by the newly introduced distinction (no cases for territorial threats and 
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all forces), no analysis was possible with the variable “servicetype 1” or “servicetype 2.” 
Therefore, the variable “UsN-UsMC Team” was employed as dependent variable. 
This time, the stepwise regression included all three independent variables. The find-
ings clearly demonstrate the dominance of maritime forces only among the military 
responses in crises posing a “threat to territory.” The likelihood of the deployment of 
naval forces increases with a “territorial threat,” by 7.567, although “no naval involve-
ment” is even more likely, with a factor of 14.915. Thus while the United states overall is 
reluctant to become engaged in territorial threats with military forces, seaborne forces 
are the tool of choice if a military response is decided on. There is a predictable outcome 
FIGure 19
Model Crisis Characteristics 1b: USNUSMCTEAM, Stepwise Multinomial Regression
CaTeGorY No NaVY usN-usmC Team
usN&oTHer ForCes  
(INCl. all ForCes)
Low-level threat 3.795** 3.589* bl
Territorial threat 14.915*** 7.567** bl
Threat to influence 0.884 0.475 bl
Grave threat rf rf bl
1–2 issues 1.462 1.105 bl
1 Mil-Sec issue 8.022*** 5.333*** bl
2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+ rf rf bl
No violence 3.445** 1.094 bl
Minor clashes 2.340 0.452 bl
Major clashes 3.427*** 0.265* bl
War rf rf bl
Low-level threat bl rf rf
Territorial threat bl 0.536 0.254***
Threat to influence bl 0.569 4.294***
Grave threat bl 1.057 3.445**
1–2 issues bl rf rf
1 Mil-Sec issue bl 0.880 0.182***
2 incl. Mil-Sec or 3+ bl 1.323 1.462
No violence bl rf rf
Minor clashes bl 0.609 1.472
Major clashes bl 0.244** 1.005
War bl 3.150** 3.445*
N = 224 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R² = 0.347 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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associated with the “threat to influence” category. It can be assumed that in such crises 
the United states was the actor coded as perceiving a threat to its influence. In this mod-
el, the threat variable also suggests that out of the military forces, seaborne forces are 
more likely to be deployed in low-threat crises, compared to stronger responses includ-
ing the air Force and army.
The second half of the analysis with “no Navy” as baseline does not show significant 
results for seaborne forces, because they are very similar to “no naval involvement,” 
as the first part of the analysis reveals. The inclusion of the threat level in this model 
suggests that this variable is likely to be influenced by seaborne responses and “stronger 
involvements” not distinguishing between the air Force and army, in particular for 
low-level threats. overall, the hypotheses concerning the gravity of threat and the level 
of violence can be partially confirmed—seaborne responses are more likely in crises 
characterized by lower threats but more violence. The hypothesis regarding the issue of 
the crisis has to be rejected for now, since “UsN-UsMC” responses do not seem to be 
correlated to low-stakes issues.
Case Study 1a: Threat to Influence and All Forces. The U.s. intervention in the Do-
minican republic in 1965 is representative of a large military forces deployment, in this 
instance to control events in, and to maintain american influence over, the Western 
Hemisphere. armed and authorized to return fire, the troops were the first combat-
ready U.s. force to enter a latin american country in almost forty years.3
a civil war broke out in the Dominican republic on 24 april 1965, when a junta, which 
had deposed Juan Bosch in a military coup in 1963, was itself overthrown. The counter-
revolution wanted to restore constitutional government and Bosch to power. The United 
states was mostly concerned about the possibility of a second Cuba; an anti-american 
regime would limit the influence of the United states and hinder its predominance 
while potentially providing the soviet Union (or Ussr) with a new ally in Washing-
ton’s own backyard.4 But the foremost official justification was the threat to the lives of 
american citizens.
shortly after the outbreak of the crisis, the U.s. embassy requested the evacuation of 
citizens of the United states and other nations. The UsN was ready to move immediate-
ly and placed a task force—including the helicopter carrier Uss Boxer (lPH 4) and 1,500 
Marines—off the Dominican coast. on 27 april the evacuation operations began, with 
unarmed helicopters airlifting Marines into the capital to protect american citizens. 
Impediments to prompt evacuation led to an increase of U.s. troop strength ashore and 
a strengthening of the naval task force. supporting air Force tactical units were moved 
to the Caribbean area. after Marine forces and army units established a safety zone 
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and a safe corridor, refugees were also taken on board directly; by 2 May the Navy had 
evacuated a total of three thousand civilians.
The mission’s objective was extended to include the prevention of communist influence 
in the Dominican government. By 6 May the United states had twenty-two thousand 
men ashore and nine thousand afloat. The signing of an “act of Dominican reconcili-
ation” on 31 august 1965 ended the international crisis, with all sides agreeing on a 
moderate provisional president. according to siegel, U.s. naval forces did not begin to 
withdraw until 28 June 1966;5 Cable sets the final withdrawal on 20 september 1966.6
The need for this successful but expensive operation is disputed. a total of forty (the 
Department of Defense [DoD] counts thirty-eight) ships of the UsN were involved, 
including Boxer, the tank landing ship Wood County (lsT 1178), destroyer transport 
Ruchamkin (aPD 89), attack cargo ships Yancey (aKa 93) and Rankin (aKa 103), and 
the dock landing ships Fort Snelling (lsD 30) and Raleigh (lPD 1). The evacuation op-
eration mainly served to underline U.s. interest in the region by establishing a presence 
and showing determination not to allow a communist takeover.7
Case Study 1b: One Military-Security Issue and Seaborne Forces Only. The Turkish 
straits crisis in 1946 presented a threat to national security for Turkey and demonstrated 
U.s. naval commitment in the Mediterranean to support countries struggling against 
communist influence—as after the second World War it had promised to do. soviet 
activities mounted a growing threat to eastern europe in 1946. When a crisis broke out 
between Turkey and the soviet Union, this commitment was put to the test. But before 
the outbreak, an important diplomatic event took place: in april 1946 the battleship 
Uss Missouri (BB 63) departed the United states for Turkey carrying the remains of 
the deceased Turkish ambassador to the United states. Missouri was the ship on board 
which Japan had surrendered at the end of the war; sending it was a clear demonstration 
of american support for Turkey and a prelude to a permanent presence in the Mediter-
ranean. Besides visiting Turkey, the battleship also underscored the U.s. commitment to 
greece. Missouri demonstrated the unique role of the Navy versus those of the air Force 
and army. The vessel could be sent to the vicinity without a real commitment, but if nec-
essary this political use of force could promptly be converted into a military use of force.
The Turkish straits crisis was triggered by two soviet demands in august 1946; the 
soviet Union sought naval bases and joint control over the straits. simultaneously, the 
soviets increased their naval activity in the region. as a direct response, the United 
states expanded its own naval activity. after a visit to lisbon, Uss Franklin D. Roosevelt 
(Cv 42) entered the Mediterranean on 8 august. The presence of the world’s largest 
aircraft carrier was intended to demonstrate the american commitment to Turkey in re-
sponse to a soviet buildup on the Turkish border and to signal concern about increased 
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soviet naval activity in the Black sea. While the carrier did not visit Turkey, its pres-
ence sent a clear message of Washington’s intentions to resist soviet expansion. The 
deployment of an aircraft carrier offered the possibility of U.s. support on the mainland 
through power projection ashore, should the soviet Union invade Turkey. This crisis 
shows the value of seaborne forces in a military-security issue crisis.
The advantage of f lexibility allows observing the events, yet f lexing muscles and exert-
ing influence. The United states was able to demonstrate a commitment while staying 
out of the way in case no direct action was necessary to solve the crisis. The deploy-
ment of stronger forces would likely have been interpreted as a direct involvement on 
the part of the United states and would have heightened tensions and anxiety. at the 
same time, it was a perfect occasion to begin the permanent stationing of U.s. ships in 
the Mediterranean. Previously, U.s. naval forces in the Mediterranean had consisted 
mostly of destroyers, cruisers, and auxiliary vessels. soviet power and influence had ex-
panded after the end of 1945 and posed a threat to the strategically important Mediterra-
nean, a favorable environment for the exploitation of the diplomatic advantages of naval 
forces. although the soviet Union downplayed the importance of the american naval 
buildup, the permanent U.s. presence—announced in september 1946—was important 
to conveying a message of immediate readiness should any country need support against 
communist influence.8
Case Study 1c: No Violence and Seaborne Forces. The Nam Tha crisis of 1962 illus-
trates the deployment of naval forces in crises not involving violence. In May 1962 an at-
tack by the laotian communist insurgent group known as the Pathet lao on the laotian 
town of Nam Tha triggered a crisis for the United states and neighboring Thailand. The 
laotian government forces did not engage and instead retreated. Thailand, fearing a 
Pathet lao advance, strengthened its border with laos. The United states sent the sev-
enth Fleet to the gulf of Thailand on standby status and deployed Marine forces already 
in Thailand for exercises to bolster that nation’s defenses against laotian communists 
should a request be received from Thailand. all U.s. forces in the Pacific and at home 
were put on alert. The aircraft carrier Valley Forge (Cv 45) assisted in the Marine land-
ing in the gulf of Bangkok, and the Hancock (Cv 19) group took position off Da Nang, 
south vietnam. The deployment of the seventh Fleet halted the Pathet lao initiative 
and, together with political pressure, brought the parties into negotiations. The crisis 
ended with tacit understandings between Thailand and the United states, as well as 
between Thailand and North vietnam, manifested on 12 June 1962 when three laotian 
princes agreed to participate in a coalition government. The United states had deployed 
naval forces to demonstrate its opposition to events in laos in what edward Marolda 
considers a show of force.9 This example mirrors the pattern of show-of-force missions 
in nonviolent settings.
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Regression Analysis Crisis Characteristics 2
The hypothesis assumes a stronger american involvement the greater the geostrategic 
importance of the crisis, measured with the two variables “geostrategic salience” (global 
versus subsystem) and “geographic location” (important versus not important). “eye-
ball” correlations suggest that the greater the threat to the global system, the more likely 
the United states is to become involved with all categories of military forces, while the 
importance of the geographic location more generally determines whether the United 
states becomes involved at all. 
The regression results confirm the observations from the frequencies, above. If geostra-
tegic salience is low (subsystem only), the United states is more likely to respond with 
lower levels of force, with “no Navy” and “UsN only” being the two dominant catego-
ries. This finding is consistent with a realist interpretation of U.s. intervention decisions 
and motivations. geographic location shows a significant result only for “no naval in-
volvement,” although the Exp(B) values suggest that the deployment of the UsN and air 
Force is more likely in crises in regions of relatively low importance to the United states 
than a deployment of all forces. When the baseline and reference category are reversed, 
“UsN-UsMC” responses show the highest likelihood of deployment, with 6.382, even 
higher than “all Forces.” geographic location represents U.s. interest in the region, but 
geostrategic salience is a more accurate measure of the potential impact the crisis may 
have on the global system. Thus the hypothesis can be confirmed.
a closer look reveals that seventy-eight of the crises posing threats to subsystems oc-
curred in geographic locations of low interest to the United states and ninety-three in 
geographic locations of high interest. Thus a threat to the subsystem is almost as likely 
FIGure 20
Model Crisis Characteristics 2: Servicetype1, Stepwise Multinomial Regression
CaTeGorY No NaVY usN oNlY usN-usmC
usN&oTHer 
ForCes 
all ForCes
Loc not important 5.362** 2.025 0.861 2.497 bl
Loc important rf rf rf rf bl
Subsystem only 11.319*** 6.203*** 5.485** 4.194** bl
Global system rf rf rf rf bl
Loc not important bl rf rf rf rf
Loc important bl 2.648* 6.382** 2.147 5.362**
Subsystem only bl rf rf rf rf
Global system bl 1.825 2.064 2.699* 11.319***
N = 227 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R² = 0.247 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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to occur in a location of interest as in one of no interest. When the crisis poses a threat 
to the dominant or global system, the distribution is very different, with fifty-seven 
cases in high-importance regions and only eight in less important ones.
Case Study 1d: Threat to Global System and All Forces. The several incidents involving 
Berlin during the Cold War are examples of crises posing threats to the global system 
and of U.s. responses including all military services. The Berlin Blockade of 1948 was 
one of the first major escalations between the United states and the soviet Union. after 
World War II, Berlin had been divided into american, British, French, and soviet zones. 
The announcement by the three Western governments that they planned to integrate 
their zones in germany triggered a crisis with the soviets, in the form of a soviet block-
ade that stopped all transport to and from Berlin through soviet-occupied east germa-
ny. The West responded with an unprecedented airlift to provision the city by air, called 
operation vittles, in which the United states deployed all available transport aircraft.
The UsN moved a carrier battle group (I was unable to determine which) to the North 
atlantic in reaction to the crisis. The contribution of the Navy to the airlift was both di-
rect and indirect. From the beginning the Navy provided airlifts and fuel in support of 
the air Force. But only in late october 1948, when the U.s. air Force needed support in 
order to meet the demand, did the U.s. Navy become directly involved. Negotiations be-
tween the soviet Union and the Western powers extended over several months until the 
soviets finally agreed to end the blockade under the condition that the United states, 
United Kingdom, and France lift their trade restrictions against east germany. The last 
day of the blockade was 12 May 1949. The end of the crisis left germany split into two 
states—the Federal republic of germany and the german Democratic republic.10
Crisis Characteristics Hypotheses Results Summary
Table 4-1 summarizes the findings for the four crisis-characteristics hypotheses. 
Crisis Actor Models
The influence of crisis actor characteristics on seaborne crisis response is analyzed with 
the help of four hypotheses: the number of involved actors, the involvement of the United 
Nations, the stability of the actors, and the attitude toward the american involvement.11 
TaBle 4-1
Hypothesis 1a: Low Threat Mixed results
Hypothesis 1b: Low Stake Not confirmed
Hypothesis 1c: Violence Mixed results
Hypothesis 1d: Geostrategic Interest Confirmed
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The models capture variables at both the macro (system) and micro (actor) levels and 
seaborne crisis response serves as both a dependent and an independent variable.
The two hypotheses under Crisis actor Model 1 assume that on the one hand, a greater 
number of actors leads to a stronger U.s. response, while on the other hand, low or no 
UN involvement triggers deployments by seaborne forces only (see sidebar 2).
SIdEBAR 2
The variables in the hypotheses are expressed as follows.
(6) x6 = number of crisis actors (cractr).
This variable was measured with the number of crisis actors as provided by 
the ICB data. 
(7) x7 = global organization organ most active in crisis (globorg,  
globorg2).
The “globorg” variable from the ICB was transformed into the new vari-
able “globorg2” and is divided into three categories: no UN involvement, 
low-level UN organ (general activity/Secretary-General/General Assembly) 
involvement, and Security Council involvement. 
(8) x8 = stability (stability).
The variable “stability” was created by combining the two ICB2 actor vari-
ables “government stability” and “societal unrest.” Possible categories 
include “normal,” when both variables remained stable; “societal instabil-
ity,” an increase in societal unrest with governmental stability normal; and, 
conversely, “governmental instability,” a decrease in governmental stability 
with no change in societal unrest. Finally, the most unstable category is 
measured by an increase in instability for both variables: “governmental 
and societal instability.”
(9) y4 = attitude to U.S. involvement (usfavr, usfavr2).
This variable measures the crisis actors’ attitudes to U.S. activity, from 
the ICB2 data, with the possible values “unfavorable,” “neutral,” and 
“favorable.”
In Crisis actor Model 2, greater stability is assumed to favor the deployment of seaborne 
forces only (see sidebar 2).
FIGure 21
Crisis Actor Model 1
x7 = UN involvement
H2a: Number of Actors x6 = number of actors
H2b: UN Involvement
Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response
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Crisis actor Model 3 analyzes the hypothesis that the deployment of seaborne crisis 
response forces only will lead to more favorable perceptions of U.s. involvement (see 
sidebar 2). 
The table in figure 24 presents the frequencies for the actor variables, with the exception 
of the metric variable “number of actors.”
The majority of “UsN only” responses occurred in crisis settings with no or low-level 
UN involvement, while for all other service combinations, deployments coinciding 
with United Nations security Council (UNsC) activity are most common. overall, the 
H2d: Perception of U.S.
Involvement
x = U.S. seaborne 
crisis response
Y4 = attitude to U.S. 
activity
FIGure 23
Crisis Actor Model 3
H2c: Stability x8 = stability
Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response
FIGure 22
Crisis Actor Model 2
FIGure 24
Crisis Actors Frequencies
aCTor CHaraCTerIsTICs No NaVY usN oNlY usN-usmC
usN & oTHer 
ForCes
all ForCes
UN involvement 
(system level)
No UN involvement 49/36 10/43.5 6/40 2/9.5 4/12.9
Low-level UN 
involvement
26/29.5 8/34.8 1/6.7 7/33.3 7/22.6
Security Council 61/63.8 5/21.7 8/53.3 12/57.1 20/64.5
Stability 
(actor level)
Governmental 
instability
18/7.4 4/7 3/8.8 9/13.8 5/5.1
Governmental and 
societal instability
34/13.9 10/17.5 6/17.6 5/7.7 16/16.2
Societal instability 26/10.7 14/24.6 11/32.4 13/20 10/10.1
Both normal 166/68 29/50.9 14/41.2 38/58.5 68/68.7
Attitude toward 
U.S. activity (actor 
level)
Favorable 124/51.9 24/49 17/54.8 25/44.6 42/50.6
Neutral 17/7.1 6/12.2 1/3.2 6/10.7 2/2.4
Unfavorable 98/41 19/38.8 13/41.9 25/44.6 39/47
Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”
138  the newport papers
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:06 NP_39 Chapter4.indd January 29, 2013 10:13 AM 
United states seems to be more likely to respond if the crisis actors experience neither 
societal nor governmental unrest. If the United states deploys in crises with societal un-
rest, seaborne forces are more likely to be deployed alone than in combination with the 
air Force or army. The frequencies for the attitudes toward U.s. activity show no clear 
pattern (all cases where the United states was coded as “crisis actor” or as “inactive” 
were treated as missing data). Perceptions of american activity without any military 
service involvement or with just naval forces are slightly more neutral or least likely to 
be unfavorable.
“UN involvement” and the “number of crisis actors” are measured at the system level 
and are combined in a stepwise multinomial regression model. The hypothesis regard-
ing the influence of instability, measured at the actor level, is analyzed in a simple 
regression model. Unfortunately, the dependent variable “attitude towards U.s. activity” 
did not generate any significant results. The attitude of the actors will be further evalu-
ated in the section looking at crisis outcomes with an introduction of a new variable. To 
understand better the impact of the often-claimed limited decisiveness, it will be inter-
esting to see how actors’ satisfaction with the outcome correlates with attitude toward 
U.s. activity.
Regression Analysis Actor Characteristics 1
In figure 25, the event “all Forces” is chosen as baseline, and both “no Navy” and 
“UsN-UsMC” are significantly negatively correlated with the number of actors. “UsN 
only” and “UsN & other Forces” suggest the same direction but fail to achieve significant 
results. When “no Navy” functions as baseline, all military service combinations are more 
likely the higher the number of crisis actors, with “UsN & other Forces” and “all Forces” 
FIGure 25
Model Actor Characteristics 1: Servicetype2, Stepwise Multinomial Regression
CaTeGorY No NaVY usN usN-usmC
usN&oTHer 
ForCes
all ForCes
Number of actors 0.486*** 0.808 0.493* 0.964 bl
No UN inv 2.755* 8.702*** 2.587 0.812 bl
Low-level UN inv 1.124 4.371** 0.330 1.650 bl
UNSC inv rf rf rf rf bl
Number of actors bl 1.664** 1.015 1.985*** 2.059***
No UN inv bl rf rf rf rf
Low-level UN inv bl 1.232 0.312 4.984* 2.452
UNSC inv bl 0.317* 1.065 3.394 2.755*
N = 226 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R² = 0.215 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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showing the highest correlations. The category “UsN-UsMC” shows a value close to 1, 
suggesting no influence, but because of the lack of significance this cannot be interpreted.
The most telling outcome of the model is the increase of the probable odds by a factor of 
8.7 for “UsN only” responses in crises with “no UN involvement” and 4.371 with “low 
level UN involvement.” There is an even greater likelihood than no naval involvement at 
all compared to “all Forces.” “all Forces” responses, and even more so the combination 
with the air Force, correlate highly with “security Council” involvement. While the 
Exp(B) for the air Force combination does not generate a significant result in the com-
bined model, a simple regression analysis with “UN involvement” as the only indepen-
dent shows significant values for “UsN & other Forces” and UNsC involvement.
overall, both hypotheses can be confirmed. The results suggest that the higher the 
number of crisis actors, the stronger the american response. For the UN activity, naval 
forces alone correlate with “no UN involvement” and “low UN involvement,” while “all 
Forces” responses concurred mainly with security Council involvement.
While low or no UN involvement might suggest that a crisis was of low importance, it 
can also suggest that the United states was hesitant to send a strong force without some 
form of legitimization. running of cross-tabulation calculations indicated “low level 
threats” occurred thirty times with “no UN involvement,” twenty-three times with “low 
level UN involvement,” and thirty-five times with “UNsC involvement.” as expected, 
“no UN involvement” was least likely in gravely threatening crises, but the UNsC re-
sponded to all three threat categories about equally. as for issues, “UNsC involvement” 
is most likely in the highest category, while “no UN involvement” is most frequent in 
crises concerning one security/military issue. But overall, no or low UN involvement is 
not a synonym for low importance. The strength of the UsN response does not seem to 
be influenced by UN activity either. “eyeball” correlation shows that a force strength 
of more than one Cv is also frequent with no or low UN involvement. The type of mis-
sion is a better predictor. Combat is most common when the UNsC is involved, while 
reconnaissance/contingent positioning coincides with no UN activity. The frequency of 
reconnaissance/contingent positioning lends further support to the idea of expressing 
concern by observing events from a distance without becoming directly involved and 
attracting only limited global attention.
Case Study 2b: Low UN Involvement and USN-Only Response. Trouble in Nicaragua 
and guatemala in early November 1960 led to the deployment of U.s. naval forces but 
low UN involvement. Cuba was suspected of supporting an invasion of Nicaragua by 
exiles and a revolt in guatemala. In response to requests by both countries, the United 
states deployed naval and air surveillance. The U.s. Navy was sent to patrol the nations’ 
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Caribbean coasts and to stand by in case of a possible invasion from mid-November 
until 7 December 1960. Two aircraft carriers, Uss Shangri-La (Cv 38) and Wasp 
(Cv 18), as well as eight other surface ships, formed the naval patrol force. They kept 
outside the three-mile limit and watched for suspicious vessels heading for the two 
countries. The naval forces were withdrawn after confirmation from Nicaragua and 
guatemala that help was no longer needed and that the crisis had ended for both ac-
tors.12 This episode serves as a good example of the flexibility, readiness, and subtlety 
of naval forces—short reaction time, ability to wait and see, and effortless withdrawal 
when no longer needed.
Regression Analysis Actor Characteristics 2
The next model analyzes the impact of the actors’ stability on seaborne crisis response at 
the actor level.
The suggested frequency distribution is confirmed in the regression analysis. The odds 
of “UsN only,” “UsN-UsMC,” and “UsN & other Forces” are increased by a factor of 
3.3, 5.3, and 2.3, respectively, in crises characterized by an increase in societal unrest 
but no change in government conditions, with “all Forces” as baseline. The results for 
“only government instability,” although positive for “no Navy” and the seaborne forces, 
present significant results only for the combination with the air Force. The results sug-
gest that “all Forces” responses are most likely when both factors remain normal, while 
seaborne forces (and especially the Marine Corps) deploy when an increase in societal 
unrest is present, in combination with the air Force in case of increased governmental 
instability. The low R2 value suggests that the association is rather weak and that many 
other factors influencing the dependent variable remain unaccounted for.
FIGure 26
Model Actor Characteristics 2: Servicetype1, Stepwise Multinomial Regression
CaTeGorY No NaVY usN usN-usmC
usN&oTHer 
ForCes 
all ForCes
Gov. instability 1.475 1.876 2.914 3.221** bl
Gov. & soc. 
instability
0.870 1.466 1.821 0.559 bl
Societal instability 1.065 3.283** 5.343*** 2.326* bl
Both normal rf rf rf rf bl
N = 499 Sig. Model = 0.007 Pseudo-R² = 0.057 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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overall, the mixed results encourage further analysis, but for now the hypothesis that 
the deployment of seaborne forces only is more likely when there is no decrease in sta-
bility cannot be confirmed.
Case Study 2c: Different Forms of Unrest within One Crisis. Because this variable 
is measured at the actor level, different actors within one crisis experience different 
changes. The Congo civil war crisis of 1998 can be cited as an example. Tensions in 
the Democratic republic of the Congo (DrC) had been growing, and on 29 July 1998 
President laurent-Désiré Kabila announced the expulsion of all foreign troops and 
of his chief military adviser, a rwandan Tutsi, triggering a crisis for rwanda. shortly 
thereafter fighting erupted, and the DrC accused rwandan forces of aggression. 
angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad backed Kabila, but his former ally rwanda 
received support from Uganda. The violent conflict triggered crises for the DrC, 
Uganda, angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Chad. after months of fighting, the gov-
ernments involved in the war signed a peace agreement, joined shortly after by the two 
principal rebel groups. violence erupted again in February 2000, and attempts to hold 
a summit were unsuccessful. When Kabila was assassinated in February 2002, his son 
Joseph inherited the presidency. In February he met rwandan president Paul Kagame 
in Washington, D.C., marking the first step toward peace talks, while rwandan and 
Ugandan troops retreated, in a gesture of goodwill. on 30 July 2002, after prolonged 
negotiations, rwanda and the DrC signed a final peace agreement in south africa. 
according to the ICB there is evidence for U.s. covert involvement in training troops 
on both sides.
The UsN was also engaged in preparation for a planned noncombatant evacuation 
operation. From 10 to 16 august 1998, Uss Saipan (lHa 2) and the 22nd MeU(soC) 
stood ready in operation autumn shelter for a possible evacuation of the ameri-
can embassy and U.s. citizens from Kinshasa, Congo. In the event, the Neo was not 
required and was canceled on 16 august. While for five of the crisis actors—angola, 
rwanda, Namibia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe—neither a change in political stability nor 
societal unrest was noted, Chad experienced an increase in societal unrest, and Congo 
suffered from both political instability and societal unrest. The UsN was engaged in 
operations in Congo, the crisis actor experiencing the most turmoil, not Chad.
Crisis Actor Hypotheses Results
Two out of the four hypotheses were confirmed by the regression analyses (see table 
4-2). The measurement of political stability needs further evaluation and results before 
rejecting the hypothesis.
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Part I Conclusion: Crisis Characteristics
While knowledge of a “trigger” would point to the initial reason for the crisis breakout, 
the gravity of the threat assesses the whole situation. To have a thorough picture for 
assessing the stakes of the crisis, the variable “gravity of threat” was introduced. While 
a violent trigger would suggest a need for immediate action, a crisis posing a grave 
threat, above all else, calls for a strong response. overall the analyses confirmed that 
a crisis posing a “grave threat” is more likely to trigger force responses stronger than 
the dispatch of seaborne forces. The air Force dominates crises characterized by the 
most extreme threats. The gravity of the threat captures the more realist component of 
the level of the crisis, since a grave threat has the potential to destabilize and disrupt a 
country and thereby spill over to other countries or affect whole regions. This in turn 
might trigger responses by other actors. Where the gravity of the situation requires a 
firm response and the dispatch of ground troops seems too risky, airpower seems to be 
the best choice. even in situations where the time factor might not be especially critical, 
the dispatch of ground troops could lose too much time, whereas air forces are capable 
of striking faster.
When a crisis poses a threat to influence, it is deemed important enough to send ground 
troops for, because it can be assumed that in most cases the influence of the superpower 
has been threatened. This finding evokes the realist school of thought in decisions about 
the intensity of engagement. While a grave threat may not threaten U.s. interests, a 
threat to influence most likely does so. Thus, grave threat crises need forceful interven-
tion, but in the form of airpower, while threats to influence trigger the strongest display 
of U.s. force. For the most part “low gravity threats” do not trigger military involve-
ment when compared to no naval involvement, but when assessed against stronger force 
levels, seaborne forces responded more frequently to low-gravity threat crises. Thus the 
U.s. force level is graduated to the gravity of the threat.
Interesting to note is the dominance of seaborne responses to territorial threats within 
military responses generally. since territorial threats are difficult to resolve, the United 
states might frequently decide to minimize any involvement. But if a military response 
is desired, naval forces can offer advantages. From a coercion-theory perspective, a 
limited level of force is most effective before a threat is carried out, for coercion is 
TaBle 4-2
Hypothesis 2a: Number of Actors Confirmed 
Hypothesis 2b: UN Involvement Confirmed
Hypothesis 2c: Political Stability Mixed results
Hypothesis 2d: Attitude to U.S. Activity No results
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superfluous if a country has already been overrun. In the case of territorial risk, imme-
diate action is appropriate to deter further escalation.13 again, the UsN is a ready force 
and has the ability to stand by and adapt to developments ashore, should the United 
states choose to send military forces at all. If the deterrence or compellence option fails, 
naval forces can readily switch to a more forceful posture. “low-level threats” suggest 
susceptibility to deterrence to prevent continued escalation because of the lower mag-
nitude and depth of conflict. The connection between deterrence and “low-level,” or 
“territorial,” threats deserves more exploration.
The second hypothesis assumed frequent seaborne activity in “low-issue” crises. The 
results show UsN-UsMC forces mostly deployed in crises concerning “one military-
security issue,” the highest of the issue categories. However, in crises with more than 
one issue, naval forces are not deployed alone. I had expected the U.s. Navy to be dis-
patched mostly in crises characterized by a political-diplomatic issue and not in high-
politics situations. Nevertheless, it can be argued that because only one single issue is 
present, albeit one of the highest importance, the crisis is more structured and the issue 
requiring resolution clearer. george finds that the clarity of the objective favors coercive 
diplomacy.14
alternatively, the explanation of no visible correlation between seaborne forces only and 
low-issue crises may lie with the vast arsenal of tools the United states can choose from 
to react to diplomatic crises besides the military services. examples include the diplo-
matic corps, foreign-aid network, and Defense Department civilians, and so on. While 
in the nineteenth century the United states had to rely primarily on naval forces to 
conduct diplomacy, today there are many other sources at the government’s disposal.15 
This view is supported by the correlation between “no naval involvement” and different 
issue categories. For crises involving security-military issues, however, the Navy is still 
preferred over the other military response tools.
The time factor is likely to play an important role as well. Military-security issues might 
require immediate responses or long-lasting deployments, both of which seaborne 
forces can offer. The results of this analysis again reveal unexpected findings for the 
ground forces. Together with “no Navy” they correlate positively with “1 to 2 issue” cri-
ses exclusive of military-security aspects, suggesting their involvement in “low-politics 
crises.” In high-stakes crises, the “UsaF” combination is dominant and the deployment 
of seaborne forces even more likely than “all Forces.” High-salience crises are said to 
be longer lasting and more difficult to resolve; this might explain the reluctance to put 
boots on the ground when no threat to american national interests is present.
The gravity of the threat and the stakes of the crisis do not include information about 
the level of violence. “UsN & other Forces” is most frequent in the highest category of 
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violence when “war-level violence” is experienced. When the independent variable is 
analyzed individually, ground troops show the weakest correlation among all military 
forces for the highest level of violence. In the combined model, the seaborne forces show 
the weakest correlation, but overall the difference between the service combinations is 
not substantial enough to confirm reluctance to put boots on the ground. Nevertheless, 
results also indicate that violence also does not call for a more forceful response. It is 
important to keep in mind that the deployment of ground troops is not a synonym for 
combat actions. For example, military training and providing security are important 
army functions. all services can offer advantages: the UsN can adopt a wait-and-see 
posture, the air Force can exert more coercion power with minimal risk, and ground 
troops can offer decisiveness. as previously stated, violent crises bear a greater risk of 
third parties becoming directly involved, especially in the form of ground confronta-
tions. often third parties remain aloof when a crisis has become too violent, as is often 
the case in civil wars or ethnic conflicts. While a certain tendency to prefer airborne 
forces as coercion tool when violence is very high is visible, the results are not as clear-
cut as anticipated. The positive correlation with seaborne forces and violence can be 
interpreted as an attempt to exert at least some influence by deploying near a crisis loca-
tion while staying out of the immediate danger zone. after observing the events ashore, 
the wait-and-see approach can quickly be converted to the use of force.
overall, the first part of the crises characteristics analysis revealed many results counter 
to my previous assumptions. In particular, the high frequency of use of ground forces in 
“low-stakes” crises and the use of seaborne forces for high-violence or territorial threats 
point to interesting research questions. The issues at stake and the gravity of threat are 
of foremost importance for the actors directly involved; thus when the United states 
intervenes as a third party, it is likely that other considerations, such as U.s. national 
interests, will exert a greater influence on the crisis management technique.
The results of the next hypothesis, controlling for geostrategic importance, show more 
clear-cut and predictable results. The realist school of thought and national interests 
suggest that a crisis of greater strategic significance to the United states triggers a 
stronger military response and thus a more robust commitment and signaling of inten-
tions. Crises merely affecting “subsystems” are most positively correlated with “no naval 
involvement” responses, followed by “UsN only,” “UsN-UsMC,” and “UsN & other 
Forces,” while “all Forces” dominates in “global system” crises. While this could point 
to the limited decisiveness of naval forces, crises affecting the global system are likely 
to be greater in magnitude and require forceful and dominant interventions. Thus, this 
point does not speak against the usefulness of seaborne forces but rather to the impor-
tance of using the right force for the task at hand. “all Forces” also responded frequently 
to crises located in important regions, although “UsN-UsMC” shows a slightly stronger 
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association to crises in these areas. This could point to the value of the UsN-UsMC 
team as a “go anywhere, do anything” force. The UsN deployment in regions of both 
low and high importance can be supported by the continuous global presence of naval 
forces. While the largest presence will be close to locations of interest to the United 
states, forward presence allows faster reactions anywhere.
overall, realist considerations seem to govern the decision-making process in choosing 
response tools for crises characterized by geostrategic importance. This is supported by 
Michael gilligan and stephen stedman’s statement that “for a realist, the location of a 
conflict plays a critical role in determining its importance because it plays a significant 
role in determining the degree of threat the conflict poses to a state’s vital interests. This 
relationship stands in sharp contrast to the humanitarian idealist model in which the 
location of the conflict should be largely irrelevant.”16
Part I Conclusion: Crisis Actors
The next part of the analysis focused on the crisis actors. The results confirmed earlier 
research, concluding that more crisis actors trigger stronger military responses by the 
United states and thus connote more complex crises. according to Meernik, crises 
involving more actors are of greater importance to U.s. national interests.17 Conflict 
resolution is more challenging when multiple actors are involved, because more than 
one party needs to be convinced or coerced and it becomes difficult to find common 
ground for agreement. Nevertheless, the differences between the service combinations 
are not very large.
The most convincing actors’ results regard the influence of UN activity. The results 
show that for the majority of “all Forces” responses the UN involvement had reached 
the security Council level. Naval forces alone are positively correlated with “no UN 
involvement” or “low-level UN involvement.” I note that “UsN only” responses are even 
more likely than “no naval involvement” for these two categories. This result supports 
the advantage of limited intrusiveness and subtlety, while flexing muscles. The dispatch 
of naval forces is more politically acceptable and offers a potentially coercive diplomatic 
tool. The ability to exert influence discreetly attracts less attention and thus less criti-
cism not only from other nations or the UN but also from Congress and the american 
public. Noninvolvement of the United Nations could also suggest a less important crisis. 
While there is a low statistical correlation between “no UN involvement” and the “grav-
ity of threat,” there is no linear relationship with UN activity. More convincing are the 
considerations of a careful legitimization of more forceful actions, the support of dip-
lomatic efforts, and the benefits of a wait-and-see approach. The findings also support 
ekatarina stepanova’s findings that often waiting for UNsC activity will cause the right 
moment for intervening to be lost.18
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The political-stability analysis revealed interesting yet inconclusive results. seaborne 
forces, especially with Marine Corps elements, dominate in crises with an increase in 
“societal unrest” but not in crises marked by “governmental instability.” The hypoth-
eses argue that lack of unity renders negotiations and thus conflict resolution more 
difficult. Presumably societal unrest need not influence a leadership’s ability to speak 
with one voice, whereas an increase in governmental instability would. “all Forces” 
responses have occurred most frequently either when an increase in both governmental 
and societal unrest was present or when both factors remained stable. To understand 
more fully the dynamics of the different service deployment combinations, it would be 
useful to control for the type of mission. Neos might be a frequent response to societal 
unrests and explain the dispatch of maritime and airborne forces. another possibility is 
the naval wait-and-see approach with only limited involvement, in an attempt to calm 
the situation down.19 In such cases, sending “UsN-UsMC” forces to the crisis location 
to show interest visibly off a coast can be a useful strategy. as previously said, conflict 
management works best between well identified entities. Thus the overall high fre-
quency of all types of american response when the stability remains constant points to 
a reluctance to become involved when conflict management is likely to be difficult and 
challenging.
The analysis regarding the last actor hypotheses did not reveal any significant results. 
The frequencies would suggest that “UsN only” responses are most likely viewed as 
“neutral” and least likely to be “unfavorable,” while the category “favorable” is very 
comparable among the different response forms. This would support that limited intru-
siveness is viewed favorably but that actors hope for a more forceful response on their 
behalf, though opponents express a less negative attitude toward this limited form of 
U.s. engagement.
The problem of all actor-level analysis is the uniform treatment of the naval variables. 
The UsN involvement is coded identically for every involved crisis actor, without con-
trolling exactly for the target country where the United states intervenes or the party 
with which the United states sides. Naval involvement is measured at the system level 
(the crisis as one entity), without accounting for differences at the macro level—within 
the crises and the actors. For example, a crisis can include five crisis actors. out of the 
five crisis actors the UsN might be involved in only one country, in the form of a Neo, 
but the current data treat all involved actors equally. Thus all five actors would be 
coded positively for UsN involvement and for a Neo mission. Controlling for the dif-
ference between ally and adversary of the United states and the resulting intervention/
nonintervention strategy for each actor could reveal important differences.
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We Move on the seas That We Control, Part II
assessing the empirical evidence—U.s. Involvement and 
Crisis outcomes
The correlation between U.s. involvement and seaborne crisis response is measured 
with the help of six hypotheses, analyzing the degree and effect of U.s. activity.1  
Depending on the hypotheses, seaborne crisis response serves as the dependent or 
independent variable. Because of high intercorrelation between the independent 
variables, all hypotheses will be analyzed in individual simple regression models (see 
sidebar 1).
U.s. Involvement Model 1 tests the hypothesis that the deployment of seaborne forces 
only is more likely in lower forms of U.s. involvement. The hypothesis for U.s. Involve-
ment Model 2 assumes that the effectiveness of american activity will be lower when 
only seaborne forces are deployed. U.s. Involvement Model 3 hypothesizes that the 
deployment of seaborne forces only is least likely in crises where U.s. direct military 
activity is the most effective. U.s. Involvement Model 4 analyzes whether in cases the 
United states deploys only seaborne forces, the contribution to the abatement is lower. 
U.s. Involvement Model 5 assumes that in crises where the United states is a direct 
actor, stronger force levels are deployed. Finally, U.s. Involvement Model 6 tests the 
hypothesis assuming that the deployment of seaborne forces only positively influences 
response readiness.
H3a: Form of U.S.
Involvement
x9 = content of
U.S. activity
Y = U.S. seaborne 
crisis response
FIGure 27
U.S. Involvement Model 1
150  the newport papers
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM 
SIdEBAR 1
The variables in the hypotheses are expressed mathematically as follows.
(1) x9 = content of U.S. activity (usinv, usinv2).
H3b: U.S. Effectiveness
x = U.S. seaborne 
crisis response
y5 = effectiveness of 
U.S. activity
FIGure 28
U.S. Involvement Model 2
H3c: U.S. Direct
Military Effectiveness
x = U.S. seaborne 
crisis response
y6 = most effective
U.S. activity
FIGure 29
U.S. Involvement Model 3
H3d: Termination
x = U.S. seaborne 
crisis response
y7 = U.S. contribution
to abatement
FIGure 30
U.S. Involvement Model 4
H3e: U.S. Crisis Actor
x10 = U.S. crisis
actor
Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response
FIGure 31
U.S. Involvement Model 5
x11 = naval reaction
x12 = USN forces
abroad
H3f: U.S. readiness
Y = U.S. seaborne
crisis response
FIGure 32
U.S. Involvement Model 6
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This variable measures the highest level of U.S. activity in international cri-
ses, based on the variable “level of U.S. involvement.” The same criterion 
was already applied to select the cases. 
(2) y5 = effectiveness of U.S. involvement (usefct, usefct2).
This dependent variable is measured with the variable coding the effective-
ness of the U.S. activity on crisis abatement, ranging from the categories 
“escalation” to “no contribution to the abatement” and the “single most 
important contributor.” Because of the limited number of cases, some cat-
egories had to be collapsed or excluded.
(3) y6 = most effective type of U.S. activity (usefac, usefac2).
The most effective type of U.S. activity (dependent variable) on the crisis 
abatement has four values: “not effective,” “low-level most effective,” 
“semi-/covert military most effective,” and “direct military most effective.”
(4) y7 = U.S. contribution to pace of abatement (uspace, uspace2).
The question of how naval forces influence the termination of a crisis is 
measured with the help of the variable “U.S. contribution to pace of abate-
ment” (dependent variable), thereby specifying whether the United States 
“contributed,” “delayed,” or had “no influence” on the pace of abate-
ment. Unfortunately, the category “no influence on the pace of abate-
ment” showed an insufficient number of cases and had to be excluded. 
(5) x10 = U.S. actor in crisis (usactor).
Whether the United States is a direct crisis actor or is involved as a third 
party is measured with the binary variable “U.S. actor in crisis.”
(6) x11 = naval reaction time (elaps), and
x12 = naval forces abroad (USNabroad).
Next I introduced duration variables, measuring the first and last days of 
the response as well as the total number of days: “start of naval involve-
ment,” “end of naval involvement,” and “duration of naval involvement,” 
adapted from the CNA reports. For cases with multiple naval involvements, 
two time variables were created. Unfortunately, only one response date is 
provided, although the services rarely all deployed at the same time. This 
variable is unable to distinguish the speed of naval force deployment com-
pared to that of the other military services. The readiness of naval forces is 
measured by the elapsed time between the crisis trigger date (from the ICB 
data set) and the start date of naval involvement (CNA), and by the total 
number of active naval personnel deployed outside the United States in 
the year of the crisis trigger date, as provided in U.S. Defense Dept., Active 
Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (Wash-
ington, D.C.: n.d.), available at www.defense.gov/.
The table in figure 33 presents the frequencies for the U.s. involvement variables, with 
the exception of the metric variables “response time” and “number of UsN personnel 
abroad.” 
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I will begin with the hypotheses treating naval involvement as the independent variable, 
analyzed in three different models.
Regression Analyses U.S. Involvement 1: Seaborne Crisis Response Independent 
Variable
The frequency chart shows a high number of “all Forces” responses and american 
interventions contributing to an “escalation” or seen as “important/most important,” 
while seaborne forces responses alone are most likely to coincide with “no or marginal 
contribution” and “important/most important.” Because “UsN & other Forces,” “UsN-
UsMC,” and intervention “escalated” only show a value of one each, the independent 
variable “UsN-UsMC Team” was chosen. 
FIGure 33
U.S. Involvement Frequencies
u.s. INVolVemeNT No NaVY usN oNlY usN-usmC
usN & 
oTHer 
ForCes
all ForCes
Content of U.S. 
activity
Low level 110/80.91 8/34.8 8/50 6/28.6 8/25.8
Semi-military 24/37.7 12/52.2 8/50 13/61.9 6/19.4
Direct military 2/14.4 3/13 0/0 2/9.5 17/54.8
Effectiveness of U.S. 
activity
Intervention 
escalated
5/3.7 4/17.4 1/6.3 1/8 7/22.6
No or marginal 
contribution
87/64.6 11/47.8 6/37.5 6/28.6 2/6.5
Important/most 
important
43/31.9 8/34.8 9/56.3 14/66.7 22/71
U.S. actor in crisis U.S. actor 7/5.1 6/26.1 4/25 10/47.6 25/80.6
U.S. not actor 129/94.9 17/73.9 12/75 11/52.4 6/19.4
Most effective U.S. 
activity
Ineffective 68/50.4 9/39.1 3/18.8 5/23.8 3/9.7
Eff. low level 51/37.8 3/13 6/37.5 6/28.6 10/32.3
Eff. semi-military 14/10.4 8/34.8 7/43.8 8/38.1 4/12.9
Eff. direct military 2/1.5 3/13 0/0 2/9.5 14/45.2
Contribution to pace 
of abatement
Not effective 80/60.2 13/68.4 4/26.7 6/28.6 2/7.7
Effective 53/39.8 6/31.6 11/73.3 15/71.4 24/92.3
Delayed 2/1.5 4/17.4 1/6.3 0/0 5/16.1
Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”
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Effectiveness of U.S. Activity
When “UsN & other incl. all forces” responses serve as the reference category, U.s. 
interventions featuring “no Navy” and “UsN-UsMC” forces were most likely to “not/
marginally contribute,” although the results fail to meet the significance requirements. 
If the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” “all Forces” responses are most likely 
in crises where U.s. intervention escalates the situation compared to “no/marginal con-
tribution.” The category “important/most important” operates in the same direction, 
although the odds ratio is weaker. “UsN-UsMC” forces show the same tendency as “all 
Forces” responses, albeit both the correlations with “escalation” and “important/most 
important” are lower. But compared to “no naval involvement,” seaborne forces are also 
FIGure 34
Model U.S. Involvement H3b: Effectiveness
CaTeGorY esCalaTeD
NoT CoNTrIBuTeD/
marGINal
ImPorTaNT/mosT 
ImPorTaNT 
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. 
all forces) 
rf rf bl
USN-USMC 1.324 4.500 bl
NO NAVY 0.523 9.105 bl
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. 
all forces)
bl rf rf
USN-USMC bl 0.294* 1.324
NO NAVY bl 5.188** 2.529
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. 
all forces)
rf bl rf
USN-USMC 0.294* bl 0.212***
NO NAVY 0.057*** bl 0.110***
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. 
all forces)
1.911 0.110*** bl
USN-USMC 2.529 0.494* bl
NO NAVY rf rf bl
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. 
all forces)
bl 0.057*** 0.523
USN-USMC bl 0.195** 0.395
NO NAVY bl rf rf
USN&OTHER FORCES (incl. 
all forces)
17.400*** bl 9.105***
USN-USMC 5.118** bl 2.023*
NO NAVY rf bl rf
N = 226 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R² = 0.200 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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more likely when american activity is “important/most important” rather than “not/
marginal contribute.” overall, whereas the odds of “escalation” are lower for seaborne 
forces, the odds for “important” influence are also weaker. Thus the hypothesis can be 
confirmed.
a closer look at the frequency distribution of the type of mission and force strength 
shows that two cases of escalation coincide with a show of force and three with a Neo, 
while for the category “important/most important” four deployments are combat and 
ten are show-of-force missions. It is unlikely that Neo missions contribute to escalation; 
thus for future analysis it would be interesting to introduce more independent variables. 
The frequencies for the strength of the force show that for the category “important/
most important,” more than one Cv was involved in twenty-six, one Cv in thirteen 
crises, and none in four. The “eyeball” correlations also reveal that “escalation” coin-
cides with eight operations that included one or more Cvs and only two with none. 
When the United states did not contribute, no Cv was involved in seven cases, one Cv 
in nine, and one or more in four. When the United states contributed to an escalation, 
the involvement was more frequent in the form of a direct military activity. When the 
U.s. contribution was important/most important, fifteen operations occurred at a low 
level and an equal number at the level of direct military engagement, while twenty-three 
were semi-military. These numbers further support the correlation with “all Forces” 
responses and escalations.
Case Study 3b: United States Contributed to Escalation. as with all the models where 
UsN involvement coincides with an escalation of the crisis, we should not assume that 
UsN activities are directly or primarily responsible for the escalation.
In the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1993–94, U.s. activity overall was directly respon-
sible for an escalation of tension, yet the UsN involvement was said to have contributed 
to the final resolution. The ICB coded the crisis as U.s. activity escalating the crisis, but 
a more in-depth look would have to distinguish between the effects of the various ac-
tivities. The death of the North Korean president earlier that month and North Korea’s 
reluctance to participate in the nuclear inspections had caused a tense situation. Thus 
Uss Kitty Hawk (Cv 63), operating with Japanese and south Korean forces in late July 
1994, was in a state of high alert. The United states negotiated with North Korea over its 
nuclear program while keeping open the option of military strikes. Two carriers—Kitty 
Hawk and a second, the name of which could not be determined—were positioned off 
the Korean Peninsula in a demonstration of force. It was later said that the carriers had 
contributed to maintaining the stability during the negotiations. The crisis ended with 
an agreement in october 1994.2
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Most Effective U.S. Activity
The following simple multinomial regression analysis shows that “USN-USMC” in-
volvement is “most effective in covert/semi military operations,” whereas “All Forces” 
are “most successful in direct military activities.” A large number of naval involvements 
also exercise “no influence.” It is important to note that the majority of “covert/semi-
military interventions” are semi-military and that only very few are covert operations.3 
Low-level activities are mostly political in nature but include a small number of eco-
nomic and propaganda engagements. 
With “All Forces” as reference category and “direct military most effective” as baseline, 
the other three American involvement categories are positively correlated with the cat-
egories “ineffective,” “effective low level activity,” and “effective semi-military activity.” 
“No Navy” shows the highest values, especially for the category “ineffective,” because of 
the very few instances in which this type of response occurred when “direct military ac-
tivity” was most effective. Seaborne forces alone increase the odds for “effective low level 
activity” by a factor of 4.200, the same as “USN & Other Forces,” although the latter fails 
Figure 35
Model U.S. Involvement H3c: Most Effective Activity
Category ineFFeCtive eFF. low level eFF. semi-military eFF. mil.
ALL FORCES rf rf rf bl
USN&OTHER FORCES 11.667** 4.200 14.000*** bl
USN-USMC 18.667*** 4.200* 17.500*** bl
NO NAVY 158.667*** 35.700*** 24.500*** bl
ALL FORCES bl rf rf rf
USN&OTHER FORCES bl 0.360 1.200 0.086***
USN-USMC bl 0.025* 0.938 0.054***
NO NAVY bl 0.225** 0.154** 0.006***
ALL FORCES 0.006*** 0.028*** 0.041*** bl
USN&OTHER FORCES 0.074** 0.118** 0.571*** bl
USN-USMC 0.118** 0.118** 0.714 bl
NO NAVY rf rf rf bl
ALL FORCES bl 4.444*** 6.476** 158.667***
USN&OTHER FORCES bl 1.600 7.771*** 13.600**
USN-USMC bl 1.000 6.071*** 8.500**
NO NAVY bl rf rf rf
N = 226 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R² = 0.291 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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to reach the significance requirements. For effective covert/semi-military operations the 
“USN-USMC Team” shows a higher value of 17.500. “All Forces” correlates highest with 
“effective direct military activities.” The high values for “low-level effective” and “semi-
military effective” are influenced by the low number of cases where “All Forces” were 
involved in crises in which U.S. activity was not effective.
When we examine the “eyeball” correlations with the type of mission, combat displays 
the highest frequency for “direct military most effective,” show of force for the category 
“semi-military most effective,” and show of force and NEO for “low level most effective.” 
CV strength presents the highest percentage of no CVs when “ineffective” and one CV 
when “semi-military effective.” As expected, one-plus (“1+”) CVs is most frequent when 
“direct military” is coded as the most effective activity. This suggests that the presence 
of an aircraft carrier greatly enhances the success of the U.S. activity.
In sum, the results suggest that the dominant influence of “seaborne forces only” lies in 
successful operations short of direct military activity. Since the hypothesis assumes that 
“All Forces” is most successful in direct military activities and naval forces in the lower 
categories of activity, the hypothesis can be confirmed. However, out of all military 
responses seaborne activities are also the ones most highly correlated to ineffectiveness.
Case Studies 3c: Semi-military and Low-Level Involvement. During the Cold War the 
United States was semi-militarily engaged in many crises in Central America. A case 
in point where the semi-military response was the most effective activity is the crisis 
in Guatemala in 1953. The United States saw the growing influence of the communist 
party in Guatemala as inimical to U.S. interests in Latin America.
When in late 1953 Guatemala learned of American support for an antigovernment 
“liberation” movement, it requested military supplies from the Soviet Union. On the 
day the Soviet arms shipment arrived, the United States began an air-sea patrol mission 
in the Gulf of Honduras to protect Honduras from an invasion by its neighbor and to 
control shipments to Guatemala. Talks between the parties and the United States were 
not successful. On 3 June 1954, the United States airlifted arms to Honduras and anti-
government forces in Guatemala, and on 7 June, a “contingency evacuation” force was 
deployed. This operation, code-named Hardrock Baker, was used to implement 
a comprehensive sea blockade of Guatemala. It included submarines and amphibious 
ships carrying a Marine battalion landing team.4 With this aggressive configuration of 
naval forces the United States built up psychological pressure on Guatemala, underscor-
ing the weakness of Guatemala’s position and opening up the option for intervention. 
On 29 June 1954, with the resignation of Guatemala’s president and the accession of an 
anticommunist government, the crisis ended. Thus the semi-military activity of the 
USN greatly helped to bring about a termination of the crisis.5
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The 1971 Bangladesh crisis can be described as a demonstration of low-level U.s. 
activity and UsN-only deployment. This crisis was triggered by an attack of the West 
Pakistan army on Dacca University in Bangladesh on 25 March 1971. at that time, Ban-
gladesh was still formally known as east Pakistan and east Bengal. east Pakistan now 
declared its independence, bringing on armed conflict with West Pakistan. India sup-
ported east Pakistan, and on 3 December, after months of minor clashes, a formal war 
between India and Pakistan broke out. Within two weeks, Indian forces overwhelmed 
the Pakistani troops based in the seceding territory. The war ended on 17 December 
1971 with Pakistan’s surrender, and Bangladesh officially became a sovereign state. 
The United states was politically very active in this crisis. To undergird U.s. support, 
the seventh Fleet moved into the Bay of Bengal in support of Pakistan. on 10 Decem-
ber, as Indian troops liberated the new country of Bangladesh, a naval force consisting 
of a battle group led by Uss Enterprise (Cv 65) and an amphibious ready group was 
deployed to the Indian ocean to stand by for a possible evacuation of Western nationals. 
an evacuation operation proved unnecessary, because the royal air Force had already 
evacuated most foreigners. Nonetheless, the naval forces stayed in the Indian ocean in 
a show of force, monitoring both Indian and Pakistani operations and maritime and 
air traffic, as well as increasing numbers of soviet aircraft and vessels, with the goal of 
intimidating India and tilting the situation in favor of Pakistan.
The Ussr had also moved some of its naval forces into the vicinity of the Bay of 
Bengal, to demonstrate support for India. according to siegel, U.s. naval forces played 
an important role in influencing events on the ground. “The presence of U.s. naval 
forces south of the Indian subcontinent, along with growing diplomatic isolation, thus 
evidently helped to sway Indian decision makers away from the preferred option of 
continuing the war with an offensive in the West. Enterprise’s deployment strengthened 
U.s. diplomatic efforts.”6 according to Mrityunjoy Mazumdar, this entry of Enterprise 
into the Bay of Bengal left a deep impression on Indian policy makers as well as the 
Indian navy for much of the next two decades.7 Thus this crisis serves as a good example 
of the power of naval forces in combination with diplomatic initiatives.
U.S. Activity and Pace of Abatement
In my examination of the impact of the different american responses on the pace of 
abatement of crises, the frequencies show that out of the military responses, “UsN 
only” contributes the least, and stronger military commitments the most. In order to 
run the regression analysis, the category “delayed” had to be recoded into missing data, 
because of the 0 value for “UsN & other Forces” and the low numbers for other service 
combinations. 
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The results confirm the surmise that the stronger the force, the more the United states 
contributes to the pace of abatement. The greatest increase in the probable odds of “no 
contribution” attaches to the category “no Navy.” When “all Forces” is the reference cat-
egory, all other U.s. involvement variable categories are more likely “not to contribute” 
to the pace of abatement. When the reference category is interchanged with “no Navy,” 
“UsN & other Forces” increases the odds by a factor of 3.774, “all Forces” by 18.113, 
and the “UsN-UsMC Team” by 1.509. The latter, however, fails to reach the significance 
level. The frequency chart suggests that for the maritime responses, the category “UsN 
only” is largely responsible for the lack of contribution to the abatement. a second re-
gression analysis distinguishing between the seaborne forces confirms this assumption. 
“UsN-UsMC” forces contribute even more to the pace of abatement than the combi-
nation with the air Force. While the statistical analysis finds that naval forces do not 
contribute to the abatement, they do not delay termination either. This was verified by 
running the regression analysis with all three categories for pace of abatement and the 
independent variable “UsN-UsMC TeaM,” collapsing the categories “all Forces” and 
“UsN & other Forces.” “all Forces” and “UsN-UsMC” forces responses contribute the 
FIGure 36
Model U.S. Involvement H3d: Abatement
CaTeGorY NoT eFFeCTIVe CoNTrIBuTeD
ALL FORCES rf bl
USN&OTHER FORCES 4.800* bl
USN-USMC 12.000*** bl
NO NAVY 18.113*** bl
ALL FORCES bl rf
USN&OTHER FORCES bl 0.028*
USN-USMC bl 0.083***
NO NAVY bl 0.055***
ALL FORCES 0.055*** bl
USN&OTHER FORCES 0.265** bl
USN-USMC 0.663 bl
NO NAVY rf bl
ALL FORCES bl 18.113***
USN&OTHER FORCES bl 3.774***
USN-USMC bl 1.509
NO NAVY bl rf
N = 214 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R² = 0.182 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category 
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most, followed by responses involving the air Force, yet the hypothesis that naval forces 
alone do not contribute to the pace of the abatement can be confirmed. The different 
findings for naval forces alone and in combination with the UsMC demonstrate the 
importance of differentiating between them if possible.
looking at the “eyeball” correlations, the deployment of no Cvs is more frequent when 
U.s. activity did not contribute, while “one-plus Cvs” shows a high correlation with 
contribution to abatement of the crisis. shows of force are more frequent for the category 
“contributed,” while most Neo operations concurred with no contribution. all combat 
operations coincided with a contribution to the abatement. similarly, when amphibious 
forces were involved, the variable showed a high frequency for contribution. This fur-
ther supports the importance of the strength of the force employed and the motivation. 
When the United states is engaged only in a Neo activity, the influence on the pace of 
the abatement is likely to be less strong.
Case Study 3d: Delay of Pace of Abatement. I select one of the U.s. crises with libya 
in the 1980s to exemplify a rare case where the american involvement did delay the 
termination of the crisis. only the UsN was involved in the response. The sixth Fleet 
announced its intention to conduct maneuvers in the Mediterranean and thereby posed 
a crisis for libya, which alerted its armed forces (12 august 1981). on 18 august libya 
claimed that U.s. naval forces had entered libyan territorial waters in the gulf of sirte, 
where the two aircraft carriers—Uss Forrestal (Cv 59) and Uss Nimitz (Cv 68)—with 
four cruisers, four destroyers, four frigates, and two destroyer escorts performed open-
ocean missile exercises. The United states had deployed the naval forces to challenge 
libya’s claim to the gulf and was holding the maneuvers to demonstrate that “america 
has the muscle to back up its words.” aircraft from both carriers had to intercept libyan 
aircraft multiple times. on 19 august UsN pilots shot down two libyan fighters that 
had threatened Nimitz. The United states intended to demonstrate its resolve to protect 
the freedom of the seas. libya’s ruler, Muammar Qadhafi, threatened to attack ameri-
can nuclear bases in the Mediterranean should the UsN again enter libyan territorial 
waters. The crisis suddenly ended on 1 september 1981. The crisis centered on the 
maneuvers of U.s. naval vessels, and not on the UsN response to the libyan counterini-
tiative. Thus the naval activity triggered the crisis but was probably not directly respon-
sible for the delay of the abatement.
after this analysis of american responses as an independent variable the next section 
pre sents the findings for the hypotheses with U.s. involvement as a dependent variable.
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Regression Analyses U.S. Involvement 2: Seaborne Crisis Response Dependent 
Variable
This analysis measures the level of U.s. activity without accounting for the effectiveness 
of the activity. as expected, no naval involvement was most frequent in “low-level U.s. 
interventions.” Both “UsN-UsMC” and “UsN & other Forces” were mostly deployed in 
“semi/covert-military,” whereas “all Forces” were typically dispatched as part of “direct 
military interventions.” as mentioned earlier, only two direct military involvements by 
the United states occurred without naval forces. somewhat surprising is the relatively 
high number of “all Forces” responses in “low-level involvements.” While “all Forces” 
clearly deploy primarily in “direct military interventions,” their dispatch in “low level 
involvements” was not anticipated.
Content of U.S. Activity
With “direct military intervention” as reference category, “low level activity” increases 
the probable odds of “no Navy” by a factor of 116.875, followed by the “UsN-UsMC 
Team” with 11.333 and “UsN & other Forces” by 6.375. For “semi/covert military 
involvements” the factors change to 34.000, 18.889, and 18.417. overall, all U.s. naval 
involvement categories are more likely to correlate with direct military interventions 
than no naval involvement.
FIGure 37
U.S. Involvement H3a: Content of Activity
CaTeGorY No NaVY usN-usmC usN&oTHer ForCes all ForCes
Low-level 116.875*** 11.333*** 6.375** bl
Covert/semi-military 34.000*** 18.889*** 18.417*** bl
Direct military rf rf rf bl
Low-level bl 0.097** 0.055*** 0.009***
Covert/semi-military bl 0.556 0.542 0.029***
Direct military bl rf rf rf
Low-level rf rf rf bl
Covert/semi-military 0.291** 1.668 2.889 bl
Direct military 0.009*** 0.088*** 0.157** bl
Low-level bl rf rf rf
Covert/semi-military bl 5.720*** 9.931*** 3.437**
Direct military bl 10.313** 18.333*** 116.875***
N = 227 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R² = 0.363 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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The frequencies from the “eyeball” correlations are confirmed by the more rigorous 
statistical model, and the hypothesis can be confirmed. seaborne involvement only is 
more likely in lower forms of american involvement. of all simple regression models, 
this model generated the largest R2 , thus suggesting the strongest association between 
the dependent and independent variables.
Case Study 3a: Low-Level Involvement and All Forces. on careful examination of the 
combination of “all Forces” and “low level U.s. involvement,” one sees that military 
forces often served as a standby resource, as in the Cyprus crisis of 1974–75, and do not 
automatically become involved in combat. I could not find any specific information 
about U.s. army deployments other than the codings in the CNa reports. on 15 July 
1974 a greek-led military coup ousted the Cypriot government and installed a puppet 
regime. This triggered a crisis for Cyprus and Turkey. The ousted Cypriot government  
requested help from Britain and the UN security Council. Turkey intervened on 20 July 
and occupied parts of the island. In an immediate reaction to the coup, the United states 
delayed the return of Uss America (Cv 66), then routinely deployed in the Mediterra-
nean, to the United states until relieved by Uss Independence (Cv 62). at the same time 
american and British diplomats began mediation attempts, which led to an unstable 
cease-fire. Forrestal was deployed to the central Mediterranean. other assignments for 
Forrestal and the sixth Fleet amphibious ready group were canceled so that they would 
be ready if needed.
on 22 July aircraft from Uss Inchon (lPH 12)—other sources name Uss Coronado 
(lPD 11)—evacuated more than four hundred american and foreign nationals to Beirut 
from the British base at Dhekelia in southern Cyprus; Independence provided air cover.8 
In early august the ships’ departures were postponed in reaction to riots and demon-
strations before the american embassy that resulted in the murder of the american 
ambassador to Cyprus. With the easing of tension, all contingency operations ended 
by 2 september. after negotiations, the toppled Cypriot president, archbishop Michael 
Makarios, returned on 7 December 1974. In January 1975 naval forces were deployed 
again for possible evacuation duties. Uss Saratoga (Cv 60) and amphibious forces were 
released on 21 January 1975. “In February 1975 a Turkish-Cypriot Federated state was 
proclaimed and, on 24 February, a Constituent assembly for Turkish Cyprus was con-
vened, ending the crisis for Turkey. By their failure to challenge this act, the crisis ended 
for Cyprus and greece as well.”9
U.S. Crisis Actor
The variable advanced in the next model controls for the U.s. involvement as a direct 
crisis actor or third party. The chart of frequencies shows that seaborne forces most 
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often deploy alone in crises where the United states is not directly involved. seventy-
four percent of all “UsN only” responses occurred when the United states acted as a 
third party, the remaining 26 percent when the United states was a direct crisis actor. 
The numbers for “UsN-UsMC” forces are almost identical, with 75 and 25 percent, re-
spectively. “UsN & other Forces” show almost a fifty-fifty distribution, and “all Forces” 
are clearly more frequent in “U.s. direct actor” crises, with 81 percent of the total “all 
Forces” responses.
The regression analysis confirms the previous assumptions. If the United states is not 
directly involved, the odds of all categories of U.s. involvement short of “all forces” 
responses increase. all Exp(B) values are significant, and “no naval involvement” and 
“UsN-UsMC forces” are the most likely responses to crises in which the United states 
acts as a third party. The results support the hypothesis that stronger forces are dis-
patched if the United states is committed as a direct actor. Crises involving the United 
states as a third party largely triggered responses involving no naval forces or only 
seaborne responses. similar to the previous model, the R2  is very high, and the binary 
variables “third party” and “direct crisis” actor are very important for the explanation of 
the different types of american responses.
U.S. Readiness
The “number of UsN personnel abroad” and the “elapsed time” between the outbreak 
of the crisis and the naval reaction are metric variables. Neither significantly correlates 
with the different service-type combinations. as mentioned previously, the inability 
to distinguish between the naval reaction date and the time elapsed before other forces 
arrive in the theater supports the speculation that were this problem accounted for, the 
FIGure 38
U.S. Involvement H3e: Actor
CaTeGorY No NaVINV usN-usmC usN&oTHer ForCes all ForCes
U.S. not crisis actor 76.786*** 12.083*** 4.583** bl
U.S. crisis actor rf rf rf bl
U.S. not crisis actor bl 0.157*** 0.060*** 0.013***
U.S. crisis actor bl rf rf rf
U.S. not crisis actor 6.355*** bl 0.379* 0.083***
U.S. crisis actor rf* bl rf rf
U.S. not crisis actor 16.753*** 2.636* bl 0.218**
U.S. crisis actor rf rf bl rf
N = 227 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R² = 0.352 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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results might be different. The Iraq/lebanon upheaval in 1958 is a good example. The 
Navy was ready off the coast of lebanon thirteen hours after the order was received, 
compared with five days for the air Force (to advance from its base in Turkey) and even 
longer for the army (from germany).10 Yet no different response dates are provided to 
control for this difference. similarly, “UsN personnel abroad” generated no statistically 
significant results. However, a further examination of the possible influence of the num-
ber of UsN personnel and the response time revealed some results.
Figure 39 shows how often different Cv-strength levels were deployed and to how 
many crises the “UsN-UsMC Team” responded per year. once these other dependent 
variables are chosen, alternative findings can be offered. The “number of UsN person-
nel” is positively correlated to both the “number of Cvs deployed” in a crisis and the 
“number of UsN-UsMC responses per year.” This finding supports the assumption that 
the frequency of crisis response is closely tied to the number of personnel the Navy has 
at its disposal and the number of Cvs deployed. Conversely, the causation may also run 
the other way. Because of international crises, more naval personnel were sent overseas. 
There is no statistically significant relationship between “elapsed time” and “UsN forces 
abroad,” but when direct military activities are excluded the number of UsN personnel 
already abroad shortens the naval reaction time. Thus in low-level and semi-military 
U.s. response activity, the number of UsN personnel and short reaction times are 
positively correlated. This finding further supports the assumption that the uniform 
treatment of elapsed time for all services negatively influences the measurement of fast 
naval reaction times. Here the R2  values can be used to demonstrate the variance in 
the dependent variable, explained by the independent variables. While all three R2s are 
FIGure 39
Frequency of Number of CVs Deployed and USN-USMC Deployments per Year
NumBer oF CVs FrequeNCY
usN-usmC DePloYmeNTs 
Per Year
FrequeNCY
0 13 0 107
1 26 1 94
2 21 2 26
3 7 3 10
4 2
6 3
8 1
Total 73 Total 237
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rather low, a single independent variable is unlikely to explain much of the variance, 
suggesting that additional factors influence the dependent variables.
even though some results can be presented with the currently available data, the hypoth-
esis cannot be answered correctly and thus has to be rejected in this analysis. However, 
the U.s. involvement hypotheses were mostly confirmed (the exception was H3f).
Crisis Outcome Models
The relation between the crisis outcome and seaborne response is measured with the 
help of four hypotheses analyzing different aspects of the termination of international 
crises.11 all hypotheses treat seaborne crisis response as the independent variable (see 
sidebar 2): Crisis outcome Model 1, Crisis outcome Model 2, Crisis outcome Model 3, 
and Crisis outcome Model 4.
TaBle 5-1
Hypothesis 3a: Form of Involvement Confirmed
Hypothesis 3b: U.S. Effectiveness Confirmed
Hypothesis 3c: Direct Military Activity Confirmed
Hypothesis 3d: Termination Confirmed
Hypothesis 3e: U.S. Crisis Actor Confirmed
Hypothesis 3f: U.S. Readiness Not confirmed
H4a: Denite Outcome
x = U.S. seaborne
crisis response
y8 = content of
outcome
FIGure 41
Crisis Outcome Model 1
FIGure 40
Multivariate Regression Outputs
DePeNDeNT VarIaBle INDePeNDeNT VarIaBle moDel R2 CoeFFICIeNT b CoeFFICIeNT t
Number of CVsa USN personnel abroad 0.057 0.239*** 3.369***
Annual USN-USMC  
crisis involvements
USN personnel abroad 0.051 0.225*** 3.397***
USN abroadb Elapsed time 0.049 –0.221* –1.714*
a. Includes only cases up to 1990 because for the later involvements no information about the number of CVs was available.
b. Cases with direct U.S. military activity were excluded from this model.
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SIdEBAR 2
The variables of the hypotheses are expressed mathematically as follows.
(1) y8 = content of outcome (outcome, outcome2).
Whether an outcome was stable was determined with the help of the vari-
able “content of outcome,” with the categories “victory” and “defeat” 
treated as definite and “stalemate” and “compromise” as more ambiguous.
(2) y9 = form of outcome (forout, forout2).
This hypothesis is measured with the variable “form of outcome,” in-
cluding such categories as “unilateral,” “imposed,” “tacit,” and “formal 
agreement,” to control for the crisis outcome. Certain categories had to 
be collapsed. For example, the different values for unilateral self, ally, and 
adversary are recoded into one category, “unilateral.”
(3) y10 = tension (outesr, outesr2).
The change in tension is measured with the variable “reduction” or “es-
calation” of tension. The category “recent case” was recoded into missing 
data.
(4) y11a = extent of satisfaction with the outcome (outevl, outevl2).
The satisfaction of the actors is identified with the variable “extent of sat-
isfaction” (outevl). Not all categories showed a large enough number of 
cases, so values had to be collapsed. All cases where at least one of the 
crisis actors was not satisfied were coded as dissatisfied (outevl2).
H4b: Agreement
x = U.S. seaborne
crisis response
y9 = form of
outcome
FIGure 42
Crisis Outcome Model 2
H4c: Reduction of
Tensions
x = U.S. seaborne
crisis response y10 = tensions
FIGure 43
Crisis Outcome Model 3
FIGure 44
Crisis Outcome Model 4
H4d: Actor Satisfaction
x = U.S. seaborne
crisis response
y11 = extent of
satisfaction
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(5) y12 = satisfaction/attitude mix.
This variable was generated by the combination of the “extent of satisfac-
tion with the outcome” and the “attitude towards U.S. activity.” Several 
categories were collapsed to establish four new categories: “favorable and 
satisfied” (favorable includes the category neutral), “favorable and dissatis-
fied,” “not favorable and satisfied,” “not favorable and dissatisfied.”
The following table presents the frequencies for the crisis outcome variables.
Regression Analyses Crisis Outcomes: Content of Outcome
about 44 percent of seaborne interventions ended in a “victory” for a crisis actor, 
compared with 20 percent that ended in “defeat,” suggesting that a little more than half 
terminated with a “definite outcome.”
sixteen percent were characterized by “compromise” and 20 percent by “stalemate,” a 
total of roughly 36 percent “ambiguous outcomes.” Forty-nine percent of “all Forces” 
responses concurred with “victories” for crisis actors and 26 percent with “defeats.” 
only 25 percent resulted in “ambiguous outcomes.” Because the frequencies suggest that 
FIGure 45
Crisis Outcome Frequencies
CrIsIs ouTComes No NaVY usN oNlY usN-usmC
usN & 
oTHer 
ForCes
all ForCes
Content of outcome Victory/defeat 125/48.1 28/50 28/77.8 41/62.1 80/74.8
Compromise 61/23.5 7/12.5 7/19.4 19/28.8 17/15.9
Stalemate 74/28.5 21/37.5 1/2.8 6/9.1 10/9.3
Form of outcome Formal agreement 52/25.2 13/28.9 12/42.9 12/20.7 31/32.6
Understanding 58/28.2 5/11.1 2/7.1 17/29.3 15/15.8
Unilateral 91/44.2 26/57.8 10/35.7 25/43.1 31/32.6
Imposed 5/2.4 1/2.2 4/14.3 4/6.9 18/18.9
Tensions Escalation 97/40.8 29/50.9 13/38.2 36/53.7 60/55.6
Reduction 141/59.2 28/49.1 21/61.8 31/46.3 48/44.4
Satisfaction Satisfied 76/29.2 11/20 6/16.7 30/44.8 18/16.7
Not satisfied 184/70.8 44/80 30/83.3 37/55.2 90/83.3
Satisfaction/attitude Fav/satisfied 51/22.6 7/17.1 3/10 13/25.5 7/8.6
Fav/dissatisfied 77/34.1 17/41.5 14/46.7 12/23.5 35/43.2
Not fav/satisfied 46/20.4 10/24.4 3/10 11/21.6 5/6.2
Not fav/dissatisfied 56/23 7/17.1 10/33.3 15/29.4 34/42
Note: The first number presents the frequencies and the second number refers to the percentage within the variable “servicetype1.”
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largely naval forces alone are deployed in crises resulting in “stalemate” (37.5 percent 
versus 2.8 percent for UsN-UMsC), the variable “servicetype1” serves as independent 
variable. although the expected values of the cross-tabulation meet the requirements, 
one has to be cautious interpreting the values for “UsN-UsMC” forces, because they 
were only deployed in one crisis resulting in a “stalemate.” However, because the main 
interest lies in “UsN only” responses, I chose “servicetype1” as the independent variable, 
in order to highlight the strong influence on “stalemates.”
When “all Forces” serves as the reference category and “defeat” as the baseline, “UsN & 
other Forces” and “no Navy” positively correlate with “compromise,” while the probable 
odds of “stalemate” are increased by “no Navy” and “UsN only” responses. “UsN only” 
exercises the strongest influence on “stalemate” in the model. Choosing “compromise” 
as baseline leads to a negative relationship between the “definite” categories of the 
FIGure 46
Model Crisis Outcome H4a: Content
CaTeGorY VICTorY ComPromIse sTalemaTe DeFeaT
ALL FORCES rf rf rf bl
USN&OTHER FORCES 1.915 3.447** 1.867 bl
USN-USMC 1.137 1.281 0.311 bl
USN ONLY 1.346 1.441 7.350*** bl
NO NAVY 1.027 2.337** 4.819*** bl
ALL FORCES rf bl rf rf
USN&OTHER FORCES 0.551 bl 0.537 0.288**
USN-USMC 0.887 bl 0.243 0.781
USN ONLY 0.934 bl 5.100*** 0.694
NO NAVY 0.439** bl 2.062* 0.428**
ALL FORCES 0.974 0.428* 0.208*** bl
USN&OTHER FORCES 1.864 1.488 0.387* bl
USN-USMC 1.107 0.548 0.065** bl
USN ONLY 1.311 0.617 1.525 bl
NO NAVY rf rf rf bl
ALL FORCES 2.275** bl 0.485* 2.337**
USN&OTHER FORCES 1.253 bl 0.260*** 0.672
USN-USMC 2.019 bl 0.188** 1.824
USN ONLY 2.125 bl 2.473* 1.621
NO NAVY rf bl rf rf
N = 525 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R² = 0.111 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
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dependent variable and all UsN involvements, although not all values are significant. 
“UsN only” and “no Navy” remain positively correlated to “stalemate.” once the refer-
ence category is changed to “no Navy,” the positive relationship between “all Forces” 
responses and “victory” and “defeat” becomes apparent, with “defeat” showing a slightly 
higher correlation. When the baseline is changed to “compromise,” both “victory” and 
“defeat” (stronger) are more likely for “all Forces” responses, while “compromise” is 
more likely than “stalemate.” The high values for “UsN-UsMC” response and “definite 
outcomes” can be ignored, because of the influence of the low number of “stalemate” 
outcomes for this category. “UsN only” responses seem to be more correlated to “defeat” 
and “victory” than to “compromise,” but not significantly. The strong relationship with 
“stalemate” is maintained. The values for the air Force associate positively with “vic-
tory” and “compromise.”
overall, naval forces show the highest correlation with the ambiguous outcome “stale-
mates,” while “UsN & other Forces” shows significant values for “victorious” outcomes 
and “compromises” and “all Forces” generally dominates the “definite outcome” catego-
ries. Thus the hypothesis can be confirmed, because a “stalemate” can be interpreted as 
an even more ambiguous outcome than a “compromise.”
Case Study 4a: Stalemate Outcome and USN Only Involvement. The most recent 
Taiwan strait crisis, from 1995, serves as an example of a stalemate outcome for all 
involved actors. The People’s republic of China (PrC) and the United states were at 
loggerheads following the visa approval for President lee Teng-hui of Taiwan for a visit 
to Cornell University. This gesture, together with the sales of fighter aircraft to Taiwan, 
increased the PrC’s fear of growing american support for Taiwanese independence. 
In an attempt to coerce the United states to commit formally to a “one-China policy,” 
the PrC conducted missile tests and naval exercises in the Taiwan strait beginning in 
July 1995. These tests and exercises elicited no U.s. response until, according to robert 
ross, 19 December, when the aircraft carrier Nimitz cruised through the Taiwan strait 
marking the first time U.s. ships had patrolled that area since 1976.12 When the Chinese 
activity continued, the United states decided to deploy two aircraft carriers to the area. 
In March 1996 Independence arrived, followed shortly thereafter by Nimitz. With the 
successful conclusion of the Taiwanese election, the crisis ended.
It is unclear how much the carriers contributed to the abatement of the crisis. similarly, 
the effectiveness of the deterrence is disputed since it is very difficult to say with cer-
tainty which action was responsible for deterring the adversary. While gouré questions 
the contribution of the two Cvs, ross sees their deployments as successful coercive 
diplomacy to guarantee stability during the elections by deterring Chinese involvement 
and confirming american commitment.13
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Agreement
seaborne forces responses are divided among 36 percent “formal agreement,” 47 percent 
“unilateral,” 8 percent “imposed,” and 9 percent “understanding” outcomes. “all Forces” 
responses frequencies are divided among 33 percent “formal agreement,” 33 percent 
“unilateral,” 19 percent “imposed,” and 16 percent “understanding.” Major differences 
are found in “unilateral” and “imposed” outcomes. similar to the variable “content of 
the outcome,” naval forces only and “imposed” outcomes concurred only once, but the 
expected frequencies of the cross-tabulation analysis allows “servicetype1” to serve as 
the independent variable.
In a first step, “imposed” serves as the baseline and “all Forces” as reference category. 
“UsN only” and “no Navy” show significant odds ratios of 7.548 and 6.039 for the 
FIGure 47
Model Crisis Outcome H4b: Agreement
CaTeGorY
Formal 
aGreemeNT
uNDersTaNDING uNIlaTeral ImPoseD
ALL FORCES rf rf rf bl
USN&OTHER FORCES 1.742 5.100** 3.629** bl
USN-USMC 1.742 0.600 1.452 bl
USN ONLY 7.548* 6.000 15.097** bl
NO NAVY 6.039*** 13.920*** 10.568*** bl
ALL FORCES bl rf rf rf
USN&OTHER FORCES bl 2.928** 2.083* 0.574
USN-USMC bl 0.344 0.833 0.574
USN ONLY bl 0.795 2.000 0.132*
NO NAVY bl 2.305** 1.750* 0.166***
ALL FORCES 0.166*** 0.072*** 0.095*** bl
USN&OTHER FORCES 0.288* 0.366 0.343 bl
USN-USMC 0.288* 0.043*** 0.137*** bl
USN ONLY 1.250 0.431 1.429 bl
NO NAVY rf rf rf bl
ALL FORCES bl 0.434** 0.571* 6.039***
USN&OTHER FORCES bl 1.270 1.190 3.467*
USN-USMC bl 0.149** 0.476 3.467*
USN ONLY bl 0.345* 1.143 0.800
NO NAVY bl rf rf rf
N = 432 Sig. Model = 0.000 Pseudo-R² = 0.113 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category 
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category “formal agreement.” Compared to “imposed,” naval forces alone show the 
highest correlation with “unilateral acts,” followed by “formal agreements,” while no 
naval involvement shows the highest Exp(B) for “understanding.” The combination with 
the air Force shows positive associations with the categories “understanding” and “uni-
lateral acts.” When the baseline is changed to “formal agreement,” all categories show a 
negative correlation with “imposed,” but only the values for “no Navy” and “UsN only” 
are significant. overall, naval forces alone are frequently featured in crises with “formal 
agreements” and “unilateral acts,” as previously suggested in the cross-tabulation. once 
the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” “all Forces” correlates more highly 
with crises characterized by “imposed” outcomes, compared to “formal agreements.” 
although not significant, “UsN only” suggests a negative correlation with “imposed” 
outcomes.
“Naval forces alone” correlates highly with “formal agreements” and “unilateral acts.” 
The same is visible for “all forces” and “imposed” outcomes. overall, these findings 
point to a positive relationship between naval forces only and “formal agreements.”
Tensions
The next advanced variable is “tension,” measuring the increase or decrease of tension 
following the termination of the crisis.
The “eyeball” correlations suggest that “all Forces” and “UsN & other Forces” respons-
es more likely coincide with an “escalation” of tensions, whereas “UsN-UsMC” forces 
seem more positively related to a “reduction.” Naval forces alone are distributed almost 
fifty-fifty. The regression analysis employed the variable “servicetype1” as independent 
variable. Unfortunately, the significance of the model does not meet the requirements; 
thus the model cannot be interpreted, and for now the simple frequencies are the only 
results available.
Case Studies 4c: Tension and Seaborne Involvement. The Jordan regime crisis in 
1957 serves as a good example for the possible impact of naval forces on the reduction 
of tensions. on 4 april 1957, Jordanian army officers and Palestinians sympathetic to 
President gamal abdel Nasser of egypt attempted to overthrow King Hussein of Jordan 
but failed. The king feared egyptian and syrian involvement in the coup attempt and 
reacted by dismissing the entire leftist cabinet, triggering demonstrations and riots. The 
United states expressed support for the king by providing economic aid and deploying 
units of the sixth Fleet, including the aircraft carriers Forrestal and Uss Lake Champlain 
(Cv 39), as well as the heavy cruisers Uss Salem (Ca 139) and Uss Des Moines (Ca 134), 
to the eastern Mediterranean. UsN ships with 1,800 Marines on board anchored off 
Beirut on 20 april ready for a possible intervention in Jordan, while thirty ships of the 
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sixth Fleet—described as the “most formidable naval striking force ever assembled in 
the eastern Mediterranean”—carried out air-defense maneuvers in the open sea. The 
task of all these forces was to ensure that the Jordanians maintained their independence 
and withstood the threat of communism. “once again,” explained vice admiral Charles 
Brown, “we find ourselves dropping everything and rushing to the scene of the fire.” It 
can be said that “the swift and firm reaction averted a near catastrophe in the Middle 
east.”14 Marines stood by in amman in case their support was needed for the evacua-
tion of americans. amphibious forces off the lebanese coast were put on a state of alert. 
only the easing of tensions due to diplomatic efforts backed up by naval forces led to 
normalization. The departure of the UsN force on 3 May signaled the end of the crisis.
In contrast, the U.s. intervention in grenada serves as a good example of the possibility 
of naval forces increasing tension, because their deployment heightened fear of a poten-
tial stronger U.s. backup. Maurice Bishop, the former prime minister of grenada, had 
been placed under house arrest, been freed on 19 october 1983, and shortly thereafter, 
together with close supporters, murdered. ostensibly fearing a threat to its influence in 
the region and to the safety of american citizens in grenada, the United states showed 
concern. In response to a request for help by the organization of east Caribbean states, 
the United states sent to the region a naval task force, including the aircraft carrier In-
dependence and assault ship Guam (lPH 9). The Independence CvBg had been en route 
to the Mediterranean for a regularly scheduled deployment. However, according to 
Christopher Wright this deployment had been hardly routine, being more likely under-
taken in anticipation of the developments in grenada.15 Because of its prior proximity to 
the Caribbean, the naval task force was immediately on the scene. This triggered a crisis 
for grenada. on 25 october, in operation Urgent Fury, U.s. naval, Marine, and 
army forces invaded grenada. Marines were airlifted to the island. When it was clear 
that american students were not in danger, the objectives of the operation shifted to the 
restoration of democratic government to grenada and the elimination of alleged Cuban 
intervention in grenada. By 28 october the U.s. troops had accomplished their mission, 
and by 4 November Independence finally departed for the Mediterranean.16
Actor Satisfaction
The frequencies suggest that all U.s. responses are more likely in crises with negative 
actors’ satisfaction. “UsN & other Forces” shows the lowest “eyeball” correlation with 
“dissatisfaction,” while “UsN-UMsC” and “all Forces” are highest, with equal percent-
ages of 83.3.
When the category “satisfied” is chosen as baseline, “No Navy,” “UsN only,” and “UsN 
& other Forces” are more likely to correlate with satisfactory outcomes than “all 
Forces.” However, the value for “UsN only” is not significant. “UsN & other Forces” 
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remains positively associated with “satisfaction” even after “no Navy” is chosen as refer-
ence category, whereas “all Forces” contributes significantly to “dissatisfaction.” When 
“UsN & other Forces” serves as reference category, all other categories increase the 
probable odds of “dissatisfaction” with the outcome, with “UsN-UsMC” forces and “all 
Forces” showing equally the highest value.
The combination with the air Force is most positively correlated to “actor satisfaction,” 
while “all Forces” responses are most negatively correlated. although the findings sug-
gest that “UsN only” responses correlate slightly positively with satisfaction compared 
to “all forces” responses, the results are mixed.
While actors might be dissatisfied with the outcome of a crisis, they might still be satis-
fied with U.s. involvement, and this point may be of great importance. Unfortunately, 
the original variable “attitude to U.s. involvement” failed to generate significant results. 
Thus for the next variable I combined “attitude to U.s. involvement” with the variable 
“actor satisfaction” (dependent variable y12).
FIGure 48
Model Crisis Outcome H4d: Satisfaction
CaTeGorY saTIsFIeD NoT saTIsFIeD
ALL FORCES bl rf
USN&OTHER FORCES bl 0.247***
USN-USMC bl 1.000
USN ONLY bl 0.800
NO NAVY bl 0.484**
ALL FORCES bl 2.065**
USN&OTHER FORCES bl 0.509**
USN-USMC bl 2.065
USN ONLY bl 1.652
NO NAVY bl rf
ALL FORCES bl 4.054***
USN&OTHER FORCES bl rf
USN-USMC bl 4.054***
USN ONLY bl 3.243***
NO NAVY bl 1.963**
N = 526 Sig. Model = 0.000, Sig. Step Servicetype1 = 0.000 Pseudo-R² = 0.055 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01  bl—baseline rf—reference category
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Mix: Satisfaction and Attitude to U.S. Involvement
The simple frequency analyses suggest that out of all military service combinations, 
“UsN & other Forces” were most often associated with crises characterized by “actor 
satisfaction” and “favorable” perception of U.s. involvement, followed by “UsN only.” 
With almost the same frequency, “all Forces” and seaborne forces responses rise to the 
top in the next category, “favorable/dissatisfied.” Naval forces alone and in combination 
with the air Force were most likely to be deployed in crises with “dissatisfied” actors 
but favorable attitudes to american activity, while at the same time “UsN only” was 
least likely to be deployed in crises with “dissatisfied” actors and “unfavorable” at-
titudes to U.s. activity. “all Forces” responses dominate in the category “not favorable/
dissatisfied.”
FIGure 49
Model Crisis Outcome H4e: Attitude/Satisfaction Mix
CaTeGorY FaV&saT FaV&mIX/DIss NoT FaV&saT NoT FaV&mIX/DIss
ALL FORCES rf rf rf bl
USN&OTHER FORCES 6.422*** 0.835 4.987** bl
USN-USMC 1.545 1.309 1.236 bl
USN ONLY 1.829 2.088* 2.833 bl
NO NAVY 3.365** 1.622* 3.612** bl
ALL FORCES bl rf rf rf
USN&OTHER FORCES bl 0.130*** 0.800 0.156***
USN-USMC bl 0.800 0.800 0.647
USN ONLY bl 1.500 1.500 0.529
NO NAVY bl 0.482 1.074 0.297**
ALL FORCES 0.297** 0.617* 0.277** bl
USN&OTHER FORCES 1.909 0.515 1.380 bl
USN-USMC 0.459 0.803 0.342 bl
USN ONLY 0.561 1.287 0.784 bl
NO NAVY rf rf rf bl
ALL FORCES bl 2.075 0.913 3.365**
USN&OTHER FORCES bl 0.270*** 0.723 0.524
USN-USMC bl 1.747 0.745 2.177
USN ONLY bl 2.293 1.397 1.781
NO NAVY bl rf rf rf
N = 473 Sig. Model = 0.001 Pseudo-R² = 0.075 
*p < 0.1 **p < 0.05 ***p < 0.01 bl—baseline rf—reference category
174  the newport papers
meyers$:___WIP from C 032812:_Newport Papers:_NP39:_InDesign:07 NP_39 Chapter5.indd January 29, 2013 12:02 PM 
Compared to “all Forces” responses, the categories “UsN & other Forces” and “No 
Navy” are positively correlated with “favorable/satisfied” (particularly the former), with 
“not favorable/dissatisfied” as baseline. However, both categories are also positively 
related to “not favorable/satisfied.” While the odds ratio for “UsN & other Forces” is 
stronger for “favorable/satisfied,” the opposite is true for no naval involvement. “UsN 
only” significantly correlates only with “favorable/dissatisfied.” all four response cat-
egories suggest a negative correlation with “not favorable/dissatisfied,” but not all meet 
the significance requirements. once the reference category is changed to “no Navy,” “all 
Forces” responses are mostly associated with “unfavorable/dissatisfied.” seaborne forces 
fail to achieve any significant results, although “UsN only” suggests a positive correla-
tion with “favorable/dissatisfied,” while the combination with the air Force remains 
correlated with “favorable/satisfied.”
The relatively high B values for “all Forces” and “dissatisfied” actors that are both 
“favorable” and “unfavorable” to U.s. activity may be influenced by the decisive-
ness of “all Forces” responses. This increases the likelihood of a definite outcome, 
leaving at least one crisis actor dissatisfied. another explanation is that crisis actors 
may be grateful for the strong U.s. commitment and yet dissatisfied with the overall 
outcome. The results do not confirm positive attitudes to solely american maritime-
force responses. somewhat more expected was the finding that when actors seem to 
be favorable to U.s. seaborne-only activity, they are less satisfied with the outcomes, 
supporting the assumption of lower decisiveness. The low R2 suggests that many other 
factors influence the attitude and satisfaction. overall, the regression analysis revealed 
mixed results.
Case Study 4d: Various Actors with Different Attitudes. The Western somalia libera-
tion Front invaded ogaden on 22 July 1977. This attack triggered a crisis for ethiopia. In 
october, the somalis came close to victory, having secured most of the ogaden territory, 
but the Ussr reacted by providing weapons and military advisers, and by transporting 
Cuban troops from angola to ethiopia. This allowed ethiopia to launch counterattacks, 
defeating the somali army, despite U.s. military aid to the latter. The somali retreat 
from the ogaden territory was announced on 9 March 1978 and finished five days later, 
ending the crisis. The UsN became involved only in February 1978, when following 
the collapse of the somali army in ogaden the Kitty Hawk battle group was ordered 
to a holding point north of singapore in case it should be needed for american citizen 
evacuation and to conduct surveillance operations. The ship was released on 23 March 
1978. In this crisis, both actors were dissatisfied with the crisis outcome; somalia was 
favorable to U.s. involvement, but ethiopia was not. The United states provided military 
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aid to somalia but no troops. This suggests that the military aid to somalia rather than 
the naval involvement might have been seen as unfavorable.
While the first two hypotheses could be confirmed, no results were generated by the 
regression analysis controlling for tension, and mixed results were found for the variable 
“satisfaction.”
TaBle 5-2
Hypothesis 4a: Definite Outcome Confirmed
Hypothesis 4b: Agreement Confirmed
Hypothesis 4c: Reduction of Tensions No results
Hypothesis 4d: Actor Satisfaction Mixed results
Part II Conclusion: U.S. Involvement
The section of the models featuring the various U.s. variables lends some support to 
claims of critics of the lack of decisiveness of naval forces. However, while seaborne 
forces alone are less important for the crisis abatement, they also correlate less with 
escalation of crises compared to “all Forces” responses. Consequently, the influence 
that “all Forces” reactions exert on the crisis comes at a high price and might worsen the 
situation rather than help bring it to an end. Thus the dispatch of “all Forces” carries 
the risk of strong, unpredictable reactions, whereas seaborne forces overall exert a more 
moderate influence.
The findings also support critics by showing that responses by naval forces alone 
often correlate with crises where the U.s. activity had no influence on the situation. 
The greater intrusiveness associated with ground forces poses a grave threat and thus 
escalates the situation but brings the strength needed to enforce compliance. This sup-
ports robert Pape’s finding that threats of force and demonstrative uses of force are less 
effective than the use of significant amounts of force in coercion.17 analysis of termina-
tion tempo shows that while seaborne forces alone do not seem to contribute to the pace 
of abatement, these results improve when a distinction between “UsN only” and the 
“UsN-UsMC Team” is made. The latter exercises a positive influence on the speed of 
crisis termination—indeed, stronger than a combined “seaborne-airborne” response, 
albeit still weaker than “all Forces.” But does a fast abatement always imply a better or 
more advantageous crisis outcome? It is possible that “all Forces” contribute to the pace 
of abatement at the cost of long-term stability. This suggests that a positive value for this 
variable is not intrinsically desirable and that the relationships are more complex.
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another analysis focused on the most effective american activity in the crisis. sea-
borne forces are frequently deployed when the most effective U.s. activity takes the 
form of semi-military operations. overall, seaborne forces are more likely correlated 
with all successful U.s. activity levels below the directly military. This supports the 
suggested advantages of subtlety and flexibility. Yet the finding that seaborne forces 
are also more likely to be involved when the american response is “ineffective,” rather 
than when “low-level activity” is successful, was not anticipated. This result would 
argue against the successful backing-up of diplomatic or other political efforts in 
low-level responses by seaborne forces. When only the “form of U.s. involvement” 
is analyzed—that is, without controlling for the “most effective form of involve-
ment”—seaborne forces are mostly deployed in semi-military and low-level operations, 
although in the former only marginally more often than “UsN & other Forces.” “all 
Forces” responses correlate highly with direct military operations. as expected, sea-
borne forces are more likely to deploy in crises where the United states acts as a third 
party and is not involved as a direct crisis actor. The last finding can again be inter-
preted in the context of realist considerations in decision making. When the United 
states is directly involved, the crisis is more likely to concern national interests and is 
thus of greater importance to the nation.
The unsatisfactory measurement of response times posed a major problem for statisti-
cal analyses. The data set did not allow a distinction between the reaction times of the 
different services, for it provided only single dates for the beginning of responses. It 
would be valuable to examine the effects (if any) of different response times, because 
readiness, speed, and independence are great naval advantages. There are significant 
differences between the military services in regard to immediate reaction capabilities. 
often, such as in lebanon in 1958 and in afghanistan in 2001, both forward-deployed 
and surged maritime forces are the first to be ready for deployment and arrive at the 
theater. similarly, the coding of the naval personnel variables is also suboptimal. The 
numbers control only generally for all active UsN personnel outside the United states, 
without taking into account the number of personnel deployed within reaction radius of 
the crisis or from which aor they were dispatched. Controlling for these different fac-
tors might produce insight. The present results suggest that operations below a “direct 
military level” involving the “UsN-UsMC Team” have faster reaction times. This find-
ing confirms my expectation, since ground troops require the longest preparation time 
before they arrive in the theater. as for the number of UsN personnel abroad, positive 
relationships were found with the total number of UsN-UsMC responses per year and 
the number of deployed aircraft carriers.
overall, the qualified decisiveness of naval forces was confirmed. Whereas the dispatch 
of “all Forces” is important for the crisis abatement, it also correlates highly with the 
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category “escalation.” This cannot be ignored, for it bears on the ineffectiveness of 
seaborne forces alone. additionally it would be helpful to see a cost-benefit analysis of 
maritime operations. The UsN offers subtleness and rapid response capabilities but 
often does not exert decisive influence. Nevertheless, seaborne forces are of great impor-
tance in semi-military operations when ground troops are less useful and thus offer a 
promising alternative tool for crisis engagement below direct military activity.
Part II Conclusion: Crisis Outcomes
In terms of crisis outcomes, seaborne forces correlate positively with ambiguous yet for-
mal outcomes. Termination in “stalemate” is most frequent in crises where the United 
states sent naval forces only, while “victory” and, to a greater extent, “defeat” are as-
sociated with “all Forces” responses. “all Forces” also correlate highest with “imposed” 
outcomes, while naval forces are dispatched alone in crises terminating with “formal 
agreements” or “unilateral acts.” one possible explanation is that naval forces are often 
unable to prevent unilateral acts but in successful interventions can shape and promote 
formal agreements. The Navy’s function of backing up diplomacy with limited intru-
siveness, signaling U.s. interest and shaping developments, would support its advantage 
in supporting formal agreements. “all Forces” are strong enough to impose outcomes 
or to help the U.s. ally win the crisis. Thus the definite crisis outcomes (victory/defeat) 
are imposed by the scale of force applied (all forces). This in turn can affect the other 
outcome criteria, “satisfaction” and “tension.”
The results for the effects on tension are more ambiguous. Because the overall model 
fit is poor, the results merely suggest that when “UsN only” responses are treated as a 
separate category, “UsN-UsMC” correlates with a reduction of tension, even more than 
“no naval involvement,” whereas the other service combinations are positively correlated 
with an increase in tension. Nevertheless, the direction of the “eyeball” correlations is 
interesting and deserves further inquiry. The assumption that excessive use of force 
can result in escalation is supported by these results, as well as by the earlier analysis 
measuring the american effectiveness. “UsN-UsMC” forces are a powerful combina-
tion but not as threatening as “all Forces” and thus can influence escalation positively, 
whereas the UsN alone might not provide a sufficient incentive to change behavior. 
Conversely, naval forces may serve as a prelude to stronger U.s. action, thereby feeding 
fear of escalation. In the event of “all Forces” responses, the actor-level results do not 
support my hypothesis that at least for the U.s. allies, tensions might ease. Where only 
one of several actors is supportive of U.s. intervention, the level of tension may not be 
diminished appreciably.
outcomes leaving all actors satisfied are most frequent where seaborne forces were 
dispatched in combination with the air Force, followed by responses with no naval 
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forces. Conversely, “all forces” and “UsN-UsMC” responses were least likely in crises 
where all crisis actors considered the outcomes satisfactory. The correlation between 
“seaborne-airborne” responses and “actor’s satisfaction” remains strong, regardless 
of the perception of the U.s. involvement. one possible explanation could be that the 
force combination was helpful in promoting a satisfactory outcome for all, but only the 
U.s. ally was satisfied with the american involvement. The direction of this variable 
may also be more dependent on the type of the crisis. Contrary to my expectation, 
naval forces alone were not viewed as significantly more favorable by the crisis actors. 
The mere frequencies suggest that UsN forces alone were most often deployed in crises 
characterized by a favorable attitude to U.s. involvement yet dissatisfaction with the 
outcome. However, more robust statistical analyses show that the significance is very 
weak. one possible explanation is the weakness of misperception. Naval signaling 
could be interpreted as a prelude to a stronger american response, a development either 
hoped for or feared. additionally, in some cases the U.s. ally may have been hoping for 
a more powerful response than was provided by naval forces. “all Forces” responses 
generated the highest correlation with unfavorable attitudes toward U.s. involvement. 
on one hand, this is surprising, since the parties favored by U.s. intervention should 
be more satisfied with a stronger commitment. on the other hand, the finding that not 
all parties were satisfied with the outcome was to have been expected, since the variable 
does not distinguish between allies of the United states and non-allies. This can further 
be influenced by the number of actors. With a large number of crisis actors, the scope 
for individual dissatisfaction is greater. Current data do not allow me to explore this 
distinction.
Importantly, the strength of the response should not be measured only by the type of 
service deployed. Blechman and Kaplan already distinguished between the type and 
the level of force.18 a possible measurement for the level of force within naval responses 
is the dispatch of aircraft carriers. a survey study conducted by Zakheim et al. found 
that there seems to be a general consensus among senior opinion leaders that only 
a U.s. carrier presence will be effective during a major crisis.19 In smaller incidents, 
the opinions differed. While some still preferred carriers, others were more cautious 
and favored displays of smaller naval-strength combinations. This question about the 
optimal type of force is crucial for a variety of reasons. generally it is important to 
distinguish between the different force levels involved in naval interventions, indepen-
dent of the service combinations. Blechman and Kaplan analyzed successful outcomes 
from the vantage point of the United states but found negative correlations with higher 
force levels.
Treating definite outcomes as more successful, this analysis reveals different find-
ings. The system-level-data evidence shows that responses without aircraft carrier 
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involvement are more likely to lead to ambiguous outcomes, whereas the stronger the 
Cv force, the more likely a definite outcome becomes. likewise, the absence of Cvs (or 
the use of only one) is positively correlated with a formal agreement, whereas more than 
one Cv strongly increases the chances of an imposed agreement. assuming that the 
United states imposes its will on the crisis actors, the Blechman/Kaplan finding can be 
confirmed. responses without any aircraft carriers concurred most frequently with the 
variable value “all actors satisfied,” whereas there was no “eyeball” correlation for the 
variable “tensions.” The presence of aircraft carriers also indicates the magnitude of the 
crisis, but one should also distinguish between the different force levels within naval 
and other military interventions. Blechman and Kaplan also found a positive influence 
of the commitment of land troops.20 The current data partially confirm this, with the 
strong correlation of all-forces responses and contribution to the pace of abatement, 
followed by UsN-UsMC deployments. While this does not directly control for success, 
the termination of a crisis can in itself be considered a success, independent of the type 
of outcome.
The dependent variables are influenced by many additional intervening factors—for ex-
ample, whether tension is more likely to escalate in crises characterized by high levels of 
violence or high-politics issues, or whether the satisfaction is influenced by the type of 
crisis. However, accounting for all these considerations would result in an overly com-
plex model, and the resulting outputs would be very difficult to interpret. For instance, 
in crises where the actors were satisfied with U.s. involvement but dissatisfied with the 
outcome, it is important not only to distinguish between the different service combina-
tions but also to control for the issue of the crisis or the form of the outcome. This would 
include the influence of the type of mission and the question of what constitutes a posi-
tive outcome. a combat operation is likely to be perceived more negatively by the crisis 
actors than a Neo mission. In this context, it would be helpful to evaluate the views of 
beneficiaries of the missions. The data suggest that in Neo and contingent positioning 
missions, the U.s. crisis involvement is more likely to be perceived as favorable or neu-
tral, whereas its involvement in combat operations is rated unfavorably. shows of force 
generate nearly equal results.
Further research would also have to control for the number of crisis actors, since this 
will influence the correlation between attitude and mission. Currently, the same mis-
sion type is coded for all involved actors. Noteworthy is the high frequency of more than 
one naval mission within a single crisis. This can be interpreted as a confirmation of the 
naval ability to be flexible. For instance, in a single crisis seaborne forces can immedi-
ately react with a show of force, followed by combat operations if necessary, and in the 
aftermath operate in a contingent positioning mission to observe the implementation 
of an agreement, cease-fire, or peace plan. While these are general crisis outcomes, it 
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would also be important to distinguish between what the United states sought to deter 
and whether it succeeded. These goals can be very different from overall crisis charac-
teristics. a comprehensive analysis of positive/negative outcomes should include the 
question of the perspective. Who perceives the outcome as satisfactory? Is a positive 
outcome representative of a peaceful settlement of the crisis terminating in a formal 
agreement, or does it refer to the perception of a crisis actor or of the United states? a 
positive outcome for the United states might just as well be an imposed agreement as a 
formal one, independent of such other considerations as the duration of the resolution 
or the disposition of the majority of the crisis actors.
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Conclusion
In this study I have sought to weave together different ideas on the usefulness of naval 
forces for U.s. crisis management. I created a new data set, measuring the activities of 
seaborne forces in american responses to international crises, by adding new variables 
to an already existing, well established crisis data project.1 By means of combining 
different methodological and theoretical approaches, I have tried to shed light on the 
overarching question: “What is the role of U.s. naval forces in crisis response?” There is 
no short and direct answer. Drawing on various theories and assumptions I found that 
maritime forces are a promising response tool for certain types of crises, yet there is no 
unambiguous response to the question posed above. I broke the research down into 
four categories and have used statistical analyses and historical examples to underline 
my findings.
The more specific research questions posed in the introductory chapter were concerned, 
first, with the types of crises and locations to which U.s. naval forces mostly respond 
alone. seaborne forces deploy in crises characterized by territorial threats and threats 
of low gravity generally and when clearly defined military-security issues are at stake. 
Their involvement is not correlated with crises characterized by low-salience issues. sea-
borne deployments in crises with high levels of violence seem just as frequent as higher-
force levels. There is no particular location that triggers seaborne deployments, but if 
the crisis location is of great geostrategic interest, naval forces will deploy not alone but 
rather together with ground troops. The research questions regarding the crisis actors 
were concerned with the influence of different actors’ characteristics and how they 
perceived the seaborne crisis response. The presence of fewer crisis actors and little or 
no UN involvement is more likely to favor “seaborne only responses,” while the stability 
of the actors does not seem to promote particular types of military response. No results 
were found to answer the question in regard to the perception of the naval involvement. 
The third set of questions looked at the type of U.s. activity, the deployment with other 
military services, and the effectiveness of seaborne responses. all american response 
activity levels below direct military favor “seaborne only deployments.”
In general, the UsN often deploys with the Marine Corps or the air Force. If the U.s. 
army is involved, usually most other services participate as well. all results differed 
depending on whether the baseline was set to “all Forces” or to “no Navy” responses. 
When “all Forces” activities were chosen as baseline, “UsN-UsMC” responses and no 
naval involvement often compared similarly. When “no Navy” was defined as baseline, 
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the results changed to indicate the military character and highlight the adaptability 
of naval forces. In all cases expect for one, “UsN & other Forces” stands for seaborne 
force(s) and “UsaF” and was therefore treated as combination with the air Force. 
Navy–Marine Corps–air Force joint forces proved to represent a highly valuable crisis-
response tool. The question regarding the effectiveness of “seaborne only responses” is 
difficult to answer. While seaborne forces were overall less effective if deployed alone, 
they also show the lowest correlation with an escalation of tension of all military service 
combinations. Thus while seaborne-only responses exert a lower influence, this should 
not be translated as ineffectiveness. The last of the categories, the crisis outcome, was 
concerned with the influence of U.s. naval forces on outcomes. Naval forces correlated 
positively with crises ending with ambiguous outcomes, but also formal agreements, 
suggesting subtle influence that can support diplomatic efforts but not decisively termi-
nate crises. To provide a more detailed overview, figure 50 presents all the hypotheses 
and results after the regression analyses.
FIGure 50
Hypotheses Results Overview
Hypothesis 1a: Low Threat Mixed results
Hypothesis 1b: Low Stake Not confirmed
Hypothesis 1c: Violence Mixed results
Hypothesis 1d: Geostrategic Interest Confirmed
Hypothesis 2a: Number of Actors Confirmed 
Hypothesis 2b: UN Involvement Confirmed
Hypothesis 2c: Political Stability Mixed results
Hypothesis 2d: Attitude to U.S. Activity No results
Hypothesis 3a: Form of Involvement Confirmed
Hypothesis 3b: U.S. Effectiveness Confirmed
Hypothesis 3c: Direct Military Activity Confirmed
Hypothesis 3d: Termination Confirmed
Hypothesis 3e: U.S. Crisis Actor Confirmed
Hypothesis 3f: U.S. Readiness Not confirmed
Hypothesis 4a: Definite Outcome Confirmed
Hypothesis 4b: Agreement Confirmed
Hypothesis 4c: Reduction of Tensions No results
Hypothesis 4d: Actor Satisfaction Mixed results
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Both advantages and disadvantages of naval deployments were confirmed. Many find-
ings point to the benefits of naval forces as flexible, subtle, and ready forces. seaborne 
forces, and to some extent the air Force, have the capability to arrive in the theater 
quickly and respond rapidly but also to stand by, in a wait-and-see posture. They are the 
military response tool of choice in low-level and semi-military U.s. activities. ground 
forces require much longer transition times and are therefore better suited for longer-
lasting crises and they signal a stronger american commitment. The findings that 
greater geostrategic interests, more crisis actors, and direct involvement trigger stronger 
responses can be explained with a realist approach. More idealist goals, such as a right 
intention, in the form of promoting a formal agreement, appear to be more likely to be 
supported by maritime forces. The results supporting realist considerations are stronger, 
and it remains to be seen if the idealist tendency can be confirmed in future studies.
lack of decisiveness should not be overstated; it is not crucial that naval forces be as 
decisive as ground forces. It is more important to implement unique naval capabilities. 
The qualities of naval forces lie in other tasks and advantages that set them apart from 
others and allow different response activities. Fast reaction, limited intrusiveness, and 
the ability to wait and see are great advantages but are not necessarily suitable for all cri-
ses types and settings. For example, if the United states wants to speed up the abatement 
decisively, “all Forces” responses are necessary, but when a stronger emphasis is placed 
on minimizing the chances of escalation caused by U.s. activity, the “UsN-UsMC team” 
presents the better response tool. similarly, if the United states wants to impose an 
outcome, ground troops are necessary, whereas support for reaching a formal agree-
ment is better undertaken by UsN forces alone. Conflict resolution is a central challenge 
of defense management, and many different tools are at the government’s disposal to 
pursue its goals. If the United states wants to intervene successfully in crises, it is crucial 
to study how the characteristics of crises and actors influence naval involvement and 
how, in turn, naval involvement impacts outcomes. american decision makers should 
carefully consider the differences of the service combinations in making their crisis 
response choices. It is thus necessary to analyze the force combinations in more depth, 
further distinguishing between military interventions to improve conflict resolution 
strategies.
This exploratory study presents a variety of promising and interesting results and iden-
tifies areas of interest for future research. Why are naval forces not more successful in 
low-level U.s. activities, through supporting political crisis-resolution efforts? Why are 
naval forces predominant in crises focusing on single military-security issues and ter-
ritorial threats? Why is there no correlation with low-gravity-of-threat crises? How can 
the influence of naval forces on outcomes be interpreted? Why is naval involvement not 
viewed more favorably by crisis actors? examination of the psychological effects of naval 
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forces on an adversary and how they are perceived would provide more useful informa-
tion on the questions of subtlety, intrusiveness, and effectiveness. all of this prompts 
the question of how sailors view themselves, as well as their role and function in conflict 
settings. Naval roles change over time and have to adapt to current threats and chal-
lenges. For example, the vulnerability of U.s. ships, especially of aircraft carriers to the 
enhanced technological resources of potential adversaries, may lead to changes in the 
american approach to crisis resolution. Yet this research suggests the importance of the 
dispatch of at least one aircraft carrier for decisive intervention. Many results, such as of 
hypotheses controlling for outcomes, point to the benefits of sending an aircraft carrier 
to underline intentions and enhance coercion power. More research is required to ana-
lyze when, how, and what type of ship to deploy to achieve the desired outcome.
In the remainder of this conclusion I will discuss the shortcomings of this analysis, 
followed by suggestions for additional data for future research. I will then take a closer 
look at the diplomatic role of naval forces and try to derive lessons from my analyses of 
the role of seaborne forces in crisis response as they pertain to current debates of  
sea power.
Shortcomings
Many of the shortcomings were already mentioned in the discussion of the results, but 
the following paragraphs identify and discuss additional problems.
Small Number of Cases and Generalization
one of the biggest shortcomings is the small number of cases. For further research it 
would be of great interest to expand the latest CNa data set in order to enlarge the num-
ber of cases and to extend them beyond international crises. The CNa studies identified 
more naval responses to international incidents than captured in this project. Follow-
ing the definition of the ICB data project meant that many incidents were excluded. 
But already the definition applied here renders comparisons difficult. The question of 
when responses cross from peacetime to wartime is difficult to answer. By application 
of siegel’s 1995 definition of a threshold of one thousand casualties, incidents as diverse 
as the gulf War in 1990, the six-Day War in 1967, an international crisis in Yemen in 
1979, and minor skirmishes in latin america in 1959 and 1960 are compared.2 By the 
addition of more cases, the different types of crises could be better grouped and distin-
guished. While the current work captures responses only within the time frame of the 
crisis, the inclusion of cases of nonroutine naval involvement before a crisis breaks out 
would allow one to draw more inferences about deterrence capabilities and potentially 
influential reactions taking place in anticipation of the crisis.
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The importance of understanding events before the occurrence of a crisis is illustrated 
by the case of “liberia–sierra leone.” The ICB codes a crisis lasting from 23 March to 
31 october 1991. However, Navy, Marine, and army elements were engaged in a Neo 
in liberia from april 1990 until January 1991, before the crisis outbreak. addition-
ally, the Neo took place in liberia, while the ICB crisis mainly focuses on the crisis in 
sierra leone, as a result of the long-lasting civil war in liberia. It is further important to 
distinguish between different deployments within crises. often, naval forces respond in 
more than one mission to a crisis, and at other times “UsN forces only” either are pres-
ent before other services join the operations or remain after they depart. For example, 
before and after the suez nationalization war in 1956–57, the United states sent naval 
patrol forces with Marines on board to the area. During the peak of the crisis, the U.s. 
response was augmented by the air Force. since it was always the largest force level that 
was coded, this dispatch of maritime forces only before the peak was not captured in 
the data for statistical analysis. The distinctions between independent naval operations 
would allow us to judge better their respective influence on the crisis and their func-
tions within the U.s. military services. 
The treatment of crises occurring within a larger conflict or even war presents an ad-
ditional problem. I tried to focus on naval responses to the specific crisis and not on the 
conflict at large, but alternative approaches might be as valid. In a future study, the cases 
where U.s. military, but not naval, forces were dispatched should be included, to control 
for possible differences. The gorenburg et al. CNa report identifies 167 cases with and 
142 without naval involvement, exclusive of Ha/Dr operations.3 It would be reward-
ing to analyze the type of incidents involving military services exclusive of the naval 
component.
Furthermore, all available CNa data could be enhanced by adding variables including 
controlling for the crisis characteristics, american involvement, actors, and outcomes. 
The inclusion of U.s. intentions and success could also produce useful findings. How-
ever, the CNa data only focus on military responses to situations, thereby excluding 
all U.s. involvements short of deploying military services. It would be worthwhile to 
expand the research to include U.s. response to international incidents short of military 
activities. a larger sample would also allow finer distinctions between the maritime 
forces. The type of mission and the type and level of force, whether power was projected 
ashore, how closely the vessels approached the adversary, and the principal naval and 
Marine activities—all these could collectively shed more light on the influence and 
responses of naval forces. There is a fundamental difference between whether Marines 
were just present and whether they landed, and if so, whether in conjunction with a 
Neo or in combat.
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The currently low number of “UsN only” cases allows for a limited number of hypoth-
eses differentiating between UsN and UsN-UsMC forces. as shown, this differentia-
tion can produce insight on the variables “geographic location,” “UN involvement,” 
“U.s. contribution to pace of abatement,” “ambiguous outcome,” and “tension.” a larger 
number of cases would enable the inclusion of a factor controlling for the level of force 
within the UsN activity. analyses providing results on the influence of the type and 
strength of different ships for successful outcomes could also prove helpful in the cur-
rent debate about the necessary number and types of ships. simple frequency distribu-
tions have suggested that the force level does play an important role. overall, it would be 
very helpful if there were a more standardized process to capture “naval data” within the 
Department of the Navy. The lack of consistent and uniform documentation renders the 
data collection very challenging and comparisons difficult.
all these shortcomings present me with the very problem I criticized in other data 
sets—generalization, particularly the generalization of “military interventions.” While 
this project contributes to the understanding of the different functions and capabilities 
of the armed services, thus differentiating between different forms of military interven-
tions, it entailed compromises and generalizations.
Simple Regression Models
Because a wide variety of different variables was included, the analysis is composed of 
many different individual models and is not structured to test different theoretical ap-
proaches against each other in one comprehensive model. While its approach provides 
a broad overview of how naval forces are deployed in international crises, it limits depth 
of analysis. The reliance on largely individual models, given their inability to control for 
interactive effects, supports simple correlations with a measurement of association of 
strength to describe the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
The stepwise regression models lowered both the Exp(B) values and the number of 
significant results. This is not surprising, since the independent variables intercorrelate 
with unpredictable effects on the dependent variable.
Moreover, it also suggests that certain variables are not as influential as assumed from 
the simple regression outputs. Future models have to determine which factors remain 
important when they are no longer treated separately. as always, the independent vari-
able is just one factor impacting the dependent variable; there are many other influ-
ences on both the dependent and independent variables. This is especially true for 
simple models including one independent variable and thus outputting only a low R2 
value. This suggests a low strength of association, because many other relevant factors 
impacting the dependent variable are not accounted for. With more data at hand, future 
research should strive to generate more complex models, controlling for interaction 
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effects. Nevertheless, the presentation of frequencies and simple regression analyses 
were sufficient for the purpose of this projects, since a stated goal was to generate a new 
data set, thereby preparing the groundwork for future projects, and to determine which 
factors deserve inquiry in greater depth.
The Maritime Century: The Way Ahead
I will end by focusing on the diplomatic functions of the UsN and the usefulness of the 
sea-air team. I believe these results can offer valuable insight when placed in the larger 
context of the role of seaborne forces in the twenty-first century, which many analysts 
have termed the “maritime century,” because of the influence sea power exercises on 
international events.4 as admiral roughead said, “our Navy is very different than the 
larger U.s. navies of the past. and while our Navy is very different, and much smaller, 
we are also facing a new emerging order that I believe requires more naval power.”5 
First I will briefly discuss the promising combination of seaborne forces and the U.s. 
air Force.
AirSea Battle
since its publication by the Center for strategic and Budgetary assessments in May 
2010, the airsea Battle concept has garnered significant attention. I do not mean to 
attempt to evaluate the concept but rather to apply my findings to the usefulness of the 
sea-air team. The airsea Battle concept “rests fundamentally on the tight integration of 
air Force and Navy operations in the WPTo [Western Pacific Theater of operations]—
each service plays a key enabling role for the other in accomplishing critical missions.”6 
Many of the results of this study strongly underline the effectiveness of the combination 
of sea and airborne forces. signaling and coercion power can be enhanced, while much 
of the present flexibility and readiness can be maintained. The influence exerted is sim-
ilar to a deployment of ground troops and the deterrent effect is significant, but the level 
of commitment is lower and less intrusive. For example, in crises involving multiple 
issues and when governmental instability is high, the combination with the air Force 
has been the response tool of choice, suggesting its usefulness in complex situations. 
Yet unlike the deployment of ground troops, sea-air forces are more likely deployed in 
U.s. activities below direct military involvements, supporting the arguments of lower 
intrusiveness and greater flexibility.
additionally, the sea-air team is also viewed as more favorable by the actors and shows a 
high “eyeball” correlation with crises where U.s. activity is important for the abatement; 
only one case coincided with activity responsible for an escalation of the situation. of 
course, these findings do not directly influence the desired antiaccess and area-denial 
capabilities, but as Jose Carreno and his coauthors say, “The salient question is, to what 
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extent did and does cooperation either make U.s. forces more efficient or create real 
synergy? . . . [I]t is important to understand that the Navy, by itself, was able then and is 
capable now to conduct an air-sea battle. [The concept] must integrate some unique set 
of capabilities from both services to create real synergistic effects that neither service 
can accomplish individually.”7 The many positive results of a combination with the air 
Force found in this study are particularly promising and can help to begin identifying 
situations where a combination of forces is most useful.8 a more careful analysis of these 
dynamics can improve effectiveness, enhance synergies, and inform the implementation 
of airsea Battle.
Naval Diplomacy
Three results in particular—the frequency of the use of naval forces short of direct mili-
tary activities, the correlation with low or no UN involvement, and the impact on crisis 
outcomes—underlined the diplomatic potential of naval forces. The Global Strategic 
Assessment of 2009 came to the following conclusion: “The character of war is changing. 
low-level uses of force and greater civil-military integration, whether to interdict traf-
fickers or conduct humanitarian operations, are becoming more necessary.”9 To support 
diplomatic initiatives—especially in low-level activities—with military strength is an 
important task for naval forces. The results of this study distinguish the Navy from the 
other services, especially short of direct military involvement; still, the statistics are not 
as supportive as I had expected. seaborne forces alone dominate lower-level U.s. deploy-
ments, but the overall number of responses was rather small, and the effectiveness of 
the activity not what would be hoped for. although the previous paragraph points to 
the effectiveness of a sea-air combination, naval forces acting alone do possess critical 
advantages that make them particularly suited for diplomatic tasks.
The study also provides very encouraging results supporting the importance of naval 
forces with respect to their diplomatic potential and their subtleness. The strong and 
positive relation between no or low-level UN involvement and “UsN only” responses 
highlights the diplomatic rather than the offensive military role of naval forces. Further-
more, the positive correlation between formal agreements and naval forces suggests a 
subtle positive influence on the solution-finding process and the form of outcome. over 
the years there has been a clear decline in operations carried out by maritime forces 
alone, as the United states seems to place emphasis on deploying forces jointly. This 
development has been observed in many other studies since the end of the 1980s.10 The 
data confirm that after 1985, joint operations dominate american crisis response, the 
change coinciding with the goldwater-Nichols act of 1986.
While joint operations have proved themselves, this very success undermines the 
Navy’s ability to exploit its diplomatic potential to the fullest. since 1990 only four of 
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the international crises featured a maritime response only. In 1994, during the second 
North Korean nuclear crisis, naval vessels were displayed in a show of force, and again 
during the Taiwan strait crisis in 1995–96 the United states deployed two aircraft carri-
ers in a show of force. The presence of naval forces, it is said, played an important role in 
both cases. In the former they contributed to maintaining the stability during the nego-
tiations.11 During the latter, the naval deployments were a successful coercive diplomacy 
effort to guarantee stability during the Taiwanese elections by deterring the Chinese.12 
The two other crises involving the UsN-UsMC team came in the form of two Neos: in 
1998 in the ethiopia-eritrea crisis (although the mission was ultimately canceled) and 
lebanon in 2006.
Naval diplomacy also has a crucial preventive role before crisis breaks out, an important 
aspect not captured in this analysis. Because every crisis is treated in the data as one 
unit, I have not accounted for the different responses within one crisis, such as changing 
missions or different levels of coercive diplomacy, or for the timing of the deployment 
of other military services. For example, the data do not distinguish between “sticks” 
employed after “carrots” have failed to solve the crisis and the two used simultaneously. 
During the Bosnia crisis, for instance, the United states remained reluctant to approve 
air strikes, but naval forces arrived in the theater in the very early stages. Because the 
response is coded at the highest service-combination level, the Bosnia case does not 
account for UsN involvement only. especially in the beginning, the naval involvement 
was largely meant to establish a blockade, which it successfully did. analysis in greater 
depth of the timing could provide more insight into these dynamics and report such 
effective outcomes as this.
But most importantly, naval diplomacy is a central task for the UsN on a daily basis and 
is not restricted to crisis response. Port visits and joint exercises also serve diplomatic 
functions, and the United states has employed its naval forces to coerce and deter on 
many occasions during routine deployments. The recent U.s. attempt to highlight the 
role of soft power inevitably portends an increased emphasis on diplomacy. as the 
QDr states,
as a global power, the United states has a broad range of tools for advancing its national interests 
described above. Whenever possible, we seek to pursue those interests through cooperation, diplo-
macy, economic development and engagement, and the power of america’s ideas and values. When 
absolutely necessary, the United states and its allies have shown the willingness and ability to resort 
to force in defense of our interests and the common good.13
With the steadily increasing criticality of the Indo-Pacific commons, the use of naval di-
plomacy will become even more important. This strategy is not confined to the United 
states; many nations have turned to their naval forces to demonstrate interest and 
intention. The results in this study suggest that naval forces as a diplomatic tool in crises 
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are underutilized and that the Navy would have much to offer. This observation is also 
supported by a 2009 Naval Institute Proceedings article calling for the reintroduction of 
naval diplomacy, described as one of the most valuable national resources.14 The 2007 
maritime strategy emphasizes soft power and low-level UsN activities. In contrast, as 
Pritchett points out, no special chapter is devoted to naval diplomacy in the NoP 2010.15 
He urges that humanitarian assistance and disaster relief be integrated as part of, and 
within, the broader frame of naval diplomacy. Ha and Dr were excluded in the present 
analysis, but they offer promising ways of exercising soft power and thus diplomatic 
influence. Polls revealed that disaster relief delivered in response to the Indian ocean 
tsunami in 2004–2005 or the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005 resulted in a more positive 
attitude toward the United states.16 Humanitarian assistance missions can improve the 
image of the United states, especially through the annual deployments of operations 
Continuing Promise and Pacific Partnership. Yet it is crucial to understand 
better the impact and the actual benefits of Ha and Dr, as well as the forms of naval 
diplomacy captured in this study, to U.s. interests.
This study presents some preliminary findings, but it will be necessary to find better 
measures of the influence that naval diplomacy exerts, especially in a time of “low-level 
uses of force and greater civil-military integration.”17 Cable concludes that “gunboat di-
plomacy is a screwdriver intended to turn a particular screw. It is not a hammer that will 
bang home any old nail.”18 This statement explains the importance of understanding 
possibilities and limitations of the impact and success of naval diplomacy. Naval forces 
alone will not decisively impose outcomes in large-scale international crises, as the 
results have confirmed. If doing so is the U.s. goal, other means should be chosen. The 
tasks assigned the UsN should be more specific and limited, such as to deter a certain 
move by one of the actors or to support political efforts. Thus, before any conclusions 
are drawn in regard to the limited decisiveness of naval forces in this context, one has to 
take such considerations into account. Depending on the crisis and american objec-
tives, naval forces alone may or may not be sufficient. luttwak finds that the influence 
of naval diplomacy is largely determined by the reaction of others, rather than by the 
intentions of the employing actor.19
This could prove interesting in the context of the increasing tensions with China in the 
western Pacific. J. J. Widen summarizes luttwak’s thought process as follows: “a latent 
and unintended application of naval diplomacy—routine fleet movements—could be 
more effective and considered more threatening than an active and planned threat us-
ing naval forces, which could sometimes be completely ignored.”20 This aspect of naval 
diplomacy—in light of the continuous U.s. presence in the Indo-Pacific commons—is 
of the highest interest, and understanding this dynamic can provide useful guidance. 
luttwak offers more lessons that remain relevant today, especially in regard to the 
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discussion of the number of ships and their types, and above all the need for aircraft 
carriers. For naval diplomacy, he argued, it is often more important to be visible than 
to be viable for combat. He had in mind the soviet Union, which built ships not only 
for combat but also to impress other actors. While one particular ship might not offer 
decisive combat power, it can still serve as a symbol for the might of the country, with 
backup readily available. “The dominating framework of armed suasion is thus the 
domestic, international and local political context, which in combination will determine 
the absolute feasibility, and degree of success, of its exercise.”21
such ideas should inform forward presence, exercises, port visits, and other such consid-
erations, as these lessons can be applied to today’s geopolitical situation, especially in 
the Indo-Pacific. again, it depends on the type of influence the United states wishes to 
exert. For influencing outcomes decisively, this study suggests the importance of more 
powerful forces, including aircraft carriers. This might not be necessary for lower-level, 
diplomatic missions.
overall, it is important to collect more data to confirm the usefulness of naval forces 
in low-level activities. The practicalities of measurement are very challenging, but this 
study provides a first step that can be built on in the future to evaluate how to employ 
naval diplomacy effectively and when this tool is appropriate. In 2009 Michael Quigley 
wrote, “a wide range of naval options—from sending a small escort ship sailing within 
sight from a foreign port to parking an entire carrier group off the coast—can provide a 
multitude of diplomatic options. gunboat diplomacy can prevent or even resolve inter-
national crisis situations.”22 In the current debates regarding the future of the U.s. Navy, 
such considerations should be given more weight, especially in this maritime century.
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Appendix A: Crises Summaries 
A.1. Crisis Listing 
# ICB Crisis # Start Year Name Crisis Actors 
     
1.  110 1946 Communism in Poland USSR 
2.  111 1946 Turkish Straits Turkey, US 
3.  112 1946 Greek Civil War Greece 
4.  113 1947 Communism in Hungary Hungary, USSR 
5.  114 1947 Truman Doctrine Greece, Turkey, US 
6.  115 1947 Marshall Plan Czechoslovakia, Russia 
7.  116 1947 Indonesia Independence II Netherlands, Indonesia 
8.  120 1947 Palestine Partition/Israel Independence Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria 
9.  121 1948 Communism in Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia, USSR 
10.  123 1948 Berlin Blockade France, UK, US, USSR 
11.  125 1948 China Civil War China, US 
12.  126 1948 Costa Rica-Nicaragua I Costa Rica 
13.  127 1948 Indonesia Independence Iii Indonesia, Netherlands 
14.  128 1948 Sinai Incursion Egypt, Israel, UK 
15.  131 1949 Soviet Bloc-Yugoslavia Yugoslavia 
16.  132 1950 Korean War I China, South Korea, Taiwan, US 
17.  133 1950 Korean War II North Korea, People's Republic of China, South 
Korea, US, USSR 
18.  134 1951 Hula Drainage Greece, Italy 
19.  135 1951 Punjab War Scare I India, Pakistan 
20.  136 1951 Suez Canal Egypt, UK 
21.  137 1952 Catalina Affair Sweden 
22.  138 1953 Burma Infiltration Burma 
23.  139 1953 Invasion of Laos I France, Laos 
24.  140 1953 Korean War III China, North Korea, South Korea; US 
25.  141 1953 East German Uprising Russia 
26.  142 1953 Trieste II Italy, Yugoslavia 
27.  143 1953 Qibya Jordan 
28.  144 1953 Guatemala Guatemala, Honduras 
29.  145 1954 Dien Bien Phu France, UK, US 
30.  146 1954 Taiwan Strait I China, Taiwan, US 
31.  147 1955 Costa Rica-Nicaragua II Costa Rica, Nicaragua 
32.  148 1955 Baghdad Pact Egypt 
33.  149 1956 Gaza Raid-Czechoslovakia Arms Egypt, Israel 
34.  152 1956 Suez Nationalization-War Egypt, France, Israel, UK, US, USSR 
35.  153 1956 Qalailya Israel, Jordan  
36.  154 1956 Poland Liberalization Poland, USSR 
37.  155 1956 Hungarian Uprising Hungary, USSR 
38.  156 1957 Mocoron Incident Honduras, Nicaragua 
39.  157 1957 Jordan Regime Jordan 
40.  158 1957 France-Tunisia Tunisia 
41.  159 1957 Syria-Turkey Confrontation Syria, Turkey, US 
42.  160 1957 IFNI Spain 
43.  161 1957 West Irian I Netherlands 
44.  164 1958 Abortive Coup Indonesia Indonesia 
45.  165 1958 Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval Jordan, Lebanon, UK, US 
46.  166 1958 Taiwan Strait II People's Republic of China, Taiwan, US 
47.  168 1958 Berlin Deadline France, German Democratic Republic, German 
Federal Republic, UK, US, USSR 
48.  170 1959 Central America-Cuba I Dominican Republic, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama 
49.  171 1959 China-India Border I China, India 
50.  172 1959 Shatt-Al-Arab I Iran, Iraq 
51.  175 1960 Failed Assassination-Venezuela Dominican Republic, Venezuela 
52.  176 1960 Congo I-Katanga Belgium, Congo 
53.  178 1960 Central America-Cuba II Guatemala, Nicaragua 
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54.  180 1961 Pathet Lao Offensive Thailand, US 
55.  181 1961 Bay of Pigs Cuba, US 
56.  182 1961 Pushtunistan III Afghanistan, Pakistan 
57.  185 1961 Berlin Wall DDR, France, UK, US, USSR, West Germany 
58.  186 1961 Vietcong Attack South Vietnam, US 
59.  187 1961 West Iraian II Indonesia, Netherlands 
60.  190 1961 Goa II Portugal 
61.  192 1962 Taiwan Strait III China 
62.  193 1962 Nam Tha  Thailand, US 
63.  194 1962 China-India Border II China, India 
64.  195 1962 Yemen War I Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen 
65.  196 1962 Cuban Missiles Cuba, Soviet Union, US 
66.  197 1963 Malysia Federation Indonesia, Malaysia 
67.  198 1963 Dominican Republic-Haiti II Dominican Republic, Haiti 
68.  200 1963 Cuba-Venezuela Venezuela 
69.  202 1963 Cyprus I Cyprus, Greece, Turkey 
70.  203 1963 Jordan Waters Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria 
71.  206 1964 Panama Flag Panama, US 
72.  208 1964 Ogaden I Ethiopia, Somalia 
73.  210 1964 Gulf of Tonkin North Vietnam, US 
74.  211 1964 Congo II Belgium, Congo, US, USSR 
75.  212 1964 Yemen War III Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen 
76.  213 1965 Pleiku South Vietnam, North Vietnam, US 
77.  214 1965 Rann of Kutch India, Pakistan 
78.  215 1965 Dominican Intervention US 
79.  216 1965 Kashmir III-Nuclear Confrontation India, Pakistan 
80.  218 1965 Rhodesia's Udi Zambia 
81.  219 1966 Yemen War IV Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen 
82.  220 1966 El Samu Israel, Jordan 
83.  221 1967 Che Guevara-Bolivia Bolivia 
84.  222 1967 Six Day War Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, US, USSR 
85.  223 1967 Cyprus III Cyprus, Greece, Turkey 
86.  224 1968 Pueblo South Korea, North Korea, US 
87.  225 1968 TET Offensive South Vietnam, US 
88.  226 1968 Karameh Israel, Jordan 
89.  227 1968 Prague Spring Offensive Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, USSR 
90.  228 1968 Essequibo I Guyana 
91.  229 1968 Beirut Airport Lebanon 
92.  230 1969 Vietnam Spring Offensive South Vietnam, US 
93.  231 1969 Ussuri River China, USSR 
94.  232 1969 War of Attrition Egypt, Israel, USSR 
95.  233 1969 EC-121 Spy Plane US 
96.  235 1969 Football War El Salvador, Honduras 
97.  236 1969 Cairo Agreement-PLO Lebanon 
98.  237 1970 Invasion of Cambodia Cambodia, North Vietnam, South Vietnam, US 
99.  238 1970 Black September Israel, Jordan, Syria, US 
100.  239 1970 Cienfuegos Submarine Base US 
101.  240 1970 Conakry Raid Guinea 
102.  241 1971 Invasion of Laos II Laos, North Vietnam 
103.  242 1971 Bangladesh Bangladesh, India, Pakistan 
104.  246 1972 Vietnam Port Mining North Vietnam, South Vietnam, US 
105.  249 1972 Christmas Bombing North Vietnam, South Vietnam, US 
106.  254 1973 Cod War I Iceland, UK 
107.  255 1973 October-Yom Kippur War Egypt, Israel, Soviet Union, Syria, US 
108.  256 1973 Oman- South Yemen Oman 
109.  257 1974 Cyprus III Cyprus, Greece, Turkey 
110.  258 1974 Final North Vietnam Offensive Cambodia, US 
111.  259 1975 Mayaguez Cambodia, US 
112.  260 1975 War in Angola Angola, Cuba, South Africa, Soviet Union, US, 
Zaire, Zambia 
113.  261 1975 Moroccan March Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Spain 
114.  263 1975 Cod War Iceland, UK 
115.  265 1976 Lebanon Civil War Syria 
116.  267 1976 Operation Thrasher Mozambique, Zimbabwe 
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117.  272 1976 Aegean Sea I Greece, Turkey 
118.  273 1976 Nagomia Raid Mozambique 
119.  274 1976 Poplar Tree North Korea, US 
120.  275 1976 Syria Mobilization Israel 
121.  277 1977 Shaba I Angola, Congo 
122.  278 1977 Mapai Seizure Mozambique 
123.  279 1977 Belize II Iceland, UK 
124.  281 1977 Egypt-Libya Clashes Egypt, Libya 
125.  282 1977 Ogaden II Ethiopia, Somalia 
126.  283 1977 Rhodesia Raid Zambia 
127.  286 1977 Chimoio-Tembue Raids Mozambique 
128.  287 1977 Beagle Channel I Argentina, Chile 
129.  289 1978 Litani Operation Lebanon 
130.  291 1978 Cassinga Incident Angola, South Africa 
131.  292 1978 Shaba II Angola, Belgium, France, US, Zaire 
132.  293 1978 Air Rhodesia Incident Zimbabwe, Zambia 
133.  294 1978 Nicaragua Civil War II Costa Rica, Nicaragua 
134.  295 1978 Beagle Channel II Argentina, Chile 
135.  296 1978 Fall of Amin Libya, Tanzania, Uganda 
136.  298 1978 Sino-Vietnam War China, North Vietnam 
137.  301 1979 North-South Yemen II North Yemen, South Yemen 
138.  303 1979 Afghanistan Invasion Afghanistan, Pakistan, Soviet Union, US 
139.  306 1979 Soviet Threat Pakistan Pakistan 
140.  307 1979 Rhodesia Settlement Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
141.  309 1979 US Hostages in Iran Iran, US 
142.  310 1979 Colombia-Nicaragua Colombia, Nicaragua 
143.  311 1980 Raid on Gafsa Libya, Tunisia 
144.  315 1980 Solidarity Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, 
Poland, USSR 
145.  317 1980 Onset Iran- Iraq War Iran, Iraq 
146.  319 1980 Jordan- Syria Confrontation Jordan 
147.  321 1981 Chad-Libya V France, Libya 
148.  322 1981 Ecuador-Peru Border III Ecuador, Peru 
149.  324 1981 Iraq Nuclear Reactor Iraq, Israel 
150.  327 1981 Al-Biby Missiles I Israel, Syria 
151.  329 1981 Coup Attempt in the Gambia Senegal 
152.  330 1981 Gulf of Syrte I Libya 
153.  331 1981 Operation Protea Angola 
154.  332 1981 Galtat Zemmouri I Morocco 
155.  335 1982 Khorramsahr Iraq 
156.  336 1982 Falkland/Malvinas Argentina, UK 
157.  337 1982 War in Lebanon Israel, Lebanon, Syria 
158.  338 1982 Ogaden III Ethiopia, Somalia 
159.  339 1982 Lesotho Raid Lesotho 
160.  340 1983 Libya Threat to Sudan Egypt, Libya, Sudan 
161.  342 1983 Chad- Libya VI Chad, France, Libya 
162.  343 1983 Invasion of Grenada Grenada, US 
163.  344 1983 Able Archer Russia 
164.  347 1983 Operation Askari Angola 
165.  348 1984 Basra- Kharg Island Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
166.  350 1984 Omdurman Bombing Egypt, Libya, Sudan 
167.  351 1984 Vietnam Incursion into Thailand Thailand 
168.  352 1984 Sino-Vietnam Clashes China, North Vietnam 
169.  354 1984 Nicaragua MIG-21S Nicaragua, US 
170.  355 1985 Botswana Raid Botswana 
171.  356 1985 Expulsion of Tunisians Tunisia 
172.  357 1985 Al-Biqa Missiles II Israel, Syria 
173.  358 1985 Egypt Air Hijacking Egypt, Libya 
174.  360 1985 South Africa Raid on Lesotho Lesotho 
175.  361 1986 Capture of Al-Faw Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
176.  362 1986 Chad- Libya VII Chad, France, Libya 
177.  363 1986 Gulf of Syrte II Libya, USA 
178.  365 1986 South Africa Cross Border Raid Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
179.  369 1986 Contras II Honduras, Nicaragua 
180.  370 1986 Chad-Libya VIII Chad, Libya 
Seaborne Crisis Response                                                                                                                                             Appendix A. Crises Summaries 
4 
 
181.  373 1987 Todghere incident Somalia 
182.  376 1987 Aegean Sea III Greece, Turkey 
183.  379 1987 Mecca Pilgrimage Iran, Saudi Arabia 
184.  380 1987 South Africa Intervention in Angola Angola, South Africa 
185.  383 1988 Contras III Honduras, Nicaragua 
186.  385 1988 Iraq Recapture of Al-Faw Iran, Iraq 
187.  386 1988 Libyan Jets Libya, US 
188.  388 1989 Cambodia Peace Conference Cambodia, North Vietnam 
189.  391 1989 Invasion of Panama Panama, US 
190.  392 1990 Kashmir III-Nuclear Confrontation India, Pakistan 
191.  393 1990 Gulf War Bahrain,Egypt,France,Iraq,Israel,Kuwait,Oman,Qat
ar,Saudi Arabia,Syria,UAE,UK,US 
192.  394 1990 Rwanda-Uganda Rwanda 
193.  395 1991 Liberia-Sierra Leone Sierra Leone 
194.  397 1991 Yugoslavia I: Croatia-Slovenia Croatia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia 
195.  398 1991 Bubiyan Kuwait 
196.  399 1991 Foreign Intervention in Zaire Belgium, Congo, France 
197.  400 1991 Ecuador-Peru Border IV Ecuador, Peru 
198.  401 1991 Nagorny-Karabakh Armenia, Azerbaijan 
199.  403 1992 Yugoslavia II: Bosnia Bosnia, Croatia, Yugoslavia 
200.  406 1992 Iraq No-Fly Zone Iraq 
201.  408 1993 North Korean Nuclear North Korea, South Korea, US 
202.  409 1993 Operation Accountability Israel, Lebanon 
203.  411 1994 Haiti Military Regime Haiti, US 
204.  412 1994 Iraq Droop Deployment- Kuwait Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, US 
205.  413 1995 Ecuador-Peru V Ecuador, Peru 
206.  415 1995 Taiwan Strait IV China, Taiwan 
207.  416 1995 Red Sea Islands Eritrea, Yemen 
208.  417 1996 Aegean Sea IV Greece, Turkey 
209.  418 1996 Operation Grapes of Wrath Israel, Lebanon 
210.  419 1996 Desert Strike Iraq, US 
211.  420 1996 North Korean Submarine North Korea 
212.  421 1996 Zaire Civil War Rwanda, Zaire 
213.  422 1997 UNSCOM I Iraq, US 
214.  423 1998 Cyprus-Turkey Missile Crisis Cyprus, Turkey 
215.  424 1998 Ethiopia-Eritrea Eritrea, Ethiopia 
216.  425 1998 Indian-Pakistan Nuclear Tests India, Pakistan 
217.  426 1998 DRC Civil War Angola, Chad, Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe 
218.  427 1998 US Embassy Bombings Afghanistan, Sudan, US 
219.  428 1998 Syria-Turkey  Syria 
220.  429 1998 UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox Iraq, UK, US 
221.  430 1999 Kosovo Albania,Belgium,Canada,France,Germany,Italy,Net
herlands,Portugal,Spain,UK,US,Yugoslavia 
(Serbia) 
222.  431 1999 Kashmir IV Kargil India, Pakistan 
223.  432 1999 East Timor II Australia, Indonesia 
224.  433 2001 Caspian Sea Azerbaijan 
225.  434 2001 Afghanistan- USA Afghanistan, Pakistan, UK, US 
226.  436 2001 Indian Parliament Attack India, Pakistan 
227.  437 2002 Kaluchak India, Pakistan 
228.  438 2002 Parsley Island Spain, Morocco 
229.  439 2002 Pankisi Gorge Russia, Georgia 
230.  440 2002 Iraq Regime Change Iraq, UK, USA 
231.  441 2002  North Korea Nuclear II USA, North Korea 
232.  442 2003 Iran Nuclear I France, Germany, UK, Iran 
233.  443 2003 Haifa Suicide Bombing Israel, Syria 
234.  444 2004 DRC - Rwanda Congo, Rwanda 
235.  445 2004 South Ossetia - Abkhazia Georgia, Russia 
236.  446 2005 Ethiopia – Eritrea II Ethiopia, Eritrea 
237.  448 2006 Iran Nuclear II France, USA, UK, Iran 
238.  449 2006 Chad-Sudan II Chad, Sudan 
239.  450 2006 North Korean Nuclear III USA, North Korea 
240.  451 2006 Israel Lebanon War II Israel, Lebanon 
241.  452 2006 Ethiopia Invasion Somalia Ethiopia 
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A.2. International Crises with USN Involvement 
The following appendix A.2 summarizes the crises in which the U.S. Navy was involved. It is 
not meant to be a comprehensive account of the international crises as such is already provided 
by the ICB. All cases are structured in the same order. For each crisis, a short summary of the 
ICB crisis description, including additional information about the USN involvement is provided. 
Information was collected from USN ship histories and available materials at the operational 
archives, such as command histories and reports by the CNO. Any additional sources are 
referenced. The reference Proceedings refers to the United States Naval Institutes Proceedings 
May issue (since 1970) published in the year following the crisis. Because of the enormous 
differences in the amount of information available for the cases, the crises descriptions vary 
greatly in length and detail. Each case includes the ICB crisis number and the codings from all 
applicable datasets: ICB, CNA I (Siegel), CNA II (Mahoney) and CNA III (Cobble, Gaffney, 
and Goreburg) for the variables name, start and end date and form of U.S. involvement. 96 cases 
are described, including Afghanistan, Iraq and the three cases where naval involvement could not 
be confirmed sufficiently to qualify for the statistical analyses. 
1. # 111 Turkish Straits; 8/7/1946 – 10/26/1946, 81 
The Turkish straits crisis in 1946 presented a threat to national security for Turkey and 
demonstrated U.S. naval commitment in the Mediterranean to support countries struggling 
against communist influence—as after the Second World War it had promised to do. Soviet 
activities mounted a growing threat to Eastern Europe in 1946. When a crisis broke out between 
Turkey and the Soviet Union, this commitment was put to the test. But before the outbreak, an 
important diplomatic event took place: in April 1946 the battleship USS Missouri (BB 63) 
departed the United States for Turkey carrying the remains of the deceased Turkish ambassador 
to the United States. Missouri was the ship on board which Japan had surrendered at the end of 
the war (Blechmand and Kaplan 1978, 1); sending it was a clear demonstration of American 
support for Turkey and a prelude to a permanent presence in the Mediterranean. Besides visiting 
Turkey, the battleship also underscored the U.S. commitment to Greece. Missouri demonstrated 
the unique role of the Navy versus those of the Air Force and Army. The vessel could be sent to 
the vicinity without a real commitment, but if necessary this political use of force could promptly 
be converted into a military use of force.  
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The Turkish straits crisis was triggered by two Soviet demands in August 1946; the Soviet Union 
sought naval bases and joint control over the straits. Simultaneously, the Soviets increased their 
naval activity in the region. As a direct response, the United States expanded its own naval 
activity. After a visit to Lisbon, USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CV 42) entered the Mediterranean 
on 8 August. The presence of the world’s largest aircraft carrier was intended to demonstrate the 
American commitment to Turkey in response to a Soviet buildup on the Turkish border and to 
signal concern about in-creased Soviet naval activity in the Black Sea. While the carrier did not 
visit Turkey, its presence sent a clear message of Washington’s intentions to resist Soviet 
expansion. The deployment of an aircraft carrier offered the possibility of U.S. support on the 
mainland through power projection ashore, should the Soviet Union invade Turkey. The 
advantage of flexibility allows observing the events, yet flexing muscles and exerting influence. 
The United States was able to demonstrate a commitment yet stay out of the way if no direct 
action was necessary. The deployment of stronger forces would likely have been interpreted as a 
direct involvement on the part of the United States and would have heightened tensions and 
anxiety. At the same time, it was a perfect occasion to begin the permanent stationing of U.S. 
ships in the Mediterranean. Previously, U.S. naval forces in the Mediterranean had consisted 
mostly of destroyers, cruisers, and auxiliary vessels. Soviet power and influence had expanded 
after the end of 1945 and posed a threat to the strategically important Mediterranean, a favorable 
environment for the exploitation of the diplomatic advantages of naval forces. Although the 
Soviet Union downplayed the importance of the American naval buildup, the permanent U.S. 
presence—announced in September 1946—was important to conveying a message of immediate 
readiness should any country need support against communist influence. Another purpose of the 
deployment was to show support for the government in Greece in its battle against the 
Communists (see case #112). 
(The CNA I study combines Turkey and Greece as one crisis: Siegel describes increased naval 
activity in the Mediterranean) 
Additional Sources: Alvarez 1974; Baer 1994, 282 – 283, Cane 1975; Sheehy 1983 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Turkish Straits 8/7/1946 – 10/26/1946, 81 3  
CNA I  Turkey/Greece 8/16/1946, 148 USN & USMC 1 CV & Amp 
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2. # 112 Greek Civil War; 11/13/1946 – 2/28/1947, 108 
Greek guerillas and the Greek government were embroiled in an ongoing conflict. On 13 
November 1946 the guerillas, supported by the Communist regime in Yugoslavia, launched a 
serious attack on Greece culminating in a crisis. The Greek army responded with military 
operations on 18 November. In addition, Greece appealed to the UN Security Council, and in 
January 1947 the UNSC authorized a fact-finding mission. The mission confirmed infiltrations 
across Greece's borders. On the day the U.S. government encouraged Greece to draft a request of 
aid from the United States, the crisis is said to have ended. The request led President Truman to 
seek Congressional approval for economic and military assistance (see Case #114). Although the 
immediate crisis ended, the conflict continued over the next two years.  
During this crisis U.S. naval forces were still in the Mediterranean because of their deployment 
in the Turkish Strait crisis. The USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s (CV 42) visit prior to the 
outbreak of this crisis was part of the demonstration of U.S. support for the Greek government. 
The Mediterranean deployment lasted until early 1947.  
Additional Sources: Cane 1975, Sheehy 1983 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Greek Civil War 11/13/1946–2/28/1947, 108 2  
CNA I  Turkey/Greece 8/16/1946, 148 USN & USMC 1 CV & Amp 
 
3. # 114 Truman Doctrine; 2/21/1947 – 5/22/1947, 91 
On 21 February 1946 the government of the United Kingdom declared that it was no longer 
capable of supporting Greece and Turkey. This announcement triggered a crisis for Greece, 
Turkey and the United States. Turkey and Greece both turned to the U.S. for help. The United 
States was now faced with a difficult decision: a refusal to provide aid to the two countries 
would signal lack of interest in Eastern Europe and encourage Soviet hegemony. Truman 
decided to become engaged. The U.S. would grant Greece and Turkey economic and military aid 
in their struggle against the Communists, ending the crisis for all three actors. With the support 
of Congress the Truman doctrine had been born.  
Seaborne Crisis Response                                                                                                                                             Appendix A. Crises Summaries 
8 
 
In the spring of 1947 a US naval squadron, consisting of the aircraft carrier USS Leyte (CV 32) 
and the cruisers USS Providence (CL 82) and USS Dayton (CL 105) and six destroyers visited 
Piraeus, Suda Bay (Crete), and Istanbul during a cruise to a number of Mediterranean ports. 
During this period of time the Congress was still debating the request for aid. The squadron 
entered Greek waters in April and visited Istanbul in early May. U.S. ships would stay in the 
region for months to come.  
(CNA I: Two of CNA I’s responses cover this crisis period: the Greek Civil War and Security of 
Turkey. Both were part of the Leyte tour in Spring 1947) 
Additional Sources: Cane 1975, Keesing’s, Sheehy 1983 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Truman Doctrine 2/21/1947-5/22/1947, 91 2  
CNA I  Greece Civil War 4/16/1947, 412 USN & USMC 1 CV & Amp 
CNA I Security of Turkey 5/2/1947, 386 USN 1 CV & Amp 
 
4. # 120 Palestine Partition / Israel Independence; 11/29/1947 – 7/20/1949, 589 
Ever since the partition of Palestine in November 1947 into two states, tensions had been high in 
the region. The UN General Assembly Resolution of 29 November 1947, calling for the partition 
of Palestine into two independent states, one Arab, the other predominantly Jewish, triggered a 
crisis for Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. For those five Arab nations this loss of Arab 
territory posed a serious threat. When Israel proclaimed the State of Israel in May 1948 the 
precarious situation escalated and they reacted with an invasion on 15 May 1948. The United 
Nations were heavily involved, trying to broker an agreement between the warring parties. 
Already in early January 1948, the Sixth Fleet began patrol operations in the Eastern 
Mediterranean in response to the deteriorating situation in Palestine. On 18 June a Marine Force 
was detached from the USS Kearsarge (CV 33). One day later on 19 June the United States sent 
the three destroyers, USS Putnam (DD 757), USS Henley (DD 762) and USS Owen (DD 776) to 
patrol the Palestinian coast to secure the implementation of the truce conditions, previously 
agreed on. No ground troops were dispatched to enforce the ceasefire. The destroyers were 
deployed to back-up the UN mediator in attempting to maintain peace between Arab and Israeli 
forces. When the truce temporarily broke down, the USS Putnam evacuated the UN team from 
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the port in Haifa on 23 July. She was thus the first U.S. Navy ship to fly the UN flag. The crisis 
had different outcomes and ended at different times for each crisis actor, for some with defeat, 
and for some with agreements, although not long-lasting. The ICB end date marked the signing 
of the last peace agreement between Israel and Syria.  
Additional Sources: Hahn 2005 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Palestine 
Partition/Israel 
Independence 
11/29/1947–7/20/1949, 589 2  
CNA I  Arab-Israel War 1/5/1948, 466 USN & USMC 1 CV & Amp 
 
5. # 123 Berlin Blockade; 6/24/1948 – 5/12/1949, 323 
The Berlin Blockade of 1948 was one of the first major escalations between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. After World War II, Berlin had been divided into American, British, 
French, and Soviet zones. The announcement by the three Western governments that they 
planned to integrate their zones in Germany triggered a crisis with the Soviets, in the form of a 
Soviet blockade that stopped all transport to and from Berlin through Soviet-occupied East 
Germany. The West responded with an unprecedented airlift to provision the city by air, called 
Operation VITTLES, in which the United States deployed all available transport aircraft.  
The USN moved a carrier battle group (I was unable to determine which) to the North Atlantic in 
reaction to the crisis. The contribution of the Navy to the airlift was both direct and indirect. 
From the beginning the Navy provided airlifts and fuel in support of the Air Force. But only in 
late October 1948, when the U.S. Air Force needed support in order to meet the demand, did the 
U.S. Navy become directly involved. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the Western 
powers extended over several months until the Soviets finally agreed to end the blockade under 
the condition that the United States, United Kingdom, and France lift their trade restrictions 
against East Germany. The last day of the blockade was 12 May 1949. The end of the crisis left 
Germany split into two states—the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic 
Republic. 
Additional Sources: United States Navy 1998 
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Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Berlin Blockade 6/24/1948–5/12/1949, 323 4  
CNA I  Security of Berlin  4/26/1948, 401 USN, USMC, 
USAF, 
USARMY 
1 CV & Amp 
 
6. # 125 China Civil War; 9/23/1948 – 12/8/1949, 4421 
On 23 September 1948 the Chinese Communists inflicted a major defeat on the Nationalists, an 
event which triggered a crisis within the United States who feared for their loss of influence over 
China. By fall 1948 the northeast of China had fallen into Communist hands and in the following 
month the Communist forces took control over the Chinese mainland. The Nationalists fled to 
Taiwan. When in late October 1948 the United States decided not to provide the Nationalists 
with military aid, the crisis ended for them. On 1 October 1949, the Chinese Communists 
announced the creation of the People’s Republic of China (PCR), followed by the proclamation 
by the Nationalists of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan on 8 December 1949. This action 
implied an unofficial acceptance of the PCR and ended the crisis. The subsequent Taiwan crises 
are a direct consequence of these events (#146, #166, and #192).  
U.S. Marines were the first U.S. forces to arrive in the theater. As early as 1945 several thousand 
Marines were dispatched to Vietnam. During the entire Civil War, Marines supported the 
Nationalists with different force levels (Buhite 1978) and since 1946, USN forces maneuvered in 
the waters around China. In early November 1948, the U.S. cruisers Helena (CA 75) and St. Paul 
(CA 73) reached the port of Shanghai. USS Helena arrived from Californian waters where she 
had held training sessions. Throughout the summer and fall of 1948, she operated in the Yellow, 
East China, and South China Seas, before returning to Long Beach in December 1948. On 25 
April 1949 the U.S. Pacific Fleet announced that the American cruiser St. Paul and Manchester 
would proceed to Chinese waters from Pearl Harbor. According to CNA I, the cruiser USS 
Belfast (PF 35) was ordered from Shanghai to Hong Kong and the cruiser USS Jamaica2 to the 
Far East from Bermuda. Multiple carriers operated in and around Chinese waters at different 
times. It was not possible to obtain exact information about the number and names of the 
                                                 
1 This crisis coding is a little problematic since it was not possible to definitely determine the U.S. military activity 
during the ICB crisis period. However the U.S. involvement during the entire Civil War suggests a positive coding. 
2 ship history says Jamaica was sold 1946 
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involved carriers. For example the aircraft carrier USS Antietam (CV 36) arrived in Chinese 
waters on 2 September 1945 and remained in the Far East for more than three years. The Yellow 
Sea constituted her primary theater of operations while her air group provided support for the 
Allied occupation of North China, Manchuria, and Korea. Surveillance operations were part of 
the mission’s tasks. During the assignment the CV did leave the theater for short visits to Japan, 
the Philippines, Okinawa, and the Marianas. Early in 1949, USS Antietam concluded her mission 
in the Orient and headed back to the United States for deactivation.  
Additional Sources: Buhite 1978; Keesing’s 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB China Civil War 9/23/1948 – 
12/8/1949, 442 
2  
CNA I  China Civil War April 46, 1038 USN, USMC, USAF, 
USARMY 
? CV & Amp 
 
7. # 131 Soviet Bloc – Yugoslavia; 8/19/1949 – 11/99/1951, 89 
Tensions in the Balkans rose with the expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform3 in the 
summer of 1948. The crisis was triggered by a Soviet ultimatum. Yugoslavia feared USSR 
intervention and reacted with a military build-up. In March 1951, Tito filed a complaint with the 
UN that Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union were mobilizing troops along 
Yugoslavia's border. The UN in turn acknowledged Yugoslavia’s pursuit of a peaceful resolution 
of the dispute. The United States supported Yugoslavia with economic aid and in mid-March, a 
reinforced Marine Corps battalion arrived in the area. Later in March the relief force for the 
Sixth Fleet arrived about 6 weeks ahead of schedule due to the tense situation in Yugoslavia. The 
aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea (CV 43) arrived in the Mediterranean on 20 March 1951. At the 
end of May, the Fleet was augmented with another aircraft carrier4. The crisis faded in 
November 1951.  
 
                                                 
3 The abbreviation stands for Information Bureau of the Communists and Worker Parties. It was the first official 
forum of the international communist movement. The intended purpose of Cominform was to coordinate actions 
between Communist parties under Soviet direction. 
4 After the end of the crisis - according to the ICB - the Yugoslavian Prime Minister Tito was welcomed aboard the 
Coral Sea for a one-day cruise. This visit in September 1952 demonstrated the U.S. support of Yugoslavia. 
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Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Soviet Bloc–Yugoslavia 8/19/1949–11/99/1951, 89 2  
CNA I  Security of Yugoslavia 3/15/1951, 869 USN, USMC 2 CV & Amp 
 
8. #132 Korean War I; 6/25/1950 – 9/30/1950 
On 25 June 1950 North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel, serving as the border between 
North and South Korea since the end of World War II, triggering a crisis for both South Korea 
and the United States. Two days later the President of the United States announced military 
support for the South and ordered the Seventh Fleet to install a blockade in the Taiwan Strait in 
reaction to the tense situation. This action triggered a crisis for the two Chinas. While the crisis 
between the PRC and the U.S. faded in July 1950, USN forces were sent to the Taiwan Straits 
on multiple occasions during the Korean War to demonstrate U.S. commitment to the 
Nationalists and prevent a PRC invasion of Taiwan. According to Siegel aircraft from the USS 
Valley Forge (CV 45) flew over Taipei early in the war und in April 1951 a task force (TF 77) 
was sent to the Taiwan Straits. While this episode does not mark the first Taiwan Straits crisis it 
is a prelude to the events of later coming years. Only the naval reaction to the Formosa Straits is 
included in the analysis. All other reactions to the Korean War are excluded. 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Korean War 6/25/1950 – 9/30/1950 4  
CNA I  Korean War, 
Formosa Straits 
6/27/1950, 951 USN 1 CV & NO 
Amp 
 
9. # 144 Guatemala; 12/12/1953 – 6/29/1954, 200 
When in late 1953 Guatemala learned of American support for an antigovernment “liberation” 
movement, it requested military supplies from the Soviet Union. On the day the Soviet arms 
shipment arrived, the United States began an air-sea patrol mission in the Gulf of Honduras to 
protect Honduras from an invasion by its neighbor and to control shipments to Guatemala. Talks 
between the parties and the United States were not successful. On 3 June 1954, the United States 
airlifted arms to Honduras and antigovernment forces in Guatemala, and on 7 June, a 
“contingency evacuation” force was deployed. This operation, code-named HARDROCK 
BAKER, was used to implement a comprehensive sea blockade of Guatemala. It included 
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submarines and amphibious ships carrying a Marine battalion landing team. With this aggressive 
configuration of naval forces the United States built up psychological pressure on Guatemala, 
underscoring the weakness of Guatemala’s position and opening up the option for intervention. 
On 29 June 1954, with the resignation of Guatemala’s president and the accession of an 
anticommunist government, the crisis ended.  
Additional Sources: Astor 2006: 50; Hippler 1984, Solantamity 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Guatemala 12/12/1953–6/29/1954, 200 3  
CNA I  Honduras-Guatemala 5/20/54, 14 USN, USMC 1 CV & Amp 
 
10. # 145 Dien Bien Phu; 3/13/1954 – 7/21/1954, 131 
In spring 1954, tensions between the French military and the Viet Minh peaked when they 
launched their first major assault on the French garrison at Dien Bien Phu (13 March 1954). On 
19 March, USN forces in the region, including the carriers USS Wasp (CV 18) and USS Essex 
(CV 9) were put on alert. Responding to pleas from the French, who were fighting in the 
mountains of Tonkin, the administration of President Dwight D. Eisenhower deployed an aircraft 
carrier task force and supporting units to the South China Sea. On 22 March the carrier task 
group steamed towards the coast of Indochina. At various times the USS Wasp, the USS Essex, 
the USS Boxer (CV 21) (replaced USS Wasp), and the USS Philippine Sea (CV 47) steamed off 
the Indochinese Peninsula prepared to launch their aircraft against Communist forces besieging 
the French base. Awaiting a possible order from Washington to enter the conflict, the USN 
dispatched carrier reconnaissance planes to fly over the area around Dien Bien Phu. The aircraft 
gathered intelligence on Viet Minh troop movements and logistic buildup. The Seventh Fleet 
recommended Operation VULTURE to rescue the French forces, but President Eisenhower 
decided against unilateral action and the idea was rejected. When Dien Bien Phu fell on 7 May 
and a formal cease-fire began, the crisis ended for the U.S. Two months later, the signing of a 
final declaration ended the crisis for all actors. 
Additional Sources: Marolda 1994, Solantamity 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
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ICB Dien Bien Phu 3/13/1954–7/21/1954, 131 2  
CNA I  Dien Bien Phu 3/13/1954, 90 USN 2 CV & NO Amp 
 
11. # 146 Taiwan Strait I; 8/66/1954 – 4/23/1955, 266 
In the summer of 1954, tensions increased over the Tachen islands in the Formosa Straits. The 
crisis centered on the Quemoy, Matsu, and Tachen island groups, held by Chiang Kai-shek’s 
Nationalists. The Chinese Communists planned to overwhelm the Chinese Nationalists, 
beginning with a bombardment of Quemoy Island, followed by an invasion of Taiwan. On 12 
September the U.S. decided to send the Seventh Fleet to the area with the orders to protect 
Taiwan against any attacks from the Chinese mainland. Since the United States did consider the 
Tachen Islands vital for the defense of Taiwan, American officials acceded to an evacuation after 
a sudden buildup of Communist Chinese on the island group. Over one week in early February, 
the USN evacuated 15,000 civilians and 11,000 military5 personnel form the Tachen Islands 
without opposition.  
Multiple USN ships supported the evacuation operation. From November 1954 to June 1955 the 
USS Essex (CV 9) engaged in training exercises for part of the time with the 7th Fleet and 
assisted in the Tachen Islands evacuation. The USS Wasp (CV 18) provided air cover for the 
evacuation mission. While operating with the Seventh Fleet, the carrier USS Kearsarge (CV 33) 
was in an alert position to assist in the evacuation of Nationalist Chinese from the Tachen 
Islands. In January of 1955 the USS Yorktown (CV 10) was called upon to help the operation. In 
December 1954, the USS Midway (CV 41) departed Norfolk on a world cruise, which culminated 
in her transfer to the Pacific Fleet and joining of the Seventh Fleet off Taiwan in February 1955. 
Not long after her arrival the carrier participated in the evacuation operation. She remained in the 
area patrolling the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea until June. When Mao realized that the 
United States was placing great military emphasis on the area, he halted the shelling and 
suspended the campaign against Taiwan until all U.S. ships and aircraft had departed. In this 
instance the U.S. military deterrence was successful, the attack was delayed. Although the U.S. 
was determined to support Taiwan, Mao had drawn the conclusion that the United States would 
not interfere in an operation against the Tachen Islands because the Mutual Defense Treaty 
                                                 
5 Numbers vary from report to report 
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between the U.S. and the Republic of China only covered Taiwan and the Pescadores. This 
misinterpretation clearly demonstrates the importance of the opponent’s perception in deterrence 
operations (Siegel 1995, 9). According to the ICB, the crisis for Taiwan ended with the 
fortification of Quemoy and Matsu, supported by the United States. President Eisenhower 
deemed the survival of the two islands very important and feared their loss to be a first step to 
the loss of Taiwan, and a demoralization for the Nationalists. The crisis between China and the 
United States wound down when during the Bandung Conference on 23 April the Chinese 
Communists announced their willingness to begin negotiations. By then end of the month an 
unofficial cease-fire for the Formosa Straits was in place. 
Additional Source: Baer 1994, Keesing’s, Marolda 2000, Rushkoff 1981, Siegel 1995 
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Taiwan Strait I 8/66/1954 – 4/23/1955, 266 3  
CNA I  Tachen Island 2/8/1955, 6 USN, USMC, 
USAF 
6 CV’s & Amp 
CNA II Tachen Island 2/1955  6 CV’s & Amp 
 
12. # 152 Suez Nationalization War; 7/26/1956 – 3/12/1957, 230 
The international Suez crisis was triggered by the invasion of Egypt by Israel, Britain, and 
France. Nasser, the president of Egypt, announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal, as a 
symbol of rising Egyptian influence in the Middle East. Britain and France viewed the 
nationalization of the Suez as a challenge to their authority and as a threat to shipping through 
the canal. Their invasion, following a provocation by Israel was supposedly intended to separate 
these two warring parties. Eisenhower strongly rejected the unilateral actions of his European 
allies. In February 1956 CNA I describes the formation of USN destroyer patrols in the Red Sea 
in reaction to the growing tension in the region. The events around the Suez Nationalization War 
are divided into three different phases and cases: Pre-Suez, Suez War, and Post-Suez. In reaction 
to the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the two aircraft carriers USS Coral Sea (CV 43) and USS 
Randolph (CV 15) and an amphibious force group were moved to the Eastern Mediterranean. 
When tensions seemed to cool off in mid-September the force was dispersed. The United States 
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was monitoring the situation via U-2 reconnaissance flights out of Turkey in what Kalley (2001) 
calls a preemptive move. Following the Israeli attack in October which triggered the war, major 
portions of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, including three aircraft carriers were moved to the Eastern 
Mediterranean again. In October 1956 the Sixth Fleet landed Marines at Alexandria and other 
points in the Middle East to protect the evacuation of 2,000 Americans and other foreign 
nationals. After receiving reports that the USSR was funneling ships through the Black Sea to the 
Mediterranean, the CNO ordered a three-carrier task force to sail from the U.S. to the Western 
Pacific and a two-carrier task force to sail to the vicinity of the Azores. Surveillance in the 
eastern Mediterranean was intensified. On 13 December the alert status was lifted. The USS 
Coral Sea evacuated American citizens from the troubled area, and stood by off Egypt until 
November before returning to Norfolk in February 1957. In response to the October 1956 attack, 
the USS Randolph was operating near the Suez Canal. Aircraft aboard Randolph provided air 
cover and surface and air reconnaissance for the evacuation of U.S. nationals from Alexandria. 
The carriers USS Forrestal (CV 59), USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVA-42) (Lake Champlain 
(CVA-39) later replaced USS Franklin D. Roosevelt), and USS Antietam (CV 36) and additional 
ships were involved. The carriers conducted air operations while maintaining readiness to enter 
the Mediterranean should their services be needed. The United States’ naval involvement 
signaled U.S. interest in the region and the resolve to defend victims of aggression. On 5 
November, both Britain and France agreed to a cease-fire and declared their intention to 
withdrawal from the Canal Zone. 12 March 1957 marked the final end of the episode with the 
completion of the Israeli withdrawal. 
Additional Sources: Cable 1981, Kalley 2001, 34 – 35 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Suez 
Nationalization 
War 
7/26/1956 – 3/12/1957, 230 
 
2  
CNA I  Red Sea Patrols 2/6/1956, 138 USN 0 CV & no Amp 
CNA I Pre Suez 8/1956, 69 USN, USMC 2 CV & Amp 
CNA I Suez War 10/4/1956, 8 USN, USMC, 
USAF 
3 CV & Amp 
CNA I Post-Suez 11/6/1956, 38 USN, USMC 3 CV & Amp 
CNA II Red Sea 2 – 8/ 1955  0 CV & Amp 
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13. # 157 Jordan Regime; 4/4/1957 – 5/3/1957 
On 4 April 1957, Jordanian army officers and Palestinians sympathetic to Nasser attempted to 
overthrow King Hussein of Jordan but failed. The King feared Egyptian and Syrian involvement 
in the coup attempt and reacted by laying off the entire leftist cabinet triggering demonstrations 
and riots. The United States expressed support for the king by providing economic aid and 
deploying units of the Sixth Fleet, including the aircraft carriers USS Forrestal (CV 59), USS 
Lake Champlain (CV 39), and heavy cruisers USS Salem (CA 139) and USS Des Moines (CA 
134) to the Eastern Mediterranean. USN ships with 1,800 Marines on board anchored off Beirut 
on 20 April to stand ready for a possible intervention in Jordan, while 30 ships of the Sixth Fleet 
described as the "most formidable naval striking force ever assembled in the Eastern 
Mediterranean", carried out air defense maneuvers in the open sea. Their task was to ensure that 
the Jordanians maintain their independence and withstand the threat of Communism. “Once 
again” explained VADM Brown, “we find ourselves dropping everything and rushing to the 
scene of the fire”. It can be said that “the swift and firm reaction averted a near catastrophe in the 
Middle East” (cited in Evans 2007). Marines stood by in Amman in case their support was 
needed for the evacuation of Americans. Amphibious forces off the Lebanese coast were put on a 
state of alert. Only the easing of tensions due to diplomatic efforts backed up by naval forces led 
to a normalization of the force status. The departure of the USN on 3 May signaled the end of the 
crisis.  
Additional Sources: Cable 1981, Hahn 2005, Keesing’s, USS Forestall Ship History (Evans 
2007) 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Jordan Regime 4/4/1957 – 5/3/1957 3  
CNA I  Jordan Unrest 4/25/1957, 9 USN, USMC 2 CVS & Amp 
CNA II Jordan 4-5/1957  2 CVS & Amp 
 
14. # 159 Syria-Turkey Confrontation; 8/18/1957 – 19/29/1957, 73 
The election of a pro-Soviet Chief of Staff of the Syrian armed forces triggered a crisis for 
Turkey and the United States. Turkey held meetings with its nearby neighbors Iraq, Jordan, 
Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia and deployed troops along its Syrian borders. The United States, 
worrying that the Soviet Union could significantly expand their influence, emphasized the 
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Eisenhower Doctrine again, confirming that the U.S. will render assistance to any country in the 
Middle East if subject to communist threat. The Soviets and Syria accused Turkey several times 
of planning an attack on Syria. Major portions of the Sixth Fleet were moved to the Eastern 
Mediterranean, and aircraft were redeployed from Western Europe to Adana, Turkey - another 
sign of U.S. support. One aircraft carrier involved was the USS Randolph (CV 15)6 which was 
deployed off the Syrian coast and patrolling the Eastern Mediterranean. The crisis came to an 
end when the Soviet Premier Khrushchev made an appearance at the Turkish Embassy in the 
Soviet Union. The ICB describes the U.S. involvement as mainly political-diplomatic, supported 
by speeches reaffirming commitments to Turkey. However the presence of four aircraft carriers 
suggests a larger U.S. involvement.  
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Syria – Turkey 
Confrontation 
8/18/1957 – 10/29/1957, 73 
 
3  
CNA I  Syria 8/21/1957, 118 USN, USMC, 
USAF 
4 CV’s & Amp 
CNA Syria 8-12/1957  4 CV’s & Amp 
 
15. # 164 Abortive Coup Indonesia; 2/21/1958 – 5/20/1958 
Indonesia’s denunciation of foreign influence and the popularity of the Indonesian Communist 
Party had been of concern to the West for some time. The rebel headquarters was located in the 
southern coastal city of Padang. Rebel strongholds stretched all the way to Medan, near the 
Northern end of the island and not far from Malaysia. The crisis was triggered by the accusation 
that the Indonesian rebels were instruments of the West and the military reaction by President 
Sukarno to defeat the rebels. The U.S. and Britain covertly supported this rebellion in its early 
phase, ideally wanting to see Sukarno overthrown. The deployment of the Seventh Fleet off the 
shore of Indonesia had a marked impact, and the Indonesian government sought to minimize any 
further U.S. involvement. Moreover, the U.S. remained reluctant to become officially involved 
and publicly declared this matter a strictly internal Indonesian affair. Many sources point to U.S. 
support of the rebels before the crisis broke out, but when their defeat seemed imminent, the U.S. 
                                                 
6 I was not able to identify the names of the other aircraft carriers  
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government tried to improve relations with the Indonesian government. Over the next several 
weeks the two states slowly resumed talks and the crisis terminated. In early March the United 
States had deployed USMC forces, one aircraft carrier, two destroyers and one heavy cruiser in 
the proximity of Indonesia. A contingency evacuation force operated north of Sumatra for most 
of this period. According to Brichoux and Gerner (2002) then CNO Admiral Burke sent the 
Chief of Naval Intelligence Admiral Frost to Jakarta where he worked closely with the U.S. 
ambassador and the Indonesian naval chiefs. The official declaration on 20 May stating no U.S. 
involvement in this internal affair triggered the abatement of the crisis.  
Additional Sources: Brichoux & Gerner 2002; 6; Curtis 2004; Fletcher Prouty 1976 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Abortive Coup 
Indonesia 
2/21/1958 – 5/20/1958 3  
CNA I  Indonesia 12/10/57, 174 USN, USMC 2 CV & Amp 
CNA II Indonesia 12/1957-6/1958  2 CV & Amp 
 
16. # 165: Iraq-Lebanon Upheaval; 5/8/1958 – 10/88/1958 
In May 1958 Lebanon experienced a crisis when riots among political and religious factions 
threatened the government. The President of Lebanon requested U.S. help to control the 
situation. In July 1958 the Iraqi army staged a coup against the Hashemite government in 
Baghdad. While first hesitant, the revolt in Baghdad led President Eisenhower to approve 
Operation BLUE BAT. The U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force and Army were all involved. 
Marines landed on Lebanese shores to restore order in Beirut, to stabilize the country and to 
protect the American citizens in the country. The deployed U.S. naval forces totaled 70 vessels, 
including the three aircraft carriers USS Saratoga (CV 60), Wasp (CV 18) and Essex (CV 9) (as 
well as heavy cruiser USS Des Moines (CA 134), guided missile heavy cruise Boston (CV 69), 
and 28 destroyers. The entire Sixth Fleet supported the operation especially through the landing 
of the Marines. Their tasks included patrol missions, reconnaissance missions and transportation 
of Marines who needed to be evacuated by carrier aviation. This incident clearly demonstrated 
the Sixth Fleet’s dominance over the Mediterranean. Soviet naval forces in the proximity were 
neither capable of challenging U.S. influence in this crisis nor their control over the 
Mediterranean. While the Navy played an important immediate role, U.S. Air Force units and 
Seaborne Crisis Response                                                                                                                                             Appendix A. Crises Summaries 
20 
 
U.S. Army units were both unable to react promptly. The Navy was ready off the coast of 
Lebanon thirteen hours after the order was received, whereas it took the Air Force five days to 
advance from its base in Turkey.  
Additional Sources: Baer 1994, 363; Berkeley University; Hahn 2005, 43; Keesing’s 
Dataset Name Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Iraq-Lebanon 
Upheaval 
5/8/1958 – 10/88/1958 4  
CNA I  Lebanon 5/15/1958, 48 USN, USMC 3 CVS & Amp 
CNA I Lebanon July 1958, 93 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
3 CVS & Amp 
CNA I Jordan-Iraq 7/17/1958, 138 USN 0 CV & NO Amp 
CNA II Lebanon 5/1958  3 CVS & Amp 
CNA II Lebanon 6-10/1958  3 CVS & Amp 
CNA II Jordan-Iraq 7-12/1958  0 CV & NO Amp 
 
17. # 166: Taiwan Strait II; 7/17/1958 – 10/23/1958, 99 
In the second Taiwan crisis the Chinese Communists attacked the islands Quemoy and Matsu by 
air. The United States deployed an impressive naval flotilla in response. The Chinese 
Communists tried to cut the islands off from outside supplies and support. A reinforced Seventh 
Fleet with a total of six aircraft carriers, a Marine Amphibious Ready Group and additional three 
USMC fighter squadrons that had moved from Japan to Taiwan, made up the naval force heading 
toward Chinese waters. China reacted by claiming extension of its territorial water line, 
effectively blocking off any access to Quemoy and Matsu. The New York Times called the USN 
and USAF deployment "the most powerful air-naval fighting force in history” (cited in the USS 
Essex ship history). Aircraft carriers involved included the USS Essex (CV 9), the USS Lexington 
(CV 16), the USS Hancock (CV 19), the USS Yorktown (CV 10) and the USS Bennington (CV 
20). The USS Yorktown and the USS Bennington earned the expeditionary medal for participation 
in an American show of strength in the Taiwan Strait. The carriers escorted Chinese Nationalist 
ships resupplying the islands. The U.S. involvement also included diplomatic efforts to resolve 
the crisis. This clear demonstration of U.S. commitment together with no signs of involvement 
by the Soviet Union led to the abatement of the crisis and no further escalations. 
Additional Sources: Halperin 1966; Marolda 2000  
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Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Taiwan Strait II 7/17/1958 – 10/23/1958, 99 3  
CNA I  Quemoy Aug 58, 1967 USN, USMC, 
USAF 
6 CVS & Amp 
CNA II Quemoy 6-12/1958  6 CVS & Amp 
 
18. # 168: Berlin Deadline; 11/27/1958 – 9/15/1959, 293 
On 27 November 1958 the Soviet Premier Khrushchev demanded in an ultimatum the 
withdrawal of the United States, Great Britain and France from Berlin and a transformation into 
a free, demilitarized city within six month. The Western Powers rejected the ultimatum and 
declared their determination to stay in West Berlin. As a reaction to the ultimatum the U.S. 
began to reinforce its combat and support units in Europe and U.S. transport planes prepared for 
an airlift. U.S. aircraft carriers7 with nuclear weapons aboard were redeployed to the 
Mediterranean and Marines alerted for a possible deployment to Berlin. For the months May 
through September naval forces worldwide were on general alert. A carrier force deployed to the 
Mediterranean was put on high alert and demonstrated readiness. In 1959 the Soviet Union 
agreed to annul the ultimatum and to meet with the Western powers. Although the talks did not 
result in an agreement they did open the door for further dialogue. Only in early August did the 
powers sign an interim agreement after President Eisenhower paid Khrushchev a visit in 
Moscow on 3 August 1959. When the Soviet returned the visit, a formal agreement was signed 
on 15 September, terminating the crisis for all the participants. The parties had agreed on a ban 
of nuclear weapons and missiles from Berlin and the reduction of local Western military forces.  
Additional Sources: Solantamity  
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Berlin Deadline 11/27/1958 – 9/15/1959, 293 2  
CNA I  Berlin Crisis May 1959, 145 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
2 CVs & Amp 
CNA II Berlin Crisis 5 – 9/ 1959   
 
                                                 
7 I could not determine which aircraft carriers were dispatched. 
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19. # 170: Central America – Cuba I; 4/25/1959 – 12/88/1959, 251 
Panama, Nicaragua, Costa Rico, and Haiti experienced crises because of invasions by Cuban 
supported rebels. The crisis for the first actor, Panama, was triggered by the landing of a boat 
carrying foreign invaders. A complaint to the OAS led to the supply of arms and the 
authorization of naval and aerial patrols off the Panama coast. The Cuban-backed invaders 
surrendered. With the termination of the patrols the Panama crisis ended. 
On 1 June a small number of Nicaraguan exiles based in Costa Rica marched into Nicaragua. 
Again the OAS conferred and decided on a fact-finding mission. Although Nicaragua did not 
feel threatened by Costa Rica, which declared its neutrality, it accused Castro of being involved 
in supporting the exiles. A brief military action by Nicaraguan forces ended the rebellion and the 
crisis ended.   
After the Nicaraguan crisis, the Dominican Republic experienced a crisis, triggered by a small 
invasion backed by Cuba. The invasion was repelled and the crisis terminated towards the end of 
the year after months of high tensions. 
Haiti was the last country to be invaded during these years of high internal instability. Again the 
invaders suspected of Cuban origin, surrendered.  
The United States sent a small naval surveillance patrol force to Caribbean waters, off the coast 
of Panama, in the early phase of the crisis, to deter further landings.  
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Central America – 
Cuba I 
4/25/1959 – 12/88/1959, 251 3  
CNA I  Panama 4/30/59, 5 USN 0 CVs & NO Amp 
CNA I Panama Aug 59, 93 USN 0 CVs & NO Amp 
CNA II Panama 3-5/1959   
 
20. # 176: Congo I – Katanga; 7/5/1960 – 2/15/1962 
Congo won its independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960. When on 5 July 1960 Congolese 
soldiers mutinied and assaulted Belgium and European nationals in Congo, Belgium sent 
military forces reinforcements. Congo reacted with appeals to the United States and the UN. U.S. 
help was not forthcoming, although the UN decided to dispatch military forces and called for the 
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withdrawal of Belgian troops. In mid-July 1960 the aircraft carrier USS Wasp (CV 18) with 
Marines aboard was deployed to the Congo in reaction to the civil strife and to support the 
evacuation of Western nationals. For the rest of the year USN ships (the carrier Wasp returned to 
the United States) supported U.N. forces in Congo and provided sealift assistance. In early 
February 1961 two amphibious ships and two destroyers supported the lift of U.N. forces into the 
Congo. But this did not end the internal division raging in the country and the crisis continued. 
Only with the ratification of a cease-fire agreement and the termination of the secession attempts 
of the Katanga province on 15 February 1962 did the crisis terminate. 
Additional Sources: Cable 1981 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Congo I - Katanga 7/5/1960 – 2/15/1962 2  
CNA I  Congo 7/1/60, 124 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
1 CV's & Amp 
CNA I Gulf of Guinea-
Congo 
2/2/61 USN, USMC 0 CV's & NO amp 
CNA II Congo 7-11/1960  1 CV & Amp 
CNA II Gulf of 
Guinea/Congo 
2-3/1961  0 CV & Amp  
 
21. # 178: Central America – Cuba II; 11/9/1960 – 12/7/1960, 29 
Trouble in Nicaragua and Guatemala in early November 1960 led to the deployment of U.S. 
naval forces. Cuba was suspected of supporting an invasion of Nicaragua by exiles and a revolt 
in Guatemala. In response to requests by both countries, the United States deployed naval and air 
surveillance. The U.S. Navy was sent to patrol the nations’ Caribbean coasts and to stand by in 
case of a possible invasion from mid-November until 7 December 1960. Two aircraft carriers, 
USS Shangri-La (CV 38) and Wasp (CV 18), as well as eight other surface ships, formed the 
naval patrol force. They kept outside the three-mile limit and watched for suspicious vessels 
heading for the two countries. The naval forces were withdrawn after confirmation from 
Nicaragua and Guatemala that help was no longer needed and that the crisis had ended for both 
actors. 
Additional Sources: Cable 1981 
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Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Central America – 
Cuba II 
11/9/1960 – 12/7/1960, 29 
 
3  
CNA I  Guatemala 11/14/1960, 272 USN 2 CVs & NO Amp 
CNA II Guatemala-
Nicaragua 
11-12/1960  2 CVs & NO Amp 
 
22. # 180: Pathet Laos Offensive; 3/9/1961 – 5/16/1961, 69 
Fighting between Pathet Laos and Laotian government troops lead to a retreat of the latter, 
threatening the accession of communist and neutralist troops. This triggered a crisis for the U.S. 
on 9 March 1961. In reaction to the deteriorating situation in Laos, ships from the Seventh Fleet, 
including the aircraft carriers USS Lexington (CV 16), USS Coral Sea (CV 34), USS Bennington 
(CV 20) and amphibious forces were ordered to deploy to the South China in January 1961. The 
naval forces were assigned to act as a deterrent force to prevent further attacks by Communist 
guerillas and to demonstrate U.S. support for the Laotian government. USN aircraft also 
conducted reconnaissance missions over Laos. In spring 1961 the situation deteriorated further 
and almost the entire Seventh Fleet was moved into the area. The three carriers, Coral Sea (CV 
43), Midway (CV 41) and Kearsarge (CV 33), one helicopter carrier, three groups of amphibious 
ships, two submarines, and three Marine battalion landing teams formed the U.S. force. In 
addition forces were put on alert in Okinawa and in the Philippines. Despite Kennedy’s decision 
not to launch a military offensive, the Chinese Communists ended the intervention and declared 
their willingness to negotiate. A cease fire was agreed upon on 8 May 1961  
(CNA I listed the deployment in January as well, but since the ICB crisis only starts in March, 
only the second CNA I crisis coding is listed although the previous one is described above as 
prelude to the spring crisis). 
Additional Source: George 1991, Marolda 1994 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Pathet Laos 
Offensive 
3/9/1961 – 5/16/1961, 69 3  
CNA I  Laos 3/21/61, 34 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
3 CV's & Amp 
CNA II Laos 3-6/1961  3 CV's & Amp 
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23. # 181: Bay of Pigs, 4/15/1961 – 4/24/1961, 24 
Naval, Marines and Air Force personnel supported the invasion of Cuba by exiles. On 15 April 
1961 the invaders, flying U.S. aircraft, bombed locations in Cuba. On the same day, Cuba 
accused the United States of complicity during a UN General Assembly meeting. Two days later 
Cuba announced a state of national alert, ordering Cubans to fight the exiles. On the 18, the day 
of the invasion, escort ships and naval frogmen provided by the USN attempted to land on the 
beaches to facilitate the invasion. According to Astor however, reefs hindered the landing of the 
ships. A carrier task force and at least one Marine battalion team stood by during the invasion 
attempt. The forces aimed to hide any sign of U.S. involvement and the destroyers were ordered 
not to move closer than 20 miles to Cuban territory and not to open fire unless fired upon first. 
Local militias detected the invaders immediately. USN units remained in the vicinity as the U.S. 
attempted to ensure that the captured exiles were not abused by the Cuban government and tried 
to negotiate terms for their release. Air cover was received from the USS Essex (CV 9) to 
intimidate Cuban government forces without directly engaging in acts of war and not to seek air 
combat nor attack ground targets. A note from the USSR to the U.S. on 18 April warned of a 
possible chain reaction to all parts of the globe arising from the invasion and reasserted Soviet 
support for Cuba in repelling the attack. The U.S. responded through President Kennedy's 
answer to the Soviets: Kennedy emphasized that the U.S. "intends no military intervention" in 
Cuba, but would act to protect the hemisphere in case of military intervention by an outside 
force. Late on 19 April, the destroyers USS Eaton (code-named Santiago) and USS Murray 
(code-named Tampico) moved into Cochinos Bay to evacuate the remaining retreating invaders. 
From 19 April until about 22 April, sorties and reconnaissance flights were flown to obtain 
visual intelligence over combat areas. It is reported that the USS Shangri-La (CV 38) was part of 
the task force stationed off the Cayman Islands.  
The crisis ended for Cuba already on 19 April when it defeated the invaders who were unable to 
escape to the mountains. It ended for the U.S. on the 24 when - reversing earlier disclaimers of 
U.S. involvement - the White House issued a statement by Kennedy assuming direct 
responsibility for the events leading to the Bay of Pigs fiasco. 
Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 67 – 68; National Security Archives 2001 
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Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Bay of Pigs 4/15/1961 – 4/24/1961, 24 3  
CNA I  Bay of Pigs Apr 1961, 62 USN, USMC, 
USAF 
2 CV's & Amp 
CNA II Bay of Pigs 4-6/1961  2 CV's & Amp 
 
24. # 185: Berlin Wall; 8/66/1961 – 10/28/1961, 89 
Before the outbreak of the crisis the Soviet Union had threatened to sign a separate peace treaty 
with East Germany if by the end of 1961 no German peace treaty was agreed upon. Following a 
period of increased flows of refugees from East Germany into West Germany, the Soviet Union 
encouraged East Germany to build a wall along the border of the two sectors of Berlin. This 
triggered a crisis for France, the U.K., the U.S. and Western Europe. In response, the U.S. sent 
reinforcements to the Berlin brigade. A rapid build-up of forward deployed forces started. Prior 
to this, in response to the mounting Soviet pressure, USN forces were augmented with more than 
30 ships and naval reserve personnel. The Sixth Fleet8 was put on alert and its strength was 
increased by one aircraft carrier. An aircraft carrier group was moved to the Northeast Atlantic. 
According to Blechman and Kaplan (1978), U.S. force demonstration deterred the Soviet Union 
from carrying out various threats previously announced, such as the signing of a unilateral peace 
treaty. For France, the U.K. and West Germany the crisis ended with the withdrawal of the 
Soviet deadline. The crisis for the two superpowers ended only later with a tacit agreement on 28 
October.  
Additional Sources: Blechman and Kaplan 1978, 71; Friedman 1983, 24 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Berlin Wall 8/66/1961 – 10/28/1961, 89 4  
CNA I  Berlin Crisis July 1961, 102 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
3 CV's & Amp 
CNA II Berlin Crisis 8/1961 - 5/1962  3 CV’s 
 
                                                 
8 I was not able to confirm the names of the involved aircraft carriers, The USS Independence, Shangri-La and 
Saratoga were all deployed to the Mediterranean at around this time. 
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25. # 193: Nam Tha; 5/6/1962 – 6/12/1962, 38 
In May 1962 an attack by the Laotian communist insurgent group known as the Pathet Lao on 
the Laotian town of Nam Tha triggered a crisis for the United States and neighboring Thailand. 
The Laotian government forces did not engage and instead retreated. Thailand, fearing a Pathet 
Lao advance, strengthened its border with Laos. The United States sent the Seventh Fleet to the 
Gulf of Thailand on standby status and deployed Marine forces already in Thailand for exercises 
to bolster that nation’s defenses against Laotian communists should a request be received from 
Thailand. All U.S. forces in the Pacific and at home were put on alert. The aircraft carrier Valley 
Forge (CV 45) assisted in the Marine landing in the Gulf of Bangkok, and the Hancock (CV 19) 
group took position off Da Nang, South Vietnam. The deployment of the Seventh Fleet halted 
the Pathet Lao initiative and, together with political pressure, brought the parties into 
negotiations. The crisis ended with tacit understandings between Thailand and the United States, 
as well as between Thailand and North Vietnam, manifested on 12 June 1962 when three Laotian 
princes agreed to participate in a coalition government. The United States had deployed naval 
forces to demonstrate its opposition to events in Laos in what Edward Marolda (1994) considers 
a show of force 
Additional Sources: George 1991; Marolda 1994 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Nam Tha 5/6/1962 – 6/12/1962, 38 3  
CNA I  Thailand 5/10/1962, 90. USN, USMC 2 CV's & Amp 
CNA II Thailand 5-8/ 1962  2 CV's & Amp 
 
26. # 194: China-India Border; 9/8/1962 – 1/23/1963, 138 
The Sino-Indian border dispute had been ongoing but escalated in 1962. This crisis was triggered 
by a Chinese troop movement that threatened India’s territorial integrity. India reacted by 
planning the eviction of the Chinese troops. By 4 October India was ready to carry out the 
operation, triggering a crisis for China. On 20 October China launched massive attacks in the 
disputed border area. Later that day Indian Prime Minister Nehru made an urgent and open 
appeal to the United States for armed intervention against the Chinese. He asked for bomber and 
fighter squadrons to begin air strikes if PRC troops further advance into Indian territory. India 
rejected the Chinese suggestion for mutual withdrawal and decided to react with military force. 
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The U.S. offered military aid to India. A U.S. aircraft carrier9 was dispatched from its base in the 
Pacific to the Bay of Bengal, but returned before reaching Indian waters when the crisis suddenly 
ended (21 November) with China’s declaration of a unilateral cease-fire and its planned 
withdrawal. In January 1963 following mediation efforts and the completed Chinese withdrawal, 
the crisis ended for India.  
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB China-India 
Border 
9/8/1962 – 1/23/1963, 138 3  
CNA I  Sino-Indian War 11/19/62, 2 USN 1 CV's & NO 
Amp 
CNA II Sino-Indian War 10-12/1962  1 CV 
 
27. # 195: Yemen War I, 9/26/1962 – 4/15/1963, 202 
On 26 September a revolution brought to an end the Yemen monarchy triggering a crisis for 
Jordan and Saudi Arabia which feared a spillover of anti-monarchy movements. In turn both 
countries supplied the Yemeni Royalists with arms, which triggered a crisis for Egypt and the 
YAR (Yemen Arab Republic). Egypt sent in troops and at the end of October a civil war erupted 
between Royalist and Republican forces. The United States recognized the Republican 
government on 19 December 1962, three month after the coup. The various participants 
interpreted U.S. recognition as they saw fit, some accusing the United States of seeking to 
protect its interests in Saudi Arabia, others viewing it as a response to potential communist 
influence. The United States did send a warship to Jeddah but was firm in not granting military 
aid to Yemen. Its intent was to reassure Saudi Arabia and demonstrate U.S. interest in the 
stability of Saudi Arabia so as to deter Egyptian and Soviet involvement. “To that end, a US Air 
Force squadron was dispatched to the Kingdom, the Saudi Air Force was augmented, and a small 
over-the-horizon naval presence was maintained” (Prados 2005). The United States with help 
from the United Nations achieved the signing of an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Egypt 
on 10 April 1963. A few days later Jordan officially recognized the Yemen Arab Republic and 
ended its involvement. The two Yemen agreed on a ceasefire ending this crisis in the first phase 
of the Yemen War.  
                                                 
9 I was not able to identify the name of the aircraft carrier. 
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Additional Sources: Youssef 2004; Prados 2005 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Yemen War I 9/26/1962 – 4/15/1963, 202 3  
CNA I  No data    
CNA II Yemen Civil War 
/ Saudi Arabia 
1-7/1963  0 CV & NO Amp 
 
28. # 196: Cuban Missiles; 10/16/1962 – 11/20/1962, 36 
During the Cuban Missile crisis the two superpowers came as close as they ever would to a 
nuclear war. In October 1962, U-2 reconnaissance planes operated by the CIA revealed the 
construction of bases in Cuba, capable of launching Soviet nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. 
Simultaneously with the gathering of additional information, naval forces in collaboration with 
other U.S. forces were ordered to the Atlantic and Caribbean to prepare for eventual 
contingencies. U.S. armed forces all around the world were put on an alerted status. The aircraft 
carrier groups Enterprise (CV 65) and Independence (CV 62) were dispatched together with six 
Polaris submarines based in Holy Loch, Scotland. Naval aerial reconnaissance units assisted in 
the effort to collect information about the situation in Cuba. Footage from naval aircraft 
confirmed the construction of a nuclear-armed redoubt. On 22 October, President Kennedy 
shared U.S. intelligence with the world and announced the deployment of quarantine force, 
including Task Force 135 and Task Force 136, to interdict Cuba-bound shipping. These naval 
forces consisted of antisubmarine carriers, cruisers, and close to 30 destroyers and guided missile 
frigates. In addition Navy shore-based patrol planes observed Soviet submarine movement and 
merchant ships heading toward Cuba. To demonstrate the resolute resolve to blockade all ships 
steaming towards Cuba the two destroyers USS John R. Pierce (DD-753) and USS Joseph P. 
Kennedy (DD-850) stopped and searched the Marucla on 26 October. The Lebanese-flagged 
vessel with Soviet goods aboard was heading for Cuba. Without military equipment aboard the 
ship was allowed to continue. Many other Soviet ships turned around before reaching the 
blockade line. The United States armed forces were visibly superior but were not aggressively 
arrayed. This allowed the Soviet Premier Khrushchev to agree to withdraw Soviet offensive 
weapons from Cuba without losing his face. In return the U.S. would not invade Cuba and would 
remove its missiles from Turkey, a step already agreed on before the crisis. By the end of 
November, U.S. naval forces confirmed the dismantling of Soviet missiles in Cuba and their 
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return to the Soviet Union. “The U.S. Navy played a pivotal role in this crisis, demonstrating the 
critical importance of naval forces to the national defense. The Navy's operations were in 
keeping with its strategic doctrine, which is as valid today as it was in late 1962. The Navy, in 
cooperation with the other U.S. armed forces and with America's allies, employed military power 
in such a way that the president did not have to resort to war to protect vital Western interests. 
Khrushchev realized that his missile and bomber forces were no match for the Navy's powerful 
Polaris ballistic missile-firing submarines and the Air Force's land-based nuclear delivery 
systems once these American arms became fully operational” (Utz 1993). In the end the Soviet 
Union was compelled to withdraw the missiles. The Cuban Missile crisis is often cited as a good 
example for a successful resolution through coercive diplomacy where instead of relying on 
military force President Kennedy chose coercive diplomacy to convince Khrushev to remove the 
missiles. He also employed a carrots and sticks approach, setting an ultimatum while offering 
incentives in the form of the removal of U.S. missiles from Turkey in return for Soviet 
compliance. The extraordinary war risk further persuaded both governments to resolve the crisis 
peacefully.  
Approximately 180 USN ships and a 60-ship amphibious force were involved in this crisis. A 
total of eight U.S. aircraft carriers were deployed as part of the force: the Enterprise (CV 65), 
Independence (CV-62), Essex (CV 9), Lake Champlain (CV 39), Lexington (CV 16), Randolph 
(CV 15), Saratoga (CV 60) and Wasp (CV 18) 10 
Additional Sources: Blechman and Kaplan 1978, 71; Utz 1993; George 1991; Marolda 2000 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Cuban Missiles 10/16/1962 – 11/20/1962, 36 4  
CNA I  Cuban Missiles 
Crisis 
10/14/62, 38 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
8 CV's & Amp 
CNA II Cuban Missile 
Crisis 
10-11/1962  8 CV's & Amp 
 
29. # 197: Malaysia Federation; 2/11/1962 – 8/9/1965, 910 
President Sukarno made a statement expressing Indonesia’s opposition to the formation of 
Malaysia on 11 February 1962. This speech triggered a crisis for Malaysia. The UK was 
                                                 
10 For a detailed listing of all USN ships involved see http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq90-3.htm#anchor156376 
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involved immediately and arranged talks between Brunei, Malaysia, Sabah (British Borneo), 
Sarawak, and Singapore to agree on the formation of the Federation of Malaysia. The resulting 
agreement triggered a crisis for Indonesia. The Federation of Malaysia was created on 16 
September 1962. The United States demonstrated an interest in the crisis and from 29 November 
through 17 December 1962 the seaplane carrier USS Salisbury Sound (AV 13) stopped for a port 
visit in Singapore. Further talks and even the involvement of the UN did not change Indonesia’s 
position. When Indonesia called back its ambassador to Kuala Lumpur, the U.S. reacted by 
halting economic aid to Indonesia. Attorney General Robert Kennedy tried to mediate but the 
agreed cease-fire was never implemented. The crisis gradually faded. “Singapore seceded from 
Malaysia on 9 August 1965, an event that Indonesia viewed as the beginning of the breakup of 
the Federation, a "face-saver." Malaya, too, perceived a victory because Indonesia's 
confrontation policy ended without destroying the Federation” (ICB, Malaysia Federation Crisis 
Summary).  
Additional Sources: Solantamity 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Malaysia 
Federation 
2/11/1962 – 8/9/1965, 910 2  
CNA I  Indonesia-
Malaysia 
October 1963, 78 USN 1 CV & NO Amp 
CNA II  Indonesia – 
Malaysia 
9-12/1963  1 CV & NO Amp 
 
30. # 198: Dominican Republic – Haiti II; 4/26/1963 – 6/3/1963 
A crisis for the Dominican Republic was triggered on 26 April 1963 when Haitian policemen 
“forcibly entered the Dominican Republic embassy and arrested opponents of Haiti's regime” 
(ICB, Dominican Republic – Haiti II Crisis Summary). On 27 April, U.S. fearing for the lives of 
American citizens in Haiti sent a naval task force, including the carrier USS Boxer (CV 21) and 
2,000 Marines. On 8 May Navy ships evacuated 2,279 civilians. The United Kingdom and 
France deployed ships as well. When the OAS fact-finding mission came to the conclusion that 
no further actions against Haiti should be undertaken and relations between Haiti and the 
Dominican Republic had normalized, the naval forces were withdrawn on 3 June. Cable 
describes the naval forces’ involvement as a positive gunboat diplomacy action. 
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Additional Sources: Cable 1981; Solantamity 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Dominican 
Republic – Haiti II 
4/26/1963 – 6/3/1963 3  
CNA I  Haitian Unrest 4/29/1963 34 USN, USMC 1 CV & Amp 
CNA II Haiti 4-6/1963  1 CV & Amp  
 
31. # 200 Cuba – Venezuela; 11/1/1963 – 12/1/1963, 31 
A crisis for Venezuela was triggered on 1 November 1963 with the discovery of an arms cache 
on a deserted beach and the uncovering of plans to hinder the elections in December and overrun 
Caracas. Later that month it was confirmed that the arms were provided by Cuba. When on 1 
December the Venezuelan elections were held without hindrance the crisis ended. 
According to Captain Roth, U.S. naval aircraft were searching for a ship suspected of carrying 
insurgents in November 1963. After the ship was located the Venezuelan Navy was notified. 
Additional Sources: Roth 2001 and email exchange 2009. 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Cuba – Venezuela 11/1/1963 – 12/1/1963, 31 2  
CNA I  NO DATA    
CNA II Venezuela-
Colombia 
11/1963  O CV & NO Amp 
 
32. # 202: Cyprus I; 11/30/1963 – 8/10/1964, 256 
A proposal by the President of the Cypriot Republic for a new constitution, which would change 
Cyprus into a unitary state with guarantees for the Turkish minority, triggered a crisis for 
Turkey. Turkey’s opposition to the changes and the threat of intervention then broadened the 
crisis to include Cyprus and Greece. A series of cease-fire talks were held, which helped to 
defuse the situation but tensions remained (December 1993). A UN Peacekeeping Force was 
formed on 27 March further easing the tension. Yet in 1964 the crisis escalated between May and 
August, with the U.K., the U.S., the NATO and the United Nations trying to broker an 
agreement. The United States showed presence by sending elements of Sixth Fleet to the vicinity 
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of Cyprus to conduct patrols. An aircraft carrier11 was stationed off Cyprus for most of March, 
early June, and from 8 August – 2 September 1964. A direct threat by the United States to halt 
all military aid to Turkey and to stand aside if the Soviets became involved, led Turkey to 
abandon its intervention plans. In August the Security Council adopted a cease-fire resolution, 
which Cyprus and Turkey accepted the next day, ending the crisis on 10 August 1964. “The UN 
was the most active mediator during the crisis, but it is likely that the U.S. -- through Johnson’s 
pleas to all actors and warning to Turkey that it would no longer automatically be under U.S. 
protection if it should invade Cyprus -- was the most effective mediator” (ICB). 
The National Defense University’s Institute for National Strategic Studies (1997, 51) states that: 
“Since 1964, U.S. intervention in the Greek-Turkish disputes has proved to be the only way to 
avoid open conflict between these two historic rivals. The Greeks and the Turks are likely to 
remain at odds. Washington will likely remain the closest thing there is to a totally honest 
broker”. 
Additional Sources: National Defense University 1997, 51 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Cyprus I 11/30/1963 – 8/10/1964, 256 2  
CNA I  Cyprus 1/22/1964, 269 USN, USMC, 
USAF 
1 CV & Amp 
CNA II Cyprus 1-10/1964  1 CV & Amp 
 
33. # 206: Panama Flag; 1/9/1964 – 1/12/1964, 4 
This short crisis between Panama and the United States was triggered by U.S. students raising 
the American flag at a high school in the Canal Zone. In reaction, Panamanian students marched 
into the Canal Zone with their flag. Serious riots followed and the U.S. responded with force. 
Panama accused the U.S. of aggression and suspended diplomatic relations on 9 January until 3 
April. Following the riots an Amphibious Ready Squadron was stationed off Panama’s East 
coast. A week after diplomatic relations were restored the U.S. naval amphibious force stationed 
in the region was withdrawn. 
Additional Sources: Global Security: Panama Canal Riots, Roth email exchange 2009 
                                                 
11 I was not able to determine the name of the involved aircraft carrier. 
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Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Panama Flag 1/9/1964 – 1/12/1964, 4 2  
CNA I  Panama January 64, 101 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
0 CV & Amp 
CNA II Panama 1-4/1964  0 CV & Amp 
 
34. # 210: Gulf of Tonkin; 7/30/1964 – 8/77/1964, 9 
The crisis began with an attack on North Vietnamese islands in the Gulf of Tonkin by South 
Vietnam. In retaliation the U.S. destroyer Maddox (DD-731), operating in international waters, 
was hit by North Vietnamese Navy on 2 August. Immediately after attack the USS Ticonderoga 
(CV 14) rushed to assist Maddox. Two days later Turner Joy (DD 951) requested support 
alleging a new torpedo attack. President Johnson decided to react to the unprovoked attacks (the 
real circumstance around the Gulf of Tonkin affair are highly debated and many disagree that the 
attacks on the U.S. destroyers were unprovoked. According to the North Vietnamese their 
sovereignty extends five miles, according to the U.S. only three). On 5 August the United States 
retaliated with strikes against the North Vietnamese mainland. The aircraft carriers Ticonderoga 
and Constellation (CV 64) were part of the force. In reaction to the events, U.S. Congress passed 
the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, authorizing all necessary means to protect U.S. armed forces on 7 
August, ending this crisis but ushering the Vietnam War escalation.  
Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 112  
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Gulf of Tonkin 7/30/1964 – 8/77/1964, 9 4  
CNA I  Gulf of Tonkin 8/2/64, 9 USN 2 CV's & NO 
Amp 
CNA II Gulf of Tonkin 8/1964  2 CV's & NO 
Amp 
 
35. # 212: Yemen War III; 12/3/1964 – 8/25/1965, 266 
During the lengthy Yemen War, a Royalist assault on Republican territory, with Saudi support, 
triggered this crisis for Yemen and Egypt. United States surface combatants from the Middle 
East Force (MIDEASTFOR) carried out surveillance and presence missions during the critical 
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period of July and August 1965. After negotiations, an agreement between the two parties lead to 
the abatement of the crisis but the war continued.  
Additional Sources: Solantamity 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Yemen War III 12/3/1964 – 8/25/1965, 266 2  
CNA I  Yemen July 1965, 32 USN 0 CV & NO Amp 
CNA II Yemen 7/1965 - 11/1967  0 CV & NO Amp 
 
36. # 215: Dominican Intervention; 4/24/1965 – 8/31/1965, 130 
The U.S. intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 is representative of a large military 
forces deployment, in this instance to control events in, and to maintain American influence 
over, the Western Hemisphere. Armed and authorized to return fire, the troops were the first 
combat-ready U.S. force to enter a Latin American country in almost forty years. 
A civil war broke out in the Dominican Republic on 24 April 1965, when a junta, which had 
deposed Juan Bosch in a military coup in 1963, was itself overthrown. The counterrevolution 
wanted to restore constitutional government and Bosch to power. The United States was mostly 
concerned about the possibility of a second Cuba; an anti-American regime would limit the 
influence of the United States and hinder its predominance while potentially providing the Soviet 
Union (or USSR) with a new ally in Washington’s own backyard. But the foremost official 
justification was the threat to the lives of American citizens. 
Shortly after the outbreak of the crisis, the U.S. embassy requested the evacuation of citizens of 
the United States and other nations. The USN was ready to move immediately and placed a task 
force—including the helicopter carrier USS Boxer (LPH 4) and 1,500 Marines—off the 
Dominican coast. On 27 April the evacuation operations began, with unarmed helicopters 
airlifting Marines into the capital to protect American citizens. 
Impediments to prompt evacuation led to an increase of U.S. troop strength ashore and a 
strengthening of the naval task force. Supporting Air Force tactical units were moved to the 
Caribbean area. After Marine forces and Army units established a safety zone and a safe 
corridor, refugees were also taken on board directly; by 2 May the Navy had evacuated a total of 
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three thousand civilians. The mission’s objective was extended to include the prevention of 
communist influence in the Dominican government. By 6 May the United States had twenty-two 
thousand men ashore and nine thousand afloat. The signing of an “Act of Dominican 
Reconciliation” on 31 August 1965 ended the international crisis, with all sides agreeing on a 
moderate provisional president. According to Siegel, U.S. naval forces did not begin to withdraw 
until 28 June 1966; Cable sets the final withdrawal on 20 September 1966.  
The need for this successful but expensive operation is disputed. A total of forty (the Department 
of Defense [DoD] counts thirty-eight) ships of the USN were involved, including Boxer, the tank 
landing ship Wood County (LST 1178), destroyer transport Ruchamkin (APD 89), attack cargo 
ships Yancey (AKA 93) and Rankin (AKA 103), and the dock landing ships Fort Snelling (LSD 
30) and Raleigh (LPD 1). The evacuation operation mainly served to underline U.S. interest in 
the region by establishing a presence and showing determination not to allow a communist 
takeover. 
Additional Sources: All Hands 1965, 2 -5, Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Cable 1981; Department 
of Defense 1965; Loewenthal 1972. 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Dominican 
Intervention 
4/24/1965 – 8/31/1965, 130 4  
CNA I  Dominican 
Republic 
4/25/1965, 515 USN; USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
2 CV'S & Amp 
CNA II Dominican 
Republic 
4/1965 - 9/1966  2 CV'S & Amp 
 
37. # 216: Kashmir II; 8/5/1965 – 1/10/1966, 159 
The infiltration of Pakistani fighters into Kashmir caused a crisis for India. In reaction, Indian 
military forces crossed the Kashmir cease-fire line, prompting the Pakistani armed forces to 
respond. On 5 September India invaded West Pakistan. The crisis led the United Nations to 
appeal for a cease-fire. Since the lives of American citizens were endangered, the U.S. decided to 
deploy a contingency evacuation force, to halt military aid to both parties (8 September 1965) 
and not to extend further economic assistance. On 11 September two ships from MIDEASTFOR 
left Bahrain for Karachi. Four days later U.S citizens were evacuated from West Pakistan with 
the support of USAF planes. China sided with Pakistan and accused India of provocation. 
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Chinese involvement and the fear of their intervention led the Western Powers to push for an 
immediate solution to the crisis. The UN resolution of 17 September did not yet end the crisis 
since both parties still deployed their armed forces in Kashmir; only further talks concluding 
with the Tashkent Declaration on 10 January 1966 brought the crisis to an end.  
Additional Sources: Solantamity 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Kashmir II 8/5/1965 – 1/10/1966, 159 2  
CNA I  Indo-Pakistani 
War 
9/11/1965, 25 USN, USAF 0 CV & NO Amp 
CNA II Indio-Pak War 10-11/1965  0 CV & NO Amp 
 
38. # 219: Yemen War IV; 10/14/1966 – 9/26/1967, 348 
A further crisis in Yemen began with air attacks on Royalist territory and Saudi villages. The 
expectation of Royalist retaliation then triggered a crisis for Egypt and Yemen.  The latter 
engaged in renewed attacks. After months of fighting reconciliation was reached in April 1966. 
The situation changed with the beginning of the Six Day War. At the end of August the Prime 
Minister of Sudan successfully proposed a new peace plan. With the final Egyptian withdrawal 
from Yemen the crisis ended on 26 September 1967. Since 1965 U.S. naval forces had been on 
station in the area to observe the developments.  
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Yemen War IV 10/14/1966 – 9/26/1967, 348 2  
CNA I  NO DATA    
CNA II Yemen 7/1965 - 11/1967 USN O CV & NO Amp 
 
39. # 222: Six Day War; 5/17/1967 – 6/11/1967, 26 
An Egyptian overflight of Israel’s nuclear research center and increased Egyptian presence in the 
Sinai precipitated a crisis between the two countries. Israel felt compelled to protect its rights of 
freedom of navigation when Egyptian President Nasser closed off the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli 
shipping. Preemptive strikes by Israel against Egypt forced Egypt and Jordan to react with 
military force. On 5 June the crisis escalated with an Israeli attack on the Egyptian Air Force and 
the occupation of the Gaza Strip and Sinai. On 9 June the Israeli invasion of the Golan Heights 
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drew Syria and the Soviet Union into the crisis. Egypt and Syria fought with Soviet weapons, 
employed by Soviet advisors, but were defeated by a numerically inferior Israeli Army. Syria’s 
acceptance of the cease-fire ended the crisis on 10 June 1967 and Israel emerged with new 
borders and additional territory. The United States was heavily involved. After initial hesitancy 
the United States deployed their Sixth Fleet with about 50 warships, including the two aircraft 
carriers USS America (CV 66) and USS Saratoga (CV 60) and a Marines battalion landing team 
on 6 June. One of the first actions was to reduce the 100- mile territorial water claim of Syria to a 
50-mile, and to send a carrier towards Syria to reinforce diplomatic efforts to reach a cease-fire 
agreement. The U.S. naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean showed its opposition to any 
Soviet intervention, and played a major role in determining the Six Day War. During the crisis 
the Arab combatants accused the United States of providing air cover to Israeli ground forces 
from its aircraft carriers, an allegation that was contradicted by the aircraft carrier’s flight plans. 
The Sixth Fleet also warned to Israel to stand down and avoid escalation.  
Additional Sources: Hahn 2005, 52 – 53; Kalley 2001 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Six Day War 5/17/1967 – 6/11/1967, 26 2  
CNA I  Six  
Day War 
6/6/1967, 6 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
2 CV's & Amp 
CNA II Middle East War 5-6/1967, 2  2 CV's & Amp 
 
40. # 223: Cyprus II; 11/15/1967 – 12/4/1967, 20 
The second Cyprus crisis was triggered by assaults on two Turkish-Cypriot villages, which led to 
the Turkish decision to dispatch military force in reaction. Turkey also requested the removal of 
the chief of the Greek forces in Cyprus. In combination these events triggered a crisis for Cyprus 
and Greece. The United Nations became involved and Cyprus Vance, the former U.S. Deputy 
Secretary of Defense acted as mediator in a shuttle diplomacy effort. On 1 December an 
agreement was reached between Turkey and Greece and three days later with Cyprus which 
ended the crisis. Cyrus Vance’s intensive shuttle diplomacy helped to resolve this crisis. 
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Although the United States deployed a contingency force from its Sixth Fleet12 to stand by for a 
possible evacuation of U.S. citizens, the evacuations took place with commercial aircraft.  
Additional Sources: Slengesol 2000, 99 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Cyprus II 11/15/1967 – 12/4/1967, 20 2  
CNA I  Cyprus 11/15/1967, 24 USN, USMC 1 CV's & Amp 
CNA II Cyprus 11-12/1967  1 CV's & Amp 
 
41. # 224: Pueblo; 1/21/1968 – 12/23/1968, 338 
North Korean forces seized the USS Pueblo on 22 January 1968. The USS Pueblo had been 
operating in international waters off the coast of Korea, gathering intelligence information. This 
incident happened one day after North Korea had tried to assassinate the South Korean President. 
Since the War of 1812 no U.S. warship had surrendered to foreign forces. The surviving crew 
members were held hostage for eleven months, accused of spying in Korean territorial waters. 
The U.S. reacted by deploying Air Force and Navy forces. Naval vessels, including the aircraft 
carrier USS Enterprise (CV 65), escorting destroyers and support ships, were dispatched to the 
Sea of Japan off the North Korean coast. On 6 February the Enterprise began to withdraw as a 
sign of goodwill from the United States. To secure their release the United States had to 
apologize and admit (falsely) that the USS Pueblo had entered Korean territorial waters at the 
time of the attack. The imposed agreement was reached on 23 December 1968 and subsequently 
the crew was released while the ship was never recovered. Different carriers were part of the 
U.S. response at different times and included the USS Ranger (CV 61), Yorktown (CV 10), Coral 
Sea (CV 43), and Kearsarge (CV 33). Because the safety of the held crew members was 
paramount the U.S. decided against a blockade, the seizure of North Korean shipping, or the 
dispatch of bombers against North Korean territory.  
Additional Sources: Cable 1981 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Pueblo 1/21/1968 – 12/23/1968, 338 3  
CNA I  Pueblo 1/24/1968, 59 USN, USAF 3 CV's & NO 
Amp 
                                                 
12 I was not able to determine the name of the involved aircraft carrier 
Seaborne Crisis Response                                                                                                                                             Appendix A. Crises Summaries 
40 
 
CNA II Pueblo  1-3/1968  3 CV's & NO 
Amp 
 
42. # 233: EC-121 Spy Plane; 4/15/1969 – 4/26/1969, 12 
North Korean aircraft shot down a USN reconnaissance plane over the Sea of Japan, accusing it 
of having entered Korean airspace. A Sea Air Rescue (SAR) mission began immediately after 
the shoot down. The United States rejected the claim and dispatched a formidable naval force to 
the Sea of Japan, including four aircraft carriers. The crisis ended on 26 April when the U.S. 
naval task force was reduced to a one carrier battle group and the other naval forces were moved 
from the Sea of Japan into the Yellow Sea.  
The naval force included the carriers USS Enterprise (CV 65), Hornet (CV 12), Ranger (CV 61) 
and Ticonderoga (CV 14) and the battleship New Jersey (BB 62).  
Additional Sources: Cable 1981 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB EC-121 Spy Plane 4/15/1969 – 4/26/1969, 12 4  
CNA I  EC-121 
Shootdown 
4/15/1969, 26 USN, USAF, 
USARMY 
4 CV's & NO 
Amp 
CNA II EC-121 4/1969  4 CV's & NO 
Amp 
 
43. # 236: Cairo Agreement – PLO; 10/22/1969 – 11/3/1969, 13 
The PLO announcement of heavy fighting between the PLO and Lebanese government forces on 
22 October 1969 drew Lebanon into the crisis. Egypt, Jordan and Syria supported the resulting 
negotiations. On 3 October the crisis ended with the “Cairo” agreement, which allowed the PLO 
to “operate as a "state within a state" in Lebanon”. During 26 – 30 October the United States 
deployed a contingency force, consisting of two aircraft carrier forces, USS Saratoga (CV 60) & 
USS Independence (CV 62), and the Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group (MARG) to the 
region.  
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Cairo Agreement 
– PLO 
10/22/1969 – 11/3/1969, 13 2  
CNA I  Lebanon-Libya 10/26/69, 5 USN, USMC 2 CV's & Amp 
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Ops 
CNA II NO DATA    
 
44. # 238: Black September; 9/15/1970 – 9/29/1970, 15 
On 11 June the aircraft carrier USS Forrestal (CV 59) was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean 
to stand by should air cover for evacuation from Jordan become necessary. When tensions 
deescalated the carrier was ordered back to Italy (21 June), but once again (3 September) the 
Sixth Fleet was brought into play due to increasing tensions. Three days later the two aircraft 
carriers Saratoga (CV 60) and Independence (CV 62) as well as the MARG were positioned in 
the Eastern Mediterranean. The crisis actually peaked on 15 September with the shuffling of the 
Jordan cabinet, which demonstrated its resolve to fight the PLO influence. The king was no 
longer willing to tolerate PLO raids from Jordanian territory. This caused a crisis for Syria and 
the United States. Whereas the U.S. feared the loss of its ally the king of Jordan, Syria remained 
committed to support the PLO and to maintain its influence in the region and invaded Jordan on 
19 September. In reaction to the Syrian invasion, the U.S. deployed an additional aircraft carrier, 
the USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) (departing from the East Coast of the U.S.) and elements of 
the 8th Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB). Jordan resisted the invasion militarily while Israel 
declared its determination to prevent a PLO victory in Jordan. When Syrian forces withdrew 
from Jordan, PLO forces moved to Southern Lebanon. After mediation efforts, Jordan and Syria 
agreed on a cease-fire on 27 September which was put into effect two days later. Only one 
aircraft carrier then remained in the Eastern Mediterranean. The USS John F. Kennedy returned 
to Souda Bay on 8 October. In addition to naval forces, the U.S. had alerted troops in Germany 
while Soviet naval forces were closely monitoring U.S. naval activities during the crisis. Former 
Sixth Fleet commander Admiral Isaac Kidd observed that the eastern Mediterranean looked like 
“an international boat show” (cited in Baer 1994, 401). 
Additional Sources: Baer 1994, 401, Cable 1981 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Black September 9/15/1970 – 9/29/1970, 15 3  
CNA I  Jordan 9/2/1970, 60 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
3 CV's & Amp 
CNA II Jordan 9-10/1970  3 CV's & Amp 
CNA Jordan Civil War 9/2/1970 - 11/1/1970, 61 Turkey, Show of  
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IIII Force, USN, 
USMC, USAF, 
USARMY 
 
45. # 239: Cienfuegos Submarine Base; 9/16/1970 – 10/23/1970, 38 
U.S. intelligence flights disclosed the construction of a Soviet submarine base on the Southern 
coast of Cuba, triggering a crisis for the U.S. The Soviet Union rejected the accusation, claiming 
that no agreements had been violated and no prohibited weapons had been stored at Cienfuegos. 
Intelligence showed the halt of the construction and Soviet naval forces left the base. This ended 
the crisis for the United States, yet disagreements persisted until spring 1971. According to CNA 
II, U.S. naval forces operated in the area in reaction to the crisis. 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Cienfuegos 
Submarine Base 
9/16/1970 – 10/23/1970, 38 2  
CNA I  NO DATA    
CNA II Cienfuegos 9/1970 - 6/1971 USN 0 CV & NO Amp 
 
46. # 242: Bangladesh; 3/25/1971 – 12/17/1971, 268 
This crisis was triggered by an attack of the West Pakistan army on Dacca University in 
Bangladesh on 25 March 1971. At that time, Bangladesh was still formally known as East 
Pakistan and East Bengal. East Pakistan now declared its independence, bringing on armed 
conflict with West Pakistan. India supported East Pakistan, and on 3 December, after months of 
minor clashes, a formal war between India and Pakistan broke out. Within two weeks, Indian 
forces overwhelmed the Pakistani troops based in the seceding territory. The war ended on 17 
December 1971 with Pakistan’s surrender, and Bangladesh officially became a sovereign state. 
The United States was politically very active in this crisis. To undergird U.S. support, the 
Seventh Fleet moved into the Bay of Bengal in support of Pakistan. On 10 December, as Indian 
troops liberated the new country of Bangladesh, a naval force consisting of a battle group led by 
USS Enterprise (CV 65) and an amphibious ready group was deployed to the Indian Ocean to 
stand by for a possible evacuation of Western nationals. An evacuation operation proved 
unnecessary, because the Royal Air Force had already evacuated most foreigners. Nonetheless, 
the naval forces stayed in the Indian Ocean in a show of force, monitoring both Indian and 
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Pakistani operations and maritime and air traffic, as well as increasing numbers of Soviet aircraft 
and vessels, with the goal of intimidating India and tilting the situation in favor of Pakistan.  
The USSR had also moved some of its naval forces into the vicinity of the Bay of Bengal, to 
demonstrate support for India. According to Siegel (1995, 7 - 8), U.S. naval forces played an 
important role in influencing events on the ground. “The presence of U.S. naval forces south of 
the Indian subcontinent, along with growing diplomatic isolation, thus evidently helped to sway 
Indian decision makers away from the preferred option of continuing the war with an offensive 
in the West. Enterprise’s deployment strengthened U.S. diplomatic efforts.” According to 
Mrityunjoy Mazumdar (2006), this entry of Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal left a deep 
impression on Indian policy makers as well as the Indian navy for much of the next two decades  
Additional Sources: Cable 1981, Siegel 1995 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Bangladesh 3/25/1971 – 12/17/1971, 268 3  
CNA I  Indo-Pakistani 
War 
12/10/1971, 30 USN 1 CV & Amp 
CNA II Indio-Pak War 12/1971 - 1/1972  1 CV & Amp 
CNA 
IIII 
Indo-Pac-War 12/10/1971 - 1/8/1972, 30 Bangladesh, NEO 
(plans only), USN, 
USMC 
 
 
47. # 255: October-Yom Kippur War; 10/5/1973 – 5/31/1974, 239 
Egyptian forces moved towards the Suez Canal on 5 October 1973, triggering a crisis with Israel. 
One day later, Egyptian and Syrian forces carried out a surprise attack against Israel, marking the 
onset of war. In the following months , talks and negotiations were held, mediation efforts 
attempted, agreements proposed, and cease-fire agreements broken until a final agreement was 
reached on 29 May 1974. The signing 2 days later ended the crisis. The United States and the 
Soviet Union played important roles in reaching the agreement and both deployed naval forces to 
the Eastern Mediterranean. In reaction to the outbreak of the war, U.S. forces around the world 
were put on alert and the Sixth Fleet was reinforced. The Sixth Fleet’s mission was the 
protection of U.S. transport planes delivering weapons and ammunition to Israel. The two 
aircraft carriers USS Independence (CV 62) and USS Roosevelt (CV 42) and an amphibious force 
were on a high level of alert in reaction to the crisis. During October the two carriers and 
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amphibious forces stood ready for a possible evacuation contingency operation. The aircraft 
carrier John F. Kennedy (CV 67), together with amphibious forces, joined the U.S Sixth Fleet in 
the Eastern Mediterranean on 25 October. With the reduction of tensions on 17 November, the 
Sixth Fleet’s alert status was scaled down to a normal DEFCON (Defense Readiness Condition). 
In April 1974 the USS Forrestal (CV 59) operated in the Central Mediterranean and was 
available to support U.S. efforts. Besides the involved carriers, CNA II lists two Marine 
Battalion Landing Teams and the vessels Guadalcanal (LPH 7) and Iwo Jima (LPH 2).  
U.S. naval forces played an important role in the 1973 Middle East crisis. The United States 
Navy with the Sixth Fleet and the Soviet Navy, with the Fifth Eskadra both had a peacetime 
naval presence in the Mediterranean. In an immediate reaction to the outbreak of the war on 6 
October 1973, the aircraft carrier USS Independence was sent to the Eastern Mediterranean to 
demonstrate U.S. concern. The aircraft carriers USS Franklin D. Roosevelt and USS John F. 
Kennedy remained in European ports, until 10 October when they deployed alongside the U.S. 
air supply route to Israel, out of concern that Libya or Algeria might try to interdict the supply 
route. The Soviet Fifth Eskadra responded in turn to the Sixth Fleet’s show of force and to 
demonstrate support for its ally Egypt. In a tit for tat the United States put its forces on yet a 
higher state of alert. The USS Independence returned to Greece only when the cease-fire 
agreement seemed certain to hold and after the end of the U.S. – Soviet naval confrontation 
(Allen 1980, 27 – 29).  
Additional Sources: Allen 1980; Cable 1981; Keesing’s; Marolda 2000 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB October Yom 
Kippur War 
10/5/1973 – 5/31/1974, 239 3  
CNA I  Middle East War 10/6/1973, 48 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
3 CV’s & Amp 
CNA I Middle East Force 10/24/1973, 22 USN 0 CV & NO Amp 
CNA II Middle East War 10 – 11/1973  3 CV’s & Amp 
CNA 
IIII 
Middle East War 10/6/1973 – 11/22/1973, 48 Syria, Cont. Pos. 
USN, USMC, 
USAF 
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48. # 256: Oman – South Yemen; 11/18/1973 – 3/11/1976, 846 
The crisis was triggered when Oman announced an aerial assault carried out by South Yemen on 
a military post and South Yemeni involvement in fighting between rebels and government forces 
in Oman. Oman successfully defeated the rebels, chasing them over the border into South Yemen 
by the end of 1975. On 11 March 1976 Oman and South Yemen signed a cease-fire agreement, 
reached with the help of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, finally ending the crisis. U.S. naval forces 
were operating off Yemen in a show of force during the early crisis period. 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Oman – South 
Yemen 
11/18/1973 – 3/11/1976, 846 3  
CNA I  NO DATA    
CNA II NO DATA    
CNA 
III 
Middle East Force 10/24/1973 - 11/13/1974, 
386. 
Yemen, Show of 
Force, USN 
 
 
49. # 257: Cyprus III; 7/15/1974 – 2/25/1975, 225 
On 15 July 1974 a Greek-led military coup ousted the Cypriot government and installed a puppet 
regime. This triggered a crisis for Cyprus and Turkey. Cyprus requested help from Britain and 
the UN Security Council. Turkey intervened on 20 July and occupied parts of the island. In an 
immediate reaction to the coup, the United States delayed the return of USS America (CV 66), 
then routinely deployed in the Mediterranean, to the United States until relieved by USS 
Independence (CV 62). At the same time American and British diplomats began mediation 
attempts, which led to an unstable cease-fire. Forrestal was deployed to the central 
Mediterranean. Other assignments for Forrestal and the Sixth Fleet amphibious ready group were 
canceled so that they would be ready if needed. 
On 22 July aircraft from USS Inchon (LPH 12)—other sources name USS Coronado (LPD 11)—
evacuated more than four hundred American and foreign nationals to Beirut from the British 
base at Dhekelia in southern Cyprus; Independence provided air cover. In early August the ships’ 
departures were postponed in reaction to riots and demonstrations before the American embassy 
that resulted in the murder of the American ambassador to Cyprus. With the easing of tension, all 
contingency operations ended by 2 September. After negotiations, the toppled Cypriot president, 
Archbishop Michael Makarios, returned on 7 December 1974. In January 1975 naval forces were 
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deployed again for possible evacuation duties. USS Saratoga (CV 60) and amphibious forces 
were released on 21 January 1975. “In February 1975 a Turkish-Cypriot Federated State was 
proclaimed and, on 24 February, a Constituent Assembly for Turkish Cyprus was convened, 
ending the crisis for Turkey. By their failure to challenge this act, the crisis ended for Cyprus and 
Greece as well.” (ICB). 
Additional Sources: Grossnick 1997, Proceedings, Slengesol 2000 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Cyprus III 7/15/1974 – 2/25/1975, 225 2  
CNA I  Cyprus 7/15/74, 39 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
2 CV's & Amp 
CNA I Cyprus Unrest 1/18/75, 4 USN, USMC 1 CV & Amp 
CNA II Cyprus 7-8/1974  2 CV's & Amp 
CNA II Cyprus 1/1975  1 CV & Amp 
CNA 
III  
Cyprus Coup 7/22/1974 - 7/25/1974, 4 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY, 
Cyprus, NEO 
 
CNA 
III 
Cyprus Unrest 1/18/1975 - 1/21/1975, 3 USN, USMC, 
Cyprus, NEO 
(plans only) 
 
 
50. # 258: Final North Vietnam Offensive; 12/14/1974 – 4/30/1975, 138 
On 14 December North Vietnam launched an offensive and on 1 January 1975 the Khmer Rouge 
followed their example in Cambodia. Cambodian and South Vietnamese forces both fought back 
and the latter requested U.S. aid. The rebels took control over the Cambodian capital on 17 April, 
ending for Cambodia the last Vietnam War crisis. Meanwhile North Vietnam advanced its 
offensive. With the fall of Saigon and the capitulation of South Vietnam (30 April 1975), the 
crisis ended. At the outset the U.S. provided aid for South Vietnam and Cambodia which 
Congress continuously reduced. Toward the end of the crisis, U.S. activity was limited to 
evacuating U.S. citizens. The carriers USS Enterprise (CV 65), USS Coral Sea (CV 43), USS 
Hancock (CV 19), USS Midway (CV 41), and the assault ship Okinawa (LPH 3) received orders 
to proceed to the Vietnamese water and stand ready for possible contingency operations in 
March. The USS Hancock served as a helicopter platform for the evacuation of U.S. citizens and 
other foreign nationals from Cambodia to Okinawa as part of Operation EAGLE PULL. On 29 
April 1975 the Enterprise together with Coral Sea executed Operation FREQUENT WIND, an 
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evacuation contingency operation to rescue foreign nationals from Vietnam, by covering 
evacuation helicopters. The USS Midway and Okinawa also assisted in the evacuation operations.   
Additional Sources: Grossnick 1997, Proceedings 
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Final North 
Vietnam 
Offensive 
12/14/1974 – 4/30/1975, 138 2  
CNA I  NO DATA    
CNA 
III 
Eagle Pull 
Cambodia  
2/1/1975 - 4/12/1975, 71 Cambodia, NEO 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
CNA 
III 
Frequent Wind 4/4/1975 - 4/30/ 1975, 27 Vietnam, NEO 
USN, USMC, 
USAF 
 
 
51. # 259: Mayaguez; 5/12/1975 – 5/15/1975, 3 
On 12 May 1975 Khmer Rouge forces seized the merchant vessel USS Mayaguez off the 
Cambodian coast, claiming the vessel had entered Cambodian territorial waters. The situation 
recalled the Pueblo affair and President Ford ordered an immediate military rescue mission. The 
U.S. had seaborne forces on location and in Thailand, who responded on the very same day. U.S. 
Marines recovered the empty USS Mayaguez while other Marines, flown by Air Force 
helicopters, attempted to rescue the captured seamen, protected by naval air and surface forces. 
USN, USMC and USAF forces were directly involved in the rescue attempt. Upon landing at 
Tang Island the Marines did not find the Mayaguez crew who had been moved to a fishing boat. 
On 14 May Cambodia announced the release of the captives and crew and vessel were retrieved 
by U.S. forces. The naval response involved two aircraft carriers the USS Coral Sea (CV 43) and 
the USS Hancock (CV 19). The latter was only alerted. According to CNA II the USMC 
dispatched Elements of Third Marine Division while the USNI Proceedings mentions companies 
from the 4th ad 9th Marines on USAF aircraft. With the termination of U.S. military activity the 
crisis ended for Cambodia on 15 May.  
Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 175 – 180; Gaffney 2002, 5, Grossnick 1997, Proceedings 
Seaborne Crisis Response                                                                                                                                             Appendix A. Crises Summaries 
48 
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Mayaguez 5/12/1975 – 5/15/1975, 3 4  
CNA I  Mayaguez 5/13/1975, 3 USN, USMC, 
USAF 
2 CV’S & Amp 
CNA II Mayaguez 5/1975  1 CV & Amp 
CNA 
IIII 
Mayaguez Rescue 5/12/1975 – 5/15/1975, 4 Cambodia, 
Combat, USN, 
USMC, USAF 
 
52. # 261 Moroccan March; 10/16/1975 – 4/14/1976, 181 
The King of Morocco declared his intention to “march” into Western Sahara on the same day the 
World Court had decided that neither Mauritania nor Morocco had any sovereignty rights over 
the Western Sahara. By this action Morocco triggered a crisis for Spain which brought the matter 
before the Security Council. Spain and Algeria were resolved to oppose the Moroccan March 
militarily. The King of Morocco reversed the incursion (6 November) after 5 days when Spain 
agreed to exclude Algeria from the negotiation. Mauritania, Morocco, and Spain signed an 
agreement on 14 November, dividing the Western Sahara between Mauritania and Morocco 
whereas Spain was granted a “share in the valuable Bu Craa phosphate mines” (ICB). Although 
the crisis ended for Spain, Algeria came into conflict with the Polisario Rebels. In December the 
rebels fought with Algerian, Moroccan and Mauritanian forces. A further agreement between 
Morocco and Mauritania ended the crisis (14 March 1976), during which the United States 
provided military aid to Morocco, whereas the Soviet Union supported the Polisario Rebels. The 
USN vessels made three highly publicized visits to Morocco ports in January 1976 to 
demonstrate U.S. support in response to the USSR involvement.  
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Moroccan March  10/16/1975 – 4/14/1976, 181 3  
CNA I  Polisario Rebels 1/5/1976, 18 USN 0 CV's & NO 
Amp 
CNA 
III 
Polisario Rebels 1/5/1976 - 1/22/1976, 18 Morocco, Show of 
Force, USN 
 
 
53. # 265: Lebanon Civil War; 1/18/1976 – 11/15/1976, 298 
Lebanese Christian forces attacked three towns, mostly inhabited by Moslems. Syria sent troops 
to support the Moslems and tried unsuccessfully to mediate the crisis, then to impose a 
resolution. By late September, Lebanese opposition against Syrian influence had ended but 
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unrest persisted until the Arab League authorized the stationing of Syrian soldiers in Beirut. 
“Shortly thereafter, Syria reverted to its traditional pro-Palestinian stance after tension and 
clashes between Syrian and Christian forces, supporting the PLO against the Israeli-backed 
Christian militias” (ICB). The United States expressed its concern over Syrian behavior. Already 
in August 1975 USN forces had been in the vicinity in case an evacuation operation became 
necessary. By the end of March 1976, vessels from the Sixth Fleet, within 20 hours distance to 
Lebanon were re-alerted for a possible evacuation. On 3 May 1976, the USS America (CV 66) 
was deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean in support of Operation FLUID DRIVE, a 
contingency operation for a possible evacuation mission of U.S. citizens and other foreign 
nationals. A state of readiness persisted for next three months. For its part, the Soviet 
Mediterranean fleet monitored events closely, as it had during the Yom-Kippur crisis. The 
evacuation began on 20 June 1976 after the assassination of the U.S. ambassador to Lebanon. 
USMC with the help of USN forces evacuated 263 Americans and other foreign nationals from 
Beirut to the USS Spiegel Grove (LSD-32) which brought them to Greece. After the successful 
operation the carrier departed for Italy on 2 August. On 28 July 308 more U.S. and foreign 
nationals were evacuated from Beirut via the USS Coronado (LPD-11) to Greece. The crisis 
involved one aircraft carrier the USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67), later replaced with the USS 
Independence (CV 62).  
Additional Sources: Proceedings 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Lebanon Civil 
War 
1/18/1976 – 11/15/1976, 298 2  
CNA I  Lebanon August 1975, 367 USN, USMC 1 CV'S & Amp 
CNA 
IIII 
Lebanon Civil 
War 
8/1/1975 - 7/28/1976, 363 Lebanon, NEO 
(plans only) 
USN, USMC 
 
CNA 
IIII 
Lebanon 6/20/1976-  6/21/1976, 2 Lebanon, NEO 
USN, USMC, 
USAF 
 
CNA 
IIII 
Lebanon 7/27/1976 - 7/27/1976, 1 Lebanon, NEO 
USN, USMC, 
USAF 
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54. # 274: Poplar Tree; 8/17/1976 – 9/16/1976, 31 
Two U.S. Army soldiers were killed in Korea while trying to cut down a poplar tree in the 
demilitarized zone of Korea, triggering a crisis for the United States. The U.S. responded by 
deploying a squadron of 20 F-111s and a navy task force to South Korea. In addition all U.S. 
forces were put on DEFCON 3. The naval task force included the aircraft carrier Midway (CV 
41) (this deployment force was comparable to that of the 1973 October-Yom Kippur crisis-war 
and only slightly lower than that of the Cuban Missile crisis). The U.S. was determined to show 
its resolve and to underscore its influence worldwide. This U.S. reaction triggered a crisis for 
North Korea, which put its armed forces on alert. Operation PAUL BUNYAN consisted of 
cutting down the tree in a sign of U.S. determination, an action that was protected from the air. 
No violence was used. The ICB call this “the most dramatic show of U.S. force in Korea since 
the Korean War” (ICB). The cutting of the tree, and North Korea’s statement recognizing the 17 
August killings as a regretful incident, deescalated the tensions. The USS Midway carrier battle 
group remained in the area of the Korea Strait until 8 September. The United States and North 
Korea signed a new joint security area (JSA) agreement in early September which ended the 
crisis (16 September).  
Additional Sources: Proceedings  
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Poplar Tree 8/17/1976 – 9/16/1976, 31 3  
CNA I  Korean Tree 
Incident 
8/19/76, 21 USN, USAF, 
USARMY 
1 CV & NO Amp 
CNA 
IIII 
Paul Bunyan 8/18/1976 - 8/21/1976, 4 South Korea, Show 
of Force USN, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
 
 
55. # 282 Ogaden II; 7/22/1977 – 3/14/1978, 236 
The Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) invaded Ogaden on 22 July 1977. This attack 
triggered a crisis for Ethiopia. In October, Somalia came close to victory, having secured most of 
the Ogaden territory, but the USSR reacted by providing weapons, military advisers, and Cuban 
troops from Angola, to Ethiopia. This allowed Ethiopia to launch counterattacks, defeating the 
Somali Army, despite U.S. military aid to the latter. The Somali retreat from the Ogaden territory 
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was announced on 9 March 1978 and finished five days later, ending the crisis. The USN became 
involved only in February 1978. Following the collapse of the Somali Army in Ogaden, the USS 
Kitty Hawk (CV 63) battle group was ordered to a holding point north of Singapore in February, 
in case the CVBG should be needed for U.S. citizen evacuation and to conduct surveillance 
operations to monitor the situation. The ship was released on 23 March 1978.   
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Ogaden II 7/22/1977 – 3/14/1978, 236 3  
CNA I  Ogaden War February 1978, 51 USN, USAF 1 CV & NO Amp 
CNA 
III 
Ogaden War 2/1/1978 - 3/23/1978, 51 Somalia, Cont. 
Posit. 
USN 
 
 
56. # 294: Nicaragua Civil War; 9/10/1978 – 7/17/1979, 311 
Guerillas invaded Nicaragua from Costa Rica on 10 September 1978. Nicaragua, fearing the 
threatened overthrow of its government launched a counterattack. Because Costa Rica did not 
have an official army, it signed a mutual aid agreement with Venezuela and received weapons 
from Panama. Nicaragua overwhelmed the guerillas on 25 September and on the same day 
agreed to the U.S. mediation offer. By mid-January it had become evident that the mediation 
efforts were not progressing and in early February the U.S. ended military support for Nicaragua. 
The OAS and the UN Assembly both condemned Nicaragua for repressing its citizens and 
endangering its neighbors. The crisis continued with occasional clashes until 27 May 1979 when 
a further guerilla infiltration from Costa Rica was defeated by Nicaragua. The Somoza 
government had become isolated and on 4 June the OAS agreed on a resolution requesting a 
democratic regime for Nicaragua. In mid-July the OAS approved the installation of a left-wing 
revolutionary junta and when President Somoza fled on 17 July the crisis ended.  
USN surface ships from the Atlantic Fleet were engaged in surveillance operations off the West 
coast of Nicaragua. The Washington Star had reported in July that the amphibious ship USS 
Saipan (LHA 2) was in position off the coast off Nicaragua in case U.S. citizens needed 
evacuation following the fall of the Somoza government  
Additional Sources: Proceedings 
Seaborne Crisis Response                                                                                                                                             Appendix A. Crises Summaries 
52 
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Nicaragua Civil 
War 
9/10/1978 – 7/17/1979, 311 3  
CNA I  Nicaragua 9/16/1978, 16 USN, USAF O CV & NO Amp 
CNA 
III 
Nicaragua Civil 
Strife 
9/16/1978 - 9/30/1978, 15 Nicaragua, Cont. 
Posit. 
USN 
 
CNA 
III 
Nicaragua Civil 
War 
06/12/1979 – 08/31/1979, 81 Nicaragua, NEO 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, 
 
 
57. # 298: Sino-Vietnam War; 12/25/1978 – 3/15/1979, 81 
China was drawn into a crisis when Vietnam crossed the Cambodian border on 25 December 
1978 and reacted with a counter-invasion of Vietnam on 17 February 1979. After more clashes, 
justified as punishment for Vietnamese aggression, China withdrew on 15 March. This ended the 
crisis. The U.S. sent six USN ships into the South China Sea, including the USS Constellation 
(CV 64) battle group, to observe the development of the crisis in a contingent positioning 
operation.  
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Sino-Vietnam War 12/25/1978 – 3/15/1979, 81 2  
CNA I  China-Vietnam 2/25/1979, 6 USN 1 CV & NO Amp 
CNA 
III 
China Invasion of 
Vietnam 
2/25/1979 - 3/3/1979, 7 China, Cont. Posit 
USN 
 
 
58. # 301: North-South Yemen II; 2/24/1979 – 3/30/1979, 35 
The lingering border conflict between the two Yemens worsened. This crisis was triggered when 
North Yemen accused South Yemen of attacking Northern territory and forwarded a complaint 
to the U.S. Ambassador, the League of Arab States (LAS), and the UN on 24 February 1979. 
North Yemen retaliated with a counterattack. Saudi Arabia tried to maintain their good relations 
with the North and to improve them with South Yemen, but alerted its troops as a precautionary 
measure. The U.S. supplied the YAR with Saudi-financed weapons; while the Soviet Union 
provided arms to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDYR). The LAS supported the 
mediation effort and brought about a cease-fire agreement, consequently broken by both parties. 
After a second cease-fire agreement the Yemeni troops began to withdraw on 18 March. On 30 
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March the two countries agreed to unite as one country. With this action the crisis ended. As a 
result of the Yemen crisis, the U.S. planned to send military equipment to Saudi Arabia to 
reimburse what the latter had given to North Yemen. In early March 1979 the United States sent 
the USS Constellation (CV 64) and two escorts from Subic Bay to the Arabian Sea for 
observation. CNA I assumes the naval force was also deployed to reassure Saudi Arabia and 
underscore its intent to remain in the region, despite the revolution in Iran. The crisis abated after 
some weeks.  
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB North-South 
Yemen 
2/24/1979 – 3/30/1979, 35 3  
CNA I  Yemen 3/6/79, 93 USN, USAF 1 CV & NO Amp 
CNA 
III  
NO DATA    
 
59. # 303: Afghanistan Invasion; 3/77/1979 – 2/28/1980, 351 
The Soviet Union, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the United States were involved in this crisis. After 
the fall of the monarchy in Afghanistan, a revolutionary council of three leaders - politically left 
oriented with ties to the Soviet Union - took power. The leader of the People's Democratic Party 
of Afghanistan (PDPA) became the new President. In March 1979 Afghan Muslims rebelled 
against the regime in the so called Herat Uprising. The Soviet Union, determined to defend the 
communist forces in Afghanistan, faced a crisis. The Afghan regime replaced the leader of the 
PDPA with Amin, in a move that affronted the Soviet Union and deepened the crisis for 
Afghanistan which feared Soviet interference. In December 1979 Soviet forces invaded 
Afghanistan. The new PDPA leader was killed in late December and the crisis as it affected 
Afghanistan and the Soviet Union abased. Yet events extended the crisis to the United States and 
Pakistan, the former stopped exports to the Soviet Union, boycotted the Olympic Games in 
Moscow and supplied the anti-soviet rebels with weapons. These actions blunted the crisis for 
the United States. For Pakistan the crisis ended with U.S. reassurance of support and military aid.  
The events in the Middle East brought strategic changes for the U.S. Navy. Towards the end of 
1979, in light of the Iran hostage crisis and the Afghanistan invasion by Soviet troops, US naval 
concentrations were deployed to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea including the USS 
Midway (CV 41) (late October) and one month later the USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63) (late 
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November), bringing the U.S. naval force in the Indian Ocean to two aircraft carrier battle 
groups. Because of the Soviet Afghanistan invasion, the United States decided to maintain this 
level of presence.  
Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 187 – 189  
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Afghanistan 
Invasion 
3/77/1979 – 2/28/1980, 351 3  
CNA I  Afghan/Iran 
Hostages 
10/9/79, 472 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
2 CV's & Amp 
CNA  Afghan/Iran 
Hostages 
10/9/1979 - 1/23/1981, 472 Iran, Afghanistan, 
Show of Force 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
 
60. # 309: U.S. Hostages in Iran; 11/4/1979 – 1/20/1981, 443 
On 4 November 1979 radical Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran, taking 
everybody hostage. The leader of the Revolution, which had overthrown the pro-Western Shah 
regime, Ayatollah Khomeini gave his tacit approval. The students demanded unsuccessfully the 
surrender of the Shah, who at that time was in the United States for medical treatment. Three 
hostages were released from captivity on 19 November, and ten more on 20 November. After 
months of negotiation and fruitless mediation, the United States committed to a secret rescue 
mission Operation EAGLE CLAW/EVENING LIGHT in an attempt to free the hostages (24 
April 1980). The eight helicopters in the rescue mission departed from the deck of the USS 
Nimitz (CV 68). Unfortunately the operation was not successful and had to be aborted. All 
hostages remained in captivity. Only after the inauguration of the new President Ronald Reagan 
did Iran agree to release the remaining fifty-three hostages on 20 January 1981, after being held 
captive for 444 days. 
As mentioned previously (Afghanistan Invasion crisis) the USN augmented its presence in the 
region by permanently deploying two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Indian Ocean and 
Arabian Sea. The USS Midway (CV 41) was moved to the region in late October, followed by the 
USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), who extended its cruise in late November 1979. This was the first time 
since World War II that the U.S. Navy had two carrier task forces in the Indian Ocean in 
response to crises. On 21 December 1979, the Defense Department announced a three-ship 
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nuclear-powered carrier battle group from the Sixth Fleet would deploy to the Indian Ocean to 
relieve the Seventh Fleet carrier battle group led by Kitty Hawk. The USS Nimitz arrived in the 
Arabian Sea on 22 January 1980. At the end of 1979 the USS Forestall (CV 59) had relieved 
Nimitz in Italy so the nuclear-powered carrier could move to the Middle East in response to the 
hostage crisis. Forestall remained the only aircraft carrier in the Mediterranean. The Midway 
was relieved by the Coral Sea (CV 43) on 5 February 1980 which remained in the Indian Ocean 
until 30 April when she was succeeded by the USS Constellation (CV 64). In the beginning of 
May the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69), coming from Norfolk, VA, relieved the USS 
Nimitz.  
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB US Hostages in 
Iran 
11/4/1979 – 1/20/1981, 443 4  
CNA I  Afghan/Iran 
Hostages 
10/9/1979, 472 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
2 CV's & Amp 
CNA  Afghan/Iran 
Hostages 
10/9/1979 - 1/23/1981, 472 Iran, Afghanistan, 
Show of Force 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
CNA  Desert One 4/24/1980 - 4/26/1980 Iran, Combat 
USN, USMC, 
USAF 
 
 
61. # 315: Solidarity; 8/14/1980 – 12/13/1981, 486 
A crisis developed between Poland and the Soviet Union when a large number of Polish ship 
builders went on strike on 14 August 1980 in Gdansk. The workers demanded labor reforms and 
greater civil rights. The strike led to the creation of Solidarity, the free national trade union. 
While the Polish government denounced the strike and the demands posed by the workers an 
agreement was reached at the end of August. Subsequently East Germany and Czechoslovakia 
were thrown into crisis by the apparent political concessions made to the striking workers by the 
so-called “Gdanks Accords”. The Communist countries demanded a harder line by Polish 
government in handling the matter. In December 1981 Poland arrested almost the entire 
leadership of Solidarity, outlawed the Solidarity trade union and enacted martial law, thereby 
terminating the crisis for the four communist crisis actors. The United States provided AWACS 
aircraft to the NATO to monitor the border situation and expressed its overall concern. “In 
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December 1980, 963rd Airborne Air Control Squadron crews on temporary duty at Keflavik 
Naval Air Station, Iceland, redeployed to Ramstein Air Base, West Germany, in response to 
heightening tensions in Poland. Linking up with NATO groundbased radar sites, the operation, 
called Exercise Creek Sentry, monitored East European air activity during the crisis” 
(globalsecurity).  
Additional Sources: Global Security: Creek Sentry  
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB  8/14/1980 – 12/13/1981, 486 2  
CNA I Poland 12/9/1980, 24 USN, USAF 0 CV & NO Amp 
CNA 
III 
Creek Sentry 10/1/80 - 5/1/81, 144 Poland, 
Reconnaissance 
USN, USAF 
 
 
62. # 317 Onset Iran-Iraq War; 9/17/1980 – 11/30/1980, 75 
When Iraq invaded Iran in 1980, U.S. support was mostly directed towards Saudi Arabia and its 
safety, provided in the form of air defense. Safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz against the 
possibility of Iranian mining was another concern. Saddam Hussein’s announcement of Iraqi 
sovereignty over the Shatt-al-Arab triggered the first intrawar crisis for Iran on 17 September 
1980. A few days later Iraq occupied a large part of the border area, virtually closing off Iranian 
access to its main oil refinery in Abadan. Additionally Iraqi forces launched air attacks on 
Iranian air and army bases, which precipitated counter strikes. Simultaneously Iraqi forces 
invaded Iranian territory in the region of its main oil facilities. The next weeks were marked by 
constant attacks and counterattacks. The crisis for Iran ended when Iran’s president declared the 
successful expulsion of Iraqi troops. Iraq unofficially accepted the stalemate on 30 November. 
Officially the U.S. adopted a position of ostensible neutrality but in the light of the threat to the 
oil facilities and to oil supplies to the Western world, the U.S., U.K., France and Australia 
deployed warships to the Strait of Hormuz. On 11 October MIDEASTFOR was reinforced and 
by mid-October about 60 warships of the four countries were in the region to avert a disruption 
of the oil supplies. In late September, 4 USAF AWACS aircraft had been deployed to Saudi 
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Arabia. By February 1981 the United States had decided to augment its naval forces in the Indian 
Ocean and to maintain a two aircraft carrier battle group13 strength.   
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Onset Iran – Iraq 
War 
9/17/1980 – 11/30/1980, 75 3  
CNA I Iran – Iraq War 9/30/1980, 125 USN, USAF 2 CV’s & Amp 
CNA 
III 
Iran – Iraq War 9/30/1980, 125 Iraq, Show of Force 
USN 
 
 
63. # 327: Al-Biqa Missiles I; 4/28/1981 – 7/24/1981, 88 
The crisis began when Israeli forces shot down two helicopters on their route to supply Syrian 
troops on 28 April 1981. The Syrian retaliation on Christian militias in Lebanon prompted Israel 
to destroy the Syrian missile bases. “Both Israel and Syria accused each other of violating the 
1976 Red Line agreement: by the use of Syrian air power against any party to the civil war and 
the introduction of missiles into Lebanon; and by Israel's intervention in the civil war with air 
power far north of the Israel/Lebanon border” (ICB, Al-Biqa Missiles I, Crisis Summary). The 
United States was actively involved and sent Philip Habib as main mediator to settle the dispute 
on 5 May. Two days earlier the U.S. deployed the USS Forrestal (CV 59) battle group and the 
Mediterranean Amphibious Ready Group to the Eastern Mediterranean. The USS Independence 
(CV 62) carrier group, transiting from the Indian Ocean through the Suez Canal, was kept in the 
Eastern Mediterranean (until 26 May) to support U.S. crisis resolution efforts. To demonstrate its 
disapproval of the continuing bombing, the U.S. halted the delivery of F-16 planes to Israel. 
They were released after the cease-fire. The mediation and U.S. pressure greatly contributed to 
the establishment of the cease-fire. With the cease-fire in effect the crisis over the Al-Biqa valley 
ended for Israel and Syria (24 July). The USS Forrestal was released after 53 day whereas the 
amphibious forces were on alert until 14 September when it became apparent that evacuation 
operations would not be necessary. 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Al-Biby Missiles I 4/28/1981 – 7/24/1981, 88 2  
                                                 
13
 I was not able to determine the names of the involved aircraft carriers 
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CNA I Syria 5/3/1981, 135 USN, USMC 2 CV’s & Amp 
CNA 
III 
Syria 5/3/1981 – 9/14/1981, 135 Syria, Contingent 
Positioning 
USN, USMC 
 
 
64. # 330: Gulf of Syrte I; 8/12/1981 – 9/1/1981, 21 
The Sixth Fleet announced its intention to conduct maneuvers in the Mediterranean, and posed a 
crisis for Libya which alerted its armed forces (12 August 1981). On 18 August Libya claimed 
U.S. naval forces had entered Libyan territory by the Gulf of Syrte, where the two aircraft 
carriers USS Forestall (CV 59) and USS Nimitz (CV 68), four cruiser, four destroyers, four 
frigates, and two destroyer escorts performed open ocean missile exercises. The U.S. had 
deployed the naval forces to challenge Libya’s claim to the Gulf of Syrte and the maneuvers 
were held to demonstrate that ”America has the muscle to back up its words”. U.S. aircraft from 
both carriers had to intercept Libyan aircraft multiple times. On 19 August, USN pilots shot 
down two Libyan fighters who had threatened the USS Nimitz. Libya’s ruler Qaddahfi threatened 
to attack American nuclear bases in the Mediterranean were the USN again to enter Libyan 
territorial waters. The crisis suddenly ended on 1 September 1981.  
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Gulf of Syrte I 8/12/1981 – 9/1/1981, 21 4  
CNA I Libya 8/1/1981, 20 USN 2 CV's & NO 
Amp 
CNA  
III 
Libya 8/1/1981 - 8/20/1981, 20 Libya, Cont. Posit 
USN 
 
 
65. # 337: War in Lebanon; 6/5/1982 – 5/17/1983, 347 
Israel attacked the PLO in South Lebanon and invaded Lebanese territory on 5 June 1982. This 
rapid progression of the invasion deepened the crisis for Syria. Although Israel and Syrian had 
agreed on a cease-fire with the help of U.S. mediation, fighting erupted again on 11 June. The 
MARG was ordered to deploy to the Eastern Mediterranean in June and the aircraft USS John F. 
Kennedy (CV 67) was sent to the region to stand by for possible evacuation operations of U.S. 
and other foreign nationals from Beirut. The ship remained on station until relieved on 17 June 
by the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69). The U.S. Embassy advised all U.S. citizens to leave 
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Lebanon and closed the embassy on 24 June. U.S. citizens were evacuated and transported to 
ships of the Sixth Fleet which brought them to Cyprus. In July the U.S. halted military aid 
deliveries to Israel to demonstrate their disapproval of Israel’s activities. In August the situation 
worsened and the MARG had to stand ready in case of the deployment as part of the 
peacekeeping force and to support the evacuation of PLO forces from Beirut. With the help of 
U.S. mediation, the crisis between Syrian and Israel was resolved by September. On 22 
September the MARG was ordered to Lebanon together with 2 aircraft carriers to support U.S. 
Marines ashore. The USS America (CV 66) arrived off the coast of Lebanon on 2 January and 
was relieved by the USS Nimitz (CV 68) on 20 January 1983. In February the alert level was 
lowered again. The United States was actively involved and ready to deploy military forces to 
Lebanon if necessary. Direct talks between the governments of Israel and Lebanon under U.S. 
auspices led to a peace agreement in May 1983.  
The presence of U.S. (and other nations’) naval forces helped to limit the conflict in Beirut by 
preventing a threatened Israeli attack on Beirut itself. The presence of naval forces also 
supported the diplomatic efforts by the United States besides providing helicopter transportation 
for the U.S. mediators during their shuttle diplomacy.  
Additional Sources: Proceedings 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB War in Lebanon 6/5/1982 – 5/17/1983, 347 2  
CNA I Israel Invasion 6/8/1982, 45 USN, USMC 1 CV & Amp 
CNA I Peacekeeping 
Force 
8/10/1982, 30 USN, USMC 2 CV’s & Amp 
CNA I Palestine 
Massacre 
9/22/1982, 143 USN, USMC 2 CV’s & Amp 
CNA 
III 
Israel Invasion of 
Lebanon 
6/8/1982 - 7/22/1982, 45 Lebanon, NEO 
USN, USMC 
 
CNA 
III 
Evac. of PLO-Leb. 8/10/1982 - 9/9/1982, 31 Lebanon, NEO 
USN, USMC, 
USAF 
 
CNA 
III 
Palestine 
Massacre 
9/22/1982 - 2/28/1984, 515 Lebanon, Show of 
Force 
USN, USMC 
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66. # 340: Libya Threat to Sudan; 2/11/1983 – 2/22/1983, 12 
Signs of an increase of military forces in Libya threatened crises in Sudan and Egypt. Sudan 
feared a Libyan attempt to remove the Numeiri regime and filed a complaint with the UN while 
alerting its armed forces. Egypt and Sudan had been part of a mutual defense agreement since 
1976 and had signed a Charter of Integration in October 1982. Egypt placed forces along its 
Syrian borders in case they needed to be deployed to Sudan. The United States became involved 
militarily on 17 February. The aircraft carrier USS Nimitz (CV 68) was deployed to the Red Sea 
to monitor the crisis off the coasts of Sudan and Egypt and delivered four multipurpose AWACS 
reconnaissance planes to Egypt. This U.S. reaction prompted a military expansion in Libya. The 
meeting of the Presidents of Sudan and Egypt on 22 February reduced tensions and ended the 
crisis for all actors. The U.S. asserted its interest through a show of force mission but without 
needing to assemble ground troops. 
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Libya Threat to 
Sudan 
2/11/1983 – 2/22/1983, 12 3  
CNA I Libya-Sudan 2/14/1983, 11 USN 1 CV & NO Amp 
CNA 
III 
Early Call/Libya 2/14/1983 - 2/28/1973, 15 Egypt, Show of 
Force 
USN, USAF 
 
 
67. # 342: Chad – Libya VI; 6/24/1983 - 12/11/1984, 536 
Continued fighting between separatists and Libyan invaders in Chad and Sudan resulted in 
another crisis in June 1983. On 24 June Libyan-backed forces occupied a city in Northern Chad. 
France warned that it would not stand idle in the face of Libyan aggression. Together with Zaire, 
it supplied weapons for Chad. Chad renewed its accusations of Libyan intrusion and the OAS 
demanded a cease-fire, a Libyan retreat from Chad, and negotiations. Parallel to diplomatic 
efforts, Chad launched a counteroffensive on 9 July that brought on Libyan air strikes. In turn, 
French troops were deployed to Chad in Operation MANTA. Peace talks and reconciliation 
efforts by the OAU were unrewarding. At the end of April, Qaddhafi proposed a withdrawal 
plan, which France accepted. Five months later the proposal was put into effect and by 12 
November the crisis had ended. The United States had reacted by increasing military aid to Chad 
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and by placing the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D Eisenhower (CV 69) in a state of alert in the 
Gulf of Syrte.  
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Chad – Libya IV 6/24/1983 - 12/11/1984, 536 3  
CNA I Libya-Chad 8/1/1983, 16 USN 1 CV & NO Amp 
CNA 
IIII 
Libya/Chad 7/25/1983 - 12/31/1983, 160 Chad, Peace Op - 
Military Supply 
USN, USAF 
 
 
68. # 343: Invasion of Grenada; 10/19/1983 – 10/28/1983, 10 
Maurice Bishop, the former prime minister of Grenada, had been placed under house arrest, been 
freed on 19 October 1983, and shortly thereafter, together with close supporters, murdered. 
Ostensibly fearing a threat to its influence in the region and to the safety of American citizens in 
Grenada, the United States showed concern. In response to a request for help by the Organization 
of East Caribbean States, the United States sent to the region a naval task force, including the 
aircraft carrier Independence and assault ship Guam (LPH 9). The Independence CVBG had 
been en route to the Mediterranean for a regularly scheduled deployment. However, according to 
Christopher Wright this deployment had been hardly routine, being more likely undertaken in 
anticipation of the developments in Grenada. Because of its prior proximity to the Caribbean, the 
naval task force was immediately on the scene. This triggered a crisis for Grenada. On 25 
October, in Operation Urgent Fury, U.S. naval, Marine, and Army forces invaded Grenada. 
Marines were airlifted to the island. When it was clear that American students were not in 
danger, the objectives of the operation shifted to the restoration of democratic government to 
Grenada and the elimination of alleged Cuban intervention in Grenada. By 28 October the U.S. 
troops had accomplished their mission, and by 4 November Independence finally departed for 
the Mediterranean. 
As Gaffney observed: “The U.S. had been watching the island anxiously as the Soviets built an 
airfield, using Cuban labor, ostensibly to bring in tourists, but which the U.S. thought was to be a 
Soviet airbase threatening the approaches to the Panama Canal. The U.S. seized upon an 
incident—a Marxist coup, using the excuse of protecting and evacuating American medical 
students—to invade 6 days after the coup. Grenada was a convenient distance from CONUS. The 
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U.S. had plenty of warning; the surprise was how ill-planned the invasion turned out to be” 
(Gaffney 2002, 7).  
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 7, Marolda 2000, Morales 1994, 80 - 81 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Invasion of 
Grenada 
10/19/1983 – 10/28/1983, 10 4  
CNA I Grenada 10/20/1983,23 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
1 CV & NO Amp 
CNA  Urgent Fury 10/20/1983 - 12/14/1983, 55 Grenada, Combat 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
 
69. # 344: Able Archer; 11/2/1983 – 11/11/1983, 914 
On 2 November 1983 the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007 which had flown 
through Soviet airspace, killing all 269 crew members and passengers. The Soviets could not 
identify the plane and chose to destroy the aircraft. Immediately after the downing, USN vessels 
from the Seventh Fleet, USAF aircraft and ships of the Japanese Maritime Safety Agency were 
deployed to the area looking for debris and demonstrating U.S. presence. The Able Archer crisis 
occurred only on 2 November with the start of NATO military exercises but it is often linked 
with the downing of KAL 007. “Able Archer” refers to the test of “nuclear release mechanisms 
in case of a nuclear first strike against the Soviet bloc” (ICB, Able Archer, Crisis Summary). The 
Soviet Union however perceived the exercise as a prelude of an actual attack and put its nuclear 
fighters on alert. The United States and other NATO members claimed to be surprised by the 
Soviet misinterpretation and reaction. The exercise ended on 11 November without any military 
confrontations and the associated tensions subsided. The mentioned naval deployment was 
triggered by the downing of the KAL 007 and naval forces remained in the region in a show of 
force after the search and rescue operation ended on 5 September.  
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Able Archer 11/2/1983 – 11/11/1983, 9 4  
CNA I KAL 007 9/1/1983, 66 USN, USAF 0 CV & NO Amp 
CNA KAL 007 Shot 9/1/1983 - 11/6/1983, 67 Soviet Union,  
                                                 
14 Because Able Archer and the KAL 007 Shot Down are not the same crisis this case is excluded from the statistical 
analysis. 
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III Down Show of Force 
USN, USAF 
 
70. # 348: Basra-Kharg Island; 2/21/1984 – 7/11/1984, 141 
During the Iran-Iraq War, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were pulled into the conflict in a series of 
minor incidents between 21 February 1984 and 11 July 1984. In February 1984, Iran captured 
the oil drilling facility on Majnoon Island in Southern Iraq, and then attempted to intercept the 
Basra-Baghdad road. Iraqi forces counterattacked on Iranian oil facilities on Kharg Island. Over 
the next week Iraq recaptured the positions held by Iranian forces ending the crisis for Iraq on 18 
March. When a Kuwaiti oil tanker was hit near Bahrain, Kuwait was drawn into the crisis (13 
May) with its claim that Iran was responsible. In turn, Iran threatened the safe passage of all 
shipping in the Gulf if Iranian access to Kharg Island was not guaranteed. This declaration set in 
motion the tanker war. When a Saudi ship was attacked within Saudi territorial waters by Iranian 
aircraft, Saudi Arabia was then implicated in the confrontation. Kuwait sought U.S. Stinger 
antiaircraft missiles and U.S. naval escorts for the protection of Kuwaiti tankers. The Saudi 
response was more forceful. On 5 June, with the help of U.S. advanced early-warning (AWACS) 
reconnaissance planes, Saudi forces shot down an Iranian F-4 fighter. For Iran, the crisis ended 
with the signing of an agreement with Iraq precluding the shelling of civilian areas. Saudi Arabia 
for its part formed an air defense zone, and Kuwaiti signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union. 
The crisis led to a renewed U.S. commitment of a continuous aircraft carrier presence in the 
North Arabian Sea. In late May, MIDEASTFOR ships began to escort U.S. merchant ships 
because of the escalating violence in the region and the USS Enterprise (CV 68) was dispatched 
as a show of U.S. resolve.  
Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, U.S. military forces remained forward deployed in the Persian 
Gulf. The intensity of the commitment varied. In general naval forces protected shipping and 
cleared mines. But especially this intra-war crisis enlarged USN involvement. Future naval 
operations such as the Earnest Will escort operations of 1987-1988, played an important role in 
preventing the spread of the war into other states of the region, but were not in direct reaction to 
an intra-war crisis and are therefore excluded.  
Additional Sources: Proceedings 
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Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Basra-Kharg 
Island 
2/21/1984 – 7/11/1984, 141 3  
CNA I  Persian Gulf  April 1984, 245 USN, USAF 1 CV & NO Amp 
CNA  Persian Gulf 04/01/1984 – 11/30/1984, 
244 
USN, Show of 
Force, Iraq 
 
 
71. # 354: Nicaragua MIG-21S; 11/6/1984 – 11/12/1984, 7 
On the day Ronald Reagan was elected President of the United States, intelligence identified a 
Soviet vessel en route to Nicaragua with MIG-21s destined for the Sandinistas and some 
members of the new government feared a repetition of the Cuban Missile Crisis. U.S. military 
exercises in Honduras were immediately intensified and the U.S. Navy increased its presence 
operations in the Central America region as a show of force and to deter Nicaraguan aggression. 
With the Soviet Union confirmation that no jet fighter aircraft were aboard the vessel, and the 
official United States acknowledgment that it had no plans to intervene in Nicaragua, the crisis 
ended. (Even earlier, U.S. naval presence had been intensified during the election period in El 
Salvador and to demonstrate U.S. commitment to Central America. The operation starting in 
March 1984 included the CVBG America (CV 66).)  
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Nicaragua MIG-
21S 
11/6/1984 – 11/12/1984, 7 3  
CNA I  Central America 3/13/1984, 264 USN, USMC 1 CV & Amp 
CNA 
III  
Central America 
CV Presence 
5/13/84 – 11/26/84, 259 Nicaragua, Show of 
Force 
USN 
 
 
72. # 358: Egypt Air Hijacking; 11/23/1985 – 12/3/1985, 11 
On 23 November 1985 an Egypt Air flight bound for Athens was hijacked. The terrorists were 
members of the “Egypt Revolution”, a group opposed to President Mubarak and supposedly part 
of the anti-Arafat “Al-Fatah Revolutionary Command”. Libyan involvement was suspected. 
Egypt’s forces were deployed along the Libyan border in a state of high alert. The hijacked 
plane, running out of fuel, landed in Malta. Refused refueling led the terrorists to segregate the 
passengers by nationality. They then shot into a group of Western European, North American, 
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Australian, and Israeli passport holders killing one hostage. Egypt sent elite troops to Malta on 
24 November in a force that included three U.S. officers to storm the airplane. During the assault 
on the terrorists 60 people died. Egypt did not retaliate against Libya and the crisis subsided (3 
December”. In a contingency operation USN vessels, including the USS Coral Sea (CV 43), were 
deployed to the waters off Malta during the stand-off.  
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Egypt Air 
Hijacking 
11/23/1985 – 12/3/1985, 11 3  
CNA I Egypt Air  
Hijacking 
11/23/1985, 3 USN 1 CV & NO Amp 
CNA 
III 
Egypt Air 
Hijacking 
11/23/1985 - 11/25/1985, 3 Malta, Response to 
Terrorism 
USN 
 
 
73. # 363: Gulf of Syrte II; 3/24/1986 – 4/21/1986, 21 
At the end of December 1985 two major terrorist attacks took place in the airports of Rome and 
Vienna. Libya was accused of funding the attacks, and all U.S. citizens were advised to leave 
Libya in January 1986. All exchange between the two governments was cancelled. The United 
States decided to dispatch a second carrier battle group to the Mediterranean. Operations near 
Libya began at the end of January and again in February without any incidents. On 24 March 
1986 the aircraft carriers USS America (CV 66), USS Coral Sea (CV 43), and USS Saratoga (CV 
60) advanced into the Gulf of Syrte, ostensibly to engage in freedom of navigation exercises. 
Libya claimed the Gulf as Libyan territory in 1973 and U.S. naval aircraft came under fire 
although without suffering any damage. The U.S. retaliated by sinking two Libyan patrol boats. 
The last two days of the exercise "Attain Document III" ended on 27 March without further 
incidents. When an explosion occurred on board a TWA flight from Rome to Athens on 2 April, 
tensions returned. The U.S. assumed Libyan involvement, Libya denied the charges. On 5 April 
1986 a bomb exploded in the La Belle Discotheque in West Berlin. Two U.S. soldiers and one 
Turkish woman died and many others were injured. Libya never publicly admitted its role but 
intelligence suggested Libyan involvement. Fearing U.S. retaliation, Libya threatened to kill 
Americans indiscriminately and to take all foreigners in Libya hostage. The U.S. was 
unsuccessful in dissuading Libya from the path of terrorism. Given the evidence of the West 
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Berlin bomb involvement, the United States decided to launch military strikes against terrorist-
related sites in Libya. On 14 April 1986 Operation EL DORADO CANYON was executed. The 
USAF with the help of aircraft from the USS America and USS Coral Sea carried out air strikes 
against Libya. This action terminated the crisis for the United States. A declaration of the UN 
Security Council condemning the U.S. strikes on 21 April was vetoed by the U.S. and the U.K. 
Operation EL DORADO CANYON had two goals; first, to compel Libyan support of terrorism 
and second, to deter Gaddafi from resuming any form of support in the future.  
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5, Till 2009, 265 – 266 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Gulf of Syrte II 3/24/1986 – 4/21/1986, 21 4  
CNA I OVL-FON Ops January 1986, 85 USN 3 CV & NO Amp 
CNA I La Belle Disco, 
Libya 
4/10/1986, 6 USN, USAF 2 CV's & NO 
Amp 
CNA 
III 
OVL-FON Ops 1/26/86 - 4/28/86, 93 Libya, Response to 
terrorism 
USN 
 
CNA 
III 
El Dorado Canyon 4/9/1986 - 4/19/1986, 11 Libya, Combat 
USN, USMC, 
USAF 
 
 
74. # 383: Contras III; 3/6/1988 – 3/28/1988, 2315 
On 6 March 1988 Nicaragua attacked Contra camps on Honduran territory. Nicaragua denied the 
Honduran allegation and sought a UN and OAS investigation, although no observers were 
dispatched. Honduras asked the United States for support which was granted by dispatching 
troops and arms. Nicaraguan troops near the border were attacked by Honduran fighter planes, 
threatening further fighting should Nicaragua not withdraw. With the withdrawal of Nicaraguan 
forces on 17 March, the crisis began to fade and was terminated once all U.S. troops left the 
region on 28 March.  
In the operation JITTERY PROP the U.S. conducted electronic surveillance operations off 
Central America throughout the 1980 to interdict possible arms smuggling by the Nicaragua 
Sandinistas to rebels in El Salvador. According to Roth an involvement of JITTERY PROP in 
the crisis is possible but not confirmed. The USS Sphinx spent most of its time during 1985-1987 
                                                 
15
 Because it USN involvement in this crisis cannot be confirmed with sufficient certainty this case is excluded from 
the statistical analyses. 
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in the Gulf of Fonseca off the coast of Nicaragua and El Salvador intercepting military and 
guerrilla communications. The vessel monitored suspected shipping, intercepted communications 
and encrypted messages, and probed the shore surveillance and air-to-air defense capabilities of 
the other nations.  
Additional Sources: Gaffney (Email exchange), Roth (Email exchange)  
Dataset Name Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Contras III 3/6/1988 – 3/28/1988, 23 3  
CNA I NO DATA    
CNA  Jittery Prop 1/8/88 - 12/14/88, 342 El Salvador, Cont. 
Posit 
USN 
 
 
75. # 391: Invasion of Panama; 12/15/1989 – 1/3/1990, 26 
Tensions between Panama and the United States had been increasing for some time over the 
revised Panama Canal treaties and General Noriega. The installation of Noriega as the new head 
of government in Panama on 15 December 1989 brought matters to a head. Random harassments 
of U.S. personnel culminated in the killing of a Marine officer and the abuse of the wife of a 
navy officer and a declaration of a state of war by Panama.   
Displays of U.S. military strength, U.S. economic sanctions, mediation attempts by other 
countries and an attempted coup failed to oust Noriega from power. Thus on 17 December the 
United States invaded Panama in Operation JUST CAUSE to protect the lives of U.S. citizens, to 
uphold democracy, to capture Noriega, and to safeguard the Panama Canal treaties. The U.S. 
overthrew the Noriega Regime, who stood down on 3 January and a new regime was installed. 
All military services were deployed to support the operation. U.S. naval involvement included a 
ship held in a MODLOC (Miscellaneous Operational Details, Local Operations) off the coast of 
Panama. The U.S. deployment of Special Forces (4’000 amongst them many Navy SEALs) was 
the largest since the Vietnam War. Morales (1994) describes “the Panamanian intervention (…) 
as an important transition from 'Monroe militarism' and Reagan's 'containment militarism' to 
Bush's 'New World Order militarism'. Panama invokes the new model of post-Cold War military 
policing actions”.  
Additional Sources: Astor 2006, 222 – 223, Morales 1994  
Seaborne Crisis Response                                                                                                                                             Appendix A. Crises Summaries 
68 
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Invasion of 
Panama 
12/15/1989 – 1/3/1990, 26 4  
CNA I Panama Elections 5/11/1989, 52 USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
1 CV & Amp 
CNA I Panama 12/20/89 34 USN, USMC, 
USAF,USARMY 
0 CV& NO Amp 
CNA 
III  
Nimrod Dancer 3/18/1988 – 12/20/1989, 643 Panama, Show of 
Force 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
 
76. # 393: Gulf War; 8/2/1990 – 4/12/1991, 254 
The Gulf War crisis erupted on 2 August 1990 with Kuwait, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the United 
States as the principal participants (Bahrain, Egypt, France, Israel, Oman, Qatar, Syria, United 
Arab Emirates (UAE), the U.K., and the USSR were also involved). On 28 May Saddam Hussein 
accused Kuwait and the UAE of launching an economic war against Iraq and Kuwait of stealing 
Iraqi oil from the disputed oil field of Rumaila. Kuwait put its armed forces on alert and denied 
the Iraqi allegation. On 23 July Iraqi forces were deployed to the Saudi Arabian border. 
Mediation efforts between Iraq and Kuwait were unsuccessful and Iraq then mobilized forces 
along the Kuwaiti border before invading the nation on 2 August. Four days later troops were 
dispatched to the Saudi Arabian border. The U.S. responded to the threat to Kuwait and its oil 
sources with a build-up of U.S. forces in the region, demanding that Iraq complies with the UN 
resolution and withdraws from Kuwait. Iraq’s response was to formally announce the annexing 
of Kuwait. Over the next weeks several UN resolutions were passed. In late October the U.S. 
began unilateral air and naval strikes and more troops were sent to the Gulf region over the next 
weeks. On 29 November the UN Security Council resolution 678 authorized “the use (of) all 
necessary mean” to coerce Iraq to comply with earlier resolutions, by no later than 15 January 
1991. When the deadline had passed, a coalition of states participated in operation DESERT 
STORM, launched on 24 February to free Kuwait with military force. On 8 April the Iraqi forces 
were thrown out of Kuwait. A formal cease-fire was in effect as of 12 April.  
Even before the outbreak of the crisis U.S. naval forces were active in the region. In response to 
Iraqi’s growing pressure on Kuwait, Middle East Force ships engaged in an exercise with the 
United Arab Emirates, involving five MEF ships and three USAF aircraft (24 July 1990). The 
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forces remained in theater on higher alert during the period prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 
But despite the combined U.S.-U.A.E. exercise, Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990. During 
this crisis and war the U.S. Navy played an important role in deciding the outcome. The USN 
also received assistance from the British, Royal Saudi, and Kuwaiti Navy. When the crisis began 
the USN was already on station with six ships of its Joint Task Force Middle East, which had 
operated in the Persian Gulf since 1949. In the initial deployment phase the role of the USN was 
critical. In a matter of days the USS Independence (CV 62) CVBG sailed from the Indian Ocean 
to the Gulf area shortly followed by the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 69) CVBG departing 
from the Mediterranean and the Saratoga (CV 60) CVBG from CONUS in Florida. The 
Independence and Eisenhower were the first U.S. forces in the theater when operation DESERT 
SHIELD began. The ships were joined in the Gulf one week later by Marines who had been at a 
prepositioning station in the Indian Ocean, ready to support the airlifted elements of Marine 
Expeditionary force. According to Baer (1994, 448) this impressive display of readiness was 
made possible by the forward deployment of Navy and Marine Corps units. In addition an 
Atlantic battle group led by the battleship Wisconsin (BB 64) was ordered to the region. Saudi 
Arabian approval to insert U.S. forces was granted in about a week (Gaffney 2002, 5). Siegel 
(1995, 17 – 18) hypothesizes that the display of U.S. military power, underlined by the presence 
of two aircraft carrier battle groups, might have played a role in King Fahd's acceptance of U.S. 
forces into Saudi Arabia. This force signaled U.S. willingness to defend Saudi Arabia even with 
forces from CONUS still on their way. Navy forces (both U.S. and allied) also played a crucial 
role in interdiction operations, enforcing Iraqi compliance with UN economic sanctions. Naval 
vessels were actively patrolling and boarded vessels, suspected of breaking the sanctions. The 
naval patrols largely guaranteed the compliance with the sanctions at sea. Dismukes (1994, 40) 
points out the advantages of forward presences and notes “in some cases, where geography and 
politics combine against the U.S., forces forward are necessary to make the deployment of forces 
from CONUS possible. In the Gulf War, if Saddam had seized the ports or had attacked when 
U.S. forces were still small, the result would have been difficult and costly for the U.S. As it 
happened, the U.S. had forward forces at sea that provided an answer to those threats. The 
employability and thus the credibility of CONUS-based forces can depend on forces already 
overseas”.  
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The first U.S. Air Force and Army units arrived at the crisis location a few days after receiving 
the order to move to Saudi Arabia on 8 August. This was the first time since the Vietnam War 
that the U.S. had deployed such a high number of troops, with 210’000 military personnel in 
theater at the end of October 1990 and more than 400’000 in early January. On 7 August, 
President Bush ordered U.S. military aircraft and troops to Saudi Arabia after King Fahd 
approved the deployment of a multinational force to defend his country against a possible Iraqi 
invasion. On 15 September the USS John F. Kennedy joined the Saratoga. The two carriers 
operated together for the next two days before the former assumed the watch in the Red Sea 
while the USS Saratoga moved to the Mediterranean. Aircraft took off nearly every day from the 
carriers and conducted training sorties over Saudi Arabia. On 27 October, John F. Kennedy held 
a turnover with Saratoga and headed back to the Mediterranean through the Suez Canal. In early 
November the decision was made to reinforce and double the current number of CVBGs. To 
meet the new force level, the USS America (CV 66), Ranger (CV 61), and Roosevelt (CV 71) 
were sent to the region to support USS John F. Kennedy, Midway (CV 41) and Saratoga. During 
the days before the beginning of the war the USS Forrestal (CV 59) received orders twice to 
deploy but both were cancelled. The total strength at the launch of DESERT STRIKE included 
six battle groups, two battleships, and a 31-ship amphibious task force totaling in over 100 ships 
and submarines, 75’000 Sailors and 85’000 Marines afloat and ashore. 
Although the Gulf War is often seen as a victory for the Air Force and Army they needed bases, 
while the Navy did not. The Navy, controlling the seas, delivered most of the equipment (Baer 
2003, 450). Till remarks that the “widespread notions that large surface ships, especially carriers, 
would be too vulnerable in narrow waters when confronted by swarms of missile-armed fast 
attack craft were comprehensively disproved in this conflict” (Till 2009, 172).  
Additional Sources: Baer 1994; Dismukes 1994; Gaffney 2002; Siegel 1995; Till 2009 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Gulf War 8/2/1990 – 4/12/1991, 254 4  
CNA I Iraqi Pressure on 
Kuwait 
7/24/1990, 9  O CV & NO Amp 
CNA I Operation Desert 
Shield 
8/2/1990, 166  6 CV & Amp 
CNA 
IIII 
Desert Shield 8/7/1990 – 1/15/1991, 162 Saudi Arabia, 
Show of Force 
USN 
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CNA 
IIII 
Iraq MIO 8/7/1990 – 12/31/1999, 3424 Iraq, MIO 
USN 
 
CNA 
IIII 
Desert Storm 1/17/1991 – 4/5/1991, 79 Iraq, Combat 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
 
77. # 403: Yugoslavia II: Bosnia; 3/3/1992 – 11/21/199516  
After the passing of a referendum for an autonomous Bosnia the crisis was triggered by the 
Bosnian independence declaration on 3 March 1992. First, the Bosnian Serb, Croat and Muslim 
leaders agreed to separate Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic regions during talks in Lisbon. 
But when they returned the Muslim President of Bosnia spoke out against a division, accusing 
Serbia and Croatia of trying to annex Bosnian territory. As of 6 April 1992 Bosnia was 
recognized by the European Union. The United States and other states followed soon thereafter. 
In a reaction to the EU recognition Bosnian Serbs, supported by Serbia, proclaimed a Serbian 
Republic of Bosnia. Intense fighting broke out between the different ethnic groups. The situation 
was especially bad in Sarajevo, the capital. The UN sent peacekeeper through the United Nations 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to alleviate the suffering of the civilians and create “safe areas. 
The NATO supported UNPROFOR with limited military involvement mainly through symbolic 
airstrikes against the Bosnian Serbs. The U.S. intervened as part of the NATO implementation. 
The U.S. spoke out for tighter sanctions against Serbia and the adoption of a UN Security 
Council resolution to enforce the no-fly zones. The crisis was marked by different policies 
towards Bosnia. While the European Union remained hesitant and favored a diplomatic solution 
the United States was more outspoken in condemning Serbian aggression. The U.S. did not send 
troops to support UNPROFOR but actively participated in the NATO air strikes. The longer the 
crisis persisted the more involved the United States became. After the shelling of the Markela 
Marketplace on 5 November the NATO finally engaged in offensive air power operations. On 21 
November 1995 all parties signed the so called Dayton Accord agreement, ending the Bosnian 
crisis. ICB lists the following four decisions the parties agreed on: (1) a division of territory 
between the Bosnian-Croat Federation (51 percent) and the autonomous Serb entity, the republic 
of Srpska (49 percent); (2) a constitution comprising a central government for Bosnia as a whole 
with a three-person group presidency, a two-house legislature, a court, and a central bank; and 
                                                 
16 The crises resulting from the break-up of Yugoslavia are very complex and involve many different actors and 
strategies. The following is only a very brief description, mostly focused on the U.S. naval involvement 
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separate presidencies, legislatures, and armies for each of the two entities within Bosnia; (3) the 
mutual withdrawal of forces by both entities behind agreed cease-fire lines; and (4) the dispatch 
of a peacekeeping NATO force of 60,000 under U.S. command to monitor the cease-fire and 
control the airspace over Bosnia. 
The United States Navy supported operations MARITIME GUARD, SHARP GUARD, 
DECISIVE ENHANCEMENT, DENY FLIGHT, DECISIVE EDGE, DECISIVE GUARD and 
DELIBERATE FORGE17.  
The first three operations were launched to establish a blockade in the Adriatic Sea. NATO 
maritime forces began operating in the Adriatic on 22 November 1992 to enforce the UN 
embargoes in former Yugoslavia. Together with Western European Union (WEU) forces, NATO 
maritime forces patrolled the waters and contacted a total of 12,367 merchant vessels, inspected 
1,032 and found 9 in violation of the UN embargoes. The operation ended with the 
commencement of operation SHARP EDGE on 15 June 1993. SHARP GUARD was established 
to enforce the economic sanctions and the arms embargo against Serbia-Montenegro. U.S. naval 
forces including surface combatants, intelligence-gathering attack submarines, and active and 
reserve maritime patrol aircraft operated with NATO and WEU forces. The U.S. participation in 
SHARP GUARD had to be restricted after U.S. Congress passed a legislation demanding a 
limitation in November 1994. The operation lasted more than three years and helped to provide 
the necessary conditions for a peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the operation no 
ships were reported in violation of the embargoes. In December 1995 SHARP GUARD was 
replaced by Operation DECISIVE ENHANCEMENT, lasting until December 1996.  
No-fly zones over Bosnia-Herzegovina were established after the adoption of Security Council 
Resolution 816. To ensure the enforcement operation DENY FLIGHT began on 12 April 1993. 
DENY FLIGHT proposed to neutralize Serbian aircraft that were supporting their ground forces 
in Bosnia. It initially involved some 50 fighter and reconnaissance aircraft (later increased to 
over 100) from various Alliance nations, flying from airbases in Italy and from aircraft carriers in 
the Adriatic. By the end of December 1994, over 47,000 sorties had been flown by fighter and 
supporting aircraft. On 28 February 1994, four warplanes violating the no-fly zone over Bosnia-
                                                 
17 Provide Promise, joint operation with the U.S. Air Force, involving both naval carrier aircraft and land-based air, 
protected humanitarian relief efforts in the besieged cities of the former Yugoslavia, lasted from July 1992 to March 
1996. This operation is not include in the summary because it constitutes a humanitarian operation and involved air 
transport and air drops of relief supplies to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
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Herzegovina were shot down by NATO aircraft. This was the first military engagement ever 
undertaken by the Alliance.  
On 24 November 1994, the North Atlantic Council decided that NATO air power could be used, 
under the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 958 and after agreement 
with Croatian authorities, against aircraft flying in Croatian air space, which have engaged in 
attacks on or which threaten UN safe areas. 
NATO's DENY FLIGHT operation, enforcing the no-fly zone over Bosnia, terminated on 
December 20, 1995, when the implementation force (IFOR) assumed responsibility for the 
airspace over Bosnia. DENY FLIGHT transitioned to DECISIVE EDGE in support of the IFOR 
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR. Carrier and shore-based squadrons continued flight operations 
in support of joint and combined enforcement of a U.N.-mandated no-fly zone in the airspace 
over the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Operation DECISIVE EDGE then transitioned to 
DELIBERATE GUARD in support of the stabilization force (SFOR) Operation JOINT GUARD. 
Throughout 1997, Italy-based Marine F/A-18D and EA-6B aircraft provided suppression of 
enemy air defense and close air support and electronic warfare to Navy maritime patrol aircraft. 
Additionally it brought real-time, still and full-motion video imagery to the ground commanders. 
DELIBERATE GUARD transited to Operation DELIBERATE FORGE. Forces from the United 
States European Command participated in, and directly supported, Operation DELIBERATE 
FORGER, the NATO air operation in support of SFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. (20 
June 1998 marked the transition from the NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) to a slightly 
smaller force).  
The U.S. CVBG’s played an important role in the overall operations. Their flexibility and 
capability to respond rapidly contributed to the success. NATO airpower was strengthen by naval 
aircraft and also served as a deterrent force. For example the continuous presence of carrier 
based aircraft in the Adriatic and NATO land-based aircraft in Europe permitted attacks far 
inland.  
Several carrier battle groups supported the operations. Among them were the USS John F. 
Kennedy (CV 67), USS America (CV 66), USS Roosevelt (CV 42) and USS Eisenhower (CV 69). 
Shortly after Christmas 1992 the USS John F. Kennedy was ordered to the Adriatic Sea to 
support a possible U.S. intervention (the carrier remained in Marseille). A year later (25 
February 1993) the carrier was called upon to monitor airdrops over Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
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conjunction with Operation PROVIDE PROMISE until 25 March when she was relieved by the 
USS Roosevelt. Between 15 March 1994 and 31 December 1994 the USS Eisenhower 
participated in the different operations DENY FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD and PROVIDE 
PROMISE in reaction to the tense situations in former Yugoslavia. During DENY FLIGHT from 
12 April 1993 to 20 December 1995, the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR) assumed 
responsibilities for the military aspects of the peace agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina. Despite 
enemy resistance including heavy and accurate ground fire, combined with logistics and bad 
weather problems during more than 100,000 sorties over DENY FLIGHT’s 983 days, the 
campaign prevented Serbia from effectively using its air power. Prior to the ship’s arrival the 
Bosnian-Serbs fired anti-aircraft artillery and surface-to-air missiles against reconnaissance 
aircraft, prompting NATO commanders to assign escorts to such flights. The USS America 
participated in operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORGE.  
Burg (2003, 57) concludes that “the use of coercive diplomacy [as of late 1994] in Bosnia by the 
United States, in cooperation with its NATO partners and local actors, succeeded in bringing the 
fighting in that country to an end and in persuading all sides to enter into a negotiated settlement 
of the war”.  
Additional Sources: Burg 2003; Global Security (various); Grimmett 2010 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Yugoslavia II: 
Bosnia 
3/3/1992 – 11/21/1995   
CNA 
III 
Maritime A4455 
Guard/Sharp 
Guard/Decisive 
Enhancement 
11/1/1992 - 12/18/1996, 1509 FRY, Show of 
Force 
 
CNA 
III 
Deny 
Flight/Decisive 
Edge/Deliberate 
Guard/Deliberate 
Forge 
4/12/1993 - 7/18/1998, 1924 Yugoslavia  
 
78. # 406: Iraq No-Fly Zone; 8/18/1992 – 9/8/1992, 22 
In March 1991 a no-fly zone over northern Iraq was established. On 18 August 1992 France, 
U.K. and the U.S. established a southern no-fly zone below the 32nd Parallel to safeguard the 
Shia population from Saddam’s forces. The U.K. sent six Tornado jets to support the Southern 
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Watch mission. These two activities triggered a crisis for Iraq. Although the no-fly zone went 
into effect in late August, attacks against the Shia rebels in the South increased. But Iraq seemed 
reluctant to cross the no-fly zone and on 8 September officially declared its non-interference with 
the no-fly zone, ending the crisis.  
The Southern Watch mission lasted until the end of 1999 and different naval vessels were 
deployed in support of the operations. The USS Independence (CV 62) was deployed to the 
Arabian Gulf as of mid-1992 and was part of the beginning of the Southern Watch mission.   
 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Iraq No-Fly Zone 8/18/1992 – 9/8/1992, 22 4  
CNA  Southern Watch 8/19/1992 - 12/31/1999, 2691 Iraq, No Fly Zone 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
 
79. # 408: North Korean Nuclear; 3/99/1993 – 10/21/1994, 600 
The death of the North Korean president earlier that month and North Korea’s reluctance to 
participate in the nuclear inspections had caused a tense situation. Thus USS Kitty Hawk (CV 63), 
operating with Japanese and South Korean forces in late July 1994, was in a state of high alert. 
The United States negotiated with North Korea over its nuclear program while keeping open the 
option of military strikes. Two carriers—Kitty Hawk and a second, the name of which could not 
be determined—were positioned off the Korean Peninsula in a demonstration of force. It was 
later said that the carriers had contributed to maintaining the stability during the negotiations. 
The crisis ended with an agreement in October 1994. 
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB North Korean 
Nuclear 
3/99/1993 – 10/21/1994, 600 2  
CNA 
IIII 
Korea tensions 6/1/94 - 7/31/94, 61 North Korea, Show 
of Force 
USN 
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80. # 411: Haiti Military Regime; 7/77/1994 – 10/15/1994, 77 
In 1991, the President of Haiti, Father Jean Bertrand Aristide, was overthrown by a military junta 
barely one year after being elected. The resulting crisis produced a large flow of refugees fleeing 
from the deteriorating situation in Haiti to the United States. The refugees were perceived as a 
threat to domestic stability. The U.S. appeared unable to restore democratic order on the 
tumultuous island. On 31 July the UN Security council passed a resolution authorizing the 
member states to “to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military 
leadership”. As a result the Clinton administration intervened on 15 September 1994 despite 
public and Congressional reluctance, traceable to the previous Somalia disaster. The U.S. 
represented by former President Carter, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General 
Powell, and Senator Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee began unofficial 
mediation. They persuaded the junta to sign an agreement to resolve the crisis without violence 
and to leave Haiti. The former president would then be brought back to head the government. 
Successful mediation owned much to the U.S. threat of military force if necessary. As part of the 
agreement, the U.S. dispatched 20,000 troops to guarantee a safe transition and Aristide returned 
on 15 October 1994.  
The U.S. military services followed up with the operations SUPPORT DEMOCRACY and 
UPHOLD/RESTORE DEMOCRACY in which the carriers USS Eisenhower (CV 69) and 
America (CV 66) and the amphibious ship Wasp (LHD 1) participated in a multinational force 
from 14 September 1994 – 24 September 1994. This intervention led to a historic Army-Navy 
collaboration in which the two services prepared for Army air assaults launched from USN 
aircraft carriers. The force not only included forces from the Army’s airborne corps but also a 
Joint Special Operations Task Force (including SEALs, Army Rangers, and the 16th USAF 
Special Operations Wing among others). The Marines aboard were prepared for combat search 
and rescue missions. Because the U.S. forces were able to land peacefully, combat was 
unnecessary. On 31 March 1995 U.S. forces’ peacekeeping operations were taken over by 
international forces.  
Additional Sources: Girard 2004 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Haiti Military 
Regime 
7/77/1994 – 10/15/1994, 77 4  
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CNA Support 
Democracy 
9/1/1993 - 10/18/1994, 413 Haiti, Show of 
Force 
USN, USMC 
 
CNA 
III 
Uphold/Restore 
Democracy 
9/8/94 - 4/17/95, 222 Haiti, Show of 
Force 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY  
 
 
81. # 412: Iraq Troop Deployment Kuwait; 10/7/1994 – 11/10/1994, 35 
This crisis had its origin in the Iraqi troop deployment and involved Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
the United States on 7 October 1994. The U.S. responded within a day and deployed the aircraft 
carrier Eisenhower (CV 69), accompanied by an Aegis cruiser carrying Tomahawk missiles to 
demonstrate resolve. Air Force and Navy units already in the area as part of the operation 
SOUTHERN WATCH, formed forces in operation VIGILANT WARRIOR. The U.S. 
commitment to Saudi Arabia was reaffirmed. Although Iraqi troops began to retreat on 11 
October, the U.S. increased its military strength in the region so as to respond quickly to future 
threats. The crisis ended on 10 November, when Saddam Hussein signed the declaration of 
"Iraq's recognition of the sovereignty of the state of Kuwait, its territorial integrity and political 
independence".  
Additional vessels supporting VIGILANT WARRIOR included the USS George Washington 
(CVN 73) battle group, the USS Tripoli (LPH 10), Amphibious Ready Group, 15th Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (SOC), and Military Sealift Command ships.  
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Iraq Troop 
Deployment 
Kuwait 
10/7/1994 – 11/10/1994, 35 3  
CNA 
III 
Vigilant Warrior 10/7/1994 - 12/31/1994, 86 Kuwait, Show of 
Force 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
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82. # 415: Taiwan Strait IV; 5/22/1995 – 3/25/1996, 307 
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States were at loggerheads following the 
visa approval for President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan for a visit to Cornell University. This 
gesture, together with the sales of fighter aircraft to Taiwan, increased the PRC’s fear of growing 
American support for Taiwanese independence. In an attempt to coerce the United States to 
commit formally to a “one-China policy,” the PRC conducted missile tests and naval exercises in 
the Taiwan Strait beginning in July 1995. These tests and exercises elicited no U.S. response 
until, according to Robert Ross, 19 December18, when the aircraft carrier Nimitz cruised through 
the Taiwan Strait marking the first time U.S. ships had patrolled that area since 1976. When the 
Chinese activity continued, the United States decided to deploy two aircraft carriers to the area. 
In March 1996 Independence arrived, followed shortly thereafter by Nimitz. With the successful 
conclusion of the Taiwanese election, the crisis ended. 
It is unclear how much the carriers contributed to the abatement of the crisis. Similarly, the 
effectiveness of the deterrence is disputed since it is very difficult to say with certainty which 
action was responsible for deterring the adversary. While Gouré (2001) questions the 
contribution of the two CVs, Ross (2000; 2002) sees their deployments as successful coercive 
diplomacy to guarantee stability during the elections by deterring Chinese involvement and 
confirming American commitment. 
 
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 8, Gouré 2001, Ross 2000 and 2002, Scarlett 2009 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Taiwan Strait IV 5/22/1995 – 3/25/1996, 307 3  
CNA 
III  
Taiwan Flexible 
Deterrence 
3/1/1996 - 4/17/1996, 48 China, Show of 
Force 
USN 
 
 
83. # 419: Desert Strike; 8/31/1996 – 9/14/1996, 15 
On 31 August 1996 Iraqi forces entered in the Kurdish civil war on behalf of the Kurdish 
Democratic Party (KDP). Because the Iraqi troops crossed the 36h Parallel, violating the safe 
zone agreement, their mobilization brought them into conflict with the United States. Air sorties 
                                                 
18 Scarlett (2009) only mentions the deployments the following March. 
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over Iraq were increased, followed by operation DESERT STRIKE, bombing Iraqi targets on 3 
and 4 September. President Clinton announced he would not tolerate any violation of the 
agreement and would react with force. Additionally the safe zone in the South was increased 
from the 32nd to the 33rd Parallel. The U.S. attempt to convince the UN to adopt a resolution 
condemning the Iraqi violation was unsuccessful. Iraq tried to oppose the increase of the 
exclusion zones but after U.S. forces destroyed the air defense system, Iraq agreed to the new 
zones and declared not to interfere with U.S. patrols anymore. This declaration terminated the 
crisis for Iraq and the United States.  
The CVBG Carl Vinson (CV 70) was part of DESERT STRIKE, together with the USS Laboon 
(DDG 58) and Shiloh (CG 67). USN forces fired 14 of the total of 26 cruise missiles. The 
remaining 13 were fired by Air Force B-52s, escorted by F-14s from Carl Vinson. On the second 
day, strikes were fired from the destroyers Russell (DDG 59), Hewitt (DD 966), Laboon and the 
nuclear-powered attack submarine Jefferson City (SSN 759). The USS Enterprise (CV 65) who 
had been operating in the Mediterranean was ordered to the Persian Gulf and arrived in the 
theater two days after receiving the order to augment the displayed force.  
Additional Sources: Global Security: Desert Strike 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Desert Strike 8/31/1996 – 9/14/1996, 15 4  
CNA 
III  
Desert Strike 9/3/1996 - 9/4/1997, 367 Iraq, Combat 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
 
84. # 421: Zaire Civil War; 10/8/1996 – 5/16/1997, 221 
In response to the threat by the government of Zaire (on 8 October 1996) to treat the 
Banyamulenge as rebels if they did not leave the country within 6 days, they launched attacks 
against the Zairian army and refugee camps. Around 1,000,000 Hutu refugees from neighboring 
Rwanda and Burundi fled from their camps in Zaire in reaction to the unrest. These 
developments triggered a crisis for Zaire and Rwanda. Zaire accused Rwanda and Burundi of 
training and arming the rebels. Both rejected the accusations. When Zairian forces shelled a 
Rwandan town on 29 October, Rwanda dispatched troops to Eastern Zaire. The Banyamulenge 
together with the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Zaire-Congo (ADFL) 
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carried out successful attacks in Eastern Zaire, creating a buffer zone between Rwanda and the 
rest of Zaire. Because the Zairian president was abroad and the Zairian army was incapable of 
halting the adversary, the political stability of the country was endangered through a threatened 
army coup. Parliament reacted by demanding the departure of all Tutsis from Zaire on 1 
November. The following day the ADFL with the help of the Rwandan army, brought East Zaire 
under their control. This resulted in mass demonstrations demanding war against Rwanda and 
Burundi and lead to attacks on Tutsi properties. More than 1,000,000 Rwandan and over 100,000 
Burundian Hutu had fled from the violence in Eastern Zaire. Alarmed by these high numbers the 
UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) called for immediate international intervention 
to prevent a grave humanitarian crisis. The ADFL announced a cease fire during which refugees 
might return to Rwanda, and approved the UN request for supplying humanitarian aid. U.S., 
Canada, U.K., South Africa and other African states approved the dispatch of UN-sponsored 
forces to eastern Zaire. Additionally the U.S. agreed to send 1,000 American troops. The 
multinational military force was ready on 14 November but the return of refugees seemed to 
make such intervention unnecessary. After the termination of the cease fire fighting resumed and 
on 20 January 1997 and Zaire declared war against the rebels. In February the UN Security 
Council adopted a peace plan and in March, following further escalations, a multinational force 
was deployed to Congo to stand by for possible evacuations of foreign nationals. When president 
Mobutu of Zaire returned on 21 March he urged the parties to agree on a cease fire and to 
assume talks. During the peace-talks, led by the President of South Africa, Mobutu agreed to step 
down after new elections whereas Kabila, the head of the ADFL demanded an immediate 
handover of power to his forces. Mobutu’s resignation on 16 May ended the crisis and Kabila 
assumed power as the head of the new Democratic Republic of Congo.  
The confused developments in Zaire led the U.S. to prepare19 for the possible evacuation of U.S. 
citizens. In November 1996, the USS Nassau (LHA 4) left port with the Mediterranean 
Amphibious Ready Group (MARG 97-1) to participate in operation SILVER WAKE off 
Albania. During this assignment Nassau was redeployed in support of Operation GUARDIAN 
RETRIEVAL in Zaire. Together with elements of the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special 
Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)) on board, the USN vessel steamed to the coast of Zaire. 
President Clinton reported to Congress that, on March 25, 1997, a standby evacuation force of 
                                                 
19 Joint Task Force Headquarters for the US Army Southern European Task Force (SETAF) 
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U.S. military personnel had been deployed to Congo and Gabon to provide security for American 
private citizens, government employees, and selected third country nationals in Zaire, and to be 
available for evacuation if necessary. Nassau’s deployment lasted about one month before the 
USS Kearsarge (LHD 3) relieved the vessel20.  
Additional Sources: Global Security: Guardian Retrieval, Grimmett 2010 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Zaire Civil War 10/8/1996 – 5/16/1997, 221 3  
CNA 
III 
Guardian 
Retrieval 
3/22/1997 - 6/5/1997, 76 Zaire, NEO 
USN, USMC, 
USAF 
 
 
85. # 422: UNSCOM I; 11/13/1997 – 2/23/1998, 102 
UNSCOM was established to oversee the elimination of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons 
programs while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) focused on the nuclear 
program. The Iraqi eviction of all U.S. UNSCOM personnel on 13 November 1997 brought an 
immediate U.S. response - the next day U.S. forces in the area were mobilized and (CENTCOM) 
responded with a land, sea, and air strike force of more than 35,000 U.S. and coalition forces. 
These activities triggered a crisis for Iraq. Tensions reached a high point when Iraq interfered in 
the inspection of a UNSCOM team accusing the American leader of espionage and expelling him 
from the country. The UN Security Council was deeply divided on an appropriate response. 
During the first two months of 1998 the U.S. advocated military strikes against Iraq while other 
members (with the exception of the UK) favored a diplomatic solution of the crisis. On 20 
February the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan arrived in Baghdad and defused the immediate 
crisis. With U.S. approval, an agreement was signed, reaffirming the authorities of UNSCOM. 
However President Clinton made it clear that U.S. forces would remain on alert until Iraq 
conformed to the new agreement.  
                                                 
20 Globalsecurity points to a difficulty in operations in Africa: “The vast continent of Africa provides some real 
challenges to a military planner as well as fuel suppliers. Re-supply for remote facilities can take several days to 
transport jet fuel one way, in extremely difficult terrain. Limited bridger support (truck-transport) and small storage 
tanks are commonplace. During Operation Guardian Retrieval, the Air Force planned missions through Libreville, 
Gabon, expecting a certain amount of fuel based on contractor stated capabilities. Their capability was no where 
near this quantity, and the airport even ran out of fuel at one point”. 
Seaborne Crisis Response                                                                                                                                             Appendix A. Crises Summaries 
82 
 
As part of the mobilization effort the USS George Washington (CV 73) was sent to the Persian 
Gulf to join the Nimitz (CV 68) battle group. To maintain the two carrier battle group presence, 
the USS Independence (CV 62) relieved Nimitz on station a few months later. USN vessels and 
allied/coalition ships made up a force of 50 ships and submarines and 200 naval aircraft to flex 
muscles and support the diplomatic initiatives. The deployment of the USS George Washington 
was followed by the dispatch of military aircraft on 20 November. Naval and Air forces were 
both prepared to launch airstrikes. Force, however did not become necessary and in early June 
the USS Independence returned to Japan. This was the largest multinational mobilization since 
the Gulf War and this demonstration of force deterred Iraqi aggression and coerced compliance 
with UNSCOM. 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB UNSCOM I 11/13/1997 – 2/23/1998, 102 3  
CNA 
III  
Desert Thunder 10/1/1997 - 5/28/1998, 239 Iraq, Show of Force 
USN, USMC, 
USAF 
 
 
86. # 424: Ethiopia – Eritrea; 5/6/1998 – 12/12/2000, 950 
6 May saw violent confrontations between Ethiopian and Eritrean forces. Each government 
accused the other with invasion. Mediation attempts by regional and international leaders were 
unsuccessful and by late May each had mobilized additional forces leading to a full-scale war 
between the two nations. A peace plan, drafted by the U.S. and Rwanda and supported by the 
OAU, was conditionally approved by Ethiopia but rejected by Eritrea. Ethiopia demanded 
Eritrean withdrawal from Ethiopian territory which Eritrea claimed for itself. Fighting resumed 
until both parties reluctantly agreed on an OAU peace plan, which eased tensions for eight 
months before fighting broke out again (23 February 2000). Again, each blamed the other for 
initiating the violence. The violence ended on 12 December when both countries signed a peace 
agreement drafted with the help of the OAU.  
The U.S. was engaged unsuccessfully as a mediator, and provided evacuation operations. 
Seaborne forces supported Operation SAFE DEPARTURE and evacuated 105 Americans and 67 
third country nationals. Elements from the 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations 
Capable) evacuated the foreign citizens on 6 June 1998 as a precautionary measure. Marine 
aircraft transported the evacuees to Amman in Jordan. The 11th MEU(SOC) was on a six-month 
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deployment aboard the ships of the USS Tarawa (LHA 1) Amphibious Ready Group, which 
includes USS Tarawa, USS Denver (LPD 9), and USS Mount Vernon (LSD 39).  
Additional Sources: Global Security: Safe Departure 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Ethiopia – Eritrea 5/6/1998 – 12/12/2000, 950 2  
CNA 
III  
Safe Departure 6/6/1998 - 6/17/1998, 12 Eritrea, NEO 
USN, USMC 
 
CNA 
III 
Eritrea 11/3/98 - 11/19/98, 17 Eritrea, NEO 
USN 
 
 
87. # 426: DRC Civil War; 7/29/1998 – 7/30/2002 
Tensions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had been growing, and on 29 July 
1998 President Laurent-Désiré Kabila announced the expulsion of all foreign troops and of his 
chief military adviser, a Rwandan Tutsi, triggering a crisis for Rwanda. Shortly thereafter 
fighting erupted, and the DRC accused Rwandan forces of aggression. Angola, Namibia, 
Zimbabwe, and Chad backed Kabila, but his former ally Rwanda received support from Uganda. 
The violent conflict triggered crises for the DRC, Uganda, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and 
Chad. After months of fighting, the governments involved in the war signed a peace agreement, 
joined shortly after by the two principal rebel groups. Violence erupted again in February 2000, 
and attempts to hold a summit were unsuccessful. When Kabila was assassinated in February 
2002, his son Joseph inherited the presidency. In February he met Rwandan president Paul 
Kagame in Washington, D.C., marking the first step toward peace talks, while Rwandan and 
Ugandan troops retreated, in a gesture of goodwill. On 30 July 2002, after prolonged 
negotiations, Rwanda and the DRC signed a final peace agreement in South Africa.  
According to the ICB there is evidence for U.S. covert involvement in training troops on both 
sides. The USN was also engaged in preparation for a planned noncombatant evacuation 
operation. From 10 to 16 August 1998, USS Saipan (LHA 2) and the 22nd MEU(SOC) stood 
ready in Operation AUTUMN SHELTER for a possible evacuation of the American embassy 
and U.S citizens from Kinshasa, Congo. In the event, the NEO was not required and was 
canceled on 16 August.  
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Additional Sources: Pritchett (Galrahn) 2009, Global Security: 22nd MEU Assumes Operational 
Control Its Major Subordinate Elements 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB DCR Civil War 7/29/1998 – 7/30/2002 3  
CNA 
III  
Autumn Shelter 8/10/98 - 8/16/98, 7 Zaire, NEO 
USN, USMC, 
USARMY 
 
 
88. # 427: US Embassy Bombings; 8/7/1998 – 8/20/1998, 13 
On 7 August 1998 the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salam, Tanzania were the 
targets of terrorist attacks. The almost simultaneous bombings killed 224 people and wounded 
more than 5,000 others. Shortly thereafter, the U.S. identified Al Qaeda as the primary suspect. 
The U.S. accused the Taliban of allowing Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda to operate freely in 
Afghanistan. While the U.S. received international support in condemning the embassy-attacks, 
the Taliban refused to comply with the U.S. request to hand over bin Laden. On 20 August the 
U.S. forces executed retaliatory air strikes over terrorist training grounds in Afghanistan and a 
factory in Sudan. Allegedly a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan’s capital Khartoum, capable of 
producing chemical weapons, was collaborating with Al Qaeda. With the launch of the air strikes 
the crisis ended for all actors. The U.S. retaliation took place without warning and included 
assorted naval vessels in the Red and Arabian Sea21. The surface combatants and SSN that fired 
the Tomahawks were already in the Indian Ocean prior to the attacks.  
Additionally, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) sent one Marine Corps Fleet Anti-
Terrorism Security Team (FAST) each to Kenya and to Tanzania. The teams were charged with 
augmenting the security personnel. Naval Forces Central Command was asked to set up a Joint 
Task Force in Nairobi. Furthermore, the USN dispatched a 30-person SEABEE unit to Kenya 
from Guam to assist in Operation RESOLUTE RESPONSE and to locate survivors in the 
buildings, treat the injured and organize repatriation of the American who had died. Marines 
were responsible for external security at the temporary U.S. Embassy location. A Platoon of 
Marines from the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) deployed to 
Nairobi, Kenya just weeks before they were scheduled for a routine six month deployment to the 
                                                 
21 According to a Washington Post (Gellman and Priest 1998) article, CVN Abraham Lincoln was involved. 
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Western Pacific, Indian Ocean and Arabian Gulf Region. The Marines of 3rd Platoon, Golf 
Company, Battalion Landing Team 2/1, 13th MEU(SOC) replaced the Fleet Anti-Terrorist 
Security Team of Norfolk VA who had been in Kenya since 9 August. 
Additional Sources: Gaffney 2002, 5 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB U.S. Embassy 
Bombings 
8/7/1998 – 8/20/1998, 13 4  
CNA 
III 
Resolute Response 8/7/1998 - 10/18/1998, 73 Kenya/Tanzania, 
security 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
CNA 
III 
Sudan/Afghanista
n Strikes 
8/20/1998, 1 Sudan/Afghanistan, 
Combat 
USN 
 
 
89. # 429: UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox; 10/31/1998 – 12/20/1998, 50 
On 31 October 1998 Iraq refused further collaboration with UNSCOM and demanded that the 
UN reviewed its sanctions and replace Richard Butler as UNSCOM chair as a condition for 
resumed inspections. The UN Security Council adopted a resolution demanding the immediate 
return of UNSCOM to Iraq on 5 November but disagreed about the means for resolving the 
crisis. Only the U.K. and the U.S. voted for the use of military force versus diplomacy. U.K. and 
U.S. forces in the Gulf region were increased unilaterally with the prospect of new military 
strikes. On 14 October Saddam Hussein indicated through diplomatic channels Iraqi’s 
acceptance of UNSCOM inspectors, even as U.S. aircraft was en route to Iraq, yet no further 
steps were taken to cooperate with UNSCOM. U.S. and U.K. forces began operation DESERT 
FOX and airstrikes lasted until 20 December. Although unauthorized by the UN, the U.S. 
claimed prior UN authority threatening severe consequences in case of Iraqi non-compliance 
with UNSCOM. With the termination of DESERT FOX the crisis ended for all actors. No 
resolution had been found in regard to a resumption of UNSCOM activities.  
The main battlegroup supporting the operation was the USS Enterprise (CV 65) which crossed 
the Atlantic in four days and transited the Strait of Gibraltar on 14 November 1998. It entered the 
Strait of Hormuz on 23 November after taking over from the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CV 
69). During DESERT FOX the USN-USMC team launched more than 70 strike and strike-
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support aircraft and in 70 hours of operations the USS Enterprise launched 297 combat sorties. 
The carrier USS Carl Vinson (CV 70) was diverted from her original schedule to Hong Kong and 
Singapore but arrived in the theater only during the last night of operation DESERT FOX. 
Nevertheless, the arrival of the carrier undermined U.S. resolve and relieved USS Enterprise.  
The following USN vessels were involved in operation DESERT FOX: CVBG: USS Enterprise 
(CV 65) and USS Carl Vinson (CV 70), USS Philippine Sea (CG 58), USS Gettysburg (CG 64), 
USS Stout (DDG 55), USS Nicholson (DD 982), USS Hayler (DD 997), USS Klakring (FFG 42), 
USS Miami (SSN 775), USS Hampton (SSN 76), USS Detroit (AOE 4)]; Amphibious Ready 
Group: USS Belleau Wood (LHD 2), USS Dubuque (LPD 8), USS Germantown (LSP 42); Mine 
Countermeasure Squadron: USS Ardent (MCM 12), USS Dextrous (MCM 13). 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB UNSCOM II 
Operation Desert 
Fox 
10/31/1998 – 12/20/1998, 50 4  
CNA 
III 
Desert Viper 11/4/1998 - 11/19/1998, 16 Iraq, Cont. Posit 
USN, USMC 
 
CNA 
III 
Desert Fox 12/16/1998 - 12/20/1998, 5 Iraq, Combat 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
 
90. # 430: Kosovo; 2/20/1999 – 6/10/1999, 109 
Kosovo, with a population compromised of 90% Albanians, became part of Serbia in 1913. 
Following the breakup of Yugoslavia, Kosovo sought independence. During the fighting 
between Serbian forces and the Kosovar Albanian Liberation Army (KLA or UCK) in early 
1998, NATO tried to mediate an agreement. In 23 February 1999, a tentative agreement for 
Kosovo’ autonomy was drafted but the FRY was unwilling to endorse a lasting peace agreement. 
NATO forces bombarded Serbian military targets in operation ALLIED FORCE in a mission 
(March 24, 1999) designed to compel Slobodan Milosevic to cease ethnic cleansing in Kosovo 
and to pull Serbian forces out of the disputed province. NATO hoped to coerce Serbia to 
negotiate. Although initially expected to last only a few days, the operation continued for 78 
days (June 10, 1999) until Milosevic agreed to NATO's terms. Although available, ground troops 
were not deployed. One day after Serbia and NATO signed an agreement, the withdrawal of 
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FRY forces from Kosovo began. The UN dispatched a peacekeeping force, to observe the 
implementation of the agreements.  
Operation NOBLE ANVIL was the U.S. component of operation ALLIED FORCE. The USS 
Enterprise (CV 65) was deployed to the Adriatic Sea on 19 February and supported the buildup 
to the operation during 22 – 26 February 1999. The aircraft carriers Enterprise and Theodore 
Roosevelt (CV 71) supported by land-based squadrons and detachments, proved key to the 
resolution of the fighting in Kosovo. The Kearsarge (LHD 3) Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) 
operated together with the USS Roosevelt.  
Murphy (1999) concluded: “The Navy contribution to ... the air campaign in Kosovo, although 
low profile, was nonetheless very significant. The Tomahawk shooters, in and of themselves, 
destroyed nearly 50 percent [of the] fixed target list in key categories such as the Serb army and 
police headquarters. ... We were able to keep nine Tomahawk shooters in-theater. Those nine 
sustained the air campaign in the first couple of weeks when the laser-guided bomb droppers 
could not find targets because of bad weather. And if it hadn't been for those nine, we would 
have stalled."The [carrier] Theodore Roosevelt arrived 14 days after the start [of hostilities]. 
Nonetheless, with only 8 percent of the total dedicated aircraft [deployed by NATO], [it was] 
credited with 30 percent of the validated kills against fielded forces in Kosovo". 
Burg (2003, 70) describes Kosovo as a failure of coercive diplomacy.”The singular emphasis on 
airpower in Kosovo, and the belief among some senior U.S. policymakers that all it would take 
would be a few days of bombing, appears to have been based on a faulty interpretation of the 
events surrounding the endgame in Bosnia. This conviction, as well as concerns about the 
domestic political costs of committing ground troops, led U.S. policymakers to take even the 
possibility of deploying ground forces “off the table” and thus to weaken the coercive threat they 
were attempting to construct”. 
Additional Sources: Baker and Evans 2001, 18, Burg 2003, 70; Murphy 1999, Rand 2001 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Kosovo 2/20/1999 – 6/10/1999, 109 4  
CNA 
III 
Noble Anvil 2/20/1999 - 7/2/1999, 133 Kosovo, Combat 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
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CNA 
III 
Joint Guardian 6/4/1999 - 7/20/1999, 47 Kosovo, 
Peacekeeping 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
 
91. # 432: East Timor II; 9/4/1999 – 10/19/1999, 45 
On 4 November elections in East Timor resulted in a majority vote for independence from 
Indonesia who had controlled East Timor since 1975. This vote resulted in an outbreak of 
violence in East Timor where Indonesian army forces supported pro-Indonesian militias. A crisis 
was experienced by Australia and Indonesia. Australia, worried by the outbreak of violence and 
instability in relative close proximity, was committed to a peaceful settlement in contrast to 
Indonesia. The United Nations authorized a peace-keeping force (INTERFET) led by Australia 
to restore peace and security, protect refugees and provide humanitarian aid. Indonesia accepted 
the UN troops but remained highly critical of the Australian involvement. When on 19 October 
Indonesia’s parliament approved East Timor’s vote for independence the crisis ended. 
Subsequently UN troops took over the peacekeeping mission.  
On 8 October the United States announced the deployment of U.S. forces, including the USS 
Belleau Wood (LHA 3) and personnel from the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit, to support 
INTERFET. The U.S. forces provided helicopter airlifts and search and rescue missions until the 
peacekeeping operation was transferred from Australia to the UN. After the crisis had ended, the 
U.S. announced the deployment of U.S. military personnel to support of the United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) to guarantee law and order and protect 
humanitarian assistance activities.  
One of the lessons of the East Timor operations was the way in which naval units could conduct 
many different activities concurrently and for extended periods. “In a typical day in theatre, a 
single frigate might, while acting in the presence and deterrence roles in a high state of combat 
readiness and contributing to the development and maintenance of the wide area surveillance 
picture, send parties ashore to assist with repair and rehabilitation work, act as a fuelling 
platform for maritime and land helicopters, provide onboard rest and relaxations for land 
component personnel, provide communication facilities and support logistics over the shore” 
(Scott Richard quoted in Ryan 2000b, 80-81). McLaughlin (2002, 112) describes the strike 
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capability of naval forces as a “protective umbrella” shielding the ground forces so they could 
focus their attention on their peacekeeping mission without hindrance. 
Additional Sources: Grimmett 2010; McLaughlin 2002; Ryan 2000b 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB East Timor II 9/4/1999 – 10/19/1999, 45 3  
CNA 
III  
Stabilize 9/10/1999 - 3/1/2000, 174 Indonesia, Peace 
Ops 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
 
92. # 434: Afghanistan – USA; 9/11/2001 – 12/7/2001 
The crisis was triggered by the Al Qaida attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 
11 September 2001. The United States accused Afghanistan of hosting the terrorists. Pakistan 
was implicated because of its ties to the Taliban and offered help by trying to persuade the 
Taliban to hand over Osama Bin Laden. President George W. Bush declared to carry the fight to 
the attackers and its network of allies, especially the Taliban. Initially the world community 
supported the United States in its acts of self-defense. On 7 October military operations against 
Afghanistan began with cruise missile attacks and bombing raids. Both air and ground forces 
were involved. By 23 November Kabul, the capital was under U.S. control. After mediation 
efforts Hamid Karzai became the head of the interim government and was installed on 5 
December. 2 days later Kandahar, the last Taliban stronghold, fell to U.S. forces. Although this 
brought an end to the immediate crisis, the conflict is unsettled and after 11 years Afghanistan 
remains critically unstable.  
Naval forces played a crucial role. Within hours after the attack on the United States, naval 
vessels were on their way to the Arabian Gulf. One carrier was already stationed in the Indian 
Ocean and was soon joined by another CVBG group. Gaffney (2002, 1 – 2) calculated that it 
took about one month “to prepare [the U.S.] retaliatory plans, assemble the forces, and secure 
some initial bases as well as using existing bases in the Gulf area and Diego Garcia”. Only 5 
days after the attacks the USS Enterprise (CV 65) and the USS Carl Vinson (CV 70) were in the 
Southwest and South Asia region. The USS Vinson had already departed towards the Persian 
Gulf in July 2001 to participate in operation SOUTHERN WATCH. After the attacks the carrier 
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changed route and steamed to the North Arabian Sea. When the call for action was announced on 
7 October the USS Vinson launched the first strikes of ENDURING FREEDOM. The carrier 
remained in the Arabian Sea for 72 days, conducting more than 4,200 combat sorties, until mid-
December. The USS Theodore Roosevelt (CV 42) moved her scheduled deployment date forward 
to 19 September. After traversing the Suez Canal on 13 October 2001 the Roosevelt carrier battle 
group arrived in the Arabian Sea on 15 October 2001. After a record breaking 159 consecutive 
days at sea, the carrier was relieved on 27 March 2002. The USS Kitty Hawk (CV 73) left port at 
the Yokosuka naval base for the Arabian Sea on 1 October 2001 until 23 December 2001 and 
flew more than 600 missions over Afghanistan, including more than 100 combat sorties. The 
USS John Stennis (CV 74) was sent to support ENDURING FREEDOM from 12 November 
2001 to 28 May 2002.  
An average of 200 sorties was flown per day with the same efficiency compared to 3,000 sorties 
a day during DESERT STORM. Whereas 10 aircraft were needed during DESERT STORM for 
one target, one aircraft could hit two targets during ENDURING FREEDOM. In the most intense 
period from 7 October to 23 December 2001, U.S. strike missions totaled in 6,500. USN carrier-
based planes conducted 75% (4,900) of the strike-missions, and the Air Force 25%. Additionally 
the USN delivered 12,900 weapons (>70% of the total).  
Additional Sources: CNN 2001; Gaffney 2002; Global Security (various); Keesing’s 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Afghanistan-USA 9/11/2001 – 12/7/2001, 88 4  
CNA 
III  
Enduring Freedom 
 
09/16/2001 -  Combat Operations  
 
93. #440: Iraq Regime; 09/12/2002 – 05/01/2003 
After 9/11, the Bush administration identified Iraq as the greatest threat to U.S. security, 
accusing Saddam Hussein of controlling weapons of mass destruction. On 12 August 2002 
President Bush declared before the UN General Assembly that the United States insisted on the 
destruction of Iraq’s weapons and termination of its weapons program. Saddam Hussein agreed 
to the unconditional return of the weapons inspectors. Over the next months the United States 
tried to gain world support for an invasion of Iraq. Meanwhile weapons inspectors arrived in Iraq 
on 18 November. As part of the inspections agreement, Iraq had to provide a complete 
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declaration of their weapons capabilities. Iraq delivered the report but it contained, according to 
UN chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, very little new information since 1998. On 19 December 
the U.S. reacted and announced a breach of UN 1441, claiming that the lack of new information 
was a sufficient reason to invade. The United States tried to form a coalition of states supporting 
a military intervention. Although peaceful resolutions were still discussed, the United States 
viewed the inspections as a failure and strongly endorsed a military resolution. U.S. diplomatic 
efforts to garner support for an intervention failed, as too many nations spoke out against military 
action. Only the U.K. and Spain strongly supported the U.S. initiative. Yet the UN weapons 
inspectors continued their work in Iraq and remarked an improvement of Iraqi collaboration. On 
4 March Powell stated U.S. determination to intervene in Iraq unilaterally and in mid March it 
had became apparent that a new UN Security Council Resolution would not pass. Following an 
emergency summit, the U.S., U.K., and Spain issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein and his 
sons: if they would not leave Iraq within 48 hours U.S military forces would invade. Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM was launched on 20 March with the aim of overrunning Baghdad (“shock 
and awe”), removing Saddam Hussein from power, and finding the weapons of mass destruction. 
On 9 April the coalition forces seized Baghdad. The campaign took longer and the forces met 
more resistance than anticipated but on 1 May President Bush declared victory on board the USS 
Abraham Lincoln (CV 72), although Saddam Hussein had not been captured. In the following 
months the violence in Iraq escalated leading to an insurgency that persisted for several years. 
Only at the end of 2011 did the last U.S. troops leave a still unstable Iraq.  
According to Keesing’s and Fox, seven carrier battle groups were deployed in support of the Iraq 
invasion, five in the Gulf and two in the Mediterranean. In addition there were 3 amphibious 
assault ships, 10 destroyers/frigates, 2 command ships and 1 submarine in the Red Sea/Golf of 
Aden region. In Iraq USN personnel are also active on land. The following words by CNO 
Admiral Roughead describe USN activity in the Middle East. “But I think many are surprised 
that as we deploy our Navy around the world, we have about 24,000 Sailors in the Middle East. 
And they are not all on ships. In fact, we have more Sailors on the ground in Iraq and 
Afghanistan-13,600 to be exact who are there and I call them sand Sailors because we have been 
in that fight with the Army and Marine Corps and the other services for some time. So we have 
over 13,000 Sailors on the ground, some are deployed in regular units, but many are there as 
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individual augmentees on the ground and they bring some skills, talent and competence that the 
other services don’t have or don’t have in the numbers that they need”. 
Additional Sources: Global Security (various); Fox 2009, Keesing’s, Roughead 2009b 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Iraq Regime 
Change 
9/4/1999 – 10/19/1999, 45 3  
CNA 
III 
OEF-Iraq 
 
11/1/2002/3/19/2003 Show of Force 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
CNA 
III 
OIF 
 
 
03/20/2003 Combat 
Operations 
USN, USMC, 
USAF, USARMY 
 
 
94. #441: North Korean Nuclear III; 10/04/2002 – 01/06/2004 
In 2002 the U.S. concluded that North Korea was running a secret enrichment program and was 
in possession of the necessary technology to manufacture nuclear weapons. On 4 October a U.S. 
delegation, led by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James 
Kelly, visited North Korea and confronted them with the U.S. findings. While first denying the 
claims, North Korea later explained its action as a necessity because the U.S. branded them as 
part of the axis of evil, although the secret program had been discovered before 2001. North 
Korea withdrew for the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), after the IAEA did not comply 
with the North Korean demands of removing seals and cameras from their nuclear facilities. 
Initially the U.S. refused to directly negotiate with North Korea before the nuclear program was 
destroyed. It reversed its position when it was clear that this furthered North Korea’s 
intransigence. In late August 2003 first talks were held between the U.S., China, Japan, South 
Korea, Russia and North Korea. The first round resulted in a vague agreement to find a solution 
and to continue the talks. On 6 January 2004 North Korea agreed not to test or produce nuclear 
weapons.  
In early February 2003 the United States alerted bombers in the Pacific to reinforce U.S. 
deterrence against any possible North Korean military action. By the end of May 2003 most of 
the B-1Bs and B-52s that had been sent to Andersen Air Force Base in Guam had returned to the 
United States. 
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Additional Sources: Global Security (various), Wolfowitz 2003 
  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB North Korean 
Nuclear III;  
10/04/2002 – 01/06/2004 2  
CNA 
III 
North Korean 
Crisis 
02/06/2003 – 05/17/2003, 
102 
North Korea, Show 
of Force, USN, 
USMC, USAF, 
USARMY 
 
 
95. # 451: Israel – Lebanon War II; 07/12/2006 – 09/08/2006 
The crisis was triggered on 12 July 2006 when Hezbollah troops invaded Lebanese territory and 
attacked an Israeli army patrol. Three Israeli soldiers were killed and two taken hostage and 
rockets were launched on Israel. Israel imposed a naval and air blockade and attacked targets in 
Southern Lebanon (Operation JUST REWARD). Hezbollah justified the attack on the soldiers as 
means of drawing attention to the Arabs, Palestinians and Lebanese held in Israeli prisons. 
Further Israeli attacks in Lebanon, led to a high number of civilian casualties and the evacuation 
of thousands of Lebanese citizens. The international community encouraged both parties to reach 
a cease-fire. The mediation efforts of Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. Secretary of State, were 
unsuccessful. The U.S., UN, EU, and the World Bank met to discuss ways of ending the crisis 
and the League of Arab Nations appealed to the UN to protect Lebanon. The fighting however 
continued and the violence escalated. Only when the parties agreed to the UN Security Council 
Resolution 1701 did a cease fire become possible. On 14 August the hostilities officially 
terminated when the cease fire came into effect but de facto some minor clashes continued until 
late August. Lebanon did not join the military conflict but focused on mediation and negotiation. 
On 8 September the Israeli sea and air blockades were lifted, marking end of the crisis. The U.S. 
supplied Israel with precision-guided bombs and evacuated U.S. citizens from Lebanon.  
U.S. evacuation operations began on 16 July 2006. Naval and Marine Corps forces evacuated 
U.S. citizens to Cyprus. A smaller number of people were evacuated by Marine helicopters. On 
17 July the U.S. announced the chartering of the cruise ship Orient Queen to evacuate U.S. 
citizens. The ship left Beirut on 19 July with 900 people aboard. The cruise ship, heading to 
Cyprus, was being escorted by the USS Gonzalez (DDG 66). Additionally U.S. sailors and 
marines from the Iwo Jima (LHD 7) Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) and the 24th Marine 
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Expeditionary Unit (MEU) with the ships Iwo Jima, USS Nashville (LPD 13), USS Whidbey 
Island (LSD 41), USS Trenton (LPD 14) and High Speed Vessel Swift (HSV 2) supported the 
operation. With the deployment of the USS Barry (DDG 52), USS Mount Whitney (LCC 20), 
USS Big Horn (T-AO 198), and USS Wasp (LHD 1) more vessels arrived in the theater. On 26 
July final NEO operations were carried out by U.S. military forces. A total of almost 14,000 U.S. 
citizens had been evacuated by sea. The NOC (2006) comes to the following conclusion after the 
Lebanon evacuation operation: “Our command and control capability, both afloat and ashore, as 
well as our ability to operate in and from the world’s oceans, will continue to make our forces 
well suited for global crisis response in the future”. 
Additional Sources: Global Security: Lebanon Non-combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO) 
2006; NOC 2006 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Israel – Lebanon 
War II 
07/12/2006 – 09/08/2006 3  
 Lebanon NEO 
Operation 2006 
07/16/2006 – 07/26/2006, 10 Lebanon, NEO, 
USN, USMC 
0 CV & AMP 
 
96. # 452: Ethiopia Invasion Somalia; 10/09/2006 – 01/02/200722 
The crisis broke out when Somali soldiers, supported by Ethiopian forces, temporarily took over 
a strategic town in the South of Somalia. The Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), in control of 
Mogadishu and most of South Somalia issued a fatah declaring war on Ethiopia. Meanwhile 
fighting between the UIC and the transitional federal government (TFG) of Somalia continued. 
When the UIC announced the capture of an Ethiopian officer, Ethiopia confessed the deployment 
of military advisers to Somalia. Despite mediation attempts by Sudan, fighting between Islamic 
forces and Ethiopian forces erupted in northern Somalia in early November. On 6 December the 
UN Security Council passed a U.S. backed resolution authorizing regional peacekeeping forces. 
The arms embargo in effect against Somalia was weakened as a result. The African Union also 
sought a resolution to the crisis, but hostilities continued and tensions escalated. In mid-
December Yemen tried to mediate between the parties to no avail. Ethiopia refused to withdraw 
from Somalia. The United States supported Ethiopia’s right of self defense. On 2 January 
                                                 
22 Because I was not able to determine with sufficient certainty whether USN involvement occurred during the ICB 
crisis period this case was excluded from the statistical analyses. 
Seaborne Crisis Response                                                                                                                                             Appendix A. Crises Summaries 
95 
 
Ethiopia achieved victory through the defeat of the UIC, and it announced the withdrawal of the 
troops. The United States had supported Ethiopia with military aid and equipment. Reuters 
reported that according to diplomats United States had provided Ethiopia with surveillance and 
intelligence information. According to Axe (2008), “U.S. Army advisers from the Guam 
National Guard trained Ethiopian troops. Ethiopian aircraft flew with U.S.-funded parts. And 
American warplanes targeted suspected terrorists at the same time that the Ethiopian army and its 
allies in the Baidoa-based transitional government forces routed Islamic Courts fighters that 
Ethiopian Prime Minster Meles Zenawi said had been on the cusp of "Talibanizing" Somalia”. 
The Associate Press (2007) printed the following information: “U.S. Defense Department 
officials said last month that a Navy strike group being sent to the Persian Gulf region as a show 
of force to Iran, at odds with the United States over its nuclear program and over Iraq, also would 
be available to help off Somalia. A U.S. Navy officer in the Gulf said Friday that the only U.S. 
aircraft carrier in the region, USS Dwight D. Eisenhower, out of Norfolk, Virginia, was not being 
deployed to the Somali coast. The officer said he could not discuss the possibility of other 
carriers moving into the zone. However, the officer, noting media reports about another aircraft 
carrier, the USS John Stennis, said it as of yesterday had not been ordered to move to the region. 
The officer asked not to be named because of the sensitivity of the issue”. In the New York 
Times Gettleman (2007) wrote “Islamists were widely believed to have been sheltering several 
wanted terrorists, and American officials said they were hoping to use the swift collapse of the 
Islamist forces as an opportunity to capture men they have been chasing for years. Ships from the 
Fifth Fleet of the United States Navy, based in Bahrain, have increased patrols off Somalia’s 
coast to prevent any suspects from escaping. “Yes, we have a presence out there,” said Lt. 
Denise Garcia, a spokeswoman for the Fifth Fleet”23. 
Additional Sources: Associated Press 2007, Axe 2008, Gettleman 2007, Reuters 2007 
Dataset  Dates U.S. Response Ships involved 
ICB Ethiopia Invasion 
Somalia 
10/09/2006 – 01/02/2007 
 
3  
 ? ? ? ? 
 
                                                 
23 The engagement of the USN in Somalia can also be attributed to the growing piracy concerns. While in late 2007 
the number of incidents had not reached their peak yet, pirates were active in the region. However, the counter-
piracy Combined Task Force 151 was only established in January 2009 (United States Navy 2009d). 
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Appendix B: Data 
B.1. Variable Codebook
24
 
B.1.1. Dependent Variables 
 
Y1 – Y3 refers to all the different service type combination variables: servicetype1, servicetype2 
and USNUSMCTEAM. All three variations are explained in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
 
ATTITUDE TO U.S. INVOLVEMENT (y4) 
 
Based on the ICB2 variable usfavr, this variable was transformed into usfavr2. 
 
usfavr       usfavr2 (y4) 
 
(1) U.S. activity viewed favorably  (1) U.S. activity viewed favorably 
(2) U.S. activity viewed neutrally  (2)  U.S. activity viewed neutrally 
(3) U.S. activity viewed unfavorably  (3)  U.S. activity viewed unfavorably 
(4) U.S. inactivity viewed favorable  (9) MD 
(5) U.S. inactivity viewed neutrally  (9) MD 
(6) U.S. inactivity viewed unfavorably  (9) MD 
(8) U.S. crisis actor    (9) MD 
 
(9) MD      (9) MD 
 
 
 
EFFECTIVENESS OF U.S. ACTIVITY (y5) 
 
This variable was adapted from the ICB1 variable usefct. The value “U.S. not active” was 
eliminated by the case selection. 
 
usefct       usefct2 (y5) 
 
(1) No U.S. activity    (9) No U.S. activity 
(2) U.S. activity escalated the crisis  (1) U.S. activity escalated the crisis 
(3) U.S. activity did not contribute to  (2)  No contribution /  
crisis abatement      Marginal contribution 
 (4) U.S. activity contributed marginally  (2)  No contribution / 
to crisis abatement     Marginal contribution 
(5) U.S. activity had an important   (3)  Important/Most important impact 
                                                 
24
 For a more detailed description of the categories please refer to the ICB1 and ICB2 codebooks online at 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/icb/data/ 
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 impact on the crisis abatement 
(6) U.S. activity was the single most important (3) Important/Most important impact 
contributor to crisis abatement 
 
(9) MD      (9) MD 
 
 
 
MOST EFFECTIVE TYPE OF U.S. ACTIVITY (y6) 
 
The most effective type of U.S. activity is adapted from the same ICB1 variable without any 
modifications. The value “U.S. not involved” has already been eliminated by the case selection. 
 
usefac       usefac2 (y6) 
 
(1) U.S. not involved    (9)  MD 
(2) U.S. ineffective    (1) U.S. ineffective 
(3) Effective low-level U.S. activity  (2) Effective low-level U.S. activity 
(4) Effective U.S. military activity  (3) Effective U.S. military activity 
 
(9) MD      (9) MD 
 
 
 
U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO PACE OF ABATEMENT (y7) 
 
This variable was modified from the ICB1 uspace variable. The values “U.S. not active” and 
“U.S. activity delayed termination” were excluded. The former has already been eliminated by 
the case selection and the latter did not show enough frequencies. 
 
uspace       uspace2 (y7) 
 
(1) No U.S. activity    (9)  MD 
(2) U.S. activity delayed termination  (9) MD 
(3) U.S. activity had no effect on the timing (1) U.S. activity had no effect on the  
 of termination      timing of termination 
(4) U.S. activity contributed to more rapid (2) U.S. activity contributed to more 
 termination      rapid termination 
 
(9) MD      (9) MD 
 
 
 
DEFINITE OUTCOME (y8) 
 
The outcome variable was adapted from the ICB2 variable content of outcome. 
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outcome      outcome2 (y8) 
 
(1) Victory     (1)  Victory 
(2) Compromise     (2) Compromise 
(3) Stalemate     (3) Stalemate 
(4) Defeat      (4) Defeat 
(5) Other      (9) MD 
 
(9) MD      (9) MD 
 
 
 
AGREEMENT (y9) 
 
This variable is adapted from the ICB2 variable form of outcome. 
 
outfor       outfor2 (y9) 
 
(1) Formal agreement    (1) Formal agreement 
(2) Semi-formal agreement   (2) Understanding 
(3) Tacit understanding    (2) Understanding 
(4) Unilateral – self    (3) Unilateral 
(5) Unilateral – ally    (3) Unilateral 
(6) Unilateral – adversary    (3)  Unilateral 
(7) Compliance     (2) Understanding 
(8) Imposed – imposer    (4) Imposed 
(9) Imposed – impose    (4) Imposed 
(10) Spillover     (9) MD 
(11) Other – glob. org. intervention  (9) MD 
(12) Other – ally     (9) MD 
(13) Other – internal or non-state actor  (9) MD 
(14) Other – misc.     (9) MD 
(15) Faded      (9) MD 
 
(99) MD      (9) MD 
 
 
 
TENSION (y10) 
 
This variable was transformed from the ICB2 level into a binary scale. 
 
outesr       outesr2 (y10) 
 
(1)  Tension escalation     (1)  Tension escalation  
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(2) Tension reduction     (2)  Tension reduction  
(3) Recent case     (3)  MD 
 
(9) MD      (9)  MD 
 
 
 
SATISFACTION (y11) 
 
This variable was transformed from the ICB2 level into a binary scaled variable.  
 
outevl       outevl2 (y11) 
 
(1) All parties satisfied with content  (1)  All parties satisfied  
 of outcome 
(2) Crisis actor satisfied, adversaries   (2) At least one party not satisfied 
 dissatisfied 
(3) Adversaries satisfied, crisis actor  (2) At least one party not satisfied 
 dissatisfied 
(4) All parties dissatisfied   (2) At least one party not satisfied 
 
(9) MD      (9) MD 
 
 
 
SATISFACTION-ATTITUDE MIX (y12) 
 
In a next step the variable actor satisfaction (y11) was combined with attitude towards U.S. 
activity (y4) 
 
Satisfaction-attitude mix (y12) 
 
(1) Not favorable and not all satisfied 
(2) Not favorable and all satisfied 
(3) Favorable/neutral and not all satisfied 
(4) Favorable/neutral and all satisfied 
 
(9) MD 
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B.1.2. Independent Variables 
 
GRAVITY OF VALUE THREAT (x1) 
 
The variable gravity of threat was adapted from the ICB1 dataset and transformed into gravcr2 
and gravcr3 by collapsing categories. 
 
gravcr     gravcr2 (x1a)   gravcr3(x1b) 
 
(1) Economic threat  (1) Low level threat  (1) Low level threat 
(2) Limited military damage (1) Low level threat  (1) Low level threat 
(3) Territorial threat  (2) Territory or influence (2) Territory 
(4) Threat to influence  (2) Territory or influence (3) Influence 
(5) Threat of grave damage (3) Grave threat  (4) Grave threat 
(6) Threat to existence  (3) Grave threat  (4) Grave threat 
 
(9) MD    (9) MD   (9) MD 
 
 
 
ISSUES (x2) 
 
Possible issues for the crisis actors are in the area of military-security, political-diplomatic, 
economic-developmental or cultural-status (ICB2). The variable issue2 was adapted from the 
ICB1 variable issues, collapsing several categories. 
 
issue       issue2 (x2) 
 
(1) One issues other than military-security (1)  1 -2 issues non military-security 
(2) Two issues other than military-security (1)  1 –2 issues non military security 
(3) Military-security issue alone   (2)  Military-security issue alone 
(4) Two issues, including military-security (3)  2 -4 issues  
(5) Three or more issues    (3)  2 -4 issues  
 
(9) MD      (9)  MD 
 
 
 
VIOLENCE (x3) 
 
The variable violence was adapted from the ICB1 dataset without any modifications.  
 
violence (x3) 
 
(1)  No violence 
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(2)  Minor clashes 
(3)  Serious clashes 
(4)  Full scale war 
 
(9) MD     
 
 
 
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION (x4) 
 
The variable geographic location was adapted from the ICB1 dataset and transformed into a 
binary variable geogloc2 employing the categorization for strategic locations by Blechman and 
Kaplan 1978. 
 
geogloc      geogloc2 (x4) 
 
(9) Central Asia     (0) Not strategic location 
(11) East Asia     (1) Strategic location 
(12) South-east Asia    (1) Strategic location 
(13) South Asia     (0) Not strategic location 
(15) Middle East     (1) Strategic location 
(20) West Africa     (0) Not strategic location 
(21) North Africa     (0) Not strategic location 
(22) East Africa     (0) Not strategic location 
(23) Southern Africa    (0) Not strategic location 
(24)  Central Africa     (0) Not strategic location 
(30) Euro-Asia     (0) Not strategic location 
(31) East Europe     (1) Strategic location 
(32) Central Europe    (1) Strategic location 
(33) West Europe     (1) Strategic location 
(34) North Europe     (1) Strategic location 
(35) Southern Europe    (1)  Strategic location 
(41) North America    (9) Missing data 
(42) Central America    (1) Strategic location 
(43) South America    (0) Not strategic location 
(51) Australasia     (0) Not strategic location 
 
(99) MD      (9) MD 
 
 
 
GEOSTRATEGIC SALIENCE (x5) 
 
The variable geostrategic salience was adapted from the ICB1 dataset and transformed into a 
binary variable geostr2. 
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geostr        geostr2 (x5) 
 
(1)  One subsystem     (1) Subsystem 
(2)  More than one subsystem    (1) Subsystem 
(3)  Dominant system and one subsystem   (2) Dominant/Global system 
(4)  Dominant system and more than one subsystem (2) Dominant/Global system 
(5)  Global system      (2) Dominant/Global system 
 
(9) MD       (9) MD 
 
 
 
NUMBER OF ACTORS (x6) 
 
The variables crisis actors was adapted from the ICB1 dataset without any changes. 
 
cractr (x6) 
 
Metric: Total number of crisis actors. 
 
 
 
UN INVOLVEMENT (x7) 
 
This variable was transformed from the ICB1 variable global organization organ most active in 
crisis (globorg). 
 
globorg      globorg2 (x7) 
 
(1) GO not in existence (1918 – 10 Jan. 1920) (9) MD 
(2) No global organization activity  (1) No UN activity 
(3) General/other global organization activity (2) Low level UN activity 
(4) (General) Assembly    (2) Low level UN activity 
(5) (Security) Council    (3) Security Council 
 
(9) MD      (9) MD 
 
 
 
STABILITY (x8) 
 
This variable was generated by combining the ICB2 variables government stability (gvinst) and 
societal unrest (socunr). 
 
Gvinst  
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(1)  Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis 
(2) Normal level during relevant period preceding the crisis 
(3) Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis 
(4) Newly independent state, government in exile 
 
(9) MD 
 
socunr 
 
(1) Significant increase during relevant period preceding the crisis 
(2) Normal level during relevant period preceding the crisis 
(3) Significant decrease during relevant period preceding the crisis 
(4) Newly independent state, government in exile 
 
(9) MD 
 
For each variable values 3 and 4 were recoded into missing data. The new binary variables were 
combined as follows: 
 
stability (x8) 
 
(1) Significant increase in governmental instability but normal level of societal unrest 
(2) Significant increase in both governmental instability and societal unrest 
(3) Normal level of government stability but significant increase in societal unrest 
(4) Both normal level 
 
(9) MD 
 
 
 
CONTENT OF U.S. ACTIVITY (x9) 
 
The variable content of U.S. activity was adapted from the ICB1 dataset. Except for the value 
U.S. not active all other categories were maintained. The category U.S. not active has already 
been eliminated by the case selection.  
 
usinv       usinv2 (x9) 
 
(1) U.S. not active    (9) MD 
(2) Low-level U.S. activity   (2) Low-level U.S. activity 
(3) U.S. covert or semi-military activity  (3) U.S. covert or semi-military activity 
(4) U.S. direct military activity   (4) U.S. direct military activity 
 
(9) MD      (9) MD 
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 U.S. ACTOR IN CRISIS (x10) 
 
The variable U.S. actor in crisis was adapted from the ICB1 dataset without any changes.  
 
usactor (x10) 
 
(1) U.S. not an actor in crisis 
(2) U.S. actor in crisis 
 
(9) MD 
 
 
 
NAVAL REACTION TIME (x11) 
 
elaps (x11) 
 
Metric: Elapsed time between crisis trigger date and naval response start measured in numbers. 
 
 
 
USN FORCES ABROAD (x12) 
 
USNabroad (x12) 
 
Metric: Number of USN personnel abroad per year. Data retrieved from Department of Defense, 
Deployment of Military Personnel by Country. Data is available as of 1950, for the years prior 
the variable was coded as missing data. 
 
 
 
 
